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Summary		This	 thesis	 concentrates	 on	 the	 economic	 integration	 of	 three	 principal	 German	North	 Sea	 ports	 –	 Emden,	 Bremen	 and	Hamburg	 –	 into	 the	 Bismarckian	 nation-state.	Prior	to	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War,	Emden,	Hamburg	and	Bremen	handled	a	major	 share	of	 the	German	Empire’s	 total	overseas	 trade.	However,	at	the	time	of	the	foundation	of	the	Kaiserreich,	the	cities’	roles	within	the	Empire	and	the	 new	 German	 nation-state	 were	 not	 yet	 fully	 defined.	 Initially,	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen	 insisted	 upon	 their	 traditional	 role	 as	 independent	 city-states	 and	remained	outside	the	Empire’s	customs	union.	Emden,	meanwhile,	had	welcomed	outright	annexation	by	Prussia	in	1866.	After	centuries	of	economic	stagnation,	the	city	had	great	difficulties	 competing	with	Hamburg	and	Bremen	and	was	hoping	for	Prussian	support.			This	 thesis	 examines	 how	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 integrate	 these	 port	 cities	 on	 an	economic	 and	 on	 an	 underlying	 level	 of	 civic	 mentalities	 and	 local	 identities.	Existing	studies	have	often	overlooked	the	importance	that	Bismarck	attributed	to	the	 cultural	 or	 indeed	 the	 ideological	 re-alignment	 of	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen.	Therefore,	 this	 study	 will	 look	 at	 the	 way	 the	 people	 of	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	traditionally	defined	 their	 (liberal)	 identity	 and	 the	way	 this	 changed	during	 the	1870s	 and	 1880s.	 It	 will	 also	 investigate	 the	 role	 of	 the	 acquisition	 of	 colonies	during	the	process	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	accession.	In	Hamburg	in	particular,	the	 agreement	 to	 join	 the	 customs	 union	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	merchants’	stance	on	colonialism.	With	regard	to	Emden,	 focus	will	be	 laid	on	its	economic	 integration,	which	 largely	 revolved	 around	Prussia	 proper	 rather	 than	the	(Prussian-led)	German	Empire.	While	Emden	got	off	to	a	slow	start	after	1866	and	was	never	really	able	to	compete	successfully	with	Hamburg	or	Bremen,	it	did	achieve	genuine	progress	under	Prussian	rule.							
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I.	Introduction			
a.	Topic	of	Research		This	 thesis	 will	 examine	 the	 economic	 and	 cultural	 developments	 in	 Germany’s	four	principal	North	Sea	ports,	from	the	foundation	of	the	German	Empire	in	1871	until	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War.	The	four	port	cities	investigated	are	the	
Freie	 und	 Hansestädte	 of	 Bremen	 and	 Hamburg,	 ancient	 self-governing	 entities	with	 a	 centuries-old	 tradition	 of	 trading	 and	 seafaring,	 and	 the	 towns	 of	Wilhelmshaven	 and	 Emden,	which	 during	 the	 period	 examined	 here	 constituted	the	main	Prussian	access	to	the	North	Sea.	Taken	together,	the	four	cities	present	a	wide	variety	of	demographic,	historical	and	economic	structures.	At	the	same	time,	they	are	all	port	cities,	which	means	that	they	were	part	of	a	transnational	system	of	trade.	Such	a	transnational	system	of	trade,	and	the	resulting	network	of	people,	encourages	an	international,	potentially	even	global,	perspective	and	cosmopolitan	tastes	 among	 citizenry.1	In	 the	 German	 context,	 such	 an	 outlook	 had	 to	 come	 to	terms	 with	 a	 changing	 domestic	 scene,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	Prussian-led	 German	 nation-state.	 Therefore,	 after	 1871,	 there	 were	 two	potentially	conflicting	identities	in	these	port	cities.	One	of	them	was	a	pre-existing	local	 identity,	 shaped	 over	 time	 by	 cosmopolitan	 thought	 and	 long-standing	international	relations.	The	other	was	a	sense	of	allegiance	to	Germany,	which	no	doubt	pre-dated	the	Franco-Prussian	War	and	the	Reichsgründung	a	year	later,	but	could	hardly	fail	to	be	affected	by	these	events.	After	all,	Germany	had	turned	from	a	 largely	 abstract	 term	 to	 a	 political	 reality,	 and	 from	 a	 loose	 confederation	substantially	 influenced	 by	 non-German	 powers	 to	 the	 pre-eminent	 power	 in	Continental	 Europe.	 Comparing	 the	 four	 different	 German	 North	 Sea	 port	 cities	should	thus	lead	to	a	clearer	sense	of	local	factors	and	comparable	developments	of	each	city’s	particularities	and	of	the	overall	similarities.	The	chosen	time	frame																																																									1	See	particularly	Gavin	Kendall,	Ian	Woodward	and	Zlatko	Skrbis,	The	Sociology	of	
Cosmopolitanism:	Globalization,	Identity,	Culture	and	Government	(Basingstoke,	2009),	p.	154;	see	also	Zlatko	Skrbis,	Ian	Woodward,	Cosmopolitanism:	Uses	of	the	Idea	(London,	2013),	p.	57	
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will	 allow	 an	 examination	 of	 how	 all	 that	 played	 out,	 from	 the	 foundation	 of	Imperial	Germany	to	the	sharp	curtailment	of	international	trade	brought	about	by	the	 First	 World	 War	 and	 Britain’s	 blockade	 of	 the	 German	 coasts.	 Since	international	 trade	 is	 directly	 linked	 to	 domestic	 and	 international	 politics,	 the	thesis	will	explore	how	the	mercantile	community	of	each	of	the	cities	was	able	to	exploit	 the	 new	 political	 situation	 after	 1871,	 or,	 on	 occasion,	 found	 themselves	hindered	by	it.			 This	thesis	does	not	simply	wish	to	be	an	exercise	in	maritime	history,	or	an	account	of	evolving	trading	patterns	between	1871	and	1914.	Rather,	the	centre	of	attention	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 new	 German	 Empire	 with	 its	Berlin-based	 institutions	 (the	 Kaiser,	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor,	 the	 Reichstag,	 the	Bundesrat	–	the	Upper	House	of	the	imperial	parliament	–	the	imperial	civil	service	etc.)	on	the	one	hand	and	the	four	trading	cities	and	their	existing	civic,	state	and	commercial	 institutions	on	 the	other.	 In	other	words,	 this	study	seeks	 to	analyse	how	 the	 new	 imperial	 reality	 affected	 the	 respective	 trading	 traditions	 of	Hamburg,	Bremen	and	Emden.	The	self-image	of	these	port	cities	and	the	way	the	rest	 of	 the	 German	 Empire	 perceived	 them	will	 be	 investigated.	Wilhelmshaven,	which	 had	 a	 less	 well	 established	 commercial	 role,	 is	 included	 here	 to	 act	 as	 a	counterweight	 to	 the	 traditional	 trading	 posts,	 two	 of	 which	 –	 Bremen	 and	Hamburg	–	are,	it	should	be	noted,	still	self-governing	city	states,	as	Länder	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany.		Central	 to	 this	 thesis	 will	 be	 the	 question	 of	 how,	 and	 to	 what	 extent,	overseas-orientated	trading	cities	were	integrated	into	the	rapidly	 industrialising	German	nation-state.	The	coastal	 region	 from	Emden	to	Hamburg	has	essentially	held	a	geographical	monopoly	over	Germany’s	overseas	trade	and	shipping.	Even	though	 the	opening	of	 the	Kaiser-Wilhelm-Kanal,	 now	known	as	 the	Nord-Ostsee-
Kanal,	 in	1895,	 shortened	shipping	 routes	between	 the	North	Sea	and	 the	Baltic,	the	 climatic	 conditions	 and	 the	 frequent	 freezing	 up	 of	 the	 ports	 on	 Germany’s	Baltic	 coast	 in	wintertime	 did	 not	 allow	 the	 emergence	 of	major	 overseas	 ports	anywhere	east	of	Hamburg.2	Lübeck,	the	only	serious	potential	competitor	on	the	eastern	shores,	found	itself	rapidly	outdistanced	after	1871,	and	the	decline,	which	Thomas	 Mann	 evoked	 in	 his	 celebrated	 Lübeck	 novel	 Buddenbrooks,	 was	 not																																																									2	Alwin	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte	(Frankfurt,	1912),	p.	15	
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limited	to	one	fictional	trading	dynasty.	It	is	no	coincidence	either	that	Lübeck	lost	its	status	as	a	self-governing	Hanseatic	entity	in	the	twentieth	century	and	is	now	a	district	of	the	state	of	Schleswig-Holstein.	The	other	port	cities	on	the	Baltic	Coast,	from	Flensburg	in	the	North	to	Memel	in	the	East,	were	always	primarily	engaged	in	trade	across	the	Baltic	(i.e.	with	Scandinavia,	the	Baltic	States	and	Russia).	The	four	port	cities	investigated	in	this	thesis	can	therefore	rightly	be	called	Germany’s	principal	gateway	to	the	wider	world.			
b.	Historiography		 	If	we	 loosely	 define	maritime	 history	 as	 the	 history	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	humans	and	 the	sea,	 it	 is	an	age-long	 tradition.	However,	maritime	history	as	an	academic	 field	 only	 became	 recognised	 and	 respected	with	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	social	 sciences	 and	 economic	 history	 after	 the	 Second	World	War.	 As	 David	 M.	Williams	 and	 Lars	 U.	 Scholl	 point	 out,	 mercantile	 maritime	 history	 only	 lost	 its	romantic,	nationalistic	and	imperial	touch	once	trade	and	shipping	were	taken	for	what	 they	 really	 are,	 which	 is	 business.3 	Consequently,	 mercantile	 maritime	history	was	analysed	 ‘in	 a	more	 scientific	 and	quantitative	 fashion,	 for	 economic	history	is	above	all	concerned	with	the	measuring	of	trends	and	change.’4		 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 present-day	maritime	historians	 can	 simply	 ignore	pre-Second	World	 War	 publications.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	academics	in	Germany	began	to	take	an	extensive	interest	in	the	German	Empire’s	role	in	overseas	trade	and	shipping.	This	is	mirrored	in	Alwin	Oppel’s	analyses	of	Bremen	and	Hamburg	 and	 in	 a	more	 comprehensive	 study	named	Die	deutschen	
Seestädte.5	The	latter	offers	a	broad	overview	of	all	of	Germany’s	remotely	relevant	port	cities	and	 is	 therefore	a	valuable	source	 for	the	prevailing	conditions	before	the	First	World	War.	Beside	Oppel’s	studies,	 it	 is	also	worth	mentioning	Bernard	Harms’s	 Deutschlands	 Anteil	 an	Welthandel	 und	Weltschiffahrt,	 Heinrich	 Flügel’s	
Die	 deutschen	 Welthäfen	 Hamburg	 und	 Bremen	 and	 Die	 nordwesteuropäischen																																																									3	David	M.	Williams,	Lars	U.	Scholl	‘Lewis	R.	Fischer	and	the	Progress	of	Maritime	Economic	History’,	Gelina	Harlaftis,	Stig	Tenold,	Jesús	M.	Valdaliso	(eds),	The	World’s	Key	
Industry:	History	and	Economics	of	International	Shipping	(Basingstoke,	2012),	pp.	11–28	4	Ibid..,	p.	11	5	Alwin	Oppel,	‘Hamburgs	und	Bremens	Stellung	im	internationalen	Warenhandel’,	in:	
Weltwirtschaftliches	Archiv	1	(1913),	pp.	361–376;	Oppel,	Seestädte		
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Welthäfen:	 London	 –	 Liverpool	 –	 Hamburg	 –	 Bremen	 –	 Amsterdam-	 Rotterdam	 –	
Antwerpen	–	Havre	in	ihrer	Verkehrs-	und	Handelsbedeutung	by	Kurt	Wiedenfeld.6	Such	 contemporary	 interest	 in	 Germany’s	 role	 as	 a	 shipping	 and	 trading	 nation	was	in	part	the	result	of	a	growing	enthusiasm	for	maritime	and	naval	matters	in	Germany	 around	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century.	 The	 Flottengesetze,	 the	 great	 ship	launchings	and	naval	parades	and	the	building	of	the	impressive	passenger	liners	
Imperator,	 Vaterland	 and	 Bismarck	 by	 the	 Hamburg-Amerikanische	 Paketfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft	 (Hapag)	 exemplify	 the	 rising	 passion	 with	 which	 many	Germans	 looked	 at	 the	 sea. 7 	However,	 these	 publications	 also	 express	 the	realisation	 by	 contemporaries	 that	 ‘ohne	 eine	 eingehende	 Würdigung	 unserer	Seewirtschaft	 kann	 [der	 Aufschwung,	 den	 unser	 Land	 in	 den	 letzten	 vier	Jahrzehnten	genommen	hat,]	nicht	richtig	verstanden	werden.’8			 However,	 even	after	 the	 ‘professionalisation’	of	maritime	history	after	 the	Second	World	War,	 it	 has	 often	 not	 been	 regarded	 as	 an	 independent	 academic	field.	Much	of	the	time	it	is	still	simply	equated	with	naval	history.	Gelina	Harlaftis	is	absolutely	right	in	arguing	that	‘naval	history	can	only	be	accepted	and	flourish	academically	when	it	regards	itself	as	a	sub-field	of	maritime	history	and	uses	the	interdisciplinary	and	comparative	historical	methods	of	this	field.’9	In	the	cases	of	Hamburg,	 Bremen,	 Emden	 and	Wilhelmshaven,	 the	 proximity	 of	 the	 sea	 and	 the	cities’	 respective	 trading	 traditions	 has	 led	 to	 an	 enormous	 output	 of	 historical	studies,	for	which	the	target	audience	is	extremely	narrow.	These	studies	include	histories	of	different	shipping	companies,	such	as	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	and	the	
Hapag,	 and	 also	 technical	 studies	 by	 various	 nautical	 enthusiasts.	 These	 studies	offer	a	vast	amount	of	information	yet	invariably	they	only	ever	touch	upon	parts	of	the	overall	developments.10	One	of	the	most	comprehensive	books	on	passenger																																																									6	Bernard	Harms,	Deutschlands	Anteil	an	Welthandel	und	Weltschiffahrt	(Stuttgart,	1916);	Heinrich	Flügel,	Die	deutschen	Welthäfen	Hamburg	und	Bremen	(Jena,	1914);	Kurt	Wiedenfeld,	Die	deutschen	Welthäfen	Hamburg	und	Bremen	and	Die	nordwesteuropäischen	
Welthäfen:	London	–	Liverpool	–	Hamburg	–	Bremen	–	Amsterdam-	Rotterdam	–	Antwerpen	
–	Havre	in	ihrer	Verkehrs-	und	Handelsbedeutung	(Berlin,	1903)	7	Jan	Rüger,	The	Great	Naval	Game:	Britain	and	Germany	in	the	Age	of	Empire	(Cambridge,	2009)	8	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte,	p.	1	9	Gelina	Harlaftis,	‘Maritime	History	or	the	History	of	Thalassa’,	Gelina	Harlaftis	et	al.,	The	
New	Ways	of	History:	Developments	in	Historiography	(London,	2010),	pp.	211–237,	particularly	p.	214	10	See	for	example	the	range	on	the	history	of	different	shipping	companies	in	Bremen	by	Reinhold	Thiel:	Reinhold	Thiel,	Die	Geschichte	des	Norddeutschen	Lloyd,	Band	1–5	(Bremen,	
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shipping	by	Arnold	Kludas,	Die	Geschichte	der	deutschen	Passagierschiffahrt,	1850–
1990,	 has	 been	 sharply	 criticised	 for	 Kludas’	 characteristic	 ‘Verinnerlichung	 und	Emphase	 von	 Volksgemeinschaft	 und	 nationaler	 Seegeltung’. 11 	According	 to	Hartmut	Rübner,	this	aims	at	a	‘(Teil-)Exkulpation	der	Diktatur’.12	Still,	apart	from	this	 ideological	 defect,	 it	 offers,	 in	 more	 than	 a	 thousand	 pages,	 an	 unmatched	overview	of	140	years	of	German	passenger	shipping.		 Maritime	history	saw	a	growth	in	popularity	from	the	1950s	to	the	1990s.	In	this	half	century,	it	was	the	research	of	the	Annales	School	that	first	focused	on	maritime	history,	in	particular	on	European	maritime	history	in	the	early	modern	age,	which	therefore	dominated	the	field	of	maritime	history	at	the	time.	From	the	1970s,	 Anglo-American	 historians	 took	 over	 the	 field	 of	 maritime	 history	 and	principally	engaged	with	the	eighteenth	century	to	the	present	day.13	In	the	1990s,	however,	the	cultural	turn	led	to	a	decrease	in	interest	in	maritime	history	due	to	its	close	links	with	social	and	economic	history.		 In	 contrast,	 if	we	 then	 look	 at	 the	historiography	on	 Imperial	Germany,	 it	becomes	 obvious	 that	 there	 is	 a	 time	 lag	 in	 popularity	 between	 the	 two	 subject	areas.	 History	 writing	 on	 the	Kaiserreich	 was	 for	 a	 long	 time	 dominated	 by	 the	application	 of	modernisation	 theory	 to	modern	 German	 history,	more	 precisely,	Hans-Ulrich	Wehler’s	assumption	of	the	German	Sonderweg.14	The	Sonderweg	has	been	used	to	try	and	explain	why	a	fascist	party	could	come	to	power	in	Germany,	one	of	the	most	industrialised	countries	in	the	world	at	the	time.	Indeed,	there	is	no	 obvious	 reason	why	 in	 Germany	 fascism	 could	 flourish	when	 the	 rest	 of	 the	industrialised	world	was	similarly	faced	with	the	crisis	of	liberal	democracy	in	the	
																																																																																																																																																																		2001-2006);	Reinhold	Thiel,	Norddeutscher	Lloyd:	Roland-Linie,	1905–1992	(Bremen,	1999);	Reinhold	Thiel,	Die	Geschichte	der	D.D.G.	„Hansa“,	Band	1–2	(Bremen,	2010-2011).	See	also	Arnold	Kludas’	series	on	the	Hapag:	Arnold	Kludas,	Die	Geschichte	der	Hapag-
Schiffe,	Band	1–5	(Bremen,	2007–2010).	Several	other	publications	include:	Dirk	J.	Peter	(ed.),	Der	Norddeutsche	Lloyd:	Von	Bremen	in	die	Welt,	„Global	Player“	der	
Schifffahrtsgeschichte	(Bremen,	2007);	Susanne	Wiborg,	Klaus	Wiborg,	1847–1997:	Unser	
Feld	ist	die	Welt,	150	Jahre	Hapag-Lloyd	(Hamburg,	1997)	11	Hartmut	Rübner,	Konzentration	und	Krise	der	deutschen	Schiffahrt:	Maritime	Wirtschaft	
und	Politik	im	Kaiserreich,	in	der	Weimarer	Republik	und	im	Nationalsozialimus	(Bremen,	2005),	p.	15	12	Ibid..,	p.	15	13	Harlaftis,	‘Maritime	History	or	the	History	of	Thalassa’,	pp.	214–216	14	Hans-Ulrich	Wehler,	Das	Deutsche	Kaiserreich	1871–1918	(Göttingen,	1994)	
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post-First	World	War	era	and	the	Great	Depression.15	For	that	reason,	defenders	of	the	Sonderweg	described	Germany’s	development	as	a	special	path,	 in	opposition	to	 the	 “usual”	 Western	 path	 to	 modernity.	 Once	 this	 idea	 of	 a	 Sonderweg	 is	accepted,	German	history	of	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century	is	only	analysed	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 outcome,	 namely	 the	 Nazi	 regime.	 The	 Sonderweg	dominated	modern	German	history	writing	far	into	the	1980s.	In	this	field,	it	was	not	until	the	cultural	turn	that	the	Kaiserreich	was	analysed	in	its	own	right.	Thus,	at	the	time	when	maritime	history	experienced	a	decline	in	popularity,	research	on	Imperial	Germany	was	intensified.	Consequently,	in	the	period	between	the	1950s	and	 the	 1990s	 there	was	 a	 distinct	 lack	 of	 studies,	 and	 this	 is	 significant	 to	 this	study.	One	of	only	 a	 few	exceptions	 to	 this	 is	 Lars	U.	 Scholl,	 one	of	 the	 founding	members	 of	 the	 International	 Maritime	 Economic	 History	 Association	 (IMEHA).	Since	the	1980s,	Scholl	has	consistently	produced	works	on	the	German	maritime	history	of	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	century.16		 As	can	be	gathered	from	this,	the	historiography	on	German	overseas	trade	and	shipping	still	lacks	a	comprehensive	study	that	goes	beyond	one	single	period	and	one	location	of	trade.	An	early	attempt	was	made	by	Hans	Konrad	Röthel,	who	published	a	study	on	Die	Hansestädte:	Hamburg,	Lübeck,	Bremen	 in	1955.17	It	was	not	his	aim	to	comparatively	analyse	the	economic	development	of	the	three	cities,	but	rather	to	show	cultural	similarities	between	them.	Röthel	therefore	wished	to	arrive	at	a	definition	for	“Hanseatic”	and	its	meaning	to	the	three	cities.	However,	being	 a	 Hamburger,	 he	 himself	 admitted	 that	 his	 love	 for	 his	 hometown	overwhelmed	 his	 pursuit	 of	 objectivity.18	Besides	 Röthel,	 there	 is	 also	 an	 early	study	by	Otto	Becker	 on	 the	 integration	 of	 the	Hanseatic	 cities	 into	 the	 customs																																																									15	However,	it	is	significant	to	point	out	that	there	was	already	opposition	against	Wehler’s	theory	of	a	Sonderweg	at	the	time.	See	for	example:	Thomas	Nipperdey,	‘1933	und	die	Kontinuität	der	deutschen	Geschichte’,	in:	Historische	Zeitschrift	227	(1978),	pp.	86–111;	Helga	Grebing,	Der	“deutsche	Sonderweg”	in	Europa	1806-1945:	Eine	Kritik	(Stuttgart,	1986)	and	also	David	Blackbourn,	Geolf	Eley,	Mythen	deutscher	Geschichtsschreibung:	Die	
gescheiterte	bürgerliche	Revolution	von	1848	(Frankfurt,	1980)	16	See	for	example:	Lars	U.	Scholl,	‘Shipping	Business	in	Germany	in	the	Nineteenth	and	Twentieth	Century’,	in:	Tsunehiko	Yui,	Keiichiro	Nakagawa	(eds),	Business	History	of	
Shipping:	Strategy	and	Structure	(Tokyo,	1985),	pp.	185-213;	Lars	U.	Scholl,	‘Struktur	und	Wandel	in	der	deutschen	Handelsschiffahrt	1815–1918’,	in:	Scripta	Mercaturae.	Zeitschrift	
für	Wirtschafts-	und	Sozialgeschichte	18	(1984),	pp.	30–60;	Lars	U.	Scholl,	‘The	German	Merchant	Marine	in	the	Inter-War	Period,	1920–1932’,	in:	Lewis	R.	Fischer,	Helge	W.	Nordvik	(eds),	Shipping	and	Trade,	1750-1950	(Pontefract,	1990),	pp.	191–212	17	Hans	Konrad	Röthel,	Die	Hansestädte:	Hamburg,	Lübeck,	Bremen	(München,	1955)	18	Ibid..,	p.	8	
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union.19	However,	while	Becker	gives	plenty	of	detailed	information	on	the	events	leading	up	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	accession	to	the	customs	union,	his	analysis	still	falls	short	of	expectations.	Overall,	Becker’s	study	reads	like	a	justification	for	Bismarck’s	 measures	 during	 the	 accession	 process.	 According	 to	 Becker,	 the	positive	 outcome,	 i.e.	 the	 accession	 of	 both	 Hanseatic	 cities,	 justified	 all	 means	taken	by	the	Reich	Chancellor,	who	is	argued	to	have	always	acted	in	the	name	of	the	German	nation.	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	role	as	free	port	cities	is	regarded	as	a	disruptive	 factor	 to	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 German	 nation.	 Becker	 does	 not	 further	examine	internal	processes	in	Hamburg	and	Bremen	and	the	arguments	against	an	accession	in	these	cities.	Therefore,	Becker	is	only	able	to	give	a	one-sided	view	on	the	events	leading	up	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	Zollanschluss	in	1888.	In	contrast	to	 Becker,	 Ernst	 Hieke’s	 examination	 also	 focuses	 on	 internal	 processes	 in	Hamburg	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 decision	 to	 join	 the	 customs	 union.20	In	 any	 case,	Hieke’s	study	also	has	major	shortcomings.	For	example,	Hieke	concentrates	solely	on	the	economic	aspects	of	Hamburg’s	accession.	As	a	result,	the	study	is	limited	to	the	period	between	1879	and	1882.	Furthermore,	Hieke	regards	the	Zollanschluss	as	a	problem	between	the	German	Empire	and	the	City	of	Hamburg.	Like	this,	he	is	not	able	to	 incorporate	the	reaction	of	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community	 into	his	investigation.			 So	far,	 there	 is	only	one	study	comparable	 in	scope	to	this	thesis,	which	is	Hartmut	 Rübner’s	 Konzentration	 und	 Krise	 der	 Deutschen	 Schiffahrt.21	Rübner’s	work	covers	the	maritime	economy	and	politics	from	the	German	Empire	through	to	 the	 Third	 Reich.	 However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 this	 thesis,	 Rübner	 understates	 the	importance	of	the	German	Empire	in	the	development	of	Germany’s	overseas	trade	and	shipping.	He	devotes	a	negligible	part	of	his	500-page-long	investigation	to	the	period	from	1871	to	1914.	Furthermore,	Rübner’s	book	fails	to	consider	the	local	differentiation	 of	 trade.	 Instead	 of	 examining	 the	 varying	 effects	 of	 politics	 and	economics	 on	 port	 cities,	 particularly	 smaller	 cities	 like	 Emden	 and	
																																																								19	Otto	Becker,	‘Bismarcks	Kampf	um	die	Eingliederung	der	Hansestädte	in	die	Zolleinheit’,	in:	Ahasver	von	Brandt,	Wilhelm	Koppe	(eds),	Städtewesen	und	Bürgertum	als	
geschichtliche	Kräfte:	Gedächtnisschrift	für	Fritz	Rörig	(Lübeck,	1953),	pp.	227–242	20	Ernst	Hieke,	Hamburgs	Stellung	zum	Deutschen	Zollverein	1879-1882.	Ein	Beitrag	zur	
Wirtschaftspolitik	Bismarcks	(Hamburg,	1935)	21	Rübner,	Konzentration	und	Krise	der	deutschen	Schiffahrt	
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Wilhelmenshaven,	Rübner	primarily	deals	with	the	overall	trend	of	overseas	trade	and	shipping.			 More	 recently,	 Michael	 B.	 Miller	 has	 published	 an	 extraordinary	transnational	 analysis	 of	 the	 fate	 of	 European	 overseas	 ports	 in	 the	 twentieth	century,	 named	 Europe	 and	 the	Maritime	World.	 Miller	 states	 that	 one	 essential	objective	of	the	book	is	to	‘restore	the	sea	to	the	center	of	how	we	think	and	write	about	 modern	 history.’22	He	 argues	 that	 realising	 the	 way	 in	 which	 people	 and	goods	were	transported	from	Europe	around	the	world	in	the	twentieth	century	is	absolutely	 central	 to	understanding	 the	 twentieth	 century	 in	Europe	 as	 a	whole,	since	 the	European	market	was	always	reliant	on	overseas	 trade.23	Miller’s	study	presents	a	prime	example	of	the	way	maritime	history	has	to	define	itself	in	order	to	be	recognised	as	a	significant	sub-field	within	the	field	of	history.	He	does	this	by	not	simply	limiting	his	research	to	certain	shipping	companies,	trade	routes	or	passenger/goods	traffic.	 Instead,	Miller	gives	an	overall	examination	of	European	trade,	 including	the	infrastructure	of	ports,	the	structure	of	trade,	and	the	people	and	companies	that	conducted	this	trade.	Most	 important	of	all,	he	reminds	us	of	the	two	most	essential	parts	of	trade,	ports	and	merchants.	Still,	Miller’s	main	focus	is	 on	 the	 largest	 ports	 of	 Europe	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 which	 for	Miller	 are	Hamburg,	 Rotterdam,	 Antwerp,	 London	 and	 Liverpool.	 Bremen,	 for	 example,	 is	only	examined	as	a	port	of	 secondary	 importance.	 In	a	European	context,	 this	of	course	makes	 sense.	 However,	Miller	 fails	 to	 present	 the	 dynamics	 between	 the	most	significant	port	cities	within	Germany.	Furthermore,	due	to	his	concentration	on	the	twentieth	century,	Miller	is	not	able	to	demonstrate	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	transition	from	independent	to	German	port	cities	in	the	nineteenth	century.			 The	high	standard	of	Miller’s	research	has	not	been	equalled	by	all	maritime	historical	publications.	Maritime	Wirtschaft	in	Deutschland,	which	was	published	in	2012,	the	same	year	as	Miller’s	study,	certainly	does	not	match	Miller’s	standard.	The	book,	consisting	of	papers	that	were	given	at	a	maritime	history	conference	in	Hamburg	 in	 2010,	 covers	 four	main	 topics.	 These	 are	 shipping,	 the	 shipbuilding	industry,	trade	and	naval	power	in	Germany	during	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	
																																																								22	Michael	B.	Miller,	Europe	and	the	Maritime	World:	A	Twentieth-Century	History	(Cambridge,	2012),	p.	3	23	Ibid..,	pp.	3–5	
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centuries.24 	One	 reason	 for	 this	 might	 be	 that	 its	 addressed	 target	 group	 is	comprised	 of	 historians,	 interested	 maritime	 historical	 readers	 and	 shipping	affiliates.	 Consequently,	 the	 publication	 certainly	 does	 not	 enter	 unchartered	waters	but	 offers,	 in	 the	words	of	 one	 reviewer,	 ‘zu	den	 im	Titel	 genannten	vier	Schwerpunktthemen	je	zwei	bis	vier	knappe	Beiträge	unterschiedlicher	Qualität.’25		 	There	 have	 of	 course	 also	 been	 less	 comprehensive	 studies	 of	 the	individual	port	 cities.	As	Germany’s	major	overseas	port,	Hamburg	has	naturally	aroused	 some	 academic	 interest.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 local	 historical	 but	 also	professional	historical	studies,	which	shed	light	on	different	aspects	of	Hamburg’s	trading	 and	 shipping	 history.	 For	 example,	 the	 role	 of	 Hamburg’s	 merchants	 in	Germany’s	 colonial	 policy	 from	 1880	 to	 1890	 is	 investigated	 in	 Washausen’s	
Hamburg	und	die	Kolonialpolitik	des	Deutschen	Reiches.26	An	analysis	by	Ekkehard	Böhm	examines	the	part	that	was	played	by	the	mercantile	community	in	building	up	 the	 German	 Navy.27	In	 addition	 to	 these	 studies,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 publication	commemorating	 the	 75th	 anniversary	 of	 Hamburg’s	 Hafen-	 und	 Lagerhaus-
Aktiengesellschaft	 in	 1960,	 consisting	 of	 two	 books	 entitled	 Der	 Freihafen	 and	
Hamburgs	Weg	zum	Welthafen	or	Hamburg’s	Speicherstadt.28	These	publications	all	deal	with	different	aspects	of	Hamburg’s	role	within	the	German	Empire.29	Overall,	studies	 like	 these	 are	 certainly	 crucial	 in	 understanding	 the	 dynamics	 and	consequences	 of	 narrowly	 defined	 developments.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 are	 too	obsessed	with	the	minutiae	of	their	respective	topics	to	able	be	to	integrate	their																																																									24	Jürgen	Elvert,	Sigurd	Hess,	Heinrich	Walle	(eds),	Maritime	Wirtschaft	in	Deutschland:	
Schifffahrt	–	Werften	–	Handel	–	Seemacht	im	19.	und	20.	Jahrhundert	(Stuttgart,	2012)	25	Hans	Pohl,	‘Rezension:	Jürgen	Elvert,	Sigurd	Hess,	Heinrich	Walle	(eds),	Maritime	Wirtschaft	in	Deutschland:	Schifffahrt	–	Werften	–	Handel	–	Seemacht	im	19.	und	20.	Jahrhundert	(Stuttgart,	2012),	in:	Vierteljahresschrift	für	Sozial-	und	Wirtschaftsgeschichte	100	(2013),	Heft	2,	pp.	249–250	26	Helmut	Washausen,	Hamburg	und	die	Kolonialpolitik	des	Deutschen	Reiches,	1880	bis	
1890	(Hamburg,	1968)	27	Ekkehard	Böhm,	Überseehandel	und	Flottenbau:	Hanseatische	Kaufmannschaft	und	
deutsche	Seerüstung	1879–1902	(Düsseldorf,	1972).	See	also	Ekkehard	Böhm,	‘Wirtschaft	und	Politik	in	Hamburg	zur	Zeit	der	Reichsgründung’,	in:	Zeitschrift	des	Vereins	für	
Hamburgische	Geschichte	(ZHG)	64	(1978),	pp.	31–53	28	Walter	Emmerich,	Bernhard	Meyer-Marwitz,	Der	Freihafen.	Hamburgs	Weg	zum	
Welthafen	(Hamburg,	1960);	Richard	Fischer,	Angelica	Griem,	Kaufmannsträume:	Die	
Hamburger	Speicherstadt	(Heidelberg,	1988)	29	See	also:	Renate	Hauschild-Thiessen,	Bürgerstolz	&	Kaisertreue:	Hamburg	und	das	
Deutsche	Reich	von	1871	(Hamburg,	1979)	and	Tobias	von	Elsner,	Kaisertage:	Die	
Hamburger	und	das	Wilhelminische	Deutschland	im	Spiegel	öffentlicher	Festkultur	(Frankfurt,	1991)	
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findings	 into	 the	 overall	 processes	 in	 trade	 and	 shipping	 in	 Hamburg	 that	 took	place	from	the	time	of	the	Empire	to	the	Third	Reich.			 A	study	by	Niall	Ferguson	accounts	for	a	notable	exception	to	this.	In	Paper	
&	 Iron,	 he	 is	 able	 to	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 dynamic	 examination	 of	Hamburg	business	and	German	politics	between	1897	and	1927,	thus	covering	the	
Kaiserreich	and	the	Weimar	Republic.30	The	combined	analysis	of	German	politics	and	 Hamburg	 business	 allows	 him	 to	 present	 the	 interdependency	 between	economics	and	politics	and	the	exercise	of	influence	of	Hamburg	businessmen	and	merchants	 on	 German	 politics.	 Taking	 economic	 but	 also	 social	 and	 cultural	aspects	into	consideration,	Ferguson	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	‘it	was	inflation	which	led	to	Wilhelmine	grandeur	to	Weimar	collapse.’31	Kurt	Doß	has	undertaken	a	similar	attempt	of	 investigating	two	periods	 in	Das	deutsche	Auswärtige	Amt	im	
Übergang	vom	Kaiserreich	zur	Weimarer	Republik.	Yet,	it	is	only	in	one	section	that	he	adequately	analyses	 in	detail	 the	exertion	of	 influence	of	Hamburg	merchants	and	 ship	 owners	 on	 Germany’s	 economic	 policy.32	It	 becomes	 obvious	 from	 this	overview	 of	 historiography	 on	 Hamburg’s	 trade	 and	 shipping	 that	 there	 is	currently	no	analysis	 in	which	the	overall	transformation	of	an	independent	city-state	into	Germany’s	foremost	port	city	is	shown.			 Another	distinguished	example	of	an	analysis	that	is	able	to	make	accessible	to	 the	 reader	 trends	 and	 changes	 taking	 place	 over	 a	 long	 period,	 is	 Gabriele	Hoffmann’s	 Das	 Haus	 an	 der	 Elbchaussee.33	In	 this	 book,	 Hoffmann	 tracks	 the	family	 history	 of	 the	 Godeffroys,	 one	 of	 Hamburg’s	 most	 influential	 merchants	families	 in	 the	nineteenth	century.	Yet,	apart	 from	solely	 focusing	on	the	 family’s	fate,	Hoffmann	also	describes	the	whole	of	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community	and	their	connections	to	each	other.	By	these	means,	the	reader	understands	not	only	the	economic	but	also	the	social	and	political	environment	in	Hamburg	during	the	period.	Within	 four	 generations	 the	 role	 of	 Hamburg’s	merchants	 changed	 ‘vom	außerhalb	der	Hansestädte	verachteten	Zwischenhändler	im	18.	Jahrhundert	über	
																																																								30	Niall	Ferguson,	Paper	&	Iron:	Hamburg	business	and	German	politics	in	the	era	of	
inflation,	1897–1927	(Cambridge,	2002)	31	Ibid..,	p.	408	32	Kurt	Doß,	Das	deutsche	Auswärtige	Amt	im	Übergang	vom	Kaiserreich	zur	Weimarer	
Republik.	Die	Schülersche	Reform	(Düsseldorf,	1977)	33	Gabriele	Hoffmann,	Das	Haus	an	der	Elbchaussee:	Die	Godeffroys	–	Aufstieg	und	
Niedergang	einer	Dynastie	(Hamburg,	1999)	
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den	merchant	banker	bis	zum	vielbewunderten	Kapitalisten’.34	Although	Hoffmann	admits	that	this	publication	is	not	a	consistently	documented	family	biography,	it	is	 still	 extremely	 useful,	 as	 it	 helps	 to	 understand	 the	 Hanseatic	 self-conception	prevalent	in	Hamburg	in	the	nineteenth	century.		 With	regard	to	Bremen,	the	situation	is,	if	anything,	worse.	There	are	a	few	studies,	which	examine	Bremen’s	relationship	with	different	former	colonies,	such	as	Hartmut	Müller’s	publications	on	Bremen	and	West	Africa	and	a	second	one	on	the	 colonial	movement	 in	Bremen.35	Müller’s	work	 remains	a	 rare	example	of	 an	economic	discussion	about	Bremen’s	historic	role	as	a	port	city	(otherwise,	studies	on	Bremen	and	the	 former	colonies	mainly	 focus	on	social	and	cultural	 issues.36)	Beyond	the	colonial	angle,	historians	have	also	researched	Bremen’s	relationship	with	 its	 most	 significant	 trading	 partners;	 primarily	 the	 United	 States	 but	 also	Australia.37	In	particular,	Ludwig	Beutin’s	analysis	of	Bremen	and	the	US	from	the	eighteenth	 century	 until	 the	 Third	 Reich	 deserves	 mentioning	 in	 this	 context.38	Published	 in	1953,	Beutin	does	not	 simply	 illustrate	 the	economic	 links	between	the	United	States	and	Bremen	but	he	also	takes	into	account	the	global	economic	environment	 and	 politics,	 since	 these	 factors	 have	 always	 had	 an	 influence	 on	trade	 links.	 Thus,	 this	 is	 a	 comparable	 approach	 to	 the	 one	 undertaken	 in	 this	thesis	–	but	it	is,	rather	obviously,	sixty	years	old.			 There	 has	 recently	 also	 been	 an	 English-language	 study	 on	 Bremen’s	mercantile	 community	 and	 its	 transatlantic	 links	 with	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the																																																									34	Ibid..,	p.	455	35	Hartmut	Müller,	‘Bremen	und	Westafrika.	Wirtschafts-	und	Handelsbeziehungen	im	Zeitalter	des	Früh-	und	Hochkolonialismus	1841–1914	(I.	Teil)’,	in:	Jahrbuch	der	Wittheit	
zu	Bremen	XV	(1971),	pp.	42–92	and	Hartmut	Müller,	‘Bremen	und	Westafrika.	Wirtschafts-	und	Handelsbeziehungen	im	Zeitalter	des	Früh-	und	Hochkolonialismus	1841–1914	(II.	Teil)’,	in:	Jahrbuch	der	Wittheit	zu	Bremen	XVII	(1973),	pp.	75–148;	Hartmut	Müller,	‘Lüderitz	und	der	koloniale	Mythos.	Kolonialbewegungen	in	Bremen’,	in:	
Diskurs.	Bremer	Beiträge	zu	Wissenschaft	und	Gesellschaft	6	(1982),	pp.	125–149	36	See	for	example	Heinz	Gustafsson,	Namibia,	Bremen	und	Deutschland:	Ein	steiniger	Weg	
zur	Freundschaft	(Delmenhorst,	2003);	Manfred	Hitz	et	al.	(eds),	Diskurs.	Bremer	Beiträge	
zu	Wissenschaft	und	Gesellschaft	6	(1982)	complete	issue	on	‘Namibia:	Die	Aktualität	des	kolonialen	Verhältnisses’	37	For	example,	Fritz	Hartmut	Tessmer,	Bremische	Handelsbeziehungen	mit	Australien:	Von	
den	Anfängen	bis	zum	Beginn	des	1.	Weltkrieges	(Bremen,	1979);	Franz	Josef	Pitsch,	Die	
wirtschaftlichen	Beziehungen	Bremens	zu	den	Vereinigten	Staaten	von	Amerika	bis	zur	Mitte	
des	19.	Jahrhunderts	(Bremen,	1974);	Lars	U.	Scholl	(ed.),	Bremen	und	Amerika:	Die	
Verbindungen	der	Hansestadt	mit	den	Vereinigten	Staaten,	Jahrbuch	2008/2009	(Bremen,	2010)	38	Ludwig	Beutin,	Bremen	und	Amerika	(Bremen,	1953)	
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nineteenth	century.39	In	German	Merchants	in	the	Nineteenth-Century	Atlantic,	Lars	Maischak	examines	 the	economic,	political	 and	cultural	 exchange	 that	 took	place	between	 Bremen	 and	 the	 US,	 which	 not	 only	 benefitted	 the	 small	 city-state	 of	Bremen,	 but	 also	 its	much	 larger	 trading	 partner	 across	 the	 Atlantic.	While	 that	study	is	guided	by	a	sound	interpretation	of	the	role	of	maritime	history,	parts	of	Maischak’s	 argument	 are	 flawed.	 For	 example,	 in	 Part	 III	 of	 the	 book	 on	 the	“Decline	 of	 a	 Cosmopolitan	 Community”,	 Maischak	 describes	 Bremen’s	 loss	 of	independence	in	1867	as	a	result	of	the	foundation	of	the	North	German	Union.	He	seems	to	simply	equate	Bremen	joining	the	North	German	Union	with	a	completed	integration	process,	which	was	not	the	case.	There	are	also	internal	contradictions.	For	 instance,	Maischak	 rightly	 argues	 that	 before	 1867	 ‘only	 a	minority	 […]	was	willing	to	give	up	Bremish	independence	for	the	promise	of	a	bright	new	future	in	a	unitary	German	state.’40	However,	 in	a	 last	chapter	on	“Patriarchs	 into	Patriots:	Hanseats	 in	 a	 World	 of	 Nation-States,	 1867–1945”,	 the	 reader	 is	 given	 the	impression	that	Bremen’s	mercantile	community	readily	came	to	terms	with	their	city’s	 integration.	 If	 such	 was	 indeed	 the	 case,	 Maischak	 conspicuously	 fails	 to	explain	the	apparent	change	in	attitudes.	With	regard	to	Anglophone	literature	on	Bremen,	Robert	Lee	definitely	deserves	mentioning.	Lee	has	published	on	a	wide	range	of	topics	on	Bremen	in	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	century.41		 Similarly,	Malte	Ritter,	 examining	 the	political	 culture	of	Bremen’s	middle	classes	 from	1859	 to	1913,	 has	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 already	prior	 to	 the	
Reichsgründung	 ‘städtische[…]	 und	 nationale[…]	 Identitätsmuster	 feste	Anknüpfungspunkte	 fanden,	 daß	 sie	 sich	 ineinander	 verwoben	 und	 sich	wechselseitig	stärkten.’42	Although	he	recognises	‘eine	Trübung	[…]	durch	die	zoll-	und	 handelspolitischen	 Vorstöße	 der	 Reichsregierung	 Ende	 der	 1870er	 und	Anfang	 der	 1880er’,	 but,	 in	 Ritter’s	 eyes,	 this	 did	 not	 do	 any	 large	 damage	 to																																																									39	Lars	Maischak,	German	Merchants	in	the	Nineteenth-Century	Atlantic	(Cambridge,	2013)	40	Ibid..,	p.	245	41	See	for	example:	W.	Robert	Lee,	‘The	Growth	of	Maritime	Trade	and	the	Determinants	of	Port-Hinterland	Relations	in	Nineteenth-Century	Germany:	the	case	of	Bremen’,	in:	Margrit	Schulte	Beerbühl	and	Jörg	Vögele	(eds),	Spinning	the	Commercial	Web:	
International	Trade,	Merchants	and	Commercial	Cities,	c.	1640–1939	(Frankfurt,	2004),	pp.	291–306	and	W.	Robert	Lee,	‘Configuring	the	region:	maritime	trade	and	port-hinterland	relations	in	Bremen,	1815–1914’,	in:	Urban	History	32,	Issue	02	(August	2005),	pp.	247–287	42	Malte	Ritter,	Die	Bremer	und	ihr	Vaterland:	Deutscher	Nationalismus	in	der	Freien	
Hansestadt	(1859–1913)	(Berlin,	2004),	p.	300	
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Bremen’s	pro-German	disposition.43	Ritter’s	argumentation	is	problematic	insofar	as	it	is	too	narrowly	focused	on	political	culture.	An	economic	analysis	of	the	1870s	and	 1880s	 might	 have	 led	 him	 to	 a	 significantly	 different	 viewpoint.	 It	 is	 not	sufficient	to	only	analyse	the	relationship	of	Bremen	with	the	German	Empire	from	a	 cultural	 perspective.	With	 Bremen’s	 reliance	 on	 trade	 and	 shipping,	 historians	have	 to	 adopt	 both	 cultural	 and	 economic	 analyses	 if	 they	 are	 to	 get	 a	 more	comprehensive	 picture	 of	 the	 development	 that	 the	 city	 took	 following	 the	foundation	of	the	German	Empire.		 Historical	 analyses	 of	 the	 cities	 of	 Emden	 and	 Wilhelmshaven,	 and	 their	respective	roles	in	the	wider	German	economy,	are	practically	non-existent.	This	is	actually	a	 remarkable	 lacuna,	 since	Emden	had	developed	 into	one	of	Germany’s	busiest	port	cities	by	the	eve	of	the	First	World	War.44	Dietmar	von	Reeken’s	study	on	Ostfriesland	zwischen	Weimar	und	Bonn	is	a	rare	exception.45	Von	Reeken’s	book	offers	 an	 analysis	 of	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 continuities	 and	 changes	 in	Emden	and	Aurich	from	1928	until	1953.	Yet,	as	a	result	of	its	wide-ranging	aims,	it	offers	little	sustained	analysis	of	Emden’s	economic	development.			 Recently,	interest	in	Emden’s	development	from	the	nineteenth	century	has	seen	an	upsurge.	For	example,	Hans-Dieter	Clasmeier	has	published	a	study	with	the	 title	100	 Jahre	Große	Seeschleuse	 in	Emden:	Geschichte	eines	Meisterwerks	der	
Ingenieurkunst.46	Although	it	 is	 largely	concentrated	on	the	planning	and	building	history	of	the	lock,	it	nevertheless	gives	an	excellent	insight	into	the	infrastructural	and	 economic	 conditions	 in	 Emden	 before	 and	 after	 the	 building	 of	 the	 lock.	 In	addition	to	this,	Gunter	Hummerich’s	work	on	Emden’s	shipping	companies	from	
																																																								43	Ibid..,	p.	300	44	Altogether,	the	available	literature	on	Emden	is	limited	to	a	few	general	overviews	of	the	city’s	history.	For	example,	Ernst	Siebert,	Walter	Deeters,	Bernard	Schröer,	Geschichte	der	
Stadt	Emden:	1750	bis	zur	Gegenwart	(Leer,	1980);	Wolfgang	Schönigh,	Überblick	über	die	
Geschichte	der	Stadt	Emden	(Hannover,	1960);	and	also	Eckart	Krömer,	Kleine	
Wirtschaftsgeschichte	Ostfrieslands	und	Papenburgs	(Norden,	1991);	Eberhard	Kliem,	Die	
Stadt	Emden	und	die	Marine,	16.	Bis	21.	Jahrhundert,	Vom	Großen	Kurfürsten	bis	zur	
Bundesmarine	(Hamburg,	2008)	45	Dietmar	von	Reeken,	Ostrfriesland	zwischen	Weimar	und	Bonn:	Eine	Fallstudie	zum	
Problem	der	historischen	Konitinuität	am	Beispiel	der	Städte	Aurich	und	Emden	(Hildesheim,	1991)	46	Hans-Dieter	Clasmeier,	100	Jahre	Große	Seeschleuse	in	Emden:	Geschichte	eines	
Meisterwerks	der	Ingenieurkunst	(Aurich,	2013)	
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1837	until	today	is	certainly	a	step	in	the	right	direction.47	While	Hummerich	also	examines	the	development	of	Emden’s	port,	his	main	interest	remains	in	the	fate	of	different	shipping	companies.	Hummerich	thus	gives	a	broad	overview	of	Emden’s	shipping	 companies	 over	 a	 large	 period	 of	 time.	 However,	 due	 to	 Hummerich’s	clear	 focus	 on	 the	 successes	 of	 Emden’s	 companies,	 the	 city’s	 troubles	 with	 its	economic	and	cultural	integration	into	the	German	Empire	are	being	pushed	aside.	Since	colonial	history	will	play	a	part	in	this	thesis,	it	also	worth	mentioning	Ulrich	van	 der	 Heyden’s	 study	 on	 the	 Brandenburgisch-Afrikanische	 Kompagnie,	 an	overseas	 enterprise	 founded	 by	 the	 Great	 Elector,	 Friedrich	 Wilhelm	 von	Brandenburg,	 in	1682.48	As	Emden	had	become	the	headquarters	of	the	company	in	1684,	this	study,	although	not	exclusively	focused	on	Emden’s	role,	also	reveals	intriguing	information	about	Emden’s	connections	to	the	company.			 The	 recent	 increase	 in	 research	 is	 certainly	 to	 do	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Stadtarchiv	Emden	only	became	an	independent	institution	in	1990s.	Before	then,	it	was	part	 of	 and	 located	 in	 the	Ostfriesisches	Landesmuseum	Emden.	 Today,	 the	members	of	staff	are	still	involved	with	making	documents	of	the	interwar	period	accessible	 for	 the	public.49	Thus,	 it	 is	not	 surprising	 that	 the	economic	history	of	Emden	is	still	largely	unchartered	territory.			 Scholarly	neglect	of	Wilhelmshaven	has	been	near	 total.	Only	a	handful	of	studies	 exist. 50 	One	 of	 these	 is	 an	 examination	 by	 Martin	 Wein	 of	 the	administrative	 problems	 existing	 in	Wilhelmshaven	 until	 1937.	 These	 problems	resulted	 from	 the	 circumstance	 that	 the	 port	 of	 Wilhelmshaven	 was	 owned	 by	Prussia,	while	the	worker	housing	areas,	which	later	formed	the	city	of	Rüstringen,	
																																																								47	Gunther	Hummerich,	Kaufmannsgut	ist	Ebbe	und	Flut:	Emder	Schifffahrtsfirmen,	von	
1837	bis	heute	(Emden,	2014)		48	Ulrich	van	der	Heyden,	Rote	Adler	an	Afrikas	Küste:	Die	brandenburgisch-preußische	
Kolonie	Großfriedrichsburg	in	Westafrika	(Berlin,	2001)	49	Note	that	the	bibliography	of	von	Reeken’s	study	(published	in	1991)	is	only	able	to	mention	‘zahlreiche	Akten	aus	der	V.	Registratur’	from	the	Stadtarchiv	Emden	and	does	not	give	any	more	detail.		50	See	for	example:	Arthur	Grunewald	(ed.),	Wilhelmshaven:	Tidekurven	einer	Seestadt	(Wilhelmshaven,	1969);	Rolf	Uphoff,	„Hier	laßt	uns	einen	Hafen	bau’n!“:	
Entstehungsgeschichte	der	Stadt	Wilhelmshaven	1848–1890	(Oldenburg,	1995);	The	memoirs	of	Louise	von	Krohn	also	offer	an	interesting	insight	into	the	founding	years	of	Wilhelmshaven,	see	Louise	von	Krohn,	Vierzig	Jahre	in	einem	deutschen	Kriegshafen	(Wilhelmshaven,	2001)	
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were	part	of	the	Grand	Duchy	of	Oldenburg.51	Nonetheless,	the	definitive	work	on	Wilhelmshaven	is	still	offered	by	Edgar	Grundig’s	Chronik	der	Stadt	Wilhelmshaven,	which	was	published	in	1957.52	The	archivist	Edgar	Grundig	began	working	on	this	study	before	the	Second	World	War	and	was,	therefore,	able	to	use	documents	that	went	missing	during	the	war.	Consequently,	Grundig’s	chronicle	offers	information	that	 would	 otherwise	 not	 be	 accessible	 anymore.	 This	 makes	 it	 a	 uniquely	important	 work	 for	 research	 on	 Wilhelmhaven’s	 past.	 However,	 even	 though	Grundig	was	able	to	use	valuable	sources,	parts	of	his	conclusions	are	out-dated.	In	his	 preface,	 Grundig	 himself	 admitted	 that	 ‘meine	 Arbeit	 Fehler	 und	 Irrtümer	enthält	[…].’53	In	the	face	of	the	sheer	extent	of	Grundig’s	study,	this	is	forgivable.	However,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 certain	 developments	 in	Wilhelmshaven,	 there	 is	 need	 for	 further	 academic	 examination.	 Additionally,	Grundig’s	work	is	marked	by	a	high	level	of	local	patriotism,	which	calls	for	a	more	neutral	examination	of	developments	in	Wilhelmshaven.54			 There	 are,	 in	 conclusion,	 two	 shortcomings	 to	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	maritime	history.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	an	overall	shortage	of	comprehensive	studies	 that	 investigate	 those	 periods	 during	which	Germany	became	one	 of	 the	leading	trading	nations.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	also	a	lack	of	individual	studies,	which	 are	 concerned	with	 the	 economic	development	of	Germany’s	major	North	Sea	ports.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									51	Martin	Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen:	Kommunale	Entwicklung	in	Wilhelmshaven/	Rüstringen,	
1853-1937	(Marburg,	2006)	52	Edgar	Grundig,	Chronik	der	Stadt	Wilhelmshaven	(Wilhelmshaven,	1957)	53	Edgar	Grundig,	Chronik	der	Stadt	Wilhelmshaven,	Band	1:	Vorgeschichte	bis	1853	und	die	
Erwerbung	des	Jadegebiets	durch	Preußen	(Wilhelmshaven,	1957),	p.	2	54	For	a	critique	of	Grundig’s	study	see	also:	Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen,	p.	29	
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c.	The	Cities	examined	
	
Als	noch	das	Reich	zerrissen	lag,		
Turnierplatz	fremder	Fehde,		
Und	jeder	gute	deutsche	Stamm		
Ging	seine	eignen	Wege,	
Trug	deine	Flagge	schon	hinaus,	
Hinaus	auf	alle	Meere	
Der	Hanseaten	Wagemut	
Und	warb	für	deutsche	Ehre.55		This	 verse,	 which	 points	 to	 the	 key	 themes	 of	 this	 analysis,	 was	 written	 about	Hamburg.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 applicable	 to	 the	 city	 on	 the	 Elbe	 and	 its	mercantile	community,	but	also	to	Bremen	and	Emden,	which	have	a	long	tradition	of	overseas	trade.	It	is	said	in	this	verse	–	and	in	the	following	verses	of	this	poem	–	that	while	the	German	nation	was	still	divided	into	small	states,	merchants	already	carried	German	virtues	into	the	world.	Thus,	this	verse	implies	that	the	mercantile	community	 of	 Hamburg	 took	 on	 a	 pioneering	 role	 in	 embodying	 German	patriotism.	 By	 using	 their	 trading	 links,	 these	 merchants	 were	 the	 first	 ones	 to	stand	for	the	German	nation	in	the	rest	of	the	world.	Trade	is	therefore	seen	as	a	catalyser	of	German	patriotism.	With	 this	verse	 in	mind,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	 take	a	closer	look	at	the	actual	relationship	between	the	port	cities	and	their	mercantile	communities	and	the	German	nation-state	founded	in	1871.	However,	prior	to	this,	it	 is	 absolutely	 vital	 to	 have	 a	 background	 of	 the	 histories	 of	 the	 cities	 under	investigation.	Only	by	understanding	the	identities	of	these	cities,	which	had	been	formed	 over	 centuries,	 are	 we	 able	 to	 understand	 the	 situation	 they	 found	themselves	 in	when	the	German	Empire	was	 founded.	For	 this,	 it	 is	 important	 to	realise	that	these	also	had	a	history	with	each	other,	which	had	an	effect	on	their	actions.	For	example,	due	to	their	shared	history	in	the	Hanseatic	League,	Hamburg	and	 Bremen	 were	 in	 close	 contact	 over	 important	 issues	 and,	 together	 with	Lübeck,	the	cities	also	finalised	contracts.56	Between	1825	and	1865,	more	than	20																																																									55	Taken	from	a	poem	by	Georg	Raven,	named	Hammaburg	und	Hansestadt,	as	cited	in	Thede-Ottowell,	Hamburg:	Vom	Alsterhafen	zur	Welthafenstadt	(Hamburg,	1996),	p.	16	56	For	more	information	on	this	see	for	example:	Jürgen	Prüser,	Die	Handelsverträge	der	
Hansestädte	Lübeck,	Bremen	und	Hamburg	mit	überseeischen	Staaten	im	19.	Jahrhundert	
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treaties	 with	 foreign	 countries	 were	 signed	 and	 the	 cities	 also	 kept	 joint	embassies.57				 	
Hamburg		Hamburg’s	name	originates	from	a	fortification	named	Hammaburg,	ham	being	the	Old	 Saxon	 word	 for	 marshland.	 The	 first	 fortification	 in	 this	 marshland	 was	probably	 built	 in	 the	 early	 ninth	 century.	 During	 the	 eleventh	 and	 twelfth	centuries,	Hamburg	grew	to	the	size	of	a	city	and	it	became	an	important	market	place.	Significantly,	Hamburg	received	a	charter	from	Emperor	Frederick	I	granting	several	 benefits	 to	 the	 city	 and	 its	 new	 port,	 such	 as	 customs-free	 transport	 of	goods	on	 the	 lower	 reaches	of	 the	 river	Elbe.	The	date	of	 issue	 for	 this	 Imperial	charter,	 7	 May	 1189,	 has	 since	 then	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 port	 of	Hamburg.58		Hamburg	was	soon	able	to	outmanoeuvre	its	local	rivals,	such	as	the	town	of	Stade,	downriver	on	 the	Elbe	estuary,	which	acted	as	 the	extended	arm	of	 the	Archbishop	of	Bremen,	and	in	the	thirteenth	century,	the	city	joined	the	Hanse,	the	famous	 Northern	 European	 league	 of	 trading	 cities.	 Another	 imperial	 decree,	issued	on	14	July	1482,	proved	vital	to	Hamburg’s	fortunes.59	In	that	document,	the	Emperor	Frederick	III	stipulated	that	all	imported	grain,	beer	and	wine	should	be	unloaded	and	put	up	for	sale	at	Hamburg,	before	onward	transport	upriver	or	on	horseback	–	the	so-called	Staple	Right.60	Hamburg’s	early	importance	as	a	trading																																																																																																																																																																			(Bremen,	1962);	Ernst	Baasch,	Die	Hansestädte	Hamburg,	Bremen	und	Lübeck	und	ihre	
Beziehungen	zu	Algier	und	Marokko	(Bremen,	2013);	Antjekathrin	Graßmann,	‘Das	Ende	souveräner	Außenpolitik	der	Hansestädte	seit	1867	–	nur	ein	Verzicht?’;	in:	Holger	Berwinkel,	Martin	Kröger	(eds),	Die	Außenpolitik	der	deutschen	Länder	im	Kaiserreich:	
Geschichte,	Akteure	und	archivische	Überlieferung	(1871-1918)	(München,	2012),	pp.	79–102	57	Graßmann,	‘Das	Ende	souveräner	Außenpolitik	der	Hansestädte	seit	1867	–	nur	ein	Verzicht?’,	p.	81	58	There	is	some	debate	about	the	authenticity	of	that	document.	Heinrich	Reincke	has	argued	that	the	charter	must	have	been	forged	in	Hamburg’s	city	hall.	See	Tratschkes	Lexikon	für	Besserwisser,	10.	September	1982,	Zeit	Online:	http://www.zeit.de/1982/37/tratschkes-lexikon-fuer-besserwisser/komplettansicht.	Accessed	12/08/2015	59	Uwe	Rada,	Die	Elbe:	Europas	Geschichte	im	Fluss	(München,	2013),	p.	210	60	Friedrich	III.,	1482	Juli	14,	Wien,	Regesta	Imperii:	http://www.regesta-imperii.de/regesten/13-20-0-friedrich-iii/nr/1482-07-14_1_0_13_20_0_281_281.html?tx_hisodat_sources%5B%40widget_0%5D%5BcurrentPage%5D=6&cHash=d9c5c976343c765f81b6a04567aab838.	Accessed	27/10/2015	
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post	is	underlined	by	the	fact	that	the	city	had	already	grown	to	roughly	the	same	size	that	it	would	still	be	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.61	Armed	with	the	 Staple	Right,	Hamburg	 extended	 and	 successfully	 defended	 its	 control	 of	 the	Elbe	 estuary	 in	 the	 following	 centuries	 against	 challenges	 by	 the	 Dukes	 of	Brunswick	and	Lüneburg	from	the	South	and	Denmark	to	the	North.		The	 Danes,	 in	 particular,	 proved	 a	 serious	 threat	 through	 the	 Danish	possession	 of	 Altona	 on	 Hamburg’s	 outskirts.	 That	 threat	 persisted	 until	 the	second	 half	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 and	 the	Gottorper	Vergleich	 –	 the	 Gottorp	Agreement	 –	 of	 1768.	 It	 is	 relevant	 to	 this	 study	 for	 two	 reasons.	 For	 one	 thing,	Danish	 Altona	 was	 the	 first	 Northern	 European	 free	 port.	 Thus	 two	 different	economic	 policies	 operated	 on	 the	 River	 Elbe:	 Hamburg	 protectionism	 versus	Altona’s	free	trade	policy,	and	that	argument	of	free	trade	versus	protective	tariffs	would	 of	 course	 become	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	 political	 discourses	 in	 the	decades	after	the	Franco-Prussian	War,	and	a	crucial	factor	in	Hamburg’s	eventual	integration	into	the	German	Empire.	The	second	aspect	of	the	earlier	rivalry	with	Altona	 that	 is	 relevant	 to	 this	 study	 is	 the	 Danish,	 or	 more	 generally,	 the	international	 angle.	 Before	 the	 unification,	 German	 territories	 were	 potentially	always	 at	 the	mercy	 of	 foreign	 powers	with	 territorial	 ambitions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Denmark,	 the	 ambition	 was	 to	 have	 Hamburg’s	 status	 of	 self-government	(confirmed	by	the	Holy	Roman	Empire’s	supreme	court,	the	Reichskammergericht,	in	1618)	revoked,	and	to	see	the	city	incorporated	into	the	chain	of	Danish	Crown	lands	 north	 of	 the	 river	 Elbe.	 It	 was	 of	 course	 a	 similar	 Danish	 attempt	 to	 ride	roughshod	over	established	constitutional	privileges	in	the	region	–	this	time	of	the	duchies	 of	 Schleswig	 and	Holstein	 –	 that	 led	 to	 the	German-Danish	war	 of	 1864	and	the	beginning	of	Bismarckian	unification.	That	process	would	ultimately	lead	Hamburg	to	re-consider	its	position	and	re-define	its	identity.	A	 large	 part	 of	 that	 identity	 had	 long	 been	 commercial.	 As	 early	 as	 1558,	Hamburg	 acquired	 a	 stock	 exchange	 –	 the	 Hamburger	 Börse	 –	 founded	 by	 the	representative	 body	 of	 the	 city’s	 merchants,	 the	 Gemeiner	 Kaufmann,	 the	predecessor	 of	 the	 Commerzdeputation	 from	 which,	 in	 turn,	 arose	 Hamburg’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	in	1867.	The	Commerzdeputation	was	founded	in	1665	and	acted	 both	 as	 the	 merchants’	 political	 voice	 in	 the	 city	 and	 as	 a	 self-regulatory																																																									61	Martin	Krieger,	Geschichte	Hamburgs	(München,	2012),	p.	32	
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body.62	The	Commerzbibliothek,	 the	 library	founded	by	the	Commerzdeputation	 in	1735,	 houses	 some	 of	 the	 sources	 upon	 which	 this	 thesis	 is	 based.	 Hamburg	history	is	to	some	extent	the	history	of	merchant	dynasties,	such	as	the	Godeffroys,	a	Huguenot	family	originally	from	La	Rochelle,	whose	firm	Joh.	Ces.	Godeffroy	&	Co.,	established	in	1766,	was	responsible	for	establishing	German	trade	with	the	South	Sea	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	would	 later	 be	 instrumental	 in	launching	German	colonialism.	The	Godeffroys	were	only	one	of	several	Hamburg	trading	 firms.	 As	 Mary	 Lindemann	 has	 argued,	 the	 city’s	 ‘seemingly	 boundless	prosperity	 rested	 almost	 entirely	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 its	 position	 in	 the	 world	market.’63	Hamburg	had	managed	 to	become	a	 trading	city	 through	and	 through:	‘while	production	 for	domestic	consumption	declined	steadily,	manufacturing	 for	export	 expanded	 greatly,	 so	 that	 by	 the	 1790s	 Hamburg	 had	 lost	 most	characteristics	of	an	artisanal	centre.’64	It	is	this	fact	that	makes	the	city	especially	interesting	to	this	thesis.		 One	 of	 the	 secrets	 of	 Hamburg’s	 economic	 success	 was	 its	 policy	 of	neutrality	in	wartime.65	This	position	proved	unsustainable	during	the	Napoleonic	Wars.	 With	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Holy	 Roman	 Empire	 in	 1806,	 following	 a	 French	ultimatum,	Hamburg’s	status	as	a	Freie	Reichsstadt	ceased.	The	French	entered	the	city	on	19	November	1806	and	 thereafter	occupied	 it	 (except	 for	brief	 intervals)	until	 1814.	 The	 French	 occupation	 was	 a	 period	 of	 considerable	 economic	hardship	 for	 Hamburg.	 Since	 Hamburg	 had	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 trade	 with	 Great	Britain,	 which	 Napoleon	 wanted	 to	 bring	 to	 its	 knees	 with	 the	 Continental	Blockade,	 it	 suffered	 a	 great	 deal	 in	 the	 resulting	 collapse	 of	 overseas	 trading	patterns.	Many	 long-established	Hamburg	 firms	 actually	 fled	 the	 city	 in	 order	 to	survive.	Worse	was	to	come.	In	1810,	Hamburg,	alongside	Bremen	and	large	parts	of	 Northern	 Germany,	 was	 actually	 annexed	 by	 France.	 Hamburg,	 it	 should	 be	noted,	lies	about	500	kilometers	beyond	France’s	present-day	borders.		French	 expansionism	 is	 significant	 not	 just	 because	 of	 its	 breath-taking	scale	 but	 because	 it	 ended	 a	 centuries-old	 tradition	 of	 self-government.	What	 is																																																									62	Kurt	Grobecker,	“Dem	heilsamen	Commercio	diensahmb”:	325	Jahre	Handelskammer	
Hamburg	(Hamburg,	1990),	pp.	29-32	63	Mary	Lindemann,	Patriots	and	Paupers:	Hamburg,	1712–1830	(Oxford,	1990),	p.	3	64	Ibid..,	p.	3	65	One	rumour	has	it	that	Hamburg’s	Navy	deliberately	came	late	for	seabattles	in	order	to	avoid	combat	but	not	the	victory	celebrations.	See	Grobecker,	325	Jahre	Handelskammer	
Hamburg,	p.	45	
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more,	all	this	was	within	living	memory	at	the	time	of	the	Franco-Prussian	war	of	1870.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 relative	 ease	 with	 which	 Hamburg	 drifted	 into	 the	Prussian	orbit	when	war	loomed	with	Napoleon	III	was	not	unconnected	with	the	shock	of	French	imperialism	under	the	first	Napoleon.	Indeed,	the	local	impact	of	the	Franzosenzeit	–	the	French	years	–	is	perfectly	illustrated	by	the	fact	that	Pierre	Godeffroy,	 brother	 of	 business	 founder	 Jean	 César	 Godeffroy,	who,	witness	 their	Christian	names,	had	been	raised	 in	a	 francophone	 family,	vowed	never	 to	speak	French	again.66		It	 has	 been	well	 noted	 that	 nothing	 in	Continental	 Europe	was	 ever	 quite	the	same	again	after	the	upheaval	of	the	Napoleonic	era.	That	was	certainly	true	of	Hamburg.	 Outwardly,	 the	 city’s	 self-rule	 was	 re-established	 at	 the	 Congress	 of	Vienna,	 within	 the	 new	 framework	 of	 the	 German	 Confederation.	 Yet	psychologically,	 the	 realisation	 that	 the	 city	 was	 vulnerable	 to	 political	 forces	beyond	its	borders	cannot	have	failed	to	have	consequences.	All	the	more	so,	since	Hamburg	quickly	lost	its	historical	staple	right	within	the	new	Deutsche	Bund.	The	Confederation	 moved	 to	 free	 all	 German	 river	 traffic	 from	 duties.	 The	
Elbschiffahrtsakte	–	the	Elbe	Navigation	Act	–	of	1821	duly	established	free	trade	on	 the	 River	 Elbe.67	Still,	 even	 though	 there	 was	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 of	 an	integrated	German	domestic	market,	via	the	Zollverein	–	the	Prussian-led	Customs	Union	–	Hamburg	was	not	at	first	prepared	to	give	up	its	status	as	a	free	port	city,	which	seemed	vital	to	trade	with	the	wider	world.68			 Indeed	 the	 1820s	 saw	 a	 final	 flourish	 of	 Hanseatic	 self-confidence	 on	 the	world	stage.	The	French	occupation	of	Spain	had	set	 in	train	the	process	of	Latin	American	 independence.	 As	 these	 erstwhile	 colonies	 began	 to	 open	 up	 to	world	trade,	 Germany’s	 Hanseatic	 cities	were	 quick	 to	 spot	 the	 opportunity.	 Delegates	from	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	Syndic	Sieveking	and	Senator	Gildemeister	were	sent	to	Brazil	 in	order	to	negotiate	a	trade	agreement	between	the	Hanseatic	Cities	of	Hamburg,	 Bremen	 and	 Lübeck	 and	 the	 Brazilian	 Emperor,	 which	 was	 signed	 in	1827.	The	Präses	of	 the	Commerzdeputation	 enthused,	 ‘Alle	die	seit	 Jahrunderten	uns	 verschlossenen,	 fast	 verborgen	 gewesenen	 Länder	 und	 Welttheile	 sind	 uns	offen	 geworden…’,	 and	 he	 was	 even	 moved	 to	 add,	 ‘Hamburg	 hat	 Colonien																																																									66	Hoffmann,	Haus	an	der	Elbchaussee,	p.	15	67	Rada,	Die	Elbe,	pp.	230–231		68	Ibid..,	p.	231	
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erhalten.’69	Germany,	it	should	be	noted,	featured	nowhere	in	this	ecstatic	account.	It	was	all	about	the	city	state	of	Hamburg.	The	moment	was	 indeed	 propitious.	 As	 Astrid	 Petersson	 has	 shown,	 Hamburg’s	merchants	were	 able	 to	 get	 their	 foot	 in	 the	 door	 of	 the	 lucrative	 sugar	 trade.70	With	the	colonial	powers	caught	up	in	the	Latin	American	Wars	of	Independence,	Hamburg’s	merchants	seized	the	chance	of	being	able	to	participate	in	direct	trade	with	 the	 West	 Indies,	 especially	 with	 Cuba.	 By	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century,	Hamburg	had	outdistanced	Bremen	in	acquiring	a	West	Indian	and	Latin	American	 trading	 empire,	 alongside	 existing	 trade	 with	 the	 East	 Indies	 and	 a	rapidly	expanding	engagement	in	Africa.71	The	figures	speak	for	themselves:	from	1815	 to	1819,	 the	 total	 value	 of	 dutiable	 imports	 amounted	 to	72,341,752	Mark	Banco,	which	was	Hamburg’s	coin	of	account.	By	1847,	dutiable	imports	had	risen	to	 114,129,520	 Mark	 Banco.	 The	 figures	 for	 dutiable	 exports	 are	 even	 more	impressive:	they	increased	from	39,673,062	Mark	Banco	in	the	years	from	1815	to	1819	to	199,868,080	Mark	Banco	in	1847.72		 The	potential	 dangers	 for	 a	 relatively	 small	 political	 entity,	 like	Hamburg,	engaging	in	activities	of	global	scale	became	apparent	a	decade	later	during	the	so-called	Panic	of	1857.	That	crisis,	which	originated	in	the	United	States	of	America,	hit	Hamburg	 hard,	 because	 the	 city	was	 a	major	 centre	 for	 finance	 (the	Bank	 of	Hamburg,	 established	 in	 1619,	 was	 one	 of	 the	 oldest	 in	 Northern	 Europe).	Hamburg	suffered	more	than	other	port	city	on	the	European	Continent.	Merchant	bankers,	combining	trade	and	finance,	were	the	predominant	type	of	merchants	in	Hamburg.	By	 issuing	 ever-larger	numbers	of	 trade	bills,	 these	merchant	bankers	attempted	to	benefit	 from	the	rising	commodity	prices	after	1848.	 In	the	process	they	exposed	 themselves	 to	a	 liquidity	 risk.	While	 the	average	rate	of	 circulating	three-month	bills	was	at	162	million	Mark	Banco	in	1855,	this	figure	rose	to	241	million	Mark	Banco	in	the	first	half	of	1857	and	reached	273	million	Mark	Banco	in	
																																																								69	In	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	chairmen	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	(or	in	this	case	the	Commerzdeputation)	carry	the	title	of	„Präses“.	For	the	quote	see:	Grobecker,	325	Jahre	
Handelskammer	Hamburg,	p.	57	70	Astrid	Petersson,	Zuckersiedergewerbe	und	Zuckerhandel	in	Hamburg	im	Zeitraum	von	
1814	bis	1834:	Entwicklung	und	Struktur	zweier	wichtiger	Hamburger	Wirtschaftszweige	
des	vorindustriellen	Zeitalters	(Stuttgart,	1998)	71	Oppel,	‘Hamburgs	und	Bremens	Stellung	im	internationalen	Warenhandel’,	p.	362	72	Eckart	Klessmann,	Geschichte	der	Stadt	Hamburg	(Hamburg,	1988),	p.	412	
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the	third	quarter	of	1857.73	A	minor	bank	failure	in	the	American	Midwest,	which	spread	 to	 the	 whole	 of	 North	 America	 and	 London,	 produced	 a	 tidal	 wave	 of	bankruptcies	 in	Hamburg.	The	 journalist	Gottfried	Cohen	concluded	 that	 the	 city	had	 not	merely	 lost	 imaginary	 riches	 but	 ‘…	 früher	mühsam	erworbenes	 Capital	dazu	und	vielleicht	gar	die	Ehre,	dieses	kostbare,	unersetzliche	Kleinod!’74			 For	 the	 second	 time	 within	 a	 generation,	 Hamburg	 had	 been	 forced	 to	accept	that	its	resources	were	insufficient	to	withstand	an	international	crisis.	The	proud	city	state	was	reduced	to	seeking	outside	help,	in	this	case	in	the	shape	of	a	loan	 amounting	 to	 10	 million	 Mark	 Banco	 in	 silver	 from	 the	 Austrian	 Empire,	which	 arrived	 in	 Hamburg	 by	 train	 in	 December	 1857.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	Hamburg	 turned	 to	Habsburg	Austria	 rather	 than	risking	dependence	on	Prussia	which,	being	on	Hamburg’s	doorstep,	seemed	uncomfortably	close.	A	decade	later,	Austro-Prussian	rivalry	and	Hamburg’s	geographical	position	meant	 that	 the	city	found	itself	firmly	in	the	Prussian	orbit.		 		
Bremen		Bremen	originated	as	a	small	settlement	called	Brema,	[from	the	Old	Low	German	
Bremun	meaning	“on	the	edge”,	probably	referring	to	the	edge	of	a	sand	dune	on	the	River	Weser].	Bremen’s	 initial	significance	was	as	 the	site	of	a	bishopric,	and	later	on,	 of	 an	archbishopric.	Early	market	 and	 toll	 privileges	 stemmed	 from	 the	ambitions	of	churchmen	seeking	to	expand	the	power	of	the	ecclesiastical	territory	of	 Bremen.75	From	 the	 twelfth	 century	 onwards,	 the	 city	 increasingly	 sought	 to	emancipate	 itself	 from	 its	 religious	 overlords,	 in	 part	 through	 trade	 with	Scandinavia,	 the	 Lower	 Weser	 and	 Westphalia. 76 	In	 the	 thirteenth	 century,	Bremen,	with	 the	 help	 of	 the	Holy	 Roman	 Emperor	Henry	 VI,	managed	 to	 grow	‘vom	 geistlichen	 Herrschaftszentrum	 mit	 angeschlossenem	 kaufmännischem																																																									73	Gerhard	Ahrens,	‘Die	Überwindung	der	Hamburgischen	Wirtschaftskrise	von	1857	im	Spannungsfeld	von	Privatinitiative	und	Staatsintervention’,	in:	ZHG	64	(1978),	pp.	1–29,	particularly	p.	7;	for	more	information	on	the	Panic	of	1857	see	also	Gerhard	Ahrens,	
Krisenmanagement	1857:	Staat	und	Kaufmannschaft	in	Hamburg	während	der	ersten	
Weltwirtschaftskrise	(Hamburg,	1986)	74	Gottfried	Cohen	quoted	in	Grobecker,	“Dem	heilsamen	Commercio	diensahmb”,	p.	67	75	See	for	example	Asmut	Brückmann,	Bremen:	Geschichte	einer	Hansestadt	(Bremen,	2008),	pp.	8–12	76	Herbert	Schwarzwälder,	Geschichte	der	Freien	Hansestadt	Bremen,	Band	1:	Von	den	
Anfängen	bis	zur	Franzosenzeit	(1810)	(Bremen	,	1995),	pp.	37–38	
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suburbium	 zu	einer	 tatsächlichen	Stadt	heran.’77	The	city	was	able	 to	 join	 trading	networks	with	Northern	Europe’s	most	significant	economic	area,	which	included	Flanders	 and	 England.	 Finally,	 Bremen’s	 leading	 families	 defeated	 Archbishop	Albert	II	in	1366,	freeing	the	city	from	ecclesiastical	rule.			 Since	Bremen’s	trading	system	was	based	on	bilateral	agreements,	the	city	was	 ambivalent	 about	 the	Hanseatic	 League.	What	 is	more,	Hanseatic	 trade	was	mostly	 conducted	 in	 and	 across	 the	 Baltic,	 whereas	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	community	 tended	 to	 look	 westward.	 Thus,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Hamburg,	 Bremen	attempted	to	stay	out	of	 the	Hanseatic	League.78	Indeed,	Bremen	only	reluctantly	joined	 the	 Hanse	 in	 1358,	 then	 went	 on	 to	 ignore	 the	 Hanseatic	 embargo	 of	Flanders	 and	 only	 supported	 the	 League	 as	 much	 as	 necessary.	 Unsurprisingly,	Bremen’s	relationship	with	the	Hanseatic	League	was	often	fraught,	with	the	city	even	expelled	from	the	League	between	1427	and	1433.	The	city	was	bursting	with	self-confidence.	 As	 Elmshäuser	 points	 out,	 ‘[die]	 Stadt	 hatte	 um	 1400	 einen	Höhepunkt	ihrer	Bedeutung	erlangt.’79			 Yet	 for	 all	 that,	 Bremen’s	 constitutional	 status	 within	 the	 Holy	 Roman	Empire	remained	unclear.	It	was	only	in	1646,	when	Emperor	Ferdinand	III	issued	the	 Linzer	Diplom,	 that	 Bremen	 formally	 became	 a	 Freie	 Reichsstadt.	 The	 Thirty	Years	 War	 and	 Germany’s	 resulting	 economic	 exhaustion,	 combined	 with	 the	tendency	of	the	River	Weser	to	sand	up,	delayed	Bremen’s	economic	development	in	the	Early	Modern	period.		 This	 changed	 during	 Bremen’s	 prosperous	 eighteenth	 century.	 The	 city’s	merchants	 expanded	 their	 trading	 relations	 to	 Africa	 and	 the	 Caribbean,	 and	started	 to	 directly	 import	 those	 exotic	 and	 valuable	 goods	 which	 were	 later	 to	become	Bremen’s	main	trading	goods,	such	as	tobacco,	cotton,	coffee	and	sugar.80	As	in	the	case	of	Hamburg,	Bremen’s	prosperity	and	independence	ended	abruptly	with	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	French	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	nineteenth	 century.	Again,	like	Hamburg,	Bremen	was	annexed	by	Napoleon	and	was	only	able	to	reclaim	its	political	independence	at	the	Congress	of	Vienna.	Alongside	Hamburg	and	Lübeck,	Bremen	became	a	sovereign	member	of	the	Deutsche	Bund.		
																																																								77	Konrad	Elmhäuser,	Geschichte	Bremens	(München,	2007),	p.	32	78	See	Elmhäuser,	Geschichte	Bremens,	pp.	27–42	79	Ibid..,	p.	38	
80	Elmhäuser,	Geschichte	Bremens,	p.	64	
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	 Like	 Hamburg,	 Bremen	 sought	 to	 re-establish	 and	 expand	 its	 overseas	connections	 after	 1815.	 Already	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 once	 the	North	American	ports	became	open	to	traders	of	any	nation,	Bremen’s	merchants	had	 begun	 to	 establish	 branch	 offices	 there.	 After	 the	 Napoleonic	 Wars,	 these	relations	were	revived.	As	a	result,	in	1827,	the	three	Hanseatic	Cities	of	Bremen,	Hamburg	and	Lübeck	were	able	to	conclude	an	agreement	with	the	United	States.	In	this	contract	both	parties	guaranteed	to	one	another	the	rights	of	most-favoured	states.	 Ludwig	 Beutin	 argues	 that	 this	 contract	 was	 important	 for	 the	 whole	 of	Germany,	 as	 it	 established	 the	 framework	 for	 German-American	 economic	relations	for	almost	a	century.81	Furthermore,	in	1846,	after	a	competitive	bidding	war	and	a	lot	of	lobbying	work,	Bremen	also	triumphed	over	Antwerp	and	became	the	 first	 continental	 European	 destination	 for	 an	 American-subsidised	 regular	steam	ship	post	line	–	the	Postdampferverbindung.82			 North	 America	 became	 Bremen’s	 most	 important	 trading	 partner	 and	remained	so	until	the	First	World	War.	Between	1840	and	1850,	an	average	of	20–30	per	 cent	of	 total	 imports	 to	Bremen	came	 from	North	America.	 For	Bremen’s	exports	 this	 number	 is	 even	 higher;	 in	 the	 same	 period,	 40–50	 per	 cent	 of	 total	exports	went	 to	North	America.83	In	 this	North	American	 trade,	 tobacco	played	a	crucial	role,	especially	from	the	1830s	onwards.	During	the	1850s,	Bremen	became	Europe’s	leading	tobacco	importer.	Its	imports	from	North	America	accounted	for	about	a	quarter	of	North	America’s	total	tobacco	production.84	From	1821	to	1850,	Bremen’s	tobacco	imports	increased	by	a	staggering	600	per	cent,	from	70,000	to	420,000	 quintals,	 of	 which	 about	 two	 thirds	 came	 from	 North	 America.	 Other	significant	 imports	 from	or	via	North	America	 included	whale	oil,	 rice	and	goods	like	 coffee	 and	 sugar.	 American	 cotton,	 which	 became	 highly	 important	 for	Bremen’s	merchants,	 only	 gained	 significance	 from	 the	middle	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century	onwards.85			 Bremen’s	exports	 to	North	America	mostly	consisted	of	emigrants.	 In	 fact,	emigration	was	a	pre-requisite	for	Bremen’s	trade	with	North	America.	It	allowed																																																									81	Beutin,	Bremen	und	Amerika,	pp.	29–32	82	Rübner,	Konzentration	und	Krise,p.	33	83	Rainer	Wallentin,	‘Schiffahrt	und	Zugfahrt’,	in	Heide	Gerstenberger,	Zwischen	Ankunft	
und	Abfahrt:	Zur	Geschichte	des	Bremer	Hauptbahnhofs	(Bremen,	1989),	pp.	11–106,	here	p.	12	84	Tessmer,	Bremische	Handelsbeziehungn,	p.	12	85	Beutin,	Bremen	und	Amerika,	pp.	34–39	
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Bremen’s	merchants	to	use	the	empty	shipping	space	on	the	way	to	North	America	and,	 therefore,	 to	 make	 American	 imports	 more	 profitable.	 Between	 1839	 and	1847,	the	number	of	people	emigrating	via	Bremen	increased	almost	tenfold	from	3,500	to	33,700.86		 Crucial	 to	 Bremen’s	 success	 during	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 was	 the	foundation	of	a	new	port	 facility	on	 the	North	Sea	 coast.	This	 solved	all	 customs	issues	 with	 the	 Grand	 Duchy	 of	 Oldenburg	 along	 the	 lower	 Weser	 and	 the	recurring	 problem	 of	 the	 sanding	 up	 of	 the	 Weser.	 Already	 in	 1816,	 at	 the	
Bundestag	in	Frankfurt,	Senator	Smidt	–the	father	of	Bremerhaven	–	had	suggested	building	 a	 port	 on	 the	 Hanoverian	 side	 of	 the	Weser	 estuary.	 However,	 at	 that	point,	Bremen’s	Senate	 regarded	 these	plans	as	unfeasible.	 It	was	not	until	1825	that	 Smidt,	 who	 had	 become	 Bremen’s	 Burgomaster	 in	 1821,	 resumed	 the	discussions	 about	 founding	 a	 port	 on	 the	 North	 Sea	 coast.	 Thereupon,	 Smidt	entered	negotiations	with	the	Kingdom	of	Hanover,	culminating	in	an	agreement	in	1827	with	George	IV	of	Hanover	(and	Great	Britain),	allowing	Bremen	to	purchase	Hanoverian	 land.	 In	September	1830,	Bremen	was	able	 to	open	 its	new	port,	 the	
Bremer	Hafen.	Today,	this	port	is	known	as	Bremerhaven	and	it	remains	part	of	the	City	 of	 Bremen.87	The	 foundation	 of	 Bremerhaven	 was	 a	 clear	 indication	 of	 the	significance	of	overseas	trade	to	Bremen	and	its	mercantile	community.88			 The	creation	of	Bremerhaven	was	 complemented	by	 the	 construction	of	 a	railway	 line	 between	 Hanover	 and	 Bremen	 in	 1847,	 which	 opened	 up	 the	hinterland	to	Bremen’s	merchants.89	With	this	new	railway	line	it	was	possible	for	emigrants	from	as	far	as	the	South	West	of	Germany	to	easily	access	Bremen	and	then	 to	 cross	 the	 Atlantic.90	The	 railway	 line	 was	 necessary	 because	 the	 Weser																																																									86	Wallentin,	‘Schiffahrt	und	Zugfahrt’,	p.	14	87	For	more	information	on	the	foundation	of	Bremerhaven,	see	the	chapter	on	‘Die	Gründung	Bremerhavens’	in	Herbert	Schwarzwälder,	Geschichte	der	Freien	Hansestadt	
Bremen,	Band	2.	Von	der	Franzosenzeit	bis	zum	Ersten	Weltkrieg	(1810–1918)	(Bremen,	1995),	pp.	121–134	88	Even	though	Elmshäuser	argues	that	the	investments	into	Bremerhaven	only	resulted	in	a	drastic	increase	of	Bremen’s	imports	and	exports	in	the	1840s,	it	certainly	helped	the	city	to	retain	its	position	as	an	important	German	seaport.	See	Elmhäuser,	Geschichte	
Bremens,	p.	73	89	For	a	more	detailed	investigation	of	the	relationship	between	shipping	and	the	construction	of	a	train	line,	see	Wallentin,	‘Schiffahrt	und	Zugfahrt’	90	See	for	example:	James	Boyd,	An	Investigation	into	the	Structural	Causes	of	German-
American	Mass	Migration	in	the	Nineteenth	Century	(unpublished	PhD,	Cardiff,	2013),	pp.	122–123	
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winds	its	way	picturesquely	from	nowhere	to	nowhere,	while	Hamburg,	thanks	to	the	 Elbe	 and	 its	 tributaries,	 had	 a	 huge	 catchment	 area.	 At	 first,	 the	majority	 of	Bremen’s	 merchants	 had	 refused	 to	 financially	 support	 the	 construction	 of	 a	railway	to	Bremen.	It	was	only	in	the	1840s	that	the	railway	question	gained	some	importance.	Arnold	Duckwitz,	a	merchant	and	politician	from	Bremen,	and	a	group	of	 ‘second	 hand	 merchants’,	 which	 defines	 the	 group	 of	 merchants	 that	 were	trading	with	the	inland,	then	successfully	headed	the	pressure	group	for	a	railway.	The	 railway	 line	 between	 Hanover	 and	 Bremen	 was	 opened	 to	 the	 public	 in	December	1847.	Wallentin	demonstrates	 that	 the	building	of	 the	 railway	did	not	only	 improve	 Bremen’s	 connections	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 Germany,	 but	 also	 helped	Bremen	 in	 becoming	 Europe’s	 most	 important	 cotton	 and	 rice	 trading	 centre.	There	was	a	close	connection	between	Bremen’s	port	and	the	new	central	station.	Between	 1851	 and	 1865,	 the	 railway’s	 share	 of	 Bremen’s	 total	 goods	 traffic	increased	 from	 40	 per	 cent	 to	 80	 per	 cent.91	Furthermore,	 the	 railway	 offered	 a	major	 advantage	 to	 Bremen	 in	 increasing	 its	 share	 in	 the	 emigration	 business.	Once	companies	from	Bremen	had	opened	a	joint	office	in	Cologne,	emigrants	were	able	to	book	journeys	from	their	hometowns	directly	to	their	desired	destinations,	and	even	at	reduced	railways	rates.92				 It	 is	 against	 this	 background	 that	 we	 have	 to	 understand	 Bremen’s	development	 after	 the	 Reichsgründung.	 At	 that	 time,	 according	 to	 Oppel,	 it	 was	only	the	Hanseatic	Cities	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen	that	were	involved	in	overseas	trade	 outside	 Europe.93	However,	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	 Empire	 brought	new	tasks	to	the	City	of	Bremen.			
Emden		Like	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen,	 Emden	 has	 a	 long-standing	 history	 as	 a	 port	 city.	Located	in	East	Frisia,	the	city’s	name	originates	from	its	location	at	the	mouth	of	the	River	Ehe	(or	Aa)	into	the	River	Ems.	Emden’s	foundation	was	most	likely	part	of	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 North-South	 connection	 between	 East	 Frisia	 and	Westphalia	 in	 the	ninth	 century.	Thereafter,	 the	 city	grew	along	with	 the	 coastal																																																									91	See	the	chapter	on	‘Durch	die	Eisenbahn	wurde	Bremen	Europas	führender	Reis-	und	Baumwollhafen’	in	Wallentin,	‘Schiffahrt	und	Zugfahrt’,	pp.	94–101	92	Engelsing,	Bremen	als	Auswandererhafen,	p.	143	93	See	Oppel,	‘Stellung	im	internationalen	Warenhandel’,	p.	361	
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and	 Baltic	 trade.	While	 this	 trade	 centred	 on	 the	 estuaries	 of	 the	 Rhine	 and	 the	Maas/Meuse,	 the	 area	 between	 East	 Frisia	 and	 the	 River	 Weser	 also	 benefited.	Eckart	Krömer	has	emphasised	the	profitability	of	this	trade,	arguing	that	only	the	great	urban	centres	of	Paris,	Saint-Omer,	Liège,	Maastricht	and	Cologne	surpassed	the	population	density	in	West	Frisia	by	around	900.	According	to	Krömer,	it	can	be	 assumed	 that	 the	 population	 density	 was	 similarly	 high	 in	 East	 Frisia.94	Significantly,	during	the	tenth	and	eleventh	century,	Frisians	had	already	started	to	do	business	on	cash	terms.95		 Although	the	territorial	sovereignty	had	lain	in	the	hands	of	the	Bishops	of	Münster	 since	 1253,	 local	 chiefs	 wielded	 actual	 power.	 After	 some	 colourful	episodes	 involving	 piracy,	 which	 provoke	 the	 ire	 of	 the	 Hanseatic	 League	 (and	resulted	in	Hamburg	actually	taking	over	Emden	for	a	while),	the	town	and	its	port	grew	steadily	 in	 the	 fifteenth	century,	with	 the	crucial	Staple	Right	confirmed	by	Emperor	Maximilian	I	in	1494.			 Emden	 rose	 to	 European	 significance	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 when	 it	exploited	 exceptionally	 propitious	 economic	 and	 political	 circumstances	 on	 its	doorstep.	During	the	conflicts	between	France	and	the	Habsburg	Emperor	Charles	V,	the	French	blockaded	the	Dutch	ports.	Emden	was	thus	able	to	establish	itself	as	an	 alternative	 to	 Antwerp	 and	 Amsterdam.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Westphalia’s	increasing	demand	for	grain	imports	from	the	Baltic	–	due	to	the	shift	of	iron	and	linen	production	 to	rural	areas	–	gave	Emden	a	second	 income	stream,	 the	more	obvious	 route	 up	 the	 Rhine	 having	 been	 likewise	 blocked	 off	 by	 the	 French.	Suddenly,	 opportunity	 seemed	 to	 beckon	 everywhere	 for	 Emden.	 The	 town’s	merchants	became	involved	in	the	salt	trade	from	Western	France	and	Portugal	to	the	Netherlands	 and	 in	wine	 exports	 from	France	 to	 the	Baltic.	 Emden	 even	 got	involved	in	the	overseas	trade	with	Brazil	at	the	end	of	the	century.	In	most	cases,	the	 reason	 for	 this	 trading	 relationship	 was	 political:	 many	 Portuguese	 traders	feared	 the	British	privateers	on	 their	 journey	back	 to	Lisbon.	Still,	 there	are	also	cases	of	journeys	to	Brazil	that	started	from	Emden.	For	example,	in	1599,	a	vessel	
																																																								94	Krömer,	Kleine	Wirtschaftsgeschichte,	p.	18	95	Ibid..,	p.	18	
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was	 for	 the	 first	 time	 sent	 directly	 to	 Brazil,	 most	 likely	 sailing	 under	 Emden’s	flag.96			 This	dazzling	rise	–	Heinrich	Schmidt	has	called	 it	 ‘ein	glitzernder	Zug	des	Außergewöhnlichen,	 auf	 fragile	Weise	 Zeitbedingten’	 –	was	 in	 some	ways	highly	contingent.97	Protestant	 refugees	 fleeing	 Spanish	 (Habsburg)	 persecution	 in	 the	Netherlands	in	1550	and	then	again	in	1567/68,	provided	Emden	with	an	influx	of	skilled	artisans	and	merchants.	The	Company	of	Merchant	Adventurers	of	London,	trading	 in	 cloth,	 also	 repeatedly	 moved	 from	 their	 staple	 port	 of	 Antwerp	 to	Emden.	 The	 extra	 consumers	 in	 Emden,	 in	 turn,	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	important	herring	fishery.		 Things	 began	 to	 turn	 against	 Emden	when	 the	Dutch	 got	 the	 upper	 hand	against	the	Spanish	in	Northern	parts	of	the	Netherlands,	and	the	refugees	began	to	 head	 home	 again	 in	 large	 numbers.	 Emden,	 though	 weakened,	 managed	 to	maintain	 its	role	as	a	central	 import	port	 for	some	time.98	According	to	Wolfgang	Schöningh,	 the	 most	 devastating	 blow	 to	 Emden’s	 economy	 was	 not	 the	remigration	 of	 Dutch	 Protestants	 but	 the	 shifting	 of	 the	 river	 channel	 in	 the	sixteenth	century.99	From	this	point	onwards,	the	issue	of	the	water	level	became	the	bane	of	Emden	shipping.			 In	 1595,	 the	 people	 of	 Emden,	 predominantly	members	 of	 the	 (Calvinist)	Reformed	 Church,	 revolted	 against	 their	 Lutheran	 overlord,	 the	 count	 of	 East	Friesland.	 With	 the	 help	 of	 Dutch	 troops,	 Emden	 became	 a	 self-governing	 city-state,	 whose	 independence	 was	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 States	 General	 of	 the	Netherlands.	The	city	was	now	increasingly	influenced	by	the	Netherlands,	which	resulted	 in	 the	 virtual	 termination	 of	 trade	 with	 Westphalia.	 Emden	 thus	experienced	 in	 the	 early	 sixteenth	 century	 what	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 would	experience	 only	 two	 centuries	 later,	 namely	 that	 small	 city-states	 can	 become	pawns	 in	 the	 conflict	 of	 greater	 powers.	 Emden	 attempted	 at	 first	 to	 remain	neutral	in	the	Dutch	War	of	Independence	against	Spain,	but	when	in	1602	Dutch	soldiers	were	allowed	into	the	city,	Emden’s	trade	with	Spain	ended	abruptly.	The	city’s	central	position	 in	European	trade	was	 lost	within	a	 few	months	and	could																																																									96	Bernhard	Hagedorn,	Ostfrieslands	Handel	und	Schiffahrt	vom	Ausgang	des	16.	
Jahrhunderts	bis	zum	Westfälischen	Frieden	(1580-1648)	(Berlin,	1912),	pp.	408–409	97	Heinrich	Schmidt,	Politische	Geschichte	Ostfrieslands	(Leer,	1975),	p.	183	98	Ibid..,	p.	200	99	Schöningh,	Überblick	über	die	Geschichte	der	Stadt	Emden,	p.	13	
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not	be	recovered	thereafter.	The	town,	as	Schmidt	puts	it,	‘…	sank	wirtschaftlich	in	den	Schatten	Hollands,	Hamburgs	und	Bremens	ab,	und	ihre	Situation	sowohl	wie	ihre	Politik	bot	dem	abgewanderten	Handel	kaum	Anreize	zur	Rückkehr.’100				 That	situation	more	or	less	prevailed	until	the	nineteenth	century,	 in	spite	of	 some	 efforts	 to	 revive	 trade,	 notably	 the	 Brandenburgisch-Afrikanische	
Compagnie	 founded	 in	 1682	 by	 the	 Great	 Elector,	 Frederick	 William	 of	Brandenburg.101	In	1684,	the	company’s	headquarters	were	moved	to	Emden	but	the	 Brandenburgisch-Afrikanische	 Compagnie	 did	 not	 meet	 with	 lasting	 success.	After	 a	 re-launch	 as	 Brandenburgisch-Africanische-Americanische	 Compagnie	 in	1692,	the	company	was	finally	dissolved	in	1711.			 Brandenburg’s	–	and	thus	Prussia’s	–	interest	in	Emden	stemmed	from	the	fact	that	historically	Prussia’s	ports	had	all	been	considerably	to	the	north-east	of	Berlin,	whereas	prior	 to	eighteenth-century	canal	building	efforts,	Brandenburg’s	waterways	 all	 led	west	 to	 the	North	 Sea.	Brandenburg-Prussia	was	 thus	 keen	 to	acquire	from	the	Emperor	Leopold	I	the	right	of	succession	to	the	County	of	East	Friesland	 (where	 the	 male	 lineage	 was	 about	 to	 become	 extinct).	 In	 1744,	 the	region	 duly	 fell	 to	 Prussia,	 which	 also	 signalled	 the	 end	 of	 Emden’s	 city-state	status.	For	Emden,	the	loss	of	independence	seemed	tolerable,	since	in	exchange	it	gained	 access	 to	 a	new	hinterland.	As	 the	kingdom’s	 only	North	 Sea	port,	 it	was	pivotal	to	Prussian	trade	policy	–	Frederick	the	Great	did	not	come	all	the	way	to	Emden	twice	for	no	reason.	Emden	was	transformed	into	a	free	port	in	1751,	thus	becoming	 Germany’s	 second	 free	 port	 city	 (in	 1664,	 Danish-ruled	 Altona	 had	become	 Germany’s	 first	 port	 city).	 Furthermore,	 between	 1751	 and	 1766,	chartered	companies	for	the	trade	with	Asia	(founded	in	1750),	Bengal	(1753)	and	with	 the	 Levantine	 (1766)	 were	 founded	 (plans	 for	 an	 East	 India	 Chartered	Company	were	not	realised).	From	1769	until	1781,	a	new	river	channel	was	dug	in	order	 to	stop	silting-up.	While	 the	success	of	 the	various	chartered	companies	was	moderate,	 overall	 Emden’s	 economy	 experienced	 a	more	 significant	 upturn,	making	 Prussian	 rule	 a	 Silver	 Age	 to	 Emden’s	 Golden	 Age	 during	 the	 sixteenth	century.	Here	too,	as	in	Bremen	and	Hamburg,	everything	changed	with	the	arrival	of	French	troops	and	the	annexation	that	followed.	French	rule	marked	the	nadir	of	Emden’s	fortunes.																																																									100	Schmidt,	Politische	Geschichte	Ostfrieslands,	p.	261	101	For	more	information	on	this	topic	see	van	der	Heyden,	Rote	Adler	an	Afrikas	Küste	
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	 Things	 did	 not	 improve	 much	 at	 the	 Congress	 of	 Vienna,	 when	 East	Friesland	 became	 part	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Hanover.	 Emden	 was	 at	 the	 furthest	fringes	of	 the	expanded	Hanoverian	 territory,	 and	 relief	 came	only	decades	 later	when	 the	 new	 railway	 line	 linking	 Emden	 via	 Papenburg	 to	 Lingen	 due	 south	began	to	open	up	new	markets.	Overall,	Hanoverian	rule	was	marked	by	economic	stagnation	 and	 a	 resulting	 nostalgia	 for	 the	 town’s	 Prussian	 era.	 Unsurprisingly,	the	 majority	 of	 Emden’s	 citizenry	 sided	 with	 the	 Prussians	 during	 the	 Austro-Prussian	 War	 of	 1866	 (whereas	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Hanover	 had	 fought	 alongside	Austria).	Although	 it	was	hoped	that	Emden	would	 immediately	benefit	 from	the	Prussian	takeover,	 it	had	little	effect,	at	 first,	on	Emden’s	economy.	Things	would	only	change	after	the	creation	of	the	German	Empire.			 	
Wilhelmshaven		Wilhelmshaven	 is	 a	 case	 apart.	 It	 completely	 lacked	 the	 centuries-old	 trading	traditions	of	Hamburg,	Bremen	and	Emden.102	In	fact	 it	 lacked	history	altogether.	At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Prussian	 purchase	 in	 1853,	 only	 123	 people	 in	 twenty-odd	hovels	 lived	 on	 the	 land	 upon	 which	 Wilhelmshaven	 would	 be	 built.103 	The	Prussian	incentive	for	building	a	port	on	the	German	North	Sea	coast	was	certainly	dictated	by	strategic	considerations,	as	it	would	be	Prussia’s	only	direct	access	to	the	 North	 Sea	 –	 a	 challenge	 of	 Hanoverian	 supremacy	 in	 the	 area.	 Oldenburg’s	decision	 to	 sell	 the	 land	 was	 partly	 territorial	 –	 it	 had	 an	 eye	 on	 the	 county	 of	Kniphausen	 –	 and	partly	 economic.	 The	 perennially	 cash-strapped	Grand	Duchy,	entirely	 lacking	in	natural	resources	or	major	 industry,	regarded	the	 likely	needs	of	a	Prussian	port	as	its	best	chance	of	being	connected	to	the	growing	rail	network	in	Germany.			 Negotiations	began	in	August	1852,	shortly	after	Prussia	had	acquired	two	vessels	 from	 the	 former	 Bundesflotte	 –	 the	 old	 Federal	 Fleet	 of	 the	 German	Confederation.	The	main	participants	 in	 these	negotiations	were	Samuel	Gottlieb	Kerst	 on	 the	 Prussian	 side	 and	 Albrecht	 Johannes	 Theodor	 Erdmann	 on	 the	Oldenburg	side.	Martin	Wein	has	argued	that	an	essential	reason	for	the	formation																																																									102	Even	though	de	facto	Wilhelmshaven	did	not	receive	its	town	charter	until	1919,	it	was	commonly	referred	to	as	the	City	of	Wilhelmshaven.	This	thesis	will	adopt	this	usage,	as	refering	to	it	as	a	rural	muncipiality	would	not	adequately	describe	its	status	at	the	time.			103	Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen,	p.	34	
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of	 the	 treaty	 was	 the	 ‘enge	 persönliche	 Verbundenheit	 der	 beiden	Vertragsführer’.104	With	 the	help	of	Ernst	Gaebler	on	 the	Prussian	side,	 the	 three	negotiators	managed	to	conclude	the	treaty	in	less	than	a	year.	It	was	also	Gaebler	who	 eventually	 signed	 the	 “Vertrag	 wegen	 Übernahme	 des	 Schutzes	 des	Oldenburgischen	 Seehandels	 und	 der	 Oldenburgischen	 Küsten,	 sowie	 der	Abtretung	 zweier	 Gebietsteile	 im	 Jadebusen	 an	 die	 Krone	 Preußens”	 on	 July	 20	1853.	 It	 goes	without	 saying	 that	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 treaty	 dealt	with	 the	military	 protection	 of	 Oldenburg’s	merchant	 fleet.	 Significantly,	 article	 13	 of	 the	treaty	 stated	 that	 Prussia	 would	 forego	 any	 intentions	 of	 constructing	 a	commercial	port	or	even	just	a	trading	city.	The	Grand	Duchy	of	Oldenburg	wanted	to	benefit	as	much	as	possible	from	the	upcoming	construction	of	Wilhelmshaven	and	hence	the	influx	of	craftsmen	and	businessmen	was	also	limited	to	the	actual	need	 of	 the	 new	 city.	 	 In	 a	 subsequent	 treaty	 between	 Prussia	 and	 Oldenburg,	signed	on	February	16	1864,	 the	 limitation	of	Wilhelmshaven’s	use	 to	 a	military	port	was	then	revoked.105			 On	 23	 November	 1854,	 more	 than	 a	 year	 after	 the	 Jade	 treaty	 was	concluded,	 Prince	 Adalbert	 of	 Prussia,	 in	 his	 capacity	 of	 admiral	 of	 the	 Prussian	Navy,	 solemnly	 received	 the	 area	 of	 around	 400	 acres	 from	 Oldenburg.	 The	ceremony	 took	 place	 in	 the	middle	 of	 nowhere,	 followed	 by	 a	 meal	 at	 a	 tavern	nearby.	 All	 in	 all,	 the	 Prince	 had	 stayed	 no	more	 than	 three	 hours.	 It	 is	 not	 for	nothing	that	a	well-known	local	doggerel	warns,	‘Und	wen	Gott	will	bestrafen,	den	schickt	er	nach	Wilhelmshaven.’106		Prussia	had	gained	sovereign	power	over	 the	 territory.	 It	now	had	 to	buy	the	 land	 itself	 from	 its	 respective	 owners.	 Only	 once	 this	 was	 successfully	completed	 could	 the	 construction	 work	 begin.	 Progress	 was	 slow.	 By	 1869,	construction	 was	 still	 unfinished	 and	 so	 Prussia	 decided	 to	 stage	 a	 symbolic	inauguration	 –	 after	 all,	 the	 new	port	 had	 not	 even	 received	 a	 name	 as	 yet.	 The	King,	Wilhelm	I,	chose	to	name	the	city	after	Himself.	Local	officials	then	spelt	the	new	 name	 of	 Wilhelmshaven	 with	 a	 “v”,	 which	 is	 the	 Low	 German	 spelling.	 In	Berlin	 this	 was	 changed	 to	 Wilhelmshafen,	 the	 orthographically	 correct	 High																																																									104	Ibid..,	p.	48	105	According	to	Wein,	the	restriction	on	trade	had	become	obsolete	by	this	point,	which	is	why	it	was	revoked.	For	more	information	on	the	details	of	the	treaty	between	Prussia	and	Oldenburg	signed	in	1864:		Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen,	pp.	85–90	106	Theo	Schuster	quoted	in	Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen,	p.	31	
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German	variant.	When	King	was	asked	by	his	minister	of	war,	Albrecht	von	Roon,	which	of	the	two	spellings	he	preferred,	the	King	chose	the	Low	German	version,	adding:	‘Ich	habe	es	ja	auch	gleich	so	ausgesprochen,	lieber	Roon.’107	There	is	only	one	 thing	 to	 add	 to	 this	 brief	 overview:	 in	 1873,	 the	 administration	 of	Wilhelmhaven	was	transferred	from	the	admiralty	to	the	civil	authorities,	and	thus	the	Province	of	Hanover.		It	is	important	to	take	away	from	this	overview	of	the	four	cities	that	three	of	 their	 mercantile	 communities	 were	 used	 to	 bolster	 the	 reputation	 of	 their	individual	port	cities.	Hamburg	acted	as	the	gateway	to	the	large	hinterland	along	the	Elbe;	Bremen	played	a	similar	role	further	west	on	the	River	Weser.	Emden’s	self-image,	 though	the	remarkably	prosperous	years	of	 the	sixteenth	century	had	long	 passed,	 revolved	 around	 the	 hope	 that	 former	 glories	 might	 perhaps	 be	regained	 if	 the	 town	was	 to	 become	 the	 principal	 port	 leading	 to	 and	 from	 the	industrial	 Ruhr	 area.	 Thus,	 the	 question	 that	 has	 to	 be	 asked	 is	 how	 these	competing	 and	 traditionally	 self-contained	 cities	 got	 along	with	 each	 other	 once	they	became	part	of	a	greater	whole,	in	other	words	the	new	German	nation	state.	As	will	have	become	apparent,	Hamburg	and	Bremen	(and	Lübeck	further	afield)	were	used	 to	 striking	 their	own	deals	and	negotiating	 their	 treaties	with	 trading	partners	up	 to	 the	 foundation	of	 the	Kaiserreich.	 Emden	hoped	 for	 support	 from	the	Prussian	kingdom,	and	only	Wilhelmshaven	was	unconditionally	Prussian	from	the	outset.				
	
d.	Methodology	and	Aims		This	 thesis	 needs	 to	 be	 situated	 within	 the	 current	 debate	 between	 maritime	historians	 and	 practitioners	 of	 “new	 thalassology”,	 as	 described	 by	 Gelina	Harlaftis.108	Supporters	 of	 this	 new	 rivalling	 sub-field	 of	 history	 have	 criticised	maritime	 history	 for	 its	 narrow	 specialisation.	 Harlaftis	 offers	 six	 areas	 of	disagreement	 between	 maritime	 historians,	 who	 reject	 all	 accusations	 of	narrowness,	 and	 the	 practitioners	 of	 the	 new	 ‘thalassology’.	 Not	 all	 of	 these	 are	relevant	to	this	study	but	it	is	worth	looking	into	some	parts	of	this	discussion,	for																																																									107	Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen,	p.	96	108	For	the	discussion	see	Harlaftis,	‘Maritime	History	or	the	History	of	Thalassa’,	pp.	213-220	
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it	 also	 opens	 up	 the	 question	 of	 how	 research	 in	 maritime	 history,	 such	 as	 the	present	one,	should	be	conducted.		 This	thesis	is	a	study	in	maritime	history.	However,	since	‘maritime	history	or	 the	 history	 of	 thalassa	 means	 different	 things	 to	 different	 historians’,	 a	clarification	regarding	the	aims	of	this	research	may	be	helpful	at	this	point.109	In	the	present	study,	the	analysis	will	be	centred	on	the	second	of	Frank	Broeze’s	six	categories	of	traditional	maritime	history.	This	category	can	be	summed	up	as	‘the	use	of	the	sea	for	transport;	the	sea	as	a	means	of	communication,	of	carrying	and	cargoes,	 of	 the	 development	 of	 ports	 and	 port	 cities	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	hinterland’.110	This	 broad	 definition	 leads	 to	 the	 question	 of	what	might	 prompt	advocates	 of	 “new	 thalassology”	 to	 criticise	 a	 study	 in	 maritime	 history	 as	 too	narrow.		 One	of	the	reasons	suggested	by	Harlaftis	is	the	fact	that	maritime	history	is	still	widely	associated	with	social	and	economic	history.	According	to	Harlaftis,	this	is	why	the	field	of	maritime	history	suffered	badly	during	the	cultural	turn	of	the	1990s.	 In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 “new	 thalassology”	 regards	 itself	 as	 a	 more	interdisciplinary	 and	 global	 form	 of	 investigating	 the	 sea	 and	 its	 economic	utilisation.	Additionally,	critics	of	maritime	history	argue	that	maritime	historians	have	not	paid	enough	attention	to	what	is	vital	to	their	field:	the	sea.	Closely	linked	to	 this	 is	 another	 point	 raised	 by	 the	 champions	 of	 “new	 thalassology”:	 the	apparent	 lack	 of	 ‘globalness’	 of	maritime	 history.	 Even	 though	maritime	 history	deals	with	the	sea	and	the	global	connections	that	are	formed	by	using	the	sea,	this	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	all	maritime	histories	are	global.	Finally,	Harlaftis	points	to	the	unclear	relationship	between	maritime	history	and	colonial	history.	Generally	 speaking,	 ‘maritime	history	 has	 profited	 from	historians	who	 consider	themselves	 as	 working	 in	 different	 historical	 fields	 but	 are	 involved	 with	 their	maritime	aspects.’111			 The	critique	suggested	by	the	supporters	of	“new	thalassology”	leads	to	the	question	 of	 how	 present-day	 research	 in	 maritime	 history	 should	 ideally	 be	conducted.	When	 examining	 the	 second	 of	 Broeze’s	 categories,	 it	 seems	 vital	 to	include	an	economic	viewpoint,	since	port	cities	exist	 in	order	to	generate	profit.																																																									109	Harlaftis,	‘Maritime	History	or	the	History	of	Thalassa’,	p.	211	110	Ibid..,	p.	212	111	Ibid..,	p.	218	
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Yet,	the	cities	examined	in	this	thesis	also	operated	in	a	cultural	setting.	In	three	of	the	 cities	 –	 the	 exception	 being	 Wilhemshaven	 –	 trade	 was	 a	 long-established	institution,	which	contributed	 in	 large	measure	 to	 the	cities’	self-conception.	 It	 is	thus,	for	instance,	not	surprising	that	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	is	situated	directly	 opposite	 the	 City	 Hall	 and	 that	 Hamburg’s	 City	 Hall	 abutted	 on	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce.	Therefore,	 the	methodology	adopted	 in	 this	 thesis	would	be	in	line	with	what	practitioners	of	“new	thalassology”	would	expect	of	a	modern	maritime	historical	analysis.		 On	 the	other	hand,	 these	critical	points	should	not	 lead	one	 to	neglect	 the	port	 cities,	 since	 these	are	 at	 least	 equally	 important	 as	 analyses	of	 the	 sea.	 It	 is	certainly	appropriate	to	argue	that	maritime	history	cannot	 ignore	the	sea	but	at	the	same	time	it	is	impossible	to	understand	the	sea	without	an	awareness	of	the	situation	 on	 its	 shores.	 Similarly,	 accusing	 maritime	 history	 of	 not	 realising	 its	global	potential	does	not	mean	that	maritime	historians	can	neglect	examinations	of	 regional	 developments.	 Harlaftis	 is	 right	 in	 reminding	 us	 that	 ‘what	maritime	history	has	done	is	to	provide	a	methodology	for	linking	the	local,	the	regional,	the	national,	the	international,	the	global,	so	giving	us	the	possibility	of	comparing	the	small	 and	 the	 unimportant,	 the	 big	 and	 the	 important,	 the	 everyday	 life,	 the	material	 culture	 and	 the	 transactions	 of	 the	 most	 remote	 places	 around	 the	world.’112	The	 local,	 the	regional	and	 the	national	are	what	 this	 thesis	sets	out	 to	link.	Furthermore,	since	Germany’s	colonial	history	is	utterly	different	from	any	of	the	 colonial	 histories	 of	 the	 other	 European	 powers,	 a	 maritime	 history	 of	Germany’s	North	Sea	ports	should	include	at	least	a	glance	at	colonial	history.	By	doing	all	this,	the	present	examination	will	able	to	offer	a	more	rounded	account.			 Today,	Germany	 is	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 trading	 and	 shipping	nations	 in	 the	world.	 Yet	 less	 than	 one	 and	 a	 half	 centuries	 ago,	 there	 was	 neither	 a	 national	government	 nor	 a	 common	 shipping	 and	 trade	 policy	 in	 Germany.	 This	 thesis	therefore	 seeks	 to	 trace	 the	 developments,	 starting	 with	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	German	 Empire	 in	 1871,	 that	 would	 produce	 within	 a	 few	 decades	 one	 of	 the	leading	players	in	international	trade.	In	the	process	the	thesis	will	examine	how	these	cities	changed	economically	and	also	culturally	following	German	unification.		
																																																								112	Ibid..,	p.	220	
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	 With	 this	 aim	 in	 mind,	 the	 choice	 of	 port	 cities	 will	 be	 particularly	rewarding.	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 had	 been	 “Free	 and	 Hanseatic	 Cities”	 for	centuries.	 This	means	 that	 both	 of	 them	were	 and,	 astonishingly,	 are	 still	 today	small	 city-states	under	 their	 own	government.	They	 first	 had	 to	be	 incorporated	into	 the	 newly	 formed	 national	 state.	 The	 Frisian	 city	 of	 Emden	 had	 existed	 for	centuries	 but	 had	 been	 in	 stagnation	 during	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century.	 Once	 the	 expression	 of	 Frisian	 trading	 ambitions,	 it	 had	 been	 left	 to	dilapidate	during	Hanoverian	rule	between	1815	and	1866.	As	a	consequence,	an	emphasis	will	be	put	on	the	integration	of	each	of	the	cities	into	the	Kaiserreich,	a	process	that	was	not	completed	until	1888.	In	the	cases	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	the	 Empire	 generated	 opportunities	 but	 also	 barriers	 to	 the	 thitherto	 politically	independent	Free	and	Hanseatic	Cities.			 While	 these	 three	 port	 cities	 are	 already	 fundamentally	 different	 in	 their	history	and	structure,	Wilhelmshaven	constitutes	a	special	case.	The	city	had	just	been	 founded	 by	 Prussia	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 century.	 It	 was	 built	 to	 allow	 the	Kingdom	 of	 Prussia	 access	 to	 the	 North	 Sea	 after	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 German	 Navy,	discussed	in	Frankfurt	in	1848/49,	had	failed	and	before	the	German	Empire	was	founded.	 However,	 research	 for	 this	 thesis	 in	Wilhelmshaven	 determined	 that	 it	would	 not	 be	 worthwhile	 to	 dedicate	 a	 whole	 chapter	 to	 the	 development	 of	commercial	trade	in	this	city.	As	will	be	revealed	later	in	this	thesis,	even	though	it	was	used	as	a	commercial	oil	harbour	after	the	Second	World	War,	its	use	before	then	was	all	but	limited	to	naval	use.			 Initially,	 the	 treaty	 between	 Prussia	 and	 Oldenburg	 stated	 that	 no	 trade	would	be	allowed	 in	 the	new	port	city.	Even	 though	 this	point	was	not	amended	until	 1864,	 the	 port	was	 from	 the	 beginning	 also	 built	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 commercial	port.113	Gotthilf	Hagen,	the	man	who	provided	the	Prussian	admiralty	with	a	plan	for	 the	 new	 port,	 counted	 on	 the	 fact	 that	Wilhelmshaven	 would	 one	 day	 have	‘große	kommerzielle	Tätigkeit’.114	Yet,	Hagen’s	foresight	did	not	materialise	during	the	time	of	the	German	Empire,	as	can	be	gathered	from	Grundig’s	definitive	work	on	Wilhelmshaven.	Grundig	underlines	that	Wilhelmshaven	was	primarily	a	naval	port	 and	 that	 commercial	 trade	 ‘hat	 daneben	 […]	 eine	 gewisse,	 obschon	 recht																																																									113	Wein,	Stadt	wider	Willen,	p.	19		114	Edgar	Grundig,	Chronik	der	Stadt	Wilhelmshaven,	Band	II,	1853–1945	(Wilhelmshaven,	1957),	p.	6	
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bescheidene	Rolle	 gespielt.’115	In	 the	 early	 days	 of	Wilhelmshaven,	 large	parts	 of	the	incoming	merchant	ships	carried	building	materials	for	the	building	of	the	port	facilities.	Gradually,	the	city	also	began	to	import	wine,	coffee,	grain,	rice,	herring,	tropical	fruits	and	tobacco.	Only	a	small	number	of	these	incoming	vessels	carried	goods	 out	 of	 Wilhelmshaven:	 from	 March	 1	 1871	 to	 February	 28	 1872,	 a	 total	number	of	2,302	vessels	called	at	the	port	of	Wilhelmshaven.	However,	only	42	of	these	were	 used	 to	 export	 goods,	 such	 as	 butter,	 beans	 and	 oat,	 amounting	 to	 a	total	of	92	tons.116	Occasional	rises	in	vessels	calling	at	Wilhelmshaven	until	1913	are	explained	by	Grundig	with	 further	 construction	works	during	 those	years.117	Oppel	 offers	 a	 table	 that	 gives	 the	 following	 numbers	 for	 Hamburg,	 Bremen,	Emden	 and	 Wilhelmshaven	 regarding	 the	 number	 of	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	vessels	and	its	overall	seaward	trade	(in	1,000	register	tons)	for	1909:		
Figure	1.1:	Trade	in	1909	Cities	 Number	of	vessels	 1,000	register	tons	Hamburg	 32,441	 24,337	Bremen	(including	Bremerhaven)	 9,612	 6,750	Emden	 4,308	 1,783	Wilhelmshaven	 1,099	 144	Source:	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte,	p.	75		This	 table	 clearly	 illustrates	 that	Wilhelmshaven’s	use	 as	 a	 commercial	 port	was	more	or	less	negligible	–	it	is	ranked	below	ports	like	Emmerich	and	Stolpemünde	regarding	register	tons.		It	seems	that	at	the	time	of	the	great	Anglo-German	naval	race,	there	was	no	space	for	considering	that	a	naval	port	might	as	well	be	used	for	anything	else	than	the	Navy.			 One	of	the	reasons	for	Wilhelmshaven’s	weak	position	in	commercial	trade	might	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 location	 of	 the	 commercial	 port	 area	changed	several	times.	Once	the	new	canal	connecting	Wilhelmshaven	with	Emden	was	completed	 in	1888,	 this	situation	 improved.	Even	a	railway	connection	 from	the	 commercial	 port	 area	 to	 Wilhelmshaven’s	 central	 station	 was	 realised.	However,	 progress	 in	 developing	 the	 commercial	 port	 area	 happened	 slowly.	 In																																																									115	Ibid..,	p.	732	116	Ibid..,	pp.	732–733	117	Ibid..,	p.	735	
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1904,	 the	 Einkaufsverein	 der	 Kolonialwarenhändler	 von	 Wilhelmshaven	 und	
Umgegend	finally	succeeded	in	receiving	a	plot	of	land	in	the	commercial	port	area.	Instead	 of	 having	 the	 goods	 shipped	 to	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen,	 which	 led	 to	additional	freight	costs,	and	storing	them	there	until	storage	or	buyers	were	found	in	 Wilhelmshaven,	 plans	 were	 made	 to	 build	 a	 bonded	 warehouse	 in	Wilhelmshaven.	However,	 this	undertaking	proved	 to	be	more	difficult	 than	 first	thought.	The	city	council	had	to	negotiate	with	many	different	parties.	These	were	the	 mercantile	 community	 of	 Wilhelmshaven,	 the	 customs	 office,	 the	 tax	authorities	and,	last	but	not	least,	the	minister	of	trade.	Eventually,	it	was	decided	that	only	 the	 city	 itself	 could	manage	 the	difficult	 task	presented	by	 the	mixture	between	the	responsibilities	of	 the	public	administration	of	a	bonded	warehouse	and	private	business	interests.	All	these	hurdles	were	not	cleared	until	October	10	1911	 when	 the	 Magistrat	 and	 the	 Bürgervorsteher-Kollegium	 agreed	 on	 the	building	of	the	bonded	warehouse,	which	was	carried	out	by	a	firm	from	Bremen.	Furthermore,	 a	 connection	 to	 the	 railway	 system	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 a	dockside	crane	were	also	concluded.			 Even	 though	 all	 this	 sounds	 promising	 at	 first,	 the	 future	 of	 commercial	trade	in	Wilhelmshaven	remained	uncertain.	The	permission	for	the	construction	was	bound	to	strict	regulations.	Besides	the	obligation	to	ensure	that	the	 lines	of	rails	 were	 cleaned	 immediately	 when	 they	 became	 dirty,	 the	 city	 council	 also	renounced	any	possible	financial	claims	in	case	the	facilities	had	to	be	changed	or	removed	 due	 to	 naval	 interests	 –	 the	 Navy	 had	 priority	 in	Wilhelmshaven.	 The	completion	 of	 the	 new	bonded	warehouse	was	 planned	 for	October	 1	 1912,	 but	this	 turned	out	 to	be	 too	ambitious.	 In	 the	end,	 it	 took	until	April	1	1913	 for	 the	warehouse	to	go	into	service.	Large	parts	of	the	building	were	rented	out	and	the	overall	reception	was	positive,	according	to	Ulrich	Räcker-Wellnitz.118	Its	function	consisted	of	safely	storing	domestic	duty	unpaid	goods,	such	as	foodstuffs,	alcohol	and	tobacco	products,	for	the	German	Navy	or	non-military	customers.	Moreover,	the	warehouse	was	 also	 used	 as	 a	 transit	 warehouse;	 for	 instance,	 foreign	 duty	unpaid	 goods	 for	 overseas	Navy	 stations	were	 stored	 temporarily.	However,	 the	fact	 that	 the	warehouse	 suffered	 badly	 from	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	Navy	 after	 the																																																									118	100	Jahre	Lagerhaus:	Schwieriger	Kurs	durch	wechselnde	Konjunktur,	Ulrich	Räcker-Wellnitz,	9.	März	2013,	Heimat	am	Meer:	http://www.wilhelmshaven.de/portal/info/13-01-HaM-100-Jahre-Lagerhaus.pdf.	Accessed	12/01/2016	
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First	World	War	also	 illustrates	 that	Wilhelmshaven’s	 commercial	 trade	 lived	on	the	demand	created	by	the	Navy.			 It	 is	 also	 telling	 that	 the	 plan	 to	 found	 a	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 in	Wilhelmshaven,	 which	 the	 Kaufmännischer	 Verein	 handed	 in	 to	 the	 regional	government	 representative	 on	 June	 1	 1874,	 was	 eventually	 denied.	 Instead	 the	Prussian	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 ordered	 the	 city	 to	 become	 part	 of	 the	 regional	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 for	 East	 Friesland	 and	 Papenburg.	 It	 is	 certainly	 right	 to	conclude	that	this	was	emblematic	for	the	first	years	of	the	recently	built	city	‘als	man	 glaubte,	mit	 stürmischem	 Eifer	 alles	 auf	 einmal	 erreichen	 zu	 können,	 ohne	daß	die	nötigen	Grundlagen	vorhanden	gewesen	wären	[…].’119	In	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	for	East	Friesland	and	Papenburg,	Wilhelmshaven	was	represented	by	a	 single	 member	 from	 the	 date	 of	 joining	 in	 1875	 until	 1897,	 when	 this	 was	increased	 to	 two	 representatives.	Altogether,	 these	 factors	did	not	make	 it	 seem	plausible	 to	 analyse	 the	 development	 of	 the	 port	 and	 trade	 in	 Wilhelmshaven	during	the	German	Empire	in	any	further	detail.			 While	Wilhelmshaven	was	struggling	to	set	in	motion	any	commercial	trade,	Bremen’s	plan	to	found	a	new	port	named	Bremerhaven	further	downstream	was	a	huge	success.	At	 the	 time	of	 its	construction,	 it	was	doubted	that	Bremerhaven	would	be	profitable	to	the	City	of	Bremen.	However,	as	it	turned	out,	Burgomaster	Johann	Smidt,	who	is	recognised	as	the	founding	father	of	Bremerhaven,	made	the	right	 decision	 in	 deciding	 to	 build	 a	 new	 port	 for	 Bremen.	 The	 numbers	 of	incoming	 and	 outgoing	 vessels	 for	 Bremen	 and	 Bremerhaven	 prove	 that	 by	 the	time	the	German	Empire	had	been	 founded,	Bremerhaven	played	a	major	role	 in	Bremen’s	overseas	trade.	
	
Figure	1.2:	Comparison	between	Bremen	and	Bremerhaven	
1873	 Bremen	 Bremerhaven	Incoming	vessels	(Tonnage	 in	 1000	NRT)120	 1,096	(43,9)	 1,354	(701,0)	Outgoing	vessels		(Tonnage	in	1000	NRT)	 1,082	(42,9)	 1,455	(715,8)	Source:	 Andreas	 Kunz,	 Lars	 U.	 Scholl	 (eds),	 Die	 deutsche	 Seeschifffahrt	 1821–1989:	 Ein	
Datenhandbuch	(Bremen,	2011),	pp.	232/238	and	244/250																																																										119	Grundig,	Chronik	der	Stadt	Wilhelmshaven,	Band	2,	p.	792	120	NRT	is	used	as	an	abbreviation	for	net	registered	tonnage	
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The	 table	 shows	 that	Bremerhaven	had	a	 larger	 share	of	 incoming	 and	outgoing	tonnage.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 number	 of	 vessels	were	 not	 too	 far	 apart,	 which	allows	us	to	conclude	that	the	average	tonnage	of	vessels	coming	in	and	going	out	of	Bremen	was	significantly	lower	than	in	Bremerhaven.	Due	to	the	sanding	up	of	the	River	Weser,	large	vessels	were	not	able	to	go	all	the	way	to	Bremen	anymore	–	the	average	tonnage	lies	at	around	40	NRT	for	Bremen.	This	situation	for	Bremen	certainly	improved	during	the	period	of	the	Kaiserreich	but	it	leads	to	an	important	methodological	question	 for	 this	 thesis:	namely,	how	does	one	deal	with	 the	 fact	that	the	State	of	Bremen	consists	of	two	ports?			 Bremerhaven	will	not	be	examined	in	detail	in	this	thesis,	and	there	is	good	reason	 for	 this.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 Bremerhaven,	 particularly	 as	 the	 homeport	 of	 the	
Norddeutscher	 Lloyd,	 was	 of	 immense	 importance	 to	 the	 state	 of	 Bremen.	Nevertheless,	 the	 mercantile	 community	 which	 gave	 Bremen	 its	 political	 and	economic	 direction	 was	 still	 residing	 in	 Bremen,	 not	 Bremerhaven.	 While	Bremerhaven	offered	the	port	and	port	facilities,	Bremen	remained	the	head	of	the	State	of	Bremen.	This	means	 that	 it	 cannot	be	wrong	 to	 include	Bremerhaven	 in	the	 statistics	 for	 the	 State	 of	 Bremen	 but,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 disregard	Bremerhaven’s	political	voice	in	both	the	State	of	Bremen	and	the	German	Empire.	Therefore,	since	this	thesis	aims	to	analyse	the	economic	and	cultural	change	that	took	place	during	and	as	a	result	of	the	German	Empire,	the	centre	of	focus	has	to	remain	on	the	City	of	Bremen.	Bremerhaven	will	be	regarded	as	a	part	of	the	State	of	Bremen,	not	as	a	port	city	in	itself.	When	the	State	of	Bremen	instead	of	the	City	of	Bremen	is	meant,	this	will	be	indicated.				 Also	connected	to	the	problem	of	how	to	deal	with	Bremerhaven	is	the	case	of	Cuxhaven.	From	1394	to	the	Groß-Hamburg-Gesetz	of	1937,	Cuxhaven,	which	is	located	 on	 the	 left	 bank	 of	 the	mouth	 of	 the	 River	 Elbe,	 belonged	 to	 the	 City	 of	Hamburg.	 Still,	 unlike	 in	 Bremen,	 the	 relationship	 between	 Hamburg	 and	Cuxhaven	 was	 absolutely	 straightforward	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 German	 Empire:	Hamburg	was	 the	main	port	and	Cuxhaven	was	 its	 auxiliary.	The	 following	 table	underlines	this	argument.						
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Figure	1.3:	Comparison	between	Hamburg	and	Cuxhaven	
1873	 Hamburg	 Cuxhaven	Incoming	vessels	(Tonnage	in	1000	NRT)	 4,809		(1842,6)	 1,108	(57,9)	Outgoing	vessels		(Tonnage	in	1000	NRT)	 4,956	(1884,1)	 1,051	(54,8)	Source:	Kunz,	Scholl,	Die	deutsche	Seeschifffahrt,	pp.	256/	262	and	268/	274		The	table	above	clearly	shows	the	importance	of	Hamburg	over	its	outpost	directly	on	the	North	Sea	coast.	However,	the	numbers	for	Cuxhaven	are	also	flattering	for	the	city.	Oppel	points	to	the	fact	that	the	shipping	and	trade	were	negligible.	The	shipping	 traffic	 was	 primarily	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 German	 flag. 121 	While	Bremerhaven	was	intensively	used	by	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd,	Cuxhaven	became	the	 calling	port	 for	 fast	 liners	of	 the	Hapag.	 In	1897,	 the	Neue	Hafen,	which	was	designed	 to	 handle	 the	 large	 passenger	 vessels	 of	 the	 Hapag,	 was	 put	 into	operation	 –	 before	 the	 passengers	 were	 brought	 to	 the	 liners	 on	 tenders.	Furthermore,	 Hamburg	 also	 built	 a	 new	 reception	 building	 in	 Cuxhaven.	 The	building,	 inaugurated	 in	 1902,	 was	 owned	 by	 the	 State	 of	 Hamburg	 but	 it	 was	leased	to	the	Hapag	 for	25	years.	In	spite	of	all	this,	Cuxhaven	did	not	go	beyond	being	an	auxiliary	port	for	the	City	of	Hamburg.	Neither	did	it	equal	the	importance	that	Bremerhaven	had	for	the	State	of	Bremen	when	the	River	Weser	was	sanding	up.	Thus,	Cuxhaven	will	not	be	examined	in	more	detail	in	this	thesis.			 After	the	question	of	places	that	will	be	investigated	further	in	this	thesis	is	answered,	 the	 precise	 dates	 that	 are	meant	when	 speaking	 of	 the	 period	 of	 the	
Kaiserreich	also	need	to	be	specified.	The	German	Empire	obviously	existed	from		January	18	1871,	 the	date	 it	was	proclaimed	 in	Versailles,	until	November	1918.	On	November	9,	Max	von	Baden	announced	Wilhelm’s	abdication	and	the	German	Republic	was	 proclaimed;	 and	 on	November	 10,	Wilhelm	 II	 left	 Germany	 for	 his	Dutch	exile	but	he	did	not	abdicate	himself	as	German	Emperor	and	Prussian	King	until	 November	 28.	 Carsten	 Burhop	 has	 already	 pointed	 out	 that	 economic	historians	tend	to	stop	in	1914	when	looking	at	the	economic	development	of	the	German	 Empire.122	Burhop,	 in	 contrast,	 continues	 to	 also	 look	 at	 the	 wartime	economy	 in	 Germany	 during	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 since	 it	 offers	 ‘sowohl																																																									121	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte,	pp.	168–169	122	Carsten	Burhop,	Wirtschaftsgeschichte	des	Kaiserreichs	1871-1918	(Göttingen,	2011),	p.	13	
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Kontinuitäten	 zur	 Wirtschaftsgeschichte	 des	 Kaiserreichs	 als	 auch	 zur	Wirtschaftsgeschichte	 der	 Weimarer	 Republik’. 123 	For	 a	 general	 overview	 of	economic	developments	during	the	period,	this	is	certainly	a	valid	point.	However,	for	a	study	that	examines	the	developments	of	 trade	 in	three	North	Sea	overseas	ports,	it	would	be	all	but	futile.			 Certainly,	it	is	of	immense	importance	to	show	the	effects	of	the	First	World	War	on	the	German	shipping	and	trading	industries,	as	Hartmut	Rübner	has	done.	Rübner	reveals	that	the	German	shipping	industry	was	hardly	hit	by	the	outbreak	of	 the	World	War.	 Even	 though	 the	 German	 government	 issued	warnings	 to	 the	shipping	companies	prior	to	the	actual	beginning	of	hostilities	due	to	the	parlous	political	situation,	not	all	vessels	were	able	to	return	to	Germany	or	to	call	at	ports	in	 neutral	 states.	 Of	 the	 remaining	 vessels,	 large	 numbers	 were	 placed	 at	 the	disposal	of	the	German	Navy.	In	addition	to	this,	the	German	Empire’s	access	to	the	sea	was	almost	entirely	sealed	off	by	the	British	blockade.	When	the	Dutch	ports	were	used	as	substitute	ports,	the	Allies	also	quickly	intervened	and	took	over	the	whole	of	 the	Dutch	merchant	 fleet.	Even	coastal	 shipping	on	 the	North	Sea	coast	was	difficult	to	maintain	in	the	face	of	the	British	blockade.	At	the	same	time,	this	did	not	mean	that	transatlantic	trade	was	altogether	discontinued.	Rübner	points	to	 the	 venture	 of	 Hugo	 Stinnes,	 who	 managed	 to	 maintain	 a	 secret	 trading	relationship	 with	 North	 and	 South	 America.	 It	 was	 pretended	 that	 the	 traded	commodities	 were	 determined	 for	 Switzerland.124	Trade	 in	 the	 Baltic	 was	 less	restricted	by	the	war.	Although	the	Allies	attempted	to	put	German	trade	with	the	Scandinavian	countries	on	hold,	 the	German	Empire	successfully	maintained	 this	significant	 trading	 relationship.	 The	 shipping	 companies	 involved	 in	 this	 trade,	which	was	largely	in	the	hands	of	the	Germans,	made	enormous	profits.	According	to	Rübner,	 the	 cargo	 rate	pro	 tonne	between	Middle	 Sweden	and	 the	River	Elbe	rose	from	3	to	4	Mark	in	1913	to	14	to	15	Mark	in	1918,	which	is	an	 increase	of	400–500%.125		 The	 famous	 blockade-runners	 certainly	 received	 more	 attention	 than	Stinnes’	undertakings.	Although	there	were	initially	plans	to	build	more,	only	two	merchant	 submarines	were	 realised,	 the	Deutschland	 and	 the	Bremen.	While	 the																																																									123	Ibid..,	p.	13	124	Rübner,	Konzentration	und	Krise	der	deutschen	Schiffahrt,	p.	66	125	Ibid..,	p.	67	
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Bremen	went	missing	 on	 its	maiden	 voyage,	 a	 telling	 fate	 for	 Bremen	 and	 other	cities	on	the	North	Sea	coast,	the	Deutschland	was	able	to	do	two	journeys	to	the	USA	 and	 back.126	Still,	 all	 this	 cannot	 hide	 the	 fact	 that	 commercial	 trade	 to	 and	from	 the	 port	 cities	 on	 the	 North	 Sea	 coast	 during	 the	 First	 World	 War	 was	virtually	non-existent.	That	 is	why	 the	period	of	 the	First	World	War	will	not	be	included	in	this	thesis.			The	 aims	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	 remarkably	 straightforward.	 Among	 historians,	 the	prevailing	opinion	 is	 that	 the	Kaiserreich	was,	 from	an	economic	point	of	view,	a	success	story.	For	example,	Miranda	Carter	argues	that	‘the	boom	that	had	started	in	 the	 post-unification	 years	 continued	 and	 continued;	 money	 poured	 into	 the	country.’127	This	economic	success	also	had	another	positive	consequence:	‘the	fact	was	Germany	was	 rich,	 and	wealth	was	 a	 great	 political	 emollient.’128	This	 point	made	by	Carter	is	also	supported	by	economic	historians	such	as	Carsten	Burhop.	He	has	illustrated	that	the	period	from	1871	to	1913	was	one	of	economic	success:	the	national	product	tripled	and	the	per	capita	income	increased.129	Central	to	this	economic	 growth	 was	 Germany’s	 foreign	 trade.	 From	 1872	 to	 1913,	 imports	 in	current	prices	rose	 from	3.5	billion	 to	10.8	billion	Mark.	During	 the	same	period	exports	increased	from	2.5	billion	to	10.1	billion	Mark.	Apart	from	1890	to	1892,	the	German	Empire	always	had	a	trading	deficit.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	Germany’s	export	 industry	expanded	rapidly	 in	 international	 comparison.	While	 it	was	only	ranked	 fourth	 in	 the	 1870s	 behind	 Great	 Britain,	 the	 USA	 and	 France,	 Germany	managed	to	overtake	France	in	the	second	half	of	the	1880s	and	began	to	challenge	the	USA	for	 its	second	place	 in	 the	years	 leading	up	to	 the	First	World	War.	This	trend	becomes	apparent	in	the	German	Empire’s	share	of	the	world’s	total	exports:	from	an	average	of	9.5%	in	the	years	1874–78,	 it	rose	to	an	average	of	12.2%	in	1909–12.	 For	 the	Kaiserreich	 itself	 these	 international	 developments	meant	 that	
																																																								126	For	more	information	on	the	two	merchant	submarines	see:	Hartmut	Schwerdtfeger,	Erik	Herlyn,	Die	Handels-U-Boote	“Deutschland”	und	“Bremen”	–	Ein	vergessenes	Kapitel	der	
Seefahrt	(Bremen,	1997).	Furtermore,	Paul	König,	captain	of	the	merchant	submarine	
Deutschland	has	published	his	experiences	during	the	journey	to	the	USA	in	Paul	König,	
Die	Fahrt	der	Deutschland	(Berlin,	1916)	127	Miranda	Carter,	The	Three	Emperors:	Three	Cousins,	Three	Empires	and	the	Road	to	
World	War	One	(London,	2009),	p.	159	128	Ibid..,	p.	159	129	Burhop,	Wirtschaftsgeschichte,	p.	215	
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the	share	of	exports	and	of	imports	as	part	of	the	national	product	also	grew.	In	the	case	of	exports,	the	numbers	rose	from	8.5%	in	1874–78	to	15.8%	in	1909–13.	The	same	 trend	applies	 to	 the	 share	of	 imports	during	 the	 same	period:	 it	 rose	 from	15.2%	to	19.2%.130			 These	numbers	show	that	foreign	trade	was	flourishing	during	the	time	of	the	 German	 Empire.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 tell	 us	 the	 story	 of	 the	 individual	developments	 of	 port	 cities	 during	 the	 period.	 Overall,	 foreign	 trade	 certainly	flourished	but	this	does	not	shed	light	on	the	fate	of	the	Empire’s	 individual	port	cities.	As	can	be	gathered	from	the	graph	below,	all	three	cities	under	investigation	in	this	thesis	were	able	to	significantly	increase	their	port	traffic,	i.e.	the	average	of	arriving	and	departing	vessels	measured	in	net	register	tonnage:		
Figure	1.4:	Port	Traffic,	1873-1913	
	Source:	 The	 numbers	 for	 this	 graph	 are	 taken	 from	 Kunz,	 Scholl,	 Die	 deutsche	
Seeschifffahrt,	pp.	154–156/	160–162,	232–234/	238–240	and	256–258/	262–264		Obviously,	the	period	of	the	German	Empire	was	a	period	of	success	for	Hamburg,	Bremen	and	Emden.	It	is	not	surprising	that	Hamburg	dominated	the	field	and	was	far	 ahead	 of	 Bremen	 and	 Emden.	 The	 graph	 confirms	 that	 Hamburg	 was	 the	German	 Empire’s	 most	 significant	 North	 Sea	 port,	 which	 is	 certainly	 not	 a																																																									130	All	numbers	are	taken	from	Burhop,	Wirtschaftsgeschichte,	pp.	102f	
1,0	
10,0	
100,0	
1000,0	
10000,0	
100000,0	
1873	1878	1883	1888	1893	1898	1903	1908	1913	
Av
er
ag
e	
of
	A
rr
iv
al
s	
an
d	
D
ep
ar
tu
re
s	
	
(i
n	
10
00
	N
RT
)	
Port	traf>ic,	1873–1913	
Hamburg	Average	Bremen	Average	Emden	Average	
	44	
revelation.	 If	we	look	at	the	development	of	trade	in	Bremen	and	Emden,	we	can	see	 that	 in	 both	 cities	 it	 naturally	 increased	 more	 rapidly	 than	 in	 Hamburg.	Bremen,	 in	 particular,	 experienced	 a	 steady	 rise,	 which	 began	 slowly	 and	 then	rapidly	 increased	 during	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1890s.	 Even	 though	 Bremen’s	average	traffic	in	1913	was	only	slightly	higher	than	Hamburg’s	traffic	of	1875,	the	progress	 that	had	been	made	since	1873	 is	 remarkable:	 the	average	of	 incoming	and	outgoing	vessels	in	NRT	increased	almost	fiftyfold.	Emden	was	not	quite	able	to	match	 this	 success	but	 its	average	 traffic	 grew	 from	32,900	NRT	 to	1,332,400	NRT	 between	 1873	 and	 1913–	 at	 least	 a	 fortyfold	 increase.	 However,	 unlike	 in	Bremen,	 a	 rapid	 rise	 in	 average	 traffic	 did	 not	 occur	 until	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	twentieth	century.	In	contrast	to	other	small	port	cities	in	Emden’s	proximity,	such	as	Leer	and	Papenburg,	Emden	experienced	a	considerable	rise	 in	port	 traffic.	 In	the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 German	 Empire,	 port	 traffic	 in	 Leer	 and	 Papenburg	 was	definitely	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	 Emden.	 Still,	 neither	 Leer	 nor	 Papenburg	 were	able	to	grow	in	importance	as	much	as	Emden	did	throughout	the	German	Empire.	In	fact,	in	both	ports,	port	traffic	hardly	increased	between	1873	and	1914.	Hence,	this	study	will	only	look	at	Emden.		 However,	what	 the	 graph	 above	does	not	 reveal	 is	 the	 relationship	of	 the	port	cities	to	the	German	Empire.	Here,	it	is	necessary	to	look	at	how	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	two	traditionally	independent	port	cities,	functioned	in	the	conglomerate	that	 was	 the	 German	 Empire.	 This	 thesis	 will	 look	 at	 how	 these	 two	 Hanseatic	cities	understood	themselves	but	also	were	understood	in	the	German	Empire.	In	addition	to	this,	it	is	vital	to	look	at	why	Emden	was	suddenly	capable	of	competing	with	Bremen	after	centuries	of	stagnation.	Hence,	the	economic	integration	of	the	three	port	cities	into	the	German	Empire	will	be	analysed.	Furthermore,	based	on	the	 assumption	 that	 port	 cities	 are	 inclined	 to	 foster	 the	 emergence	 of	cosmopolitanism,	 it	 will	 be	 analysed	 if	 and	 how	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 culturally	integrate	Hamburg,	Bremen	and	Emden.	The	port	cities	under	 investigation	have	been	part	of	a	transnational	system	of	trade	for	centuries.	Such	a	system	of	trade	encourages	the	participants,	 i.e.	the	merchants,	to	develop	an	international,	 if	not	global	 perspective	 and	 cosmopolitan	 tastes.	 Although	 there	 are	 many	 different	forms	of	expression,	what	all	forms	of	cosmopolitanism	then	share	‘is	a	disposition	
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of	openness	to	the	world	around	them.’131	The	merchants	of	Hamburg,	Bremen	and	Emden	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 form	 trading	 links	 outside	 their	 surrounding	regions	and	the	rest	of	the	German	Empire.	It	was,	for	example,	much	easier	for	a	merchant	in	Hamburg	to	reach	his	trading	partners	around	the	world	rather	than	other	German	cities,	such	as	Stuttgart	or	Munich.	It	will	be	examined	in	this	thesis	how	the	merchants	of	the	three	port	cities	reacted	to	the	foundation	of	the	newly	founded	German	nation-state.	 Thus,	 this	 thesis	will	 trace	 back	 the	 economic	 but	also	cultural	integration	of	these	three	port	cities	into	the	German	Empire.	Such	a	comparative	 study	 on	 a	 regional	 basis	 constitutes	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 existing	historiography	of	German	overseas	 trade	 and	 shipping.	 It	 is	 about	 time	 that	 this	gap	is	filled.			 The	core	of	this	study	will	be	divided	into	three	sections,	one	for	each	of	the	port	cities.	It	is	the	aim	to	analyse	the	development	of	the	three	port	cities,	where	possible,	 in	 a	 chronological	 order.	 Thus,	 the	 study	 will	 begin	 by	 looking	 at	 the	integration	 of	 the	 three	 cities	 into	 the	 new	 national	 state.	 Whenever	 required,	connections	 and	 similarities	 between	 two	 or	 even	 all	 three	 cities	 will	 be	mentioned.	 Particularly,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 Zollanschluss	 in	Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 this	 will	 be	 inevitable.	 In	 the	 chapters	 on	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen,	 the	 emphasis	 will	 be	 placed	 on	 the	 Zollanschluss	 and	 on	 German	colonialism.	By	looking	at	the	two	from	a	port	city	perspective,	it	will	be	possible	to	argue	 for	 or	 against	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 Zollanschluss	 of	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen	and	the	beginning	of	German	colonialism.			 The	 chapter	 on	 Emden	will	 focus	 particularly	 on	 the	 so-called	 Fürbringer	era.	Leo	Fürbringer	was	mayor	of	Emden	from	1875	until	1913.	His	dedication	to	the	cause	of	Emden	was	unquestionably	crucial	for	the	development	shown	in	the	graph	 above.	 Together	 with	 Emden’s	 member	 of	 the	 Prussian	 Landtag,	 Carl	Schweckendieck,	 Fürbringer	 invested	 a	 lot	 of	 effort	 into	 the	 improvement	 of	Emden’s	run-down	port	facilities.	However,	simply	improving	the	port	facilities	in	Emden	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 overall	 traffic	was	 definitely	 not	 sufficient;	 Emden’s	mercantile	community	also	had	to	play	their	part.	Even	when	all	these	components	geared	into	each	other,	for	example	with	the	emigration	business,	Emden	was	still	dependent	on	the	good	will	of	its	bigger	neighbours,	Hamburg	and	Bremen.																																																										131	Skrbis	and	Woodward,	Cosmopolitanism,	p.	2		
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	 Even	though	one	would	most	likely	expect	that	due	to	its	pivotal	role	within	Germany,	 Hamburg	 should	 be	 dealt	 with	 first,	 this	 will	 not	 be	 the	 case	 in	 this	dissertation.	The	 reasons	 for	 this	 are	 straightforward.	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 no	way	of	arguing	 against	Hamburg	 having	 been	 by	 far	 the	 largest	 of	 the	 port	 cities.	 Thus,	starting	with	 Hamburg’s	 achievements	would	 cast	 a	 negative	 light	 over	 Bremen	and	Emden.	By	turning	to	Hamburg	in	the	final	chapter,	Bremen	and	Emden	can	be	analysed	and	understood	 in	 their	own	right.	 Secondly,	 it	 is	hoped	 that	 this	order	will	 assist	 in	 putting	 Bremen	 and	 Emden	 back	 on	 the	 historical	 radar,	 on	which	Hamburg	has	loomed	too	large	in	the	past.	For	all	that,	the	order	of	cities	analysed	in	 this	 thesis	 will	 not	 have	 any	 consequences	 for	 its	 content.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 a	purely	structural	matter.				 All	 in	 all,	 this	 thesis	 will	 reveal	 how	 port	 cities	 with	 strong	 international	links	and	a	 long	history	of	 independence,	such	as	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	became	integrated,	 on	 an	 economic	 and	 cultural	 basis,	 into	 the	 newly	 founded	 German	Empire.	The	waiving	of	its	right	to	remain	outside	the	German	customs	union	was	decisive	 in	 this	 respect,	 as	 was	 the	 concession	 of	 overseas	 colonies	 to	 the	mercantile	communities	of	both	cities.	Emden,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	have	to	be	 integrated,	 as	 it	 had	been	delighted	 to	 again	 become	part	 of	 Prussia	 in	 1866.	However,	 this	cheerful	 integration	 into	 the	Prussian	state	was	 linked	 to	concrete	demands.		
e.	Sources		This	 thesis	 is	 based	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 archival	 sources.	 Since	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen	are	still	city-states	today,	most	of	their	official	documents	are	collected	in	the	 Staatsarchiv	Hamburg	 and	 the	 Staatsarchiv	Bremen.	 In	 the	 State	 Archives	 of	Hamburg,	 the	 great	 majority	 of	 sources	 were	 drawn	 from	 the	 Zoll-	 und	
Akzisedeputation	 (314-1)	 and	 the	Deputation	 für	 Handel,	 Schiffahrt	 und	 Gewerbe	(371-8).	These	two	collections	offer	an	important	insight	into	Hamburg’s	overseas	trade	 including	 the	German	 colonies.	 Invaluable	 sources	 for	 an	understanding	of	the	 mercantile	 community	 of	 both	 cities	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 Chambers	 of	Commerce	of	both	cities.	However,	in	this	respect,	the	situation	in	Hamburg	is	less	clear.	While	 in	 Bremen	 the	majority	 of	 sources	 can	 be	 viewed	 in	 the	Archiv	 der	
Handelskammer	 Bremen,	 there	 are	 two	 independent	 archives	 in	 Hamburg’s	
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Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 the	 Hanseatisches	 Wirtschaftsarchiv	 and	 the	 Archiv	 der	
Handelskammer	Hamburg.	 In	 the	Hanseatisches	Wirtschaftsarchiv,	 the	minutes	 of	the	 Commerzdeputation,	 the	 highest	 body	 of	 Hamburg’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	and	 the	 appendices	 of	 these	 minutes	 for	 the	 period	 of	 the	 Kaiserreich	 were	consulted.	 The	 appendices	 of	 the	 Protokolle	 der	 Commerzdeputation	 contain	further	information	and	more	detail	on	the	issues	that	were	discussed	during	the	sessions	 of	 the	 Commerzdeputation.	 Naturally,	 not	 all	 volumes	 of	 these	 minutes	were	 examined,	 as	 this	 would	 have	 simply	 exceeded	 a	 manageable	 workload.	Instead,	 certain,	 decisive	 years	 were	 chosen	 and	 examined	 together	 with	respective	appendices.			 In	the	Archiv	der	Handelskammer	Hamburg,	which	is	not	as	easily	accessible	as	the	Hanseatisches	Wirtschaftsarchiv,	the	focus	was	laid	on	sources	regarding	the	processes	 leading	up	 to	Hamburg	 joining	 the	German	 customs	union	 and	on	 the	Chamber’s	 involvement	 in	 the	 German	 Empire’s	 acquisition	 of	 colonies.	 Of	particular	interest	in	the	collection	of	the	Archiv	der	Handelskammer	Hamburg	was	certainly	 Adolph	 Woermann’s	 memorandum	 on	 the	 demands	 of	 Hanseatic	merchants	at	the	West	Coast	of	Africa.	By	working	in	both	the	State	Archives	and	the	 Archives	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 the	 aim	 was	 to	 show	 the	 close	relationship	between	politics	and	economics	in	Hamburg,	and	of	course,	in	Bremen	as	well.			 In	 Bremen’s	 city	 archives,	 primarily	 sources	 from	 the	Ratsarchiv	 and	 the	
Senatsregistratur	were	reviewed.	The	sources	of	the	Ratsarchiv	include	important	information	on	Bremen’s	decision	to	become	part	of	the	Empire’s	customs	union	–	these	files	are	grouped	in	2-Ss.4.	On	the	other	hand,	documents	which	shed	light	on	Bremen’s	foreign	affairs,	such	as	colonial	affairs,	are	found	in	the	Senatsregistratur	(these	 documents	 are	 collected	 under	 3-R.1.).	 The	 Archiv	 der	 Handelskammer	
Bremen	 offers	 sources	 with	 a	 large	 variety	 of	 focus	 areas.	 These	 are	 ordered	alphabetically	with	regard	to	their	topic.	Since	sources	from	different	focus	areas	have	 been	 analysed	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 comprehensive	 impression	 of	 the	mood	 in	Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 go	 into	 detail	 about	 the	structure	of	archiving	in	these	archives.			 While	 it	 is	 needless	 to	 point	 out	 that	 all	 of	 the	 archives	mentioned	 above	incurred	 losses	 in	material	 during	 the	 Second	World	War,	 Emden’s	 city	 archives	have	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 second	 difficulty.	 Although	 the	 collection	 of	 important	
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documents	in	Emden	dates	back	to	the	sixteenth	century,	the	task	of	archiving	did	not	receive	its	due	attention	until	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century.	From	1934	to	1945,	 the	 Stadtarchiv	 Emden	was	 headed	 by	 Dr	 Louis	 Hahn,	 after	 it	 had	 been	deserted	 in	 1914.	 Hahn	 provided	 a	 new	 order	 for	 the	 archived	 records.	 The	removal	of	the	archives	to	several	different	locations	during	the	Second	World	War	led	 to	 large	 losses	 of	 files	 as	well	 as	 file	 indices.	 After	 the	war,	 the	 city	 archives	were	managed	as	part	of	the	Ostfriesisches	Landmuseum,	where	the	archives	were	also	 based.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	 restore	 the	 order	 of	 the	
Stadtarchiv.	This	only	began	with	the	relocation	of	the	City	Archives	to	its	current	premises	 in	 1995/96.	 At	 present,	 the	 inventory	 of	 the	 archives	 is	 being	 re-registered	 by	 Dr	 Rolf	 Uphoff,	 head	 of	 the	 Stadtarchiv,	 and	 his	 team.	 This	circumstance	means	that	not	all	files	are	available	for	visitors.	Archival	research	in	Emden	for	this	thesis	was	focused	on	the	fourth	registry,	which	covers	the	period	from	1866	 to	 1918.	Although	not	 all	 files	 of	 the	 fourth	 registry	 have	been	made	accessible,	large	numbers	of	files	could	be	analysed.				 The	archival	sources	were	then	augmented	by	an	examination	of	local	press	reactions	to	decisive	events,	such	as	the	Samoa-Vorlage	or	the	decision	to	build	the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	 For	 this,	 three	major	newspapers,	 the	Bremer	Nachrichten,	the	 Courier	 and	 the	 Weser-Zeitung,	 were	 investigated	 in	 Bremen.	 All	 three	newspapers	 are	 available	 in	 Bremen’s	 city	 archives.	 In	 Hamburg,	 another	 three	newspapers	 were	 analysed.	 These	 were	 the	 Hamburger	 Nachrichten,	 the	
Börsenhalle	 and	 the	 Correspondent,	 which	 are	 collected	 in	 the	 Staats-	 und	
Universitätsbibliothek	Hamburg	Carl	von	Ossietzky.	 Emden’s	most	 significant	 local	newspapers	 at	 the	 time,	 the	 Ostfriesische	 Zeitung	 and	 the	 Emder	 Zeitung,	 were	accessed	in	Emden’s	Stadtarchiv.		Furthermore,	most	of	 the	data	for	the	period	that	will	be	examined	in	this	study	 is	 taken	 from	 the	 impressive	 collection	 of	 data	 published	 in	Die	 deutsche	
Seeschifffahrt	 1821–1989:	 Ein	 Datenhandbuch	 by	 the	 editors	 Andreas	 Kunz	 and	Lars	 U.	 Scholl.132	This	 enormous	 effort	 to	 offer	 a	 comparative	 overview	 of	 the	development	of	trade	encompasses	63	port	cities	–	of	which	not	all	are	still	located	in	present-day	Germany.																																																											132	Kunz,	Scholl,	Die	deutsche	Seeschifffahrt	
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II.	Bremen			When	 the	 German	 Empire	 was	 founded	 in	 1871,	 Bremen	 already	 had	 a	 long-standing	 history	 of	 overseas	 trade	 and	 consequently	 of	 overseas	 networks.	 The	question	of	how	it	became	part	of	the	newly	founded	German	nation-state	will	be	studied	 in	 this	 chapter.	 In	 order	 to	 answer	 this	 question,	 it	will	 be	 important	 to	examine	the	processes	leading	up	to	Bremen’s	accession	to	the	Empire’s	customs	union.	 Incorporating	Bremen	 into	 this	new	entity	was	essential	 for	 the	economic	unification	of	the	Empire.	However,	as	the	chapter	will	demonstrate,	the	accession	did	not	simply	lead	to	economic	unification	but	also	to	a	cultural	unification.	Once	the	 customs	 border	 between	 Bremen	 and	 the	 Empire	 was	 abolished,	 Bremen’s	cultural	 values	 began	 to	 align	 themselves	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 German	 Empire.	Furthermore,	this	chapter	will	also	look	at	an	issue,	which	occurred	at	roughly	the	same	 time	 as	 the	 customs	 union	 debate:	 that	 of	 German	 colonialism,	 and	 more	precisely,	Bremen’s	 involvement	 in	German	colonialism.	Together,	 these	 subjects	will	tell	the	story	of	Bremen’s	development	from	an	independent	to	a	German	port	city.				
	
a.	Bremen	versus	Germany		First	of	all,	it	is	essential	to	take	a	look	at	the	role	that	Bremen	assumed	in	the	new	German	nation-state.	Central	to	this	discussion	is	the	issue	of	competing	identities,	i.e.	 a	 Hanseatic	 one	 and	 pan-German	 one.1	There	 are	 problems	 with	 previous	examinations	of	 these	competing	 identities.	For	example,	Maischak	 took	a	 rather	pessimistic	 view	 of	 Bremen’s	 fate	 as	 part	 of	 the	 new	 German	 nation-state.	 It	 is	certainly	 true	 that	 Bremen	 lost	 most	 of	 its	 former	 independence	 with	 the	formation	 of	 the	 Northern	 German	 Union	 after	 the	 war	 of	 1866.	 As	 Maischak	rightly	 points	 out,	 ‘trade	 policy,	 consular	 matters,	 foreign	 relations,	 shipping	regulations	and	questions	of	war	and	peace	were	no	longer	decided	in	Bremen,	but																																																									1	In	his	work	on	German	merchants	in	the	nineteenth-century	Atlantic,	Lars	Maischak	dedicated	one	chapter	on	‘Patriarchs	into	Patriots:	Hanseats	in	a	World	of	Nation-States,	1867–1945’.	See	Maischak,	German	merchants,	pp.	250–262	
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in	Berlin.’2	Certainly,	there	was	no	disguising	Prussian	hegemony	after	1866.	Even	Bremen’s	Burgomaster,	Arnold	Duckwitz,	was	not	able	to	whitewash	the	negative	consequences	of	this	step	towards	Prussian	hegemony.	In	a	private	letter	to	Rudolf	Schleiden,	 the	 Hanseatic	 Minister	 Resident	 in	 Washington	 D.C.	 and	 London,	Duckwitz	 admitted	 that	 ‘[e]ven	 if	 Germany	will	 be	 strengthened	 […]	 and	 even	 if	Bremen	shares	in	these	advantages,	nevertheless	many	things	that	were	our	pride	will	undoubtedly	be	buried.’3	The	new	situation	also	unquestionably	led	to	changes	in	one	of	the	prides	of	Hanseatic	identity,	namely	family	businesses.	Instead,	it	was	joint-stock	 companies,	 such	 as	 the	Norddeutscher	 Lloyd,	 that	 now	 took	 the	 lead.	Overall,	 Maischak	 comes	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 ‘the	 age	 of	 nation-states	 and	industrial	 capitalism	 had	 begun’.4	Yet,	 Bremen’s	 Hanseatic	 identity	 did	 not	 end	with	the	foundation	of	the	Northern	German	Union.				 Before	 looking	more	 closely	 at	 the	 conflict	 between	Bremish	 and	German	identity,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 attempt	 to	 define	what	 is	meant	 by	 Bremish	 identity.	Most	importantly,	certainly	not	all	people	in	Bremen	shared	the	Bremish	identity	under	examination	in	this	thesis.	It	has	to	be	emphasised	that	this	thesis	analyses	the	 mercantile	 community	 instead	 of	 the	 entirety	 of	 Bremen’s	 population.	Bremen’s	mercantile	community	was	a	politically	and	economically	powerful	unit.	That	means	 it	was	 not	 part	 of	 the	 broader	 population	 but	 it	was	 an	 elite	 group	within	 Bremen’s	 society.	 The	mercantile	 community	 of	 Bremen	 consisted	 of	 the	people	who,	at	 least	 in	part,	 formed	the	city’s	 identity	by	representing	 its	values.	So,	 this	 section	 looks	 at	 how	 one	 of	 Bremen’s	 elite	 groups,	 the	 mercantile	community,	 reacted	 to	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	 nation-state.	We	 cannot	 of	course	deduce	from	this	that	all	of	the	city’s	population	felt	the	same	way.	Yet,	at	the	same	time,	these	merchants	had	formed	Bremen’s	identity	as	a	port	city	for	a	long	time.	Thus,	 it	 is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	merchants’	attitudes	played	a	significant	role	in	defining	the	city’s	political,	economic	and	cultural	identities.			 The	definition	of	Bremish	identity	used	in	this	thesis	is	closely	linked	to	the	idea	of	cosmopolitanism.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	port	cities	are	inclined	to	 foster	 the	 emergence	 of	 cosmopolitan	 thought.	 Bremen’s	 historic	 trading	networks	 had	 always	 led	 its	mercantile	 community	 to	 look	 beyond	 those	 states																																																									2	Ibid.,	p.	248	3	Ibid.,	p.	249	4	Ibid.,	p.	249	
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that	 later	 formed	 the	 German	 Empire.	 As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	Hanse,	 the	 political	dimension	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 ultimately	 aims	 at	 the	 establishment	 of	 supra-national	 institutions.	 If	 trading	 networks	 lay	 at	 the	 root	 of	 cosmopolitanism	thought	in	Bremen,	we	also	have	to	suppose	that	they	had	an	impact	on	Bremen’s	identity.	Certainly,	by	1871,	 the	Hanseatic	League	was	 long	gone	but	 its	heritage	was	proudly	 commemorated	 in	Bremen’s	 self-image.	 In	 addition	 to	 its	Hanseatic	past,	 there	were	also	other	features	imported	by	Bremen’s	merchants	that	added	to	the	community’s	identity.	It	would	be	all	but	impossible	to	accurately	determine	the	characteristics	of	Bremish	 identity.	 In	 any	way,	 this	 identity	was	 not	 the	 same	 for	 all	 of	 Bremen’s	merchants.	 Still,	 there	 are	 some	 cornerstones	 of	 it,	 and	 some	 common	 features,	that	are	worth	mentioning.	Although	written	 in	an	excessively	 romantic	manner,	Hans	Konrad	Röthel	is	still	able	to	skilfully	convey	the	essence	of	the	Hanseatic	and	Bremish	 identity	 in	 his	 study	 on	 the	 Hanseatic	 Cities	 of	 Hamburg,	 Lübeck	 and	Bremen.	 Instead	 of	 feeling	 connected	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Munich	 or	 Stuttgart,	 the	Hanseatic	merchants	are	more	attached	to	other	mercantile	communities,	such	as	those	 of	 Amsterdam,	 Scandinavia,	 London	 and	 Valparaiso.5	Consequently,	 Röthel	defines	the	Hanseatic	(and	therefore	also	Bremish)	identity	as	follows:			[…]	Das	Weltoffene	und	Meerverbundene;	der	ins	Große	greifende	Wagemut	verquickt	 mit	 nüchtern-klugem	 Rechnen;	 das	 Aristokratische	 ihres	Bürgertums	 und	 die	 in	 jahrhundertealter	 Tradition	 bewährte	republikanische	 Gesinnung;	 Stille	 und	 Stolz	 und	 jene	 feine	 Mischung	 von	Urbanität	 und	 kühler	 Zurückhaltung,	 die	 ihnen	 der	 Ruf	 der	 Steifheit	eintrugen	[…].6		Thus,	Röthel	points	to	distinctive	differences	in	the	characteristics	of	the	Hanseatic	people	 and	 other	 Germans.	 Unlike	 other	 Germans,	 the	 Hanseatic	 people	 have	 a	Republican	and	cosmopolitan	conviction.		Naturally,	the	trouble	with	these	definitions	is	that,	as	Matthis	Wegner	has	pointed	out,	 they	 tend	 to	perpetuate	 clichés.	7	Wegner	argues	 that	we	should	not	exaggerate	 the	 accuracy	 of	 such	 characterisations.	 Instead,	 he	 points	 to	 the	 fact																																																									5	Ibid.,	pp.	10–11	6	Röthel,	Die	Hansestädte,	p.	10	7	Matthias	Wegner,	Hanseaten:	Von	stolzen	Bürgern	und	schönen	Legenden	(Berlin,	1999)	
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that	 ‘wie	 stets	 erweisen	 sich	 auch	 hier	 alle	 noch	 so	 sensiblen	 und	 vorsichtigen	Etiketten	 menschlicher	 Gemeinschaften	 eben	 doch	 als	 höchst	 fragwürdige	Klischees.’ 8 	Certainly,	 we	 have	 to	 be	 careful	 when	 attributing	 any	 kind	 of	characteristics	 to	 a	 certain	 group	of	 people,	 such	 as	 the	people	 of	Bremen.	 Even	more,	 searching	 for	 overarching	 characteristics	 of	 the	Hanseatic	people	 can	only	lead	 to	 categorisation	 and	 simplification.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	we	 also	 have	 to	acknowledge	that	a	trading	community,	such	as	Bremen’s	mercantile	community,	will	make	 contacts	 to	 the	outside	world	 through	 the	 form	of	 international	 trade.	These	contacts	shape	an	 identity	 for	a	community	and	also	 for	a	city.	The	marks	that	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 Hanseatic	 League	 left	 were	 but	 one	 factor	 for	 the	Bremish	identity.		Apart	 from	 the	 Hanseatic	 identity,	 Lars	 Maischak	 has	 analysed	 the	economic,	 political	 and	 cultural	 relationship	 between	 Bremen	 and	 its	 most	important	trading	partner,	the	United	States.	Links	like	the	one	between	the	United	States	and	Bremen	markedly	 shaped	 the	Bremish	 identity.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	values	and	norms	of	Bremen’s	mercantile	community	influenced	the	identity	of	the	United	States.	Trading	links	tend	to	have	a	reciprocal	effect	on	its	trading	partners.	In	 this	 respect,	 Maischak	 points	 out	 that	 ‘France,	 Britain	 and	 America	 made	appearances	 in	 Bremish	 thought	 not	 just	 as	 abstract	 examples.’ 9 	This	cosmopolitanism	then	led	to	a	line	of	thought	that	was	different	to	other	German	states.	Furthermore,	Maischak	is	able	to	demonstrate	that	this	foremost	economic	relationship	also	gave	Bremen’s	merchants	a	significant	political	voice	in	countries	that	were	benefitting	from	Bremen’s	economic	success.10		Taking	all	these	factors	described	above	together,	we	get	an	idea	of	some	of	the	features	of	what	can	be	described	as	a	Bremish	identity:	urbane,	cosmopolitan,	open,	 and	 republican.	 	 As	 we	 saw	 earlier,	 Bremish	 identity	 drew	 parts	 of	 its	substance	from	Bremen’s	historical	role	as	a	member	of	the	Hanseatic	League.	 In	addition,	 the	mercantile	 community’s	 contact	 with	 its	 trading	 partners	 played	 a	role	 in	 the	development	of	Bremish	 identity	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 foundation	of	 the	German	Empire.		
																																																								8	Ibid.,	p.	33	9	Maischak,	German	merchants,	p.	266	10	Ibid.,	p.	263	
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	 Prior	to	becoming	part	of	the	Northern	German	Union,	Bremen	had	already	made	a	step	towards	economic	cooperation	between	the	German	states.	This	was	the	Deutsche	Handelstag	(DHT),	a	Chamber	of	Commerce	transcending	the	smaller	German	 states.	 From	 the	 beginning,	 Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 played	 an	important	 role	 in	 the	 preparations	 for	 the	 DHT	 as	well	 as	 its	 foundation,	which	took	place	in	Heidelberg	between	May	13	and	May	16	1861.	Due	to	the	high	level	of	commitment	to	the	course	of	the	DHT,	the	Handelskammer	Bremen	was	able	to	set	 influential	 impulses.11	One	of	 the	 first	of	 these	 impulses	was	a	 request	 to	 the	DHT.	 The	 request	 asked	 for	 the	 coordination	 of	 external	 tariff	 rates	 between	 all	German	 states	 by	 concluding	 collective	 commercial	 treaties.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	differential	treatment	of	German	states	would	be	abolished.	Thus,	Bremen’s	aim	of	being	 part	 of	 the	 DHT	 became	 clear	 from	 the	 outset:	 it	wanted	 to	 promote	 free	trade	–	an	aim	that	was	not	entirely	unselfish.	The	request	resulted	in	a	resolution	from	 the	 DHT	 that	 called	 for	 keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 unity	 of	 all	 German	 states	pertaining	to	commercial	and	shipping	treaties.				 The	 participation	 of	 Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 in	 the	 DHT	 reveals	that	the	city’s	mercantile	community	was	aware	of	the	necessity	to	work	together	with	 the	 other	 German	 states.	 Bremen	was	de	 jure	 still	 completely	 independent.	Since	 it	was	not	part	of	 the	German	Customs	Union	 it	was	even	de	facto	 still	not	dependent	 on	 the	 other	 German	 states.	 All	 the	 same,	 the	 initiative	 of	 Bremen’s	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 clearly	 shows	 a	 trend	 towards	 a	 growing	 sense	 of	collectiveness	 among	 the	 German	 states.	 It	 was	 no	 longer	 possible	 to	 pursue	 a	policy	of	complete	political	and	economic	exclusion.	At	the	same	time,	Bremen	did	not	succumb	to	the	feeling	of	German	unity	altogether.	Bremen	remained	outside	the	Deutsche	 Zollverein	 even	 after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	 Empire.	 It	 is	 a	cultural	aspect	that	sheds	the	most	light	on	Bremen’s	role	in	Germany.		 In	 particular,	 Bremen’s	Kriegerdenkmal,	 which	was	 erected	 in	memory	 of	Bremish	 soldiers	during	 the	Franco-Prussian	War,	delivers	 insight	 into	Bremen’s	self-conception	 in	 the	German	Empire.	 The	need	 to	 build	 a	memorial	 to	 the	war	opened	 up	 the	 question	 of	 what	 precise	 function	 it	 should	 have.	 To	 this	 end,	 a	special	 deputation	 was	 appointed	 with	 the	 task	 of	 discussing	 the	matter,	 which	presented	different	options	to	the	Senat	in	1872.	The	choices	were:																																																										11	See	Holger	Bischoff,	150	Jahre	DIHK:	Beiträge	der	Handelskammer	Bremen	zur	Geschichte	
des	DIHK	(Bremen,	2011)	
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	 Es	 könnte	 sich	 darum	 handeln	 durch	 ein	 Monument	 die	 Erhebung	 und	Einigung		 Deutschlands	 zu	 verherrlichen,	 oder	 denjenigen	Truppentheil,	in	welchem	die		größte	 Zahl	 der	 Bremer	 angehörigen	 Krieger	an	der	Vertheidigung	des		 Vaterlandes	Theil	genommen	hat,	ein	Denkmal	zu	errichten,	oder	endlich	das	Denkmal	zunächst	und	vorzugsweise	den	für	das	Vaterland	gefallenen	Söhnen		 Bremens	zu	widmen.12		In	the	end,	the	deputation	opted	for	the	last	of	the	three	choices,	a	memorial	to	the	fallen	 soldiers	 of	 Bremen.	 It	 was	 argued	 that	 ‘[e]in	 Monument,	 bestimmt,	 die	nationale	 Erhebung	 in	 ihrer	 ganzen	 Bedeutung	 zu	 verherrlichen	 würde	 der	Stellung	Bremens	und	bei	einer	entsprechenden	Ausführung	den	Mitteln	Bremens	kaum	angemessen	sein.’13			 Certainly,	 the	decision	 to	dedicate	 the	memorial	 to	 the	soldiers	of	Bremen	does	not	necessarily	mean	 that	 it	was	not	a	 symbol	 for	Bremen’s	patriotism	and	nationalism.	Yet,	to	the	members	of	the	deputation,	it	was	more	important	to	grant	a	 sense	 of	 home	 to	 the	 monument	 than	 to	 simply	 glorify	 the	 unification	 of	 the	German	 states.	 In	 the	 justification	 for	 the	 deputation’s	 choice,	 it	was	 added	 that	Bremen’s	 youth	 should	 be	 reminded	 of	 the	 participation	 of	 soldiers	 from	 their	home	city	 in	the	war	that	unified	Germany.	Hence,	 it	was	not	the	unified	German	nation	that	was	of	primary	concern	to	the	elites	of	Bremen	when	the	need	to	build	a	memorial	was	decided.	Rather,	the	soldiers	of	Bremen	and	the	city’s	contribution	to	the	Franco-Prussian	War	were	thought	to	be	more	significant.	After	some	delay,	the	 Kriegerdenkmal	 was	 inaugurated	 on	 December	 5	 1875.	 According	 to	 the	newspaper	Courier,	it	showed	a	German	soldier	with	a	waving	flag	in	his	left	hand,	a	drawn	sword	in	his	right	hand	and	trophies	at	his	feet.	Nevertheless,	some	sort	of	national	 symbol	 also	 had	 to	 be	 included:	 a	 frieze	 depicting	 ‘Kaiser	Wilhelm,	 den	Kronprinzen	des	deutschen	Reiches	u.s.w.’.14	Hence,	 in	Bremen,	which	was	 still	 a	republic,	it	was	merely	a	frieze	that	was	dedicated	to	the	royal	family.		 Without	question,	the	representation	of	national	feeling	and	pride	as	part	of	the	new	unified	nation	was	not	lacking	in	Bremen.	Yet,	even	by	1875,	the	ranking	order	 of	 belonging	 to	 Bremen	 and	 the	 nation	 was	 not	 as	 clearly	 settled	 as,	 for																																																									12	StaB	2-M.6.g.2.m.,	Anlage	zur	Mittheilung	des	Senats	vom	8.	März	1872	13	Ibid.	14	StaB	2-M.6.g.2.m.,	Courier.	Montag,	6.	Dezember	1875	
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example,	 Malte	 Ritter	 likes	 to	 believe.15	Ritter	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 people	 of	Bremen	were	able	to	build	a	dual	identity,	which	combined	Hanseatic	with	national	pride.	 In	 his	 conclusion,	 Ritter	 suggested	 ‘daß	 der	 nationale	 Gedanke	 seine	Durchdringungs-	 und	 Lebenskraft	 erst	 dadurch	 ausbildete,	 daß	 er	 alte	Identitätsbindungen	 nicht	 kappte	 oder	 verdrängte,	 sondern	 vielmehr	 auf	 ihnen	aufbaute,	 in	 ihnen	und	durch	sie	wirkte.’	16	Still,	 the	situation	seems	to	have	been	more	complicated	than	Ritter	is	willing	to	accept	when	he	argues	that	‘[w]enn	man	in	 Bremen	 für	 den	 Partikularismus	 plädierte,	 dann	 meinte	 man	 damit	 etwas	anderes,	als	das	Streben,	die	eigenen	Interessen	gegen	die	allgemeinen	Interessen	der	 übergeordneten	 staatlichen	Gemeinschaft	 durchzusetzen.’17	National	 pride	 in	Bremen	did	not	automatically	mean	that	the	German	nation	became	first	priority.	In	a	similar	vein,	Reinhard	Alings	has	put	forward	his	interpretation,	which	goes	as	follows:	 ‘Die	 nationale	 Sinnstiftung	 ergab	 sich	 auch	 hier	 wieder	 durch	 das	Herausstreichen	 des	 lokalen	 Anteils	 am	 Zustandekommen	 des	 Sieges	 im	Einigungskrieg	 –	 einer	 deutlich	 terrotialstaatlichen	 Komponente.’18	Furthermore,	Alings	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 Bremen’s	 memorial	 served	 as	 an	 example	 not	 only	with	regard	to	its	form	and	formation	but	also	with	respect	to	its	local	reference.19		Hence,	the	Kriegerdenkmal	was	first	and	foremost	a	monument	to	the	fallen	soldiers	 of	 Bremen.	 While	 it	 is	 without	 doubt	 that	 patriotic	 feelings	 towards	Germany	played	an	important	role	in	the	building	of	this	monument,	it	also	gave	an	identity	 to	 the	 fallen	 soldier.	 This	 identity	 was	 not	 rooted	 in	 Germany	 but	 in	Bremen.	There	remained	a	difference	between	fallen	soldiers	 from	other	parts	of	Germany	 and	 casualties	 from	 Bremen.	 Thus,	 having	 died	 during	 the	 war	 which	unified	Germany	and	which	heralded	the	foundation	of	a	German	nation-state	was	not	 tantamount	 to	 being	 a	 German	 soldier.	 In	 Bremen,	 these	 soldiers	 were	 still	regarded	as	people	of	Bremen,	not	of	the	newly	founded	German	nation.		In	any	case,	arguing	for	a	strong	local	identity	in	Bremen	at	the	time	of	the	foundation	of	the	Kaiserreich	does	not	mean	that	Bremen’s	situation	is	completely	atypical	to	the	rest	of	Germany.	In	fact,	 it	 is	extremely	difficult	to	imagine	that	all																																																									15	Ritter,	Die	Bremer	16	Ibid.,	p.	299	17	Ibid.,	p.	299	18	Reinhard	Alings,	Monument	und	Nation:	Das	Bild	vom	Nationalstaat	im	Medium	Denkmal	
–	zum	Verhältnis	von	Nation	und	Staat	im	deutschen	Kaiserreich,	1871-1918	(Berlin,	1996),	p.	99	19	Ibid.,	p.	99	
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people,	from	one	day	to	the	next,	became	convinced	German	nationals.	One	other	example	that	immediately	comes	to	mind	when	talking	about	Bremen	is	the	former	Kingdom	of	Hanover,	which	bordered	on	the	Free	and	Hanseatic	City.	The	Kingdom	of	Hanover	was	annexed	by	the	Prussian	Kingdom	after	the	Austro-Prussian	War	of	 1866.20	Yet,	 the	 Hanoverians	 did	 not	 simply	 give	 in	 to	 their	 fate.	 The	 joint	opposition	of	the	Centre	Party	and	the	Guelfs,	exemplified	by	Ludwig	Windthorst,	towards	the	Prussian	Kingdom	and	Bismarck	was	a	thorn	in	the	Reich	Chancellor’s	side.	 Consequently,	Bismarck	 attempted	 to	 transform	 the	Hanoverian	population	into	Prussians	from	1866	until	the	Reichsgründung.	Any	Hanoverian	participating	in	 ‘Protestkundgebungen	 […],	 setzte	 sich	 der	 Gefahr	 aus,	 wegen	 Beteiligung	 an	“welfischen	 Agitationen”	 hart	 bestraft	 zu	 werden.’ 21 	In	 the	 end,	 Bismarck’s	intention	 of	 forming	Hanoverians	 into	 Prussians	 had	 the	 opposite	 effect,	 namely	parts	 of	 the	 Hanoverian	 population	 refused	 to	 identity	 themselves	 with	 the	Prussian	 Kingdom.	 For	 all	 that,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 at	 this	 point	 that	 not	 all	Hanoverians	were	against	the	annexation	of	Prussia,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	chapter	on	Emden.	As	a	result,	Heide	Barmeyer	concludes	that	the	annexation	‘traf	[…]	alle	Hannoveraner	 tief,	 war	 unerwünscht	 auch	 bei	 denen	 unter	 ihnen,	 die	 aus	nationalen	 und	 wirtschaftlichen	 Gründen	 eng	 mit	 Preußen	 zusammengehen	wollten,	 und	 erschütterte	 alle	 Konservativen	 zutiefst	 in	 ihrem	Rechtsbewußtsein.’22	Consequently,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Reichsgründung,	 one	 was	able	to	again	regard	oneself	in	good	conscience	as	‘guter	Hannoveraner	und	guter	Deutscher.’23	Hanoverians	 did	 not	 want	 to	 be	 Prussians,	 ‘da	 erinnerte	 man	 sich	schon	 lieber	 in	 historischer	 Traditionspflege	 niedersächsischer	 Anfänge	 und	kultivierte	 ein	 auf	 älteste	 Stammeszusammenhänge	 angeblich	 zurückgehendes	Zusammengehörigkeitsbewußtsein	 […].’24 	The	 case	 of	 the	 former	 Kingdom	 of	Hanover	shows	that	there	were	similar	cases	to	Bremen	in	the	Protestant	North	of	
																																																								20	For	more	information	on	the	annexation	of	the	Kingdom	of	Hanover	and	its	opposition	to	Bismarck	see	for	example:	Helmut	Maatz,	Bismarck	und	Hannover,	1866–1898	(Hildesheim,	1970);	Heide	Barmeyer,	Hannovers	Eingliederung	in	den	preußischen	Staat:	
Annexion	und	administrative	Integration,	1866-1868	(Hildesheim,	1983).	On	the	topic	of	identities	within	the	German	Empire	see	also:	Michael	B.	Klein,	Zwischen	Reich	und	Region:	
Identitätsstrukturen	im	Deutschen	Kaiserreich	(1871-1918)	(Stuttgart,	2005)	21	Maatz,	Bismarck	und	Hannover,	p.	38	22	Barmeyer,	Hannovers	Eingliederung,	pp.	182–183	23	Ibid.,	p.	186	24	Ibid.,	p.	186	
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the	 German	 Empire,	 where	 local	 identity	 still	 played	 an	 important	 role	 after	1871.25	The	example	of	 the	Kriegerdenkmal	 thus	cannot	be	used	 in	order	 to	argue	that	Bremen	 remained	an	 isle	of	non-conformist	 cosmopolitans	 surrounded	by	a	sea	of	patriots	and	nationalists	in	the	German	Empire.	The	people	of	Bremen	were	not	 suddenly	 willing	 to	 give	 up	 their	 local	 identity	 once	 the	 Kaiserreich	 was	founded,	as	the	Kriegerdenkmal	demonstrates.	Consequently,	the	process	in	which	Bremen’s	 population	 became	 German	 instead	 of	 Bremish	 has	 to	 be	 examined	further	if	we	want	to	find	out	how	and	when	exactly	the	German	identity	replaced	the	Bremish	identity	in	this	port	city.	Hence,	the	noticeable	feature	about	the	City	of	 Bremen	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	Kaiserreich	 is	 that	 it	was	 neither	culturally	nor	economically	fully	integrated	into	the	Empire.		
b.	Bremen,	the	Empire	and	the	Gründerkrise		The	 event	 that	 certainly	 dominated	 the	 1870s	 in	 the	 German	 Empire	 was	 the	
Gründerkrise.	From	the	perspective	of	economic	history,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	precisely	pinpoint	 the	 directions	 of	 trade	 cycles.	 It	 is	 generally	 accepted	 that	 the	 period	around	Germany’s	unification	 led	 to	 increased	economic	activity,	 a	period	 that	 is	known	as	the	Gründerzeit.	The	Gründerzeit	was	then	disrupted	by	a	depression,	the	
Gründerkrise,	beginning	with	a	stock	exchange	crash	in	1873.	Aided	by	the	French	reparation	payments	after	the	war,	the	German	economy	received	large	inputs	of	capital,	 which	 were	 not	 exclusively	 invested	 reasonably.	 Due	 to	 a	 new	 law	introduced	 in	1870,	 joint	 stock	companies	no	 longer	needed	a	public	concession.	As	 a	 result,	 no	 fewer	 than	928	 joint	 stock	 companies	with	 a	 total	 capital	 of	 2.78	billion	 Marks	 were	 established	 in	 1871,	 1872	 and	 1873.26	Yet,	 the	 origin	 of	 the	
Gründerkrise	is	not	found	in	Germany	but	in	the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire	and	its	financial	 capital	 Vienna.	 In	 the	 Austro-Hungarian	 Empire,	 there	 was	 a	 founding																																																									25	For	more	information	on	Bismarck’s	domestic	policy	see	also:	Christoph	Nonn,	
Bismarck:	Ein	Preuße	und	sein	Jahrhundert	(München,	2015),	pp.	208–261;	Hans-Christof	Kraus,	Bismarck:	Größe	–	Grenzen	–	Leistungen	(2015,	Stuttgart),	in	particular	pp.	211–224;	Otto	Pflanze	(ed.),	Innenpolitische	Probleme	des	Bismarck-Reiches	(München,	1983);	Hans-Ulrich	Wehler,	Krisenherde	des	Kaiserreichs,	1871-1918	(Göttingen,	1979);	Jonathan	Steinberg,	Bismarck:	A	Life	(Oxford,	2011)	pp.	312–362	26	Rolf	Walter,	Wirtschaftsgeschichte:	Vom	Merkantilismus	bis	zur	Gegenwart	(Köln,	2003),	p.	109	
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boom	of	new	companies	similar	to	the	one	taking	place	in	the	German	Empire.	In	the	 end,	 factors	 such	 as	 a	 generous	 issuing	 of	 concessions	 and	 capital	 coming	 in	from	 Germany	 led	 to	 a	 bubble.	 As	 soon	 as	 the	 players	 in	 Austria’s	 booming	financial	sector,	the	Franko-Ungarische	Bank	in	Budapest,	experienced	problems	of	liquidity,	 the	 bubble	 burst.	 Vienna	 was	 hit	 by	 a	 wave	 of	 ceased	 payments.	Inevitably,	repercussions	of	the	Austrian	stock	exchange	crash	were	also	felt	in	the	German	Empire.	In	October	1873,	the	Vereinsbank	Quistorp	&	Co.	became	insolvent,	which	meant	 that	 the	 crisis	 had	 reached	 Berlin.	 Compared	 to	 1872,	 the	 market	values	 of	 444	 joint	 stock	 companies	 decreased	 by	 46	 per	 cent	 in	 1873.	Furthermore,	 only	 34	 of	 the	 107	 joint	 stock	 banks	 founded	 between	 1870	 and	1872	were	left	at	the	end	of	1873.27		The	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 a	 financial	 crisis	 in	 1873	 is	 undeniable.	 Still,	 the	effect	 of	 this	 crisis	 on	 the	 German	 economy	 is	 not	 as	 straightforward	 as	 some	historians	like	to	think.	In	this	respect,	Carsten	Burhop	has	shown	that	it	is	difficult	to	 base	 the	 strict	 scheduling	 of	 events,	 such	 as	 the	 Gründerzeit	 and	 the	
Gründerkrise,	on	economic	data.28	Burhop’s	argument	 is	based	on	the	 idea	that,	 if	economic	historians	stopped	using	a	linear	trend	model	for	the	national	product	to	illustrate	long-term	economic	growth,	a	model	which	indeed	reveals	a	crisis	from	the	1870s	to	the	mid-1890s,	the	Gründerkrise,	would	not	have	existed.29	Thus,	the	
Gründerkrise	 is	 a	 model	 of	 how	 economic	 data	 is	 used	 and	 processed.	 Burhop	presents	the	following	example:	‘Lässt	man	beispielsweise	einen	Strukturbruch	im	langfristigen	Wachstumsverlauf	 zu,	 dann	 zeigt	 sich,	 dass	die	deutsche	Wirtschaft	im	Verlauf	der	1870er	Jahre	auf	einen	höheren	Wachstumspfad	einschwenkte,	was	mit	 der	 These	 einer	 jahrzehntelangen	 Depression	 nur	 schwer	 in	 Einklang	 zu	bringen	ist.’30	According	to	Burhop,	even	a	precise	dating	of	the	Gründerkrise	to	the	year	1873	would	be	problematic	if	economic	historians	did	not	exclusively	rely	on	the	cyclical	component	of	the	national	product.		Hence,	it	is	time	for	historians	to	turn	away	from	looking	at	the	trade	cycles	of	 the	 German	 Empire	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 strict	 economic	 metrics.	 While	general	economic	development	and	 long-term	processes	are	of	course	 important,	short-term	crises	and	phases	of	increasing	and	decreasing	economic	activity	are	at																																																									27	Ibid.,	p.	111	28	Burhop,	Wirtschaftsgeschichte,	p.	69	29	Ibid.,	p.	69	30	Ibid.,	p.	69	
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least	equally	significant.	As	Nipperdey	has	rightly	pointed	out,	 to	contemporaries	these	 short-term	 up-	 and	 downturns	 were	 even	 more	 important	 than	 to	historians.31	Consequently,	by	examining	the	way	contemporaries	experienced	the	
Gründerkrise,	 historians	 are	 able	 to	 overcome	 the	 narrowness	 of	 economic	 data	and	 the	 difficulty	 of	 determining	 a	 precise	 date	 to	 the	 upper	 turning	 point	 of	 a	trade	cycle	for	all	of	Germany.		A	 contemporary	 view	 of	 the	 booming	Gründerzeit	 and	 the	Gründerkrise	 is	given	by	the	Jahresberichte	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	for	the	respective	years.	Usually	these	reports	were	issued	on	a	yearly	basis.	Yet,	the	reports	for	the	years	from	1870	to	1872	and	for	the	year	1873	were	published	in	one	volume	in	1874.	This	was	 justified	with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 four	 years	 represented	 a	 self-contained	whole,	 marked	 by	 the	 war	 and	 its	 consequences,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	was	concerned.32	As	we	would	expect,	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce	also	noticed	 a	 continuing	 economic	 upturn	 after	 the	 Franco-Prussian	 War.	Unsurprisingly,	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	regarded	the	war	‘als	den	Störer	jeder	Friedensthätigkeit,	der	plötzlich	die	Arbeit	des	Einzelnen	und	der	Gesammtheit	in	andere	 Bahnen	 lenkt,	wie	 die	 gewohnten,	 der	 daher	Handel	 und	Gewerbe	 lähmt	und	 jeglichen	 materiellen	 Fortschritt	 hemmt.’33	Yet,	 the	 war	 turned	 out	 to	 be	beneficial	 for	 Bremen’s	 economy.	 After	 all,	 it	was	 the	war,	 ‘der	 den	Verkehr	mit	einem	Male	wie	von	einem	Alpdruck	erlöste,	der	uns	das	deutsche	Reich	gründete	und	der	uns	den	Goldstrom	der	Milliarden	brachte.’34		It	 is	remarkable	that	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	dates	the	beginning	of	the	downturn,	 which	 followed	 the	 Gründerzeit,	 to	 the	 end	 of	 1872.	 Hence,	 while	economic	historians	are	still	struggling	to	specify	the	beginning	of	the	crisis	from	an	 analytical	 viewpoint,	 contemporary	 sources	 provide	 a	 clearer	 answer.	Remarkably,	 the	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 assumes	 indeterminable	 reasons	behind	the	end	of	the	economic	upturn,	‘da	naturgemäß	der	gewaltigen	Anspannung	aller	Kräfte	 Abspannung	 folgen	 muß’. 35 	Since	 Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	
																																																								31	Thomas	Nipperdey,	Deutsche	Geschichte	1866-1918,	Band	1:	Arbeitswelt	und	Bürgergeist	(München,	1998),	p.	283	32	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Berichte	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	die	Jahre	1870–1873	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1874)	33	Ibid.,	p.	5	34	Ibid.,	p.	5	35	Ibid.,	p.	5	
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considered	the	years	leading	to	the	crisis	as	one	whole,	it	is	worth	looking	at	these	in	more	detail.			 Indeed,	while	 there	was	not	much	 the	Chamber	 thought	 it	 could	do	about	the	 emerging	 crisis,	 it	 focused	 on	 other	 projects.	 Naturally,	 one	 of	 the	 greatest	dangers	of	the	sudden	outbreak	of	war	in	1870	for	Bremen’s	trading	and	shipping	industry	lay	in	the	capturing	of	merchant	vessels	by	the	French	Navy.	Additionally,	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	apparently	also	feared	a	French	invasion,	which	probably	brought	back	memories	of	 the	French	occupation	of	Bremen	during	the	Napoleonic	Wars	 for	Bremen’s	elderly.36	In	 regard	of	 the	 former	danger,	Bremen	remained	a	trailblazer	in	reforming	the	law	of	naval	warfare.	In	fact,	Bremen	had	played	this	role	since	1859,	when	it	first	campaigned	for	the	principle:	 ‘frei	Schiff	unter	Feindes	Flagge’.37	This	principle	 said	 that	even	merchant	vessels	belonging	to	hostile	 countries	 should	not	be	 attacked	or	 captured.	Although	German	 states	were	adhering	 to	 this	principle,	 the	French	were	not.	The	Austro-German	War	of	1866	had	 already	been	 fought	 on	 the	basis	 of	 this	 principle,	 agreed	upon	by	 the	Reichstag,	and	Bismarck,	the	Chancellor	of	the	Confederation,	had	promised	to	do	his	best	in	order	to	let	it	be	acknowledged	by	international	law.	Towards	the	end	of	1870,	Bismarck	was	willing	to	abandon	the	principle,	due	to	the	French	North	Sea	blockade,	which	led	to	objection	on	the	part	of	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce.38		Ultimately,	Bremen’s	undertaking	to	make	private	property	inviolable	at	sea	was	not	successful,	 since	 it	was	never	recognised	by	 the	French	government,	not	even	during	the	peace	negotiations.	Still,	German	owners	of	ships	and	cargo	were	at	 least	 reimbursed.	 This	 did	 not	 happen	 directly	 by	 French	 reimbursement	payments	to	the	ship	and	cargo	owners,	however,	but	rather	as	part	of	the	French	reparations	 payments,	 as	 regulated	 in	 a	 law	 regarding	 Kriegsentschädigung	 der	
Rheder	und	Ladungseigenthümer.	It	was	the	result	of	a	joint	effort	by	Chambers	of	Commerce	from	all	over	Germany.	In	the	case	of	Bremen,	it	led	to	reimbursements	amounting	 to	 782,340	 Taler,	 equivalent	 to	 2,347,020	 Marks,	 to	 ship	 and	 cargo	owners.39	Hence,	at	this	point,	it	of	course	made	more	sense	for	Bremen	to	raise	its	claims	 in	 a	 joint	 effort	 with	 other	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce.	 This	 indicates	 that	
																																																								36	Ibid.,	p.	6	37	Ibid.,	pp.	11–12		38	Ibid.,	p.	12	39	Ibid.,	p.	14	
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Bremen	realised	that	it	was	starting	to	become	more	reliant	on	other	parts	of	the	German	Empire.	Despite	 this	 joint	 effort	 for	 reimbursements,	 Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	persisted	as	a	stronghold	for	economic	liberalism	and	it	used	its	status	to	get	involved	in	the	economic	affairs	of	its	trading	partners.	While	the	Chamber	of	 Commerce	 admitted	 that	 it	was	difficult	 to	 campaign	 for	 free	 trade	when	 this	was	 not	 practised	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 Germany,	 it	 still	 did	 not	 shrink	 from	 issuing	 a	report	which	included	its	wishes	and	demands	to	North	America.	Simultaneously,	the	 Chamber	 was	 occupied	 with	 putting	 up	 a	 fight	 against	 a	 first	 attempt	 at	 a	tobacco	monopoly	put	forward	by	Württemberg,	which	envisaged	a	replacement	of	the	 existing	 customs	 duty	 and	 tax	 on	 tobacco.	 Tobacco	 was	 of	 course	 one	 of	Bremen’s	 most	 significant	 trading	 goods.	 Fortunately	 for	 Bremen,	 the	 Federal	Assembly	 rejected	 this	 first	 attempt	 but	 the	 idea	 would	 become	 an	 important	matter	in	the	dispute	between	Bremen	and	the	German	Empire.	Similarly,	in	1873,	another	attempt	was	made	to	increase	the	customs	duty	and	taxes	on	tobacco,	this	time	in	order	to	abolish	the	duty	on	salt.	The	draft	law	was	once	again	rejected,	yet	the	 draft	 law	 itself	 had	 negative	 short-term	 consequences	 for	 Bremen’s	 tobacco	trade.	The	Chamber	of	Commerce	argued	that	it	would	be	strongly	desirable	’daß	in	 Zukunft	 bei	 Berathung	 so	 wichtiger	 Steuergesetze	 ein	 anderes	 Verfahren	beobachtet	wird.’40	Overall,	 the	Handelskammer	observed	a	development	towards	free	 trade	 in	 the	German	Empire,	but	 there	was	always	 the	danger	of	 tariffs,	 like	the	one	on	tobacco.	Even	debates	on	the	introduction	of	such	laws	had	an	impact	on	 trade	 in	Bremen.	 Thus,	 although	 a	 free	 port	 under	 the	Empire’s	 Constitution,	Bremen’s	 economy	 was	 definitely	 also	 dependent	 on	 Berlin	 and	 the	 policies	pursued	 there.	 This	 should	 not	 be	 overlooked	 when	 discussing	 Bremen’s	independence	as	a	free	port.		Overall,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 Gründerkrise	 did	 not	 strongly	 affect	 Bremen	immediately,	since	it	was	first	and	foremost	a	financial	crisis	and	not	a	commercial	crisis.	Yet,	 it	certainly	also	had	an	 impact	on	Bremen’s	trade	and	shipping	sector.	More	 precisely,	 the	 annual	 report	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 described	 that,	even	though	commodity	trade	was	not	altogether	spared,	this	area	of	business	was	
																																																								40	Ibid.,	p.	47	
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not	deeply	affected	by	the	crisis,	at	least	in	Germany.41	As	already	mentioned,	the	crisis	started	at	the	Vienna	Stock	Exchange	in	May	1873	and	then	made	its	way	to	Berlin	and	New	York.	As	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce	observed,	 the	downturn	had	come	to	an	end	in	late	1873,	although	a	lasting	recovery	had	not	occurred.42		Overall,	 it	seems	that	 in	1873	the	crisis	was	not	as	significant	to	Bremen’s	mercantile	 community	 as	 were	 the	 changes	 in	 law	 prepared	 and	 concluded	 in	Bremen	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Empire	 during	 that	 year.	 For	 instance,	 the	Reichstag	prompted	a	revision	of	 the	 law	 from	1870	regarding	 the	 foundation	of	joint	stock	companies,	which	is	generally	regarded	as	having	been	facilitated	by	the	following	 economic	 crisis.43	When	 the	 individual	 German	 states	 were	 asked	 to	report	 on	 their	 experience	 with	 the	 new	 law,	 Bremen’s	 response	 was	 neutral.	According	to	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	it	was	not	yet	able	to	determine	the	effect	the	new	law	had	on	the	current	crisis.	It	also	added	that	‘in	Bremen	seien	übrigens	keinerlei	 Erscheinungen	 zu	 Tage	 getreten,	 welche	 als	 Mißbrauch	 bezeichnet	werden	 könnten.’44	More	 significant	 to	 Bremen	 was	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 Empire’s	tariff	law,	which	came	into	effect	on	July	7	1873.	This	reform	was	a	step	towards	a	freer	trading	policy	in	the	customs	union.	As	a	result	of	this	reform,	a	large	number	of	goods,	such	as	iron	and	ironware,	became	exempt	from	import	duties,	and	other	duties	 were	 reduced.	 Naturally,	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	 community	 welcomed	 this	reform,	 even	 though	 ‘es	 lebhaft	 bedauert	werden	muß,	 daß	 die	 Volksvertretung	mehr,	als	die	Regierung,	durch	schutzzöllnerische	Interessen	beeinflußt	wird,	und	sich	 durch	 diese	 Interessenpolitik	 zu	 einer	 Verschlechterung	 der	Regierungsvorlage	 hat	 bestimmen	 lassen.’ 45 	Hence,	 at	 this	 point,	 Bremen’s	
Handelskammer	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 satisfied	 with	 the	 Imperial	 government’s	stance	 on	 trade	 policy.	 It	 was	 the	 German	 Parliament	 that	 was	 linked	 with	protectionism.	 So,	 while	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 was	 viewed	 favourably,	 the	representative	 body	 of	 the	 German	 people	 was	 criticised.	 This	 proves	 that	 the	interests	of	Bremen	were	still	at	odds	with	those	of	the	rest	of	the	German	Empire	when	it	came	to	trade	policy.																																																												41	Ibid.,	p.	33	42	Ibid.,	p.	33	43	Walter,	Wirtschaftsgeschichte,	p.	109	44	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Berichte	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	die	Jahre	1870–1873	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1874),	p.	46	45	Ibid.,	p.	47	
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The	 following	 year	 did	 not	 hold	 any	 unwelcome	 surprises	 for	 Bremen’s	mercantile	community	either.	In	fact,	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	was	satisfied	with	the	 progress	 that	 had	 been	 made	 regarding	 new	 legislation	 the	 previous	 year.	Consequently,	 1874	was	 a	 relatively	 quiet	 year	 for	 Bremen.	 Contently,	 Bremen’s	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 concluded	 that:	 ‘Die	 Aufgaben,	welche	 durch	 den	Art.	 54	der	 Reichsverfassung	 gegeben	 waren	 und	 deren	 allmähliche	 Lösung	 die	 stetige	und	zusammenhängende	Arbeit	der	vorhergehenden	Jahre	gebildet	hatten,	waren	erledigt.’46	Article	54	of	the	German	Constitution	of	1871	stipulated	amongst	other	things	 that	 the	 German	 Empire	 ‘hat	 das	 Verfahren	 zur	 Ermittelung	 der	Ladungsfähigkeit	 der	 Seeschiffe	 zu	 bestimmen,	 die	 Ausstellung	 der	 Meßbriefe,	sowie	 der	 Schiffscertificate	 zu	 regeln,	 und	 die	 Bedingungen	 festzustellen,	 von	welchen	die	Erlaubniß	zur	Führung	eines	Seeschiffes	 abhängig	 ist.’47	The	 road	 to	unity	 of	 the	 German	merchant	marine	was	 also	 completed	with	 the	 coming	 into	effect	 of	 the	 new	 maritime	 labour	 act	 in	 March	 1873.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 not	unsurprising	 that	 Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 utilised	 this	 situation	 to	instigate	 further	 changes	 to	 the	 German	 Empire’s	 maritime	 law.	 These	 changes	consisted	 of	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 Gesetz	 über	 die	 Errichtung	 einer	 deutschen	
Seewarte	and	the	publication	of	the	Standungsordnung	in	1874.		A	 look	 at	 the	 trade	 statistics	 for	 1874	 reveals	 that	 the	 six	 year	 period	spanning	from	1869	to	1874	was	in	fact	not	unsuccessful	for	Bremen’s	port.		
	Figure	2.1:	Bremen’s	trade,	1869–1874		 Number	of	arriving	vessels	 Number	of	departing	vessels	 Total	(in	register	tons)	
1869	 3,032	 3,176	 1,	325,	064	
1870	 2,350	 2,368	 1,	058,	936	
1871	 3,237	 3,241	 1,	704,	555	
1872	 3,638	 3,568	 1,	667,	552		
1873	 3,465	 3,324	 1,	883,	336	
1874	 3,407	 3,243	 1,	893,	116	Source:	 AdHB	 B54	 1	 (1),	 Jahres-Bericht	 der	 Handelskammer	 in	 Bremen	 für	 1874	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1875),	p.	49																																																										46	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Jahres-Bericht	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	1874	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1875),	p.	5		47	Internet-Portal	“Westfälische	Geschichte”.	Bundes-Gesetzblatt	des	Deutschen	Bundes	No.	16.	Verfassung	des	Deutschen	Reiches.	Artikel	54:	http://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-geschichte/que/normal/que840.pdf	Accessed:	26/04/2016	
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	Thus,	 the	 table	 above	 reveals	 that	 even	 though	 we	 would	 expect	 a	 drop	 in	Bremen’s	trade	statistics	in	view	of	the	Gründerkrise	which	began	in	1873,	there	is	a	slight	–	but	noticeable	–	increase	in	trade,	measured	in	register	tons,	from	1871	to	1874.	It	has	to	be	noted	at	this	point	that	the	statistics	only	show	tonnage	and	not	 prices.	 That	 was	 precisely	 the	 approach	 adopted	 by	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	community:	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 effect	 of	 the	Gründerkrise,	 prices	 of	 Bremen’s	staple	 goods	 were	 adjusted	 downwards.	 This	 led	 to	 positive	 trade	 statistics,	 as	shown	above.	If	at	all,	one	could	point	to	the	decline	in	total	trade	in	1872.	Still,	the	decrease	was	only	around	two	per	cent	of	the	total	trade	of	the	previous	year	and	the	total	number	of	arriving	and	departing	vessels	increased	at	the	same	time.	To	speak	 of	 a	 crisis	 with	 respect	 to	 tonnage	 handled	 in	 Bremen	 would	 surely	 be	exaggerated.	 During	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	 Gründerkrise,	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	community	was	able	to	avoid	adverse	effects.		Furthermore,	 it	 is	 also	 worth	 examining	 the	 trading	 partners	 of	 Bremen	during	 the	 same	 period.	 This	 will	 give	 insight	 into	 a	 possible	 change	 to	 trading	partners	 that	 took	place	after	 the	 foundation	of	 the	German	Empire.	For	 the	 six-year-period	from	1869	to	1874	we	get	the	following	picture:	
	
Figure	2.2:	Bremen’s	trading	partners		 European	Ports	 Transatlantic	Ports	Total	Vessels	 Total	Register	Tons	 Of	which	German	(in	Reg.	Tons)	
Of	which	British	(in	Reg.	Tons)	
Total	Vessels	 Total	Register	Tons	 Of	which	USA	and	Canada	(in	Reg.	Tons)48	
1869	 5,355	 588,	375	 144,	183	 267,	005	 873	 736,	689	 584,	427	
1870	 4,043	 464,	372	 100,	975	 231,	311	 675	 594,	564		 495,	349	
1871	 5,491	 827,	594	 117,	477	 511,	138	 987	 876,	961	 686,	303	
1872	 6,326	 816,	971	 152,	833	 482,	581	 880	 850,	581	 671,	311	
1873	 5,673	 810,	056	 133,	139	 436,	526	 1,	116	 1	073,	280	 876,	812	
1874	 5,517	 800,	060	 139,	836	 465,	051	 1,	138	 1	092,	516	 917,	903	Source:	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Jahres-Bericht	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	1874	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1875),	pp.	49–50		
																																																								48	Note	that	the	report	for	1873,	from	which	the	numbers	for	1869	are	taken,	subdivides	into	North	America	instead	of	the	USA	and	Canada.	For	some	reason,	there	is	a	slight	but	tolerable	difference	between	these	two	categories	of	North	America	and	of	the	USA	and	Canada	regarding	tonnage	as	well	as	the	number	of	vessels.	
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If	 we	 compare	 Table	 2.1	 and	 Table	 2.2	 with	 attention	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 trade	between	1869	and	1871,	we	can	gather	from	it	that	the	German	unification	did	not	directly	affect	Bremen’s	choice	of	trading	partners.	From	1869	to	1871,	Bremen’s	overall	trade	measured	in	register	tons	increased	by	no	less	than	28.6	per	cent.	At	same	time,	trade	with	German	ports	even	went	down	from	144,	183	register	tons	to	117,	477	register	tons,	which	constitutes	a	decline	of	18.5	per	cent.	The	market	that	 benefitted	 most	 from	 Bremen’s	 steep	 increase	 in	 trade	 between	 1869	 and	1871	was	the	British	market.	Here,	we	can	observe	almost	a	doubling	of	tonnage.	Overall,	 trade	with	 other	German	ports	 between	1869	 and	1871	played	 a	minor	role	compared	to	trade	with	British	and	North	American	ports.	In	1869	and	1871,	Bremen’s	share	of	tonnage	to	and	from	German	ports	was	at	10.9	and	6.9	per	cent	respectively.	Tonnage	to	and	from	the	USA	and	Canada	accounted	for	44.1	and	40.2	per	 cent	 in	 1869	 and	 1871	 respectively.	 The	 second	 most	 important	 trading	partner	were	 the	British	 Isles	with	20.2	 and	30.0	per	 cent	 in	 the	 two	year.	Until	1874,	 the	 share	 of	 German	 ports	 as	 part	 of	 Bremen’s	 trading	 pattern	 did	 not	change	significantly	and	the	same	is	true	for	Britain	and	the	USA	and	Canada.	Thus,	Table	2.1	and	Table	2.2	demonstrate	two	important	points.	One	of	these	is	the	fact	that	 Bremen’s	 merchants	 succeeded	 in	 averting	 any	 possible	 impacts	 of	 the	
Gründerkrise	 on	 Bremen	 trade	 statistics	 by	 adjusting	 prices	 accordingly.	 Until	1874,	 the	 growth	 of	 Bremen’s	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 tonnage	 was	 stable.	 The	second	 point	 is	 that	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	 nation	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 more	trade	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 German	 Empire.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 trade	 with	 unified	Germany	actually	decreased,	and	in	particular,	trade	with	British	ports	increased.		 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Gründerkrise	 had	 not	 affected	 Bremen’s	 trade	statistics	by	1874	does	not	mean	that	Bremen	was	untroubled	by	its	consequences.	It	only	took	longer	for	the	crisis	to	have	an	impact	on	Bremen’s	trade.	The	report	for	1875	concludes	that	‘[d]as	Bild,	welches	ein	Rückblick	auf	die	wirthschaftlichen	und	handelspolitischen	Aufgaben	gewährt,	 ist	 im	Allgemeinen	ein	erfreuliches,	so	wenig	 ersprießlich	 freilich	 das	 vergangene	 Jahr	 für	 Handel	 und	 Verkehr	 selbst	gewesen	 ist.’ 49 	By	 1875,	 the	 economic	 crisis	 had	 reached	 Bremen	 and	 its	mercantile	 community.	 By	 a	 hair’s	 breadth,	 Bremen	would	 have	 ended	 up	 even	worse	 than	 just	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 Gründerkrise.	 One	 of	 the	 city’s	 most																																																									49	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Jahres-Bericht	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	1875	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1876),	p.	5	
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important	 trading	 businesses,	 the	 migration	 business,	 was	 in	 danger	 of	 being	prohibited	 by	 the	 German	 Empire.	 Initially,	 German	 penal	 law	 only	 forbade	persuading	Germans	to	emigrate	by	advertising	false	facts.	This	would	be	changed	in	 a	 way	 that	 would	 have	 included	 any	 kind	 of	 enticing	 German	 nationals	 to	emigrate.	 Naturally,	 this	met	with	 incomprehension	 in	 Bremen.	 The	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	commented:	 ‘Es	 leuchtet	ein,	daß	diese	Tendenz	eine	grundfalsche	ist,	nachdem	der	Grundsatz	der	Auswanderungsfreiheit	im	deutschen	Reiche	einmal	in	vollem	Maße	anerkannt	ist.’50			 The	intended	change	in	penal	law	was	introduced	due	to	the	belief	that	the	existent	 penal	 law	 had	 increased	 emigration. 51 	According	 to	 Bremen’s	
Handelskammer,	 the	 Franco-Prussian	War	 of	 1870–71	 led	 to	 a	 short	 upsurge	 in	emigration.	Still,	the	average	emigration	per	year	in	the	five	year	period	from	1870	to	1874	was	 in	no	way	higher	 than	 in	 the	previous	 five	year	period	–	 the	annual	average	of	people	emigrating	from	Hamburg	and	Bremen	was	at	around	80,000.52	What	 is	 more,	 the	 number	 of	 emigrants	 actually	 fell	 from	 100,040	 in	 1873	 to	30,000	 in	1874,	 the	 lowest	number	since	1850.	Again,	as	had	been	 the	case	with	the	Empire’s	new	tariff	law	in	1873,	Bremen	got	off	lightly.	In	the	end,	a	tightening	of	the	German	penal	law	with	respect	to	emigration	was	not	undertaken.	However,	this	example	together	with	the	discussion	about	a	new	tariff	 law	make	absolutely	clear	 that	 from	 1871	 onwards,	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	 community	 was	 to	 a	 large	degree	dependent	on	decisions	made	in	Berlin.		At	the	same	time,	Bremen	was	not	cut	off	from	the	global	economy.	Hence,	it	is	hardly	surprising	that	the	Gründerkrise	eventually	had	some	effect	on	Bremen’s	trading	 sector.	 From	 1874	 to	 1875,	 the	 total	 tonnage	 of	 vessels	 arriving	 and	departing	 dropped	 from	 1,	 893,	 116	 to	 1,	 600,	 986	 register	 tons	 –	 the	 lowest	number	since	1870.53	This	constitutes	a	fall	of	15.4	per	cent	in	a	single	year	and	the	decrease	in	the	total	number	of	vessels	was	similar.		Remarkably,	trade	with	North																																																									50	Ibid.,	p.	14	51	Indeed,	in	Prussia,	emigration	was	made	illegal	in	1812	due	to	the	Napoleonic	Wars.	While	the	Deutsche	Bundesakte	of	1815	effectively	allowed	migration	between	the	German	states,	only	the	Kingdom	of	Saxony	put	this	freedom	into	effect.	In	the	remaining	states,	emigration	remained	prohibited.	For	example,	in	Prussia,	there	was	a	strict	prohibition	of	emigration	until	1842.	See	Wolfgang	Riechmann,	„Vivat	Amerika“	–	Auswanderung	aus	dem	
Kreis	Minden	1816-1933	(Minden,	1993),	pp.	46–50	52	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Jahres-Bericht	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	1875	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Konvent	(Bremen,	1876),	p.	14	53	Ibid.,	pp.	43-44	
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America	was	hit	the	hardest	by	the	coming	crisis.	In	this	trade	sector,	total	tonnage	decreased	from	917,	903	to	692,	322	register	tons,	which	amounted	to	almost	25	per	 cent.	Trade	with	 the	German	Empire,	on	 the	other	hand,	 remained	 relatively	stable:	it	only	shrank	from	139,	836	to	136,	795	register	tons.	In	fact,	a	more	severe	slump	in	Bremen’s	trade	with	Germany	had	taken	place	from	1872	to	1873	when	total	tonnage	decreased	from	152,	833	to	133,	139	register	tons.			 Consequently,	 these	 numbers	 allow	 us	 to	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
Gründerkrise	 in	 the	same	way	as	 the	mercantile	community	of	Bremen	did	 in	 the	report	for	1876.	Here,	it	is	described	that	‘[d]ie	Krisis,	in	welche	seit	1873	nach	und	nach	fast	alle	Productionszweige	hineingezogen	sind,	hat	sich	auch	im	verflossenen	Jahre	 dem	 Handel	 noch	 immer	 fühlbar	 gemacht.’54	Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce	also	 recognised	a	 slight	 improvement	 to	 the	 situation	–	a	situation	that,	as	admitted	by	Bremen’s	Handelskammer,	was	never	as	damaging	as	first	predicted.	In	1876,	it	was	possible	again	to	price	up	these	goods,	and	some	of	them	 could	 even	 be	 made	 considerably	 more	 expensive.	 As	 a	 result,	 ‘das	 dem	legitimen	Waarenverkehr	 entzogene	 Capital	 kehrte	 mehr	 und	 mehr	 zurück	 und	auch	 die	 in	 Folge	 der	 vielen	 fehlgeschlagenen	 Hoffnungen	 verminderte	Unternehmungslust	scheint	wieder	aufzuleben.’55		For	 all	 that,	 it	 is	 highly	 difficult	 to	 assess	 the	 concrete	 impact	 of	 the	
Gründerkrise	 in	 Bremen.	 As	 already	 examined,	 during	 the	 first	 five	 year	 period	after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Empire,	 there	 was	 hardly	 any	 effect	 on	 Bremen’s	incoming	 and	 outgoing	 tonnage.	 Table	 2.3	 below	 gives	 an	 overview	 of	 Bremen’s	trade	statistics	between	1874	and	1876.			
Figure	2.3:	Bremen’s	trade,	1874-1876		 Number	of	arriving	vessels	 Number	of	departing	vessels	 Total	(in	register	tons)	
1874	 3,407	 3,243	 1,	893,	116	
1875	 2,801	 2,809	 1,	600,	986	
1876	 2,720	 2,799	 1,	782,	711	Source:	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Jahres-Bericht	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	1876	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Convent	(Bremen,	1877),	p.	41																																																									54	AdHB	B54	1	(1),	Jahres-Bericht	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	für	1876	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Convent	(Bremen,	1877),p.	6	55	Ibid.,	p.	6	
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	As	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 this	 table,	 traded	 tonnage	 remained	 relatively	 stable	throughout	the	years,	and	following	the	slump	in	1875,	it	went	up	again	in	1876.	In	addition,	it	is	noticeable	that	during	the	Gründerkrise,	in	1876,	the	wealth	tax	paid	to	the	City	of	Bremen	was	remarkably	high,	as	the	annual	report	reveals.	While	it	was	estimated	 that	 income	 from	wealth	 tax	would	 lie	at	around	700,	000	Marks,	this	 number	 was	 surpassed	 by	 more	 than	 200,	 000	 Marks.	 According	 to	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	 this	amounted	 to	an	 increase	of	at	 least	60%	 in	 the	 total	assets	of	the	City	of	since	1866,	the	last	time	the	tax	was	called	in.56			 Overall,	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 1870s	 still	 remained	 impacted	 by	 the	consequences	of	the	economic	crisis.	The	report	for	1878	stated	once	again	 ‘[d]ie	wirthschaftliche	Krisis	der	letzten	Jahre	ist	noch	immer	nicht	vorüber.’57	However,	according	to	the	Chamber,	worse	than	the	adverse	effect	of	the	crisis	on	trade	and	shipping	was	the	fact	that	it	paved	the	way	for	protectionist	measures.	There	was	an	imminent	danger:			 Die	Gefahr,	daß	die	ruhmvollen	Traditionen	der	gemäßigt	freihhändlerischen	preußisch-deutschen	Wirtschaftspolitik	 von	 den	 leitenden	Männern	 in	 der	Reichsregierung	 geringer	 geschätzt	 werden	 sollten,	 als	 die	 schillernden	Schutzzollprojecte,	 nach	 denen	 beim	 Eintritt	 einiger	Verkehrsbeschränkungen	 die	 Heilung	 des	 kranken	 Wirtschaftskörpers	 mit	Sicherheit	 zu	 erwarten	 steht,	 ist	 denn	 auch	 in	 Wirklichkeit	 während	 des	verflossenen	 Jahres	 erheblich	 gewachsen,	 der	 Kampf	 zwischen	 Freihandel	und	Zollschutz	auf	der	ganzen	Linie	entbrannt.58			From	 the	beginning	of	 this	 conflict,	Bremen	campaigned	 for	 free	 trade.	Although	Bremen’s	trade	recorded	a	positive	year	in	1879,	the	struggle	between	free	traders	and	protectionists	in	the	German	Empire	could	no	longer	be	prevented.59		In	fact,	by	then	protectionism	had	already	gained	the	upper	hand	with	the	Customs	Act	of	July	15	1879.	Naturally,	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	was	opposed	to																																																									56	Ibid.,	p.	5	57	AdHB	B54	1	(2),	Bericht	über	die	Thätigkeit	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	im	Jahre	1878	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Convent	(Bremen,	1879),	p.	5	58	Ibid.,	p.	5	59	AdHB	B54	1	(2),	Bericht	über	die	Thätigkeit	der	Handelskammer	in	Bremen	im	Jahre	1879	erstattet	an	den	Kaufmanns-Convent	(Bremen,	1879),	p.	5	
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these	 protectionist	 measures.	 In	 December	 1878,	 Reich	 Chancellor	 Bismarck	announced	 his	 protectionist	 programme.	 Following	 this,	 a	 committee	 of	 the	
Bundesrat	was	formed	in	order	to	discuss	Bismarck’s	plans.	In	this	committee	the	Hanseatic	Cities	had	one	vote,	while	Bismarck	and	Prussia	had	three	each	out	of	a	total	 of	 15	 (Württemberg,	 Saxony,	 Baden,	 Hessen,	 Mecklenburg	 and	 Saxony-Weimar	were	 the	other	members	of	 the	committee).	Theodor	Barth,	who	will	be	looked	 at	 it	 in	 more	 detail	 below,	 represented	 the	 Hanseatic	 vote.	 As	 a	consequence	 of	 having	 just	 one	 vote	 it	 was	 realised	 in	 Bremen	 that	 these	circumstances	together	with	that	the	character	of	the	committee	‘sich	sehr	bald	in	den	wirklichen	Charakter	 eines	nach	politischen	Gesichtspunkten	 abstimmenden	Collegiums	 verwandelte,	 so	 war	 die	 Opposition	 der	 freihändlerischen	 Minorität	von	vornherein	wenig	aussichtsvoll.’60		Against	all	expectations,	Bismarck’s	protectionist	programme	was	approved	of	in	the	committee	in	just	three	months.	Still,	Bremen	did	not	lose	hope,	although	this	 proved	 to	 be	 extremely	difficult.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 final	 report	 of	 the	committee	still	mentioned	the	free	traders’	objections	to	protectionism,	these	were	simply	omitted	in	the	report	to	the	Reichstag.61	Nonetheless,	Bremen	continued	to	lobby	 for	 free	 trade.	 In	 February,	 Bremer’s	 Handelskammer	 took	 part	 in	 a	conference	for	Chambers	of	Commerce	with	a	free	trade	disposition	that	took	place	in	 Berlin	 and	 another	 one	 organised	 by	 the	 Deutscher	 Nautischer	 Verein.	 The	impact	of	these	measures	on	government	policy	was	negligible	but	it	is	significant	that	Bremen	did	not	simply	accept	its	fate.	Even	a	city-state	as	small	as	Bremen	felt	that	it	could	have	an	effect	on	state	affairs	in	Berlin.			 To	conclude,	in	this	part,	it	was	examined	how	Bremen	was	integrated	into	the	 German	 Empire	 during	 the	 1870s.	 Politically,	 Bremen	 was	 far	 from	independent	 from	 decisions	 made	 in	 Berlin.	 Yet,	 economically,	 Bremen’s	mercantile	community	was	capable	in	fending	off	the	Gründerkrise	from	having	an	impact	on	Bremen’s	trade.	In	fact,	for	the	merchants,	the	period	between	1866	and	1876	 was	 mainly	 successful	 despite	 the	 Gründerkrise.	 What	 must	 have	 been	concerning	for	the	mercantile	community,	however,	was	the	fact	that	Bremen	was	more	 and	more	 dependent	 on	 goodwill	 towards	 the	 Hanseatic	 City	 from	 Berlin.	This	 is	 exemplified	 best	 by	 the	 continuous	 struggle	 to	 fight	 off	 any	 protectionist																																																									60	Ibid.,	p.	6	61	Ibid.,	pp.	67	
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agitations,	 such	 as	 the	 tobacco	 monopoly	 or	 the	 Customs	 Law,	 and	 to	 further	promote	 free	 trade.	 While	 the	 prevention	 of	 the	 Customs	 Law	 of	 1879	 was	eventually	 unsuccessful,	 there	were	 still	more	 areas	 of	 conflict	 between	Bremen	and	the	German	Empire.			
c.	The	Case	of	Theodor	Barth		The	 case	 of	 Theodor	 Barth	 is	 particularly	 intriguing,	 since	 it	 demonstrates	 the	fragility	 of	 Bremen’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 and	 the	 German	Empire.	Therefore,	 it	will	be	necessary	 to	 take	a	 look	at	Theodor	Barth’s	 life	and	work	in	Bremen.	In	an	article	on	Barth’s	life	and	his	dedication	to	liberalism,	Hans	Kloft	 described	 him	 as	 follows:	 ‘Wirtschaftsmann,	 politischer	 Abgeordneter	 und	vehementer	Gegner	Bismarcks,	Herausgeber	 und	Publizist	 eines	 herausragenden	liberal	Organs	in	der	Wilhelminischen	Zeit	–	es	war	eine	Kombination,	wie	sie	für	das	 Kaissreich	 in	 dem,	 was	 sie	 leisten,	 und	 auch:	 was	 sie	 nicht	 leisten	 konnte	typisch,	vielleicht	nur	in	ihrer	Billanz	außergewöhnlich	war.’62	Theodor	 Barth	 was	 born	 on	 July	 16	 1849	 in	 Duderstadt	 near	 Göttingen.	Four	 years	 later,	 he	 and	 his	 family	 moved	 to	 Bremerhaven,	 where	 his	 father	opened	 a	 pharmacy.	 He	 went	 on	 to	 study	 law	 and	 economics	 in	 Bremen,	Heidelberg	 and	 Leipzig.	 Barth	 did	 not	 come	 from	 one	 of	 the	 long-established	Bremish	 families.	 He	 returned	 to	 Bremen	 as	 a	 lawyer	 and	 then	 went	 to	Bremerhaven	 as	 an	 assessor	 before	 he	 became	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce’s	 in-house	 lawyer,	 a	 so-called	 Syndikus,	 in	 1877,	 a	 post	 that	 he	 held	 until	 1883.	Additionally,	 Barth	 also	 became	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Reichstag	 for	 the	 Liberale	
Vereinigung,	 a	 liberal	party,	 in	1881.	Later	on,	he	 joined	 the	 so-called	Freisinnige	
Vereinigung,	before	founding	the	Demokratische	Vereinigung	 together	with	Rudolf	Breitscheid	und	Hellmut	von	Gerlach	in	1908,	just	one	year	before	his	death.		Kloft	 has	 aptly	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 position	 of	 Syndikus	 ‘in	 seinen	Zuständigkeiten	 leicht,	 in	 seinem	 realen	 Einfluss	 schwer	 zu	 bestimmen	 [ist].’63	Barth’s	 assigned	areas	of	 responsibility	 –	 trade	and	 shipping,	 emigration,	 budget	affairs,	coinage	and	banking	–	set	the	stage	for	great	conflict.	He	certainly	made	the																																																									62	Hans	Kloft,	‘Politik	und	Journalismus	im	Wilhelminischen	Reich.	Theodor	Barth	(1849–1909):	Politiker,	Publizist	und	Syndikus	der	Bremer	Handelskammer’,	in:	Bremisches	
Jahrbuch	88	(2009),	pp.	172–193,	here	p.	175	63	Ibid.,	p.	174	
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most	of	this	potential	conflict.	Not	without	reason	did	the	Vossische	Zeitung	write	about	Theodor	Barth:	 ‘Es	war	eine	wunderliche	Erscheinung	wie	der	 jugendliche	Vertreter	 der	 Bremer	Handelskammer	 im	 Jahre	 des	 zollpolitischen	Umschwungs	1879	 als	Vertreter	der	Hansestädte	 in	der	bundesratlichen	Tarifkommission	den	Plänen	des	Fürsten	Bismarck	mit	Mut	und	Nachdruck	entgegentrat.’64		1879	marked	the	end	of	free	trade	in	the	German	Empire.	The	changeover	from	 a	 national	 liberal	 to	 a	 conservative	 Reichstag	 went	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 the	transition	from	free	trade	to	protectionism	in	the	Empire’s	customs	policy.	While	the	 tariff	 law	 of	 1879	was	mainly	 concerned	with	 textiles,	 produce	 of	 the	 heavy	industry	and	agricultural	products,	there	had	also	been	a	persistent	debate	about	a	possible	tariff	on	tobacco.	This	debate	started	in	1873	and	experienced	its	height	around	 1878.	 This	 of	 course	 called	 Bremen	 into	 action,	 as	 tobacco	 was	 still	 a	profitable	and	thus	significant	commodity	for	the	mercantile	community.	After	all,	the	 value	 of	 imported	 and	 exported	 tobacco	 amounted	 to	 140	million	Marks,	 to	which	9	million	Marks	in	cigars	could	be	added.65	Plans	were	made	to	introduce	a	tax	based	on	the	weight	of	tobacco	that	was	grown	in	Germany	and	a	triplication	of	the	 tobacco	 tariff.66	However,	 the	most	 controversial	 point	was	 a	 projected	 state	monopoly	on	tobacco.	Regarding	the	value	of	its	tobacco	trade,	Bremen’s	reaction	was	entirely	unsurprising.	While	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	realised	that	an	increase	 of	 the	 tax	 on	 tobacco	 was	 inevitable,	 it	 was	 decisively	 against	 the	introduction	 of	 a	 monopoly.67	For	 this,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 succeeded	 in	convincing	the	Senate	to	take	up	this	position	in	the	Federal	Assembly.			In	fact,	Bremen	did	not	stand	alone	in	its	rejection	of	protectionism	and	the	planned	 tobacco	 monopoly.	 At	 the	 delegates’	 conference	 of	 German	 maritime	trading	 towns	 in	May	1878,	 the	delegates	objected	 to	protectionism,	 the	 tobacco	monopoly	and	also	the	idea	of	a	national	economic	senate,	the	Volkswirtschaftlicher	
Senat.	Naturally,	 this	 idea	 led	to	criticism	from	the	opposite	side.	The	wording	of																																																									64	Vossische	Zeitung,	3.	Juni	1909,	Nr.	254,1	cited	in	Kloft,	‘Politik	und	Journalismus’,	p.	174	65	Schwarzwälder,	Geschichte	der	freien	Hansestadt	Bremen,	Bd.	2.,	p.	332	66	The	cultivation	of	tobacco	in	Germany	goes	back	around	400	years.	Today,	the	majority	of	tobacco	is	cultivated	in	Baden-Württemberg	and	Rhineland-Palatinate.	At	the	time	of	the	foundation	of	the	German	Empire,	tobacco	was,	for	example,	still	cultivated	in	the	area	around	Göttingen.	However,	‘der	hiesige	Tabakanbau	hatte	keine	Zukunft.’	See	Rudolf	von	Thadden,	Günter	J.	Trittel	(eds),	Göttingen	–	Geschichte	einer	Universitätsstadt,	Band	3:	Von	
der	preußischen	Mittelstadt	zur	südniedersächsischen	Großstadt,	1866-1989	(Göttingen,	1999),	p.	7	67	Ibid.,	p.	332	
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this	 criticism	was	 extremely	 harsh,	 as	 can	 be	 gathered	 from	 an	 article	 from	 the	
Deutsche	 volkswirthschaftliche	 Correspondenz.	 In	 this	 article	 the	 author	 raged	 as	follows:	‘Was	die	Vertreter	der	Seehandelsstädte	vorgebracht	haben,	übersteigt	an	Rücksichtslosigkeit	 und	krasser	 Sondersucht	Alles,	was	 in	den	 letzten	 Jahren	bei	ähnlichen	 Vereinsversammlungen	 geleistet	 worden	 ist.’68	But	 as	 if	 that	 was	 not	enough,	 the	 author	went	 on	 to	 stylise	 the	 debate	 into	 a	 question	 of	 being	 for	 or	against	 the	whole	German	nation.	He	argues:	 ‘Durch	 ihre	Debatten	zieht	sich	wie	ein	 rother	Faden	der	 cynische	Gedanke	hindurch:	wir	wollen	uns	auf	Kosten	des	gesammten	Hinterlandes	mästen,	 gleichviel	 ob	unsere	 selbstsüchtige	Politik	 zum	Ruin	des	Vaterlandes	führe	oder	nicht.’69	This	 is	 the	situation	that	Theodor	Barth	found	himself	in	when	he	published	his	book	on	Die	handelspolitische	Stellung	der	
Deutschen	Seestädte	in	1880.	The	book	was	based	on	a	paper	that	Barth	had	given	at	 the	 Volkswirthschaftliche	 Gesellschaft	 in	 Berlin	 in	 January	 1880.	 It	 is	 worth	looking	 at	 this	 publication	 of	 Barth	 in	 more	 detail,	 as	 it	 outlines	 his	 political	outlook	 and	 conviction,	 which	 in	 the	 end	 put	 Barth	 at	 war	 with	 the	 Reich	Chancellor.		It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 Barth’s	 publication	 is	 aimed	 at	 defending	 the	disposition	of	trading	cities	towards	free	trade	in	the	dispute	between	supporters	of	free	trade	and	protectionism.	As	seen	above,	it	was	not	untypical	in	this	dispute	to	equate	support	for	free	trade	with	egoism	and	unpatriotic	attitudes	on	the	part	of	 the	 trading	 cities.	 This	 of	 course	 gave	 the	 critics	 of	 free	 trade	 an	 edge	 over	mercantile	communities	insisting	upon	free	trade.	In	such	an	emotionally	charged	atmosphere	it	was	not	easy	to	counter	the	arguments	put	forward	by	supporters	of	protectionism.	Theodor	Barth	nevertheless	made	an	attempt	to	highlight	that	free	trade	did	not	stand	in	opposition	to	the	advancement	of	the	German	nation.	First	of	all,	 Barth	 argued	 that	 mercantile	 communities	 did	 not	 principally	 oppose	protectionism	due	to	‘nackte[m]	Eigennutz’.70	Instead,	if	Bremen	had	been	selfish,	that	would	not	mean	that	 it	had	to	oppose	protectionism.	The	share	of	 industrial	products	as	part	of	total	trade	was	not	significantly	high,	so	even	a	complete	loss	of	this	 trade	 would	 have	 been	 bearable.	 Furthermore,	 customs	 duties	 would	 be	passed	on	entirely	 to	 the	consumer;	 in	Bremen,	 these	consisted	 largely	of	people																																																									68	Theodor	Barth,	Die	handelspolitische	Stellung	der	Deutschen	Seestädte	(Berlin,	1880),	p.	6	69	Ibid.,	p.	6	70	Ibid.,	p.	7	
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who	 bought	 staple	 goods,	 like	 tobacco	 and	 petroleum,	 and	 foodstuffs.	 Since	demand	for	such	goods	tended	to	be	inelastic,	Bremen	would	remain	more	or	less	unaffected	by	protectionist	measures.	Due	to	a	tariff	on	thread,	Bremen’s	trade	in	raw	materials,	such	as	cotton	and	wool,	would	possibly	even	have	increased.	This	argument	 was	 supposed	 to	 underline	 that	 Bremen	 acted	 on	 economic	 rationale	rather	than	idealism	when	defending	free	trade.		With	 Barth	 mentioning	 in	 passing	 that	 ‘[d]ie	 Neigung	 zu	 derartigen	künstlichen	 Regulirungen	 des	 Seehandels	 ließ	 sich	 bei	 dem	 Alles	 vermögenden	Reichskanzler	präsumiren’,	we	 also	 get	 an	 idea	of	 his	 attitude	 towards	Bismarck	and	his	political	views.	In	this	quote,	Barth	was	referring	to	Bismarck’s	attempt	to	convince	 the	 merchants	 of	 a	 Surtaxe	 d’Entrepot,	 an	 additional	 customs	 tariff	 on	goods	 from	 European	 ports	 outside	 Germany.	 This	 tariff	 was	 aimed	 at	discriminating	 against	 other	 European	 ports.71	Bismarck’s	 attempt	 backfired	 and	was	 rejected	 by	 Hamburg’s	 merchants,	 to	 which	 Bismarck	 had	 made	 this	 offer	hoping	 that	 it	 would	 make	 them	 shift	 from	 their	 free	 trade	 stance.	 Hamburg’s	mercantile	 community	 rejected	 Bismarck’s	 offer	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 free	 trade	would	find	the	cheapest	option	available	even	without	any	public	aid.72			Barth	asked:	why	was	it	not	just	idealism	then	that	made	the	trading	cities	on	 the	 coasts	 reject	 protectionism?	 In	 response	 to	 this	 question,	 Barth	 himself	revealed	a	highly	idealised	view	on	mercantile	communities	in	Bremen	and	other	German	cities.	He	argued	that:		Interessen	 sind	gewiß	maßgebend	 für	die	handelspolitische	Stellungnahme	der	 deutschen	 Seestädte,	 aber	 die	 dauernden	 Interessen,	 nicht	 die	 des	Augenblicks.	 Die	 Seestädte	 operiren,	 wie	 Capitalisten,	 die	 auf	 kleine	augenblickliche	 Annehmlichkeiten	 verzichten,	 indem	 sie	 ihr	 Geld	 in	 ein	Unternehmen	 stecken,	 um	 dauernde	 Vortheile	 dagegen	 einzutauschen.	 Sie	haben	den	Egoismus	von	Leuten,	die	der	Henne,	welche	 ihnen	goldene	Eier	legt,	 den	 Hals	 nicht	 umgedreht	 wissen	 wollen,	 so	 viel	 man	 ihnen	 auch	vordemonstrirt,	 daß	 die	 Henne	 nothwendigerweise	 den	 ganzen	 Leib	 voll	Gold	haben	muss.73																																																									71	Julia	Laura	Rischbieter,	Mikro-Ökonomie	der	Globalisierung:	Kaffee,	Kaufleute	und	
Konsumenten	im	Kaiserreich	1870-1914	(Köln,	2011),	p.	82	72	Ibid.,	pp.	82–83	73	Barth,	Die	handelspolitische	Stellung,	p.	9	
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	The	business	acumen	of	merchants	leads	to	an	understanding	that	their	prosperity	is	 linked	to	that	of	the	German	nation.	Thus,	 to	Barth,	 it	was	clear	that	defending	free	 trade	was	 equivalent	 to	 doing	 his	 best	 for	 the	 German	 nation.	 After	 all,	 not	without	 reason	 did	 merchants	 fear	 protectionism,	 ‘[s]ie	 fürchten	 das	Schutzzollsystem	wie	eine	falsche	Heilmethode,	den	Körper	momentan	belebt,	um	ihn	schlißlich	noch	kränker	zu	machen,	als	er	vorher	war.’74		After	clarifying	that	merchants	acted	in	accordance	with	the	interests	of	the	German	nation,	Barth	turned	to	the	reasons	for	the	emphasis	that	was	put	on	the	idea	of	free	trade.	According	to	Barth,	this	significance	was	based	on	three	factors:	geographical,	 historical	 and	 political.	 Geographical	 factors	 encouraged	 German	port	 cities	 to	 strive	 for	 free	 trade,	 since	 they	also	acted	as	gateways	 to	countries	beyond	Germany,	 such	as	Russia,	 Switzerland	and	parts	of	 the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire.	After	all,	the	industrial	heartland	of	the	Habsburg	Monarchy,	Bohemia,	was	situated	on	the	River	Elbe	and	not	on	the	Danube.	Similarly,	the	industrial	areas	of	Austrian	 Silesia	 and	Northern	Moravia	were	 not	 connected	 to	 the	Danube	 Basin	but	to	the	German	Empire	via	the	Oder	and	Vistula.		Finally,	due	to	the	railway,	the	German	North	 Sea	 ports	were	 no	 less	 accessible	 for	 the	 textile	 industries	 of	 the	western	Crown	Land	of	Vorarlberg	than	were	Trieste	or	Flume.	Furthermore,	the	significance	of	 free	 trade	 for	port	 cities	on	 the	Baltic	Sea	coast	was	based	on	 the	fact	 that	 they	 focused	on	 transit	 trade	 in	wood	and	grain.	Therefore,	 these	 cities	were	hit	hard	by	the	protectionist	measures,	as	these	shrunk	their	hinterlands.	Interestingly,	 the	 historical	 and	 political	 factors	 are	 rather	 problematic	when	it	comes	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	as	they	had	not	always	been	advocates	of	free	trade	in	the	nineteenth	century.	During	the	1830s	and	1840s,	both	port	cities	stood	up	for	protectionism	in	the	form	of	favouring	the	German	trade	over	the	flag	of	other	nations.	Barth	explained	this	with	the	fact	that	different	Navigation	Acts	in	other	 countries	 discriminated	 against	 the	 German	 flag.75	Naturally,	 in	 the	 end,	‘[d]iese	schutzzöllnerischen	Velleitäten	hatten	jedoch	in	den	Hansestädten	keinen	langen	 Bestand.’76	By	 the	 late	 1840s,	 the	 tide	 had	 turned.	 According	 to	 Barth,	proponents	of	 free	 trade	were	now	able	 to	gain	 the	upper	hand	 in	 the	Hanseatic																																																									74	Ibid.,	p.	9	75	Ibid.,	p.	13	76	Ibid.,	p.	17	
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Cities	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen.	Barth	argued	that	this	circumstance	was	proven	by	the	publication	of	an	official	memorandum	by	Hamburg’s	Senate	in	1847	titled	Das	
Differential-Zollsystem.	In	this,	it	is	concluded	that	‘niemals	aber	wird	der	Vortheil	der	 einzelnen	 Stadt,	 des	 einzelnen	 Landes	 die	 Annahme	 eines	 Systems	rechtfertigen	 können,	 welches	 der	 Nation	 mehr	 Schaden	 als	 Nutzen	 bringt.’77	It	was	along	this	line	that	the	German	port	cities	argued	in	a	petition	to	the	Reichstag	in	May	1879:	‘Die	deutschen	Seestädte	haben	sich	in	allen	Perioden	der	deutschen	Geschichte	als	die	treuesten	Anhänger	von	Kaiser	und	Reich	bewährt;	und	auch	wir	werden,	 wenn	 die	 Nothwendigkeit	 von	 den	 gesetzgebenden	 Factoren	 anerkannt	ist,	uns	selbst	schweren	Opfern	willig	unterwerfen.’78		Inevitably,	 Barth	 depicts	 those	 port	 cities	 that	 were	 opponents	 of	protectionism	 as	 loyal	 patriots.	 Anything	 else	would	 have	 been	 unthinkable	 in	 a	debate	as	charged	as	this	one.	Still,	it	also	becomes	clear	that	Barth	was	not	simply	looking	 to	get	 the	best	deal	 for	Bremen	and	other	port	 cities.	On	 the	 contrary,	 it	was	 his	 liberal	 viewpoint	 that	 made	 him	 argue	 for	 free	 trade.	 Apart	 from	protectionism,	Barth	was	also	opposed	to	the	Samoa-Vorlage.	This	will	be	looked	at	in	 detail	 later	 on	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 suffices	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	Samoa-Vorlage	was	intended	by	Bismarck	to	financially	support	a	private	overseas	venture	from	Hamburg.	 Barth’s	 principle	 remained:	 ‘Denn	 mit	 dem	 einen	 neuen	 Privilegium	schafft	 man	 den	 Appetit	 nach	 Privilegien	 bei	 hundert	 anderen	 Gewerben,	 und	gerade	 diese	 Sucht	 nach	 Begünstigungen	 auf	 Kosten	 Dritter,	 das	 ist	 das	Entnervende,	 was	 die	 Freihändler	 in	 erster	 Linie	 bekämpfen	 müssen.’79	It	 was	wholly	unacceptable	for	a	merchant	to	accept	gifts,	as	this	would	run	contrary	to	the	 merchants’	 economic	 pride.	 Even	 worse,	 protecting	 one	 branch	 of	 domestic	industry	was	accepted	just	as	reluctantly	as	subsidising	one	particular	business.	All	of	 these	actions	were	seen	 to	 lead	 to	 ‘eine[m]	Krach,	bei	dem	auch	die	gesunden	schlecht	 wegkommen,	 und	 dann	 ist	 die	 allgemeine	 Misère	 da.’80	Furthermore,	Barth	already	warned	that	concessions	like	the	Samoa-Vorlage	and	possibly	others	could	be	used	as	a	protectionist	lure.		By	 analysing	 Barth’s	 publication,	 Die	 handelspolitische	 Stellung	 der	
deutschen	 Seestädte,	 it	 becomes	 obvious	 that	 there	 was	 potential	 for	 conflict																																																									77	Ibid.,	p.	19	78	Ibid.,	p.	19	79	Ibid.,	p.	22	80	Ibid.,	p.	23	
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between	 Barth’s	 liberal	 point	 of	 view	 and	 the	 direction	 of	 Bismarck’s	 politics	towards	protectionism.	As	we	 shall	 see	 later	 on,	Barth	was	 at	 least	 representing	large	parts	of	Bremen’s	mercantile	community,	who	sympathised	with	his	 liberal	ideas.	In	1881,	Theodor	Barth	became	a	member	of	the	Reichstag	for	the	Liberale	
Vereinigung,	which	had	split	from	the	Nationalliberale	Partei.	Thus,	Barth	was	able	to	 defend	his	 point	 of	 view	 even	more	publicly.	However,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	remark	that	Barth	was	not	a	representative	for	Bremen	but	for	the	constituency	of	Gotha.	In	the	same	year,	the	mandate	of	Alexander	Georg	Mosle,	a	member	of	the	
Nationalliberale	Partei	to	the	Reichstag,	had	come	to	an	end.	Mosle	had	sided	with	Bismarck	during	the	debate	on	protectionism.	As	a	result	of	the	uproar	this	caused	in	 Bremen,	 he	 was	 urged	 to	 resign	 his	 seat	 immediately	 in	 1880.	 Even	 though	Mosle	 left	 the	party,	he	 refused	 to	 resign	and	remained	 in	office	until	1881.81	So,	while	Mosle,	who	was	supporting	Bismarck’s	 change	of	policy,	 left	 the	Reichstag,	Barth,	an	opponent	of	Bismarck’s	protectionism,	joined	the	Reichstag.		With	 Barth	 acceding	 to	 his	 new	 role	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Reichstag,	 it	 is	worth	looking	at	the	letters	he	sent	back	to	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	for	which	he	remained	active	as	a	Syndikus.	The	few	letters	that	can	be	found	in	the	Chamber	of	 Commerce’s	 archives	 date	 from	 January	 1882	 to	 February	 1883.	 Most	 of	 the	contents	 of	 these	 letters	 are	 only	 understandable	 in	 context	 with	 the	 prevalent	debates	in	the	Reichstag.	However,	in	their	entirety	they	give	a	good	impression	of	Barth’s	 political	 agenda.	 For	 example,	 in	 his	 letter	 from	 January	 7	 1882,	 Barth	made	no	secret	of	his	opposition	to	Ludwig	Windthorst,	a	member	of	the	Zentrum.	He	complained	that	Windthorst	 ‘erweist	sich	mehr	und	mehr	als	Figaro,	der	dem	Bismarck	gern	für	gute	Bezahlung	jeden	Gefallen	tut.’82	Overall,	Barth	saw	himself	in	a	difficult	position,	as	both,	the	government	and	the	Centre	Party,	were	opposed	to	him.	As	a	result	of	this,	Barth	expected	a	‘Hagel	von	Schmutz	und	Steinen	in	der	nächsten	Zukunft	[…].’83	However,	he	was	already	prepared	for	this:	‘Ich	werde	es	kaltblütig	hinnehmen.’84	Barth	never	failed	to	emphasise	his	liberal	conviction.	He	was	completely	at	odds	 with	 the	 Nationalliberale	 Partei,	 whose	 members,	 he	 suspected,	 ‘möchten																																																									81	Schwarzwälder,	Geschichte	der	freien	Hansestadt	Bremen,	Bd.	2.,	p.	333	82	AdHB,	D13,	Barth,	Berlin,	den	7.	Juni.	1882,	Sehr	geehrter	Herr	Praeses.		83	Ibid..		84	Ibid..		
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Bismarck	 immer	 noch	 gern	wieder	 aus	 der	 Hand	 fressen.’85	In	 Barth’s	 eyes,	 this	cooperation	with	Bismarck	was	 enough	 to	deprive	 the	party	 of	 its	 right	 to	 exist.	However,	it	was	not	just	the	Nationalliberale	Partei	that	incurred	Barth’s	wrath.	On	the	subject	of	a	debate	in	the	Reichstag,	he	depicted	the	Reich	Chancellor’s	course	of	 action	 regarding	 an	 intervention,	 as	 follows:	 ‘[I]ch	 vermuthe,	 er	wird	 es	 thun,	wenn	 er	 Centrum	 oder	 Nat.-Lib.	 kirre	 gemacht	 hat;	 andererseits	 wird	 er	 wol	vorziehen,	 krank	 zu	 werden.’ 86 	This	 frustration	 with	 Bismarck	 also	 became	transparent	 in	 another	 letter	 from	 January	 1883.	 In	 a	 debate	 about	 a	 ban	 on	imports,	Bismarck	took	a	hand.	Barth	described	the	situation:	‘Die	Commissare	des	Bundesraths	 spielten	 die	 übliche	 klägliche	 Rolle	 und	 Bismarck	 that	 durch	Hereinziehen	 eines	 ganz	 heterogenen	 Gegenstandes	 das	 Seinige,	 um	 eine	ordnungsmäßige	sachliche	Debate	zu	hintertreiben.’87	Thus,	Barth	was	definitely	not	prepared	to	restrain	himself	when	it	came	to	a	situation	that	did	not	conform	to	his	liberal	outlook.	This	also	became	obvious	in	his	 depiction	 of	 another	 conflict,	 which	 he	 had	 with	 Wilhelm	 Freiherr	 von	Minnigerode,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Konservative	 Partei.	 In	 a	 Reichstag	 session	 on	customs	 matters	 on	 February	 7	 1883,	 Barth	 took	 the	 opportunity	 ‘das	 Huhn,	welches	 ich	noch	mit	Minnigerode	 zu	pflücken	hatte,	 gehörig	 [zu	 rupfen].	 Er	 hat	jedenfalls	 nicht	 den	 Längeren	 bei	 dieser	 Auseinandersetzung	 gezogen.’88	This	proves	 that	Barth	was	 certainly	not	afraid	of	openly	exchanging	differences	with	other	members	of	the	Reichstag.89		However,	 in	 the	end,	Barth’s	willingness	 to	 take	action	against	Bismarck’s	politics	eventually	led	to	his	downfall,	at	least	in	Bremen.	Barth’s	political	agenda	displeased	the	Reich	Chancellor	to	such	an	extent	that	he	instructed	the	Prussian	Minister	 Resident,	 Friedrich	 Krüger,	 to	 see	 to	 Barth’s	 dismissal	 as	 Syndikus	 in	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce.	As	a	result,	Barth	himself	resigned	from	his	post	in	May	 1883.90	After	 this,	 Barth	moved	 to	 Berlin	 to	 concentrate	 on	 his	 role	 as	 a	member	of	the	Reichstag	and	to	actively	pursue	his	political	goals.	Together	with	Ludwig	Bamberger,	Barth	founded	the	liberal	weekly	journal	Die	Nation,	published																																																									85	Ibid..		86	Ibid..		87	AdHB,	D13,	Barth,	Berlin,	d.	11.	I	83.	Verehrter	Herr	Prases!	88	AdHB,	D13,	Barth,	Berlin,	d.	8.	Febr.	83,	Verehrter	Herr	Präses!	89	In	fact,	as	will	be	shown	below,	Bismarck	also	took	offence	at	Barth’s	expressions	of	opinion	and	his	adamant	defence	of	liberalism	and	especially	free	trade.		90	Kloft,	‘Politik	und	Journalismus’,	p.	175	
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between	1883	and	1907.91	One	year	before	his	death,	Barth	was	also	 involved	 in	the	foundation	of	a	political	party,	the	Demokratische	Vereinigung.	In	summary,	one	could	argue	that	Barth’s	role	as	a	member	of	the	Reichstag	was	independent	of	his	position	in	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce.	Yet,	Bismarck	obviously	still	perceived	Barth	as	a	representative	of	the	general	mood	in	Bremen.	In	 accordance	with	Bremen’s	politics,	Barth	 stood	 for	 a	 left	 of	 centre	worldview.	Particularly	 after	 Bismarck’s	 turn	 to	 protectionism,	 Barth’s	 views	 were	 in	 stark	opposition	to	those	of	the	Reich	Chancellor.	When	Bremen	was	forced	to	give	in	to	the	 Chancellor’s	 demands,	 Barth’s	 position	 as	 Syndikus	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	Commerce,	which	still	associated	him	with	Bremen,	became	unacceptable.	 In	 line	with	 this,	 Barth’s	 resignation	 was	 certainly	 a	 step	 towards	 integration	 into	 the	German	Empire.			
	
d.	Economic	Integration	–	The	Zollanschluss		Recently,	 the	proceedings	of	 a	 conference	on	Ökonomie	und	Nation.	Der	Deutsche	
Zollverein	 als	 Faktor	 der	 ‚kulturellen	 Nationsbildung’	 im	 19.	 Jahrhundert	 were	published.92	In	 this	miscellany,	Hans-Werner	Hahn	and	Marko	Kreutzmann	point	to	the	fact	that	the	history	of	the	Zollverein	has	attracted	relatively	little	attention	by	 historians,	 especially	 in	 recent	 years. 93 	This	 is	 why	 there	 are	 only	 two	comprehensive	analyses	of	the	German	customs	union,	one	of	which	dates	back	to	1939. 94 	The	 authors	 claim	 that	 the	 Zollverein	 did	 not	 only	 play	 ‘für	 die	wirtschaftliche	 Entwicklung,	 sondern	 etwa	 auch	 für	 die	 Geschichte	 des	Föderalismus,	des	Parlamentarismus	und	nicht	zuletzt	auch	des	Nationalismus	und	der	 Nationsbildung	 eine	 zentrale,	 bislang	 jedoch	 selten	 systematisch	 untesuchte	Rolle.’95	For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 German	customs	union.																																																										91	For	a	detailed	evaluation	of	the	journal,	see	also	Kloft,	‘Politik	und	Journalismus’,	pp.	178–190	92	For	the	publication	see:	Hans-Werner	Hahn	and	Marko	Kreutzmann	(eds),	Der	Deutsche	
Zollverein:	Ökonomie	und	Nation	im	19.	Jahrhundert	(Köln,	2012)	93	Hans-Werner	Hahn,	Marko	Kreutzmann,	‘Der	Deutsche	Zollverein	in	der	Geschichte	des	19.	Jahrhunderts:	Neue	Perspektiven	der	Forschung’,	in:	Hahn,	Kreutzmann,	Der	Deutsche	
Zollverein,	pp.	1–29	94	See	William	O.		Henderson,	The	Zollverein	(London,	1939);	Hans-Werner	Hahn,	
Geschichte	des	Deutschen	Zollvereins	(Göttingen,	1984)	95	Hahn,	Kreutzmann,	‘Der	Deutsche	Zollverein’,	p.	3	
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	 The	ideas	of	the	Neue	Kulturgeschichte	and	its	influences	on	the	concept	of	nation	 building	 are	 regarded	 as	 central	 by	 the	 authors.	 This	 new	 approach	 is	identified	 as	 emphasising	 the	 ‘Charakter	 der	 Nation	 als	 ein	 in	 den	Wahrnehmungen	 und	 Vorstellungen	 der	 Menschen	 entstehendes	 Kontrukt’. 96	Instead	 of	 accepting	 the	 notion	 of	 “nation”	 simply	 as	 a	 natural	 fact,	 we	 should	accept	that	the	Zollverein	was	crucial	in	constructing	one	version	of	nation.	 	If	we	do	this,	then	the	question	follows	of	where	Bremen	was	positioned	and	positioned	itself	in	this	version	of	a	nation.	Certainly,	the	national	version	of	the	Zollverein	was	but	one	version	of	a	German	nation.	Jürgen	Müller,	for	example,	has	argued	that	the	economic	integration	initiated	by	the	Deutsche	Bund	cannot	simply	be	overlooked,	as	it	had	been	done	until	then.97	Müller	shows	that	Bremen	was	an	active	member	in	 some	 of	 the	 committees	 working	 towards	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 economic	integration;	 Johann	 Smidt,	 who	 is	 known	 as	 the	 founder	 of	 Bremerhaven,	 is	mentioned	as	 a	particularly	 active	member.98	Still,	 even	Müller	has	 to	 admit	 that	‘[w]enn	auch	nicht	in	den	Ergebnissen,	so	doch	vom	politischen	Ansatz	her	waren	die	 nationalen	 Integrationsprojekte	 des	 Deutschen	 Bundes	 auf	wirtschaftspolitischem	Gebiet	viel	umfassender	und	vielfältiger.’99		 It	 was	 not	 without	 reason	 that	 the	 Austrian	 Chancellor	 Clemens	 von	Metternich	 expressed	 that	 what	 the	 beginning	 of	 economic	 integration	 between	German	states	 represented	was	 ‘der	erste	Keim	zu	einem	Bunde	 im	Bunde’.100	In	line	with	 this	 thought,	 Christopher	Clark	has	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	Zollverein	was	pivotal	for	one	particular	reason:	‘It	was	here	that	ministers	and	officials	learned	to	think	 in	an	authentically	German	compass	 […]’101	Even	 though	 the	Zollverein	was	definitely	not	 the	Prussian	predecessor	of	a	German	nation-state,	 it	 still	played	a	central	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 German	 nation	 building.102	Consequently,	 if	 it	 is																																																									96	Ibid.,	p.	5	97	Jürgen	Müller,	‘Der	Deutsche	Bund	und	die	ökonomische	Nationsbildung:	Die	Ausschüsse	und	Kommissionen	des	Deutsches	Bundes	als	Faktoren	politischer	Integration’,	in:	Hahn,	Kreutzmann,	Der	Deutsche	Zollverein,	pp.	283–302	98	Ibid.,	p.	290	99	Ibid.,	p.	288	100	Metternich	quoted	in	Adreas	Etges,	Wirtschaftsnationalismus:	USA	und	Deutschland	im	
Vergleich	(1815–1914)	(Frankfurt,	1999),	p.	60	101	Christopher	Clark,	Iron	Kingdom:	The	Rise	and	Downfall	of	Prussia	(London,	2007),	p.	394	102	Hahn	and	Kreutzmann	argue:	‚Der	Deutsche	Zollverein	spielte	eine	nicht	zu	unterschätzende	Rolle	für	die	„kulturelle	Nationsbildungs.	Zunächst	einmal	schuf	er	mit	der	gemeinsamen	Institution	eine	Deutungssubstanz,	die	im	Gegensatz	zu	eher	amorphen	
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argued	 that	 the	 Zollverein	 had	 an	 integrating	 and	 nation	 building	 effect	 on	 its	member	 states,	 it	 is	 indispensable	 to	 ask	 how	 the	 Hanseatic	 Cities	 positioned	themselves	 towards	 this	 economic	 union	 after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	nation-state.103	We	have	 already	 examined	Theodor	Barth’s	 role	 in	Bremen’s	 relationship	with	the	German	Empire	at	the	end	of	the	1870s	and	beginning	of	the	1880s.	As	we	have	 seen,	 the	 prevalent	 liberalism	 in	 Bremen	 stood	 in	 the	 way	 of	 Bismarck’s	conservative	turn	at	the	end	of	the	1870s.	Inevitably,	this	led	to	conflict.	One	major	area	of	 conflict	was	definitely	 the	question	of	Bremen’s	 accession	 to	 the	German	customs	union.	Article	34	of	the	Reichsverfassung	of	1871	stated	that:			 Die	 Hansestädte	 Bremen	 und	 Hamburg	 mit	 einem	 dem	 Zweck	entsprechenden	 Bezirke	 ihres	 oder	 des	 umliegenden	 Gebietes	 bleiben	 als	Freihäfen	 außerhalb	 der	 gemeinschaftlichen	 Zollgrenze,	 bis	 sie	 ihren	Einschluß	in	dieselbe	beantragen.		Thus,	 the	right	 to	remain	outside	 the	Empire’s	customs	union	was	guaranteed	to	the	 Hanseatic	 Cities	 of	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 by	 the	 Federal	 Constitution.	 In	theory,	 it	was	the	cities’	right	to	decide	when	joining	the	customs	union.	Yet,	this	right	 proved	 illusory.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 even	 though	 there	 were	supporters	of	Bremen’s	position	as	a	free	port	city	–	particularly	in	Bremen	–	there	were	 naturally	 also	 opponents	 of	 this	 situation.	 Even	 in	 Bremen,	 there	 was	 no	consensus	about	the	right	path	for	Bremen.	We	cannot	look	at	just	one	side	of	the	debate	and	pretend	that	this	was	the	general	opinion	in	Bremen.		
																																																																																																																																																																		Projektionsflächen	wie	der	gemeinsamen	Sprache	ein	klar	abgrenzbares	Substrat	für	politische	Identitätsentwürfe	bot.’	See:	Hahn,	Kreutzmann,	‘Der	Deutsche	Zollverein’,	in:	Hahn,	Kreutzmann,	Der	Deutsche	Zollverein,	p.	21	103	This	question	was	not	adequately	answered	in	either	of	the	two	standard	works	on	the	
Zollverein	by	Henderson	and	by	Hans-Werner	Hahn.	In	fact,	only	Henderson	dedicates	a	sub-section	of	a	mere	six	pages	to	the	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	accession	to	the	customs	union,	while	Hahn’s	analysis	only	mentions	the	case	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen	on	the	last	two	pages.	In	respect	of	these	shortcomings,	Otto	Pflanze’s	study	on	Bismarck	in	two	volumes	represents	a	rare	example.	Even	though	the	Zollanschlussfrage	is	only	dealt	with	on	four	pages,	Pflanze	is	at	least	one	of	a	few	historians	of	the	German	Empire	taking	this	topic	into	consideration.	Hence,	it	is	unquestionably	necessary	to	pay	more	attention	to	the	processes	leading	up	to	the	Hanseatic	Cities’	accession	to	the	customs	union	in	1888.	See	Henderson,	Zollverein,	pp.	330–335;	Hahn,	Geschichte,	pp.	187–188	and	Otto	Pflanze,	
Bismarck:	Der	Reichskanzler	(München,	1998),	pp.	252–255	
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	 Bremen’s	 traffic	 conditions	 with	 the	 Zollverein	 were	 regulated	 in	 two	separate	treaties	between	the	two,	one	from	January	26	1856	and	the	other	from	December	14	1865.	Due	to	the	changes	that	had	taken	place	in	the	meantime	–	the	foundation	of	the	German	Empire	and	with	it	the	creation	of	the	Empire’s	customs	union	 in	 place	 of	 the	 Zollverein	 –	 the	 agreement	 between	 the	 Zollverein	 and	Bremen	was	 terminated	as	of	 January	1	1878	by	 the	 Imperial	government	at	 the	beginning	of	the	year	1877.	As	a	result,	Bremen	needed	to	enter	negotiations	with	the	 Empire.	 However,	 on	 November	 6	 1877,	 Senator	 Otto	 Gildemeister,	Burgomaster	 of	Bremen,	 complained	 to	 Friedrich	Krüger,	 the	Hanseatic	Minister	Resident	 in	 Berlin,	 that	 since	 Bremen	 had	 expressed	 willingness	 to	 enter	negotiations	 ‘herrscht	 altum	 silentium.’104	Gildemeister	 also	 noted	 with	 elegant	understatement:	 ‘Begreiflicher	 Weise	 empfindet	 man	 hier	 einige	 Neugier,	 was	denn	am	1.	 Januar	werden	soll.’105	Within	a	day,	 came	Krüger’s	 response.	Krüger	notified	 Gildemeister	 that	 ‘die	 Angelegenheit	 wegen	 Erneuerung	 des	Zollvereinsvertrages	mit	Bremen	bisher	nicht	für	dringlich	angsehen	und	daher	im	Reichskanzler-Amt	noch	nicht	zum	Vortrag	gebracht	ist.’106	This	was	justified	with	the	 fact	 that	only	 slight	 changes	were	 seen	as	necessary	and	 that	 these	 could	be	dealt	with	in	a	short	period	of	time.	Yet,	in	the	end,	the	termination	of	agreements	had	 to	be	postponed	until	 January	1	1879	and	 then	again	until	 July	1	1879.	The	second	 postponement	 was	 requested,	 as	 it	 was	 regarded	 as	 inevitable	 to	 also	regulate	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 customs	 border.	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 shift	 of	 the	borderline,	so	that	a	small	part	of	Bremen,	the	Stadtwerder,	was	henceforth	part	of	the	 Empire’s	 customs	 union.107	The	 final	 draft	 of	 the	 new	 agreement	 was	 only	brought	 before	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	 in	 June	 1879	 but	 it	 was	 resolved	 and	published	by	the	end	of	June	1879.						 In	February	1877,	as	a	consequence	of	the	terminated	agreement,	Bremen’s	
Bürgerschaft,	 the	 city	 parliament,	 requested	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 deputation.	 This	deputation	 was	 set	 up	 in	 order	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 Bremen’s	status	 as	 a	 free	 port	 city	 should	 be	 suspended.	 This	 deputation	 forwarded	 the	question	 to	 Bremen’s	 Handelskammer,	 the	 Gewerbekammer	 and	 the																																																									104	StaB,	2-Ss.4.d.2.e.2.g.1.,	Letter	to	Krüger,	Bremen	6.	November	1877.	105	Ibid..	106	StaB,	2-Ss.4.d.2.e.2.g.1.,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	No.	113,	Berlin,	den	7ten	November	1877	107	See	Schwarzwälder,	Geschichte	der	freien	Hansestadt	Bremen,	Bd.	2.,	p.	346	
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Landwirtschaftskammer.	 All	 three	 Chambers	 were	 asked	 to	 submit	 a	 survey	 in	response	 to	 the	question.	Their	views	varied	and,	 thus,	 it	 is	worth	 looking	at	 the	way	the	three	Chambers	justified	their	decisions.			 Having	 outlined	 Barth’s	 position,	 it	 does	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 that	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	argued	for	staying	outside	the	Empire’s	customs	union.108	First	 of	 all,	 the	 report	 clarified	 that	 a	 decision	 for	 joining	 the	 customs	union	could	not	be	predicated	on	the	fact	that	other	important	port	cities,	such	as	Amsterdam,	Antwerp	or	London,	flourished	without	being	free	port	cities.	Neither,	it	was	contended,	did	the	positive	experience	of	the	accession	of	the	Hanseatic	City	of	 Lübeck	 in	 1868	 count	 as	 a	 valid	 argument	 for	 Bremen’s	 accession.	 Lübeck’s	accession	happened	simultaneously	with	that	of	the	duchies	on	the	River	Elbe	and	of	 Mecklenburg.	 Since	 these	 places	 were	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 trade	 freely	 with	Hamburg,	Lübeck	was	used	as	a	replacement	of	Hamburg	and	saw	an	increase	in	trade.109	Subsequently,	the	report	discussed	three	viable	possibilities	for	Bremen’s	accession.	 Firstly,	 the	 accession	 of	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 State	 of	 Bremen’s	 territory,	including	Bremerhaven.	Secondly,	an	accession	with	the	exception	of	the	docks	in	Bremerhaven	 and,	 thirdly,	 leaving	 Bremerhaven	 entirely	 outside	 the	 customs	union.			 First	of	all,	the	report	explained	the	three	consequences	an	accession	to	the	customs	 union	 would	 have	 on	 Bremen’s	 shipping	 and	 trade.	 These	 were:	 a	prolongation	of	the	discharging	time,	a	reduction	of	worker	performance	and	the	rise	 of	 expenses	 due	 to	 charges	 for	 customs	 guards.	 The	 damage	 an	 accession	would	 cause	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 discharging	 a	 steamer	 arriving	 from	London	 or	 Hull	 to	 Bremerhaven	 took	 around	 one	 day,	 whilst	 discharging	 a	transatlantic	steamer	could	be	accomplished	in	two.	In	Lübeck,	the	discharge	of	a	small	 steamer	 took	 up	 to	 eight	 days	 on	 average	 after	 the	 city’s	 accession	 to	 the	Empire’s	 customs	 union.110 	What	 would	 have	 been	 worse,	 was	 the	 fact	 that	‘insbesondere	in	Bezug	auf	die	unendlich	wesentliche	Handhabung	der	Regulative	wäre	 Bremen	 einem	 fremden	 Willen	 und	 Verständniß	 unterworfen.’111	It	 was	argued	that	as	a	result	of	this,	Bremen	would	lose	out	to	its	competitors	in	the	Low																																																									108	For	the	report	see	AdHB,	Z	I	3,	Bd.	2	Gutachten	der	Bremer	Handels	in	der	Zollanschluß-Frage	Bremen,	1877	109	Ibid.,	p.	5-6	110	Ibid.,	p.	8-9	111	Ibid.,	p.	10	
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Countries,	 such	 as	 Rotterdam,	 Antwerp	 and	 Flushing.	 So,	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	German	nation-state	was	one	thing,	losing	control	over	its	trade	and	shipping	was	unacceptable	 in	 Bremen.	 This	 is	 an	 interesting	 aspect	 to	 the	 nation	 that	 was	founded	 in	1871:	being	part	of	 the	German	nation	was	acceptable	as	 long	as	 this	did	not	interfere	with	business.		Again	and	again,	Lübeck	served	as	an	example	of	where	the	accession	to	the	customs	 union	 created	 a	 disadvantageous	 situation	 instead	 of	 constituting	 a	positive	example	for	an	accession.	Here,	an	official	complaint	about	a	shortage	of	customs	personnel	was	simply	rebuffed	by	the	Federal	Assembly.	 It	 follows	from	this	 that	 an	 accession	 of	 the	 whole	 of	 Bremen’s	 state	 territory,	 which	 includes	Bremerhaven,	 would	 have	 been	 highly	 detrimental	 with	 regard	 to	 Bremish	shipping	companies.		Since	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	did	not	regard	this	as	an	option,	the	Chamber	 next	 discussed	 the	 possibility	 of	 simply	 leaving	 the	 docks	 in	Bremerhaven	 outside	 the	 customs	 union.	 Even	 assuming	 that	 a	 complete	separation	 of	 the	 free	 port	 area	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 Bremerhaven	would	 somehow	have	been	possible,	the	City	of	Bremen	itself	would	have	suffered.	Cargo	arriving	in	large	vessels	was	usually	transported	in	lighters	to	Bremen.	Had	it	been	possible	to	facilitate	 customs	 handling	 in	 Bremerhaven,	 this	 would	 have	 had	 to	 happen	 in	Bremen	at	the	latest	–	irrespective	of	a	free	port	area	in	Bremerhaven	or	the	whole	of	 Bremerhaven	 being	 a	 free	 port.	 As	 a	 result,	 ‘Bremerhaven	 [würde	 dann]	 für	denjenigen	 Theil	 des	 Handels,	 welcher	 den	 Freihafen	 sucht,	 eine	 solche	Anziehungskraft	 besitzen,	 daß	 derselbe	 sich	 sehr	 bald	 von	 Bremen	 nach	Bremerhaven	 ziehen	 müßte.’ 112 	Thus,	 although	 Bremerhaven’s	 importance	 in	Bremen’s	overseas	trade	was	certainly	highly	significant,	trade	was	still	conducted	from	the	City	of	Bremen.	It	is	understandable	that	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	would	not	allow	the	relocation	of	the	trading	centre	from	Bremen	to	Bremerhaven.		Consequently,	not	only	was	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	against	an	accession	to	the	customs	 union,	 it	 also	 emphasised	 that	 ‘[sie]	 für	 die	 Schifffahrt	 in	 dem	Zollanschluß	keinen	einzigen	Vortheil	sieht.’113	Apart	 from	shipping,	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce	also	considered	the	effect	of	 an	accession	on	Bremen’s	 commodity	 trade.	The	 report	 analyses	 the	effect	on																																																									112	Ibid.,	p.	13	113	Ibid.,	p.	13	
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five	 different	 trading	 goods,	 namely	 tobacco,	 rice,	 colonial	 goods,	 wine	 and	manufactured	goods.114	It	will	suffice	at	this	point	to	present	the	effect	on	tobacco	and	 rice,	 as	 these	were	 two	 of	 the	most	 significant	 trading	 goods	 in	 Bremen.115	From	 the	 outset,	 the	Handelskammer	 insisted	 that	 an	 accession	 to	 the	 customs	union	 would	 have	 a	 damaging	 effect	 on	 Bremen’s	 trade	 in	 rice	 and	 tobacco.	Regarding	rice,	the	main	concerns	expressed	involved	practical	issues.	Most	of	the	raw	rice,	which	amounted	to	a	total	of	68	million	kilograms	in	1876,	was	imported	seasonally,	meaning	it	had	to	be	processed	within	a	short	period	of	time.	Since	the	increased	processing	of	rice	during	peak	season	would	put	stress	on	the	customs	authority,	 it	was	doubted	 that	Bremen	could	expect	 its	 full	 support	during	 these	times	 of	 working	 to	 capacity.	 Even	 though	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 did	 not	provide	any	concrete	evidence,	the	fact	that	major	rice	mills	did	not	exist	outside	Hamburg	and	Bremen	spoke	for	itself.	The	 tobacco	 trade	was	 immensely	 important	 for	 Bremen.	With	 a	 value	 of	almost	63	million	Marks	out	of	a	total	of	421,824,680	Marks,	tobacco	was	the	most	valuable	exported	good	in	Bremen.	Out	of	this	total	export	value,	43.85%	consisted	of	transit	trade,	which	was	less	profitable	for	the	merchants.	Yet,	a	large	majority	of	the	traded	tobacco	was	dealt	for	Bremish	merchants’	own	account:	60,778,635	Marks	of	the	63	million	total.	116	Apart	from	the	sheer	value	of	the	tobacco	trade,	it	also	created	other	 jobs	 in	Bremen.	 In	contrast	 to	other	commodities,	most	of	 the	traded	 tobacco	was	 stored	 in	Bremen	 for	 an	 average	period	 of	 a	whole	 year.	 Its	quality	was	examined,	sorted	and	processed,	thus	creating	jobs,	such	as	the	role	of	a	Küper	(tallyman)	who	was	responsible	for	examining	the	quality	of	goods	and	the	correct	storing.	The	job	market	created	by	the	tobacco	trade	was	valued	at	around	2	million	Marks	per	year.	Furthermore,	Bremen	had	established	 itself	as	a	major	player	 in	 the	 international	 tobacco	 trade	 and	 the	 value	 of	 traded	 tobacco	 had	increased	steadily	even	during	the	economic	crisis	of	the	mid-1870s.		If	 Bremen	was	 to	 become	part	 of	 the	Empire’s	 customs	union,	 this	would	have	 left	 importers	 of	 tobacco	 with	 three	 options.117	Firstly,	 paying	 the	 duty	 on	tobacco	immediately	after	importing.	Secondly,	the	importer	could	store	his	goods	in	a	bonded	warehouse	or,	thirdly,	store	it	 in	a	private	warehouse	bonded	by	the																																																									114	Ibid.,	p.	14	115	For	rice	and	tobacco	see:	Ibid.,	pp.	20-26	116	Ibid.,	p.	22	117	Ibid.,	pp.	23–24	
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customs	 authority.	 Paying	 the	 duty	 on	 imported	 tobacco	 directly	 was	 not	considered	an	option,	as	40%	of	it	was	re-exported	and	due	to	the	loss	of	tobacco	during	 the	 cleaning	 and	 sorting	 process.	 Unsurprisingly,	 the	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	also	regarded	the	two	remaining	options	as	unacceptable.	This	was	due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 options	 would	 have	 led	 to	 extra	 costs	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	importer.	Amongst	a	list	of	objections,	the	reader	finds	the	restricted	access	to	the	warehouses	 and	 taking	 samples	 can	 only	 be	 undertaken	 after	 notifying	 customs	authority.	At	 this	point,	 it	becomes	obvious	that	Bremen’s	mercantile	community	feared	 that	 it	 was	 losing	 control	 over	 its	 established	 trading	 procedure.	 This	 is	justified	with	the	fact	that	the	loss	of	control	would	most	likely	give	other	tobacco	traders	the	edge	over	Bremen.	These	traders	did	not	necessarily	have	to	be	foreign.	The	idea	of	losing	this	trade	to	Hamburg,	and	within	Bremen’s	own	territory	from	the	older	wharfs	 in	the	city	 itself	 to	the	newer	docks	downriver	 in	Bremerhaven,	was	not	acceptable.118		Overall,	the	report	concludes	that	‘Handel	und	Schifffahrt	beim	Zollanschluß	zurückgehen	 würden	 und	 zwar	 besonders	 stark	 zurückgehen	 würden,	 wenn	Bremens	 größter	 Concurrent	 Hamburg	 nach	 wie	 vor	 Freihafen	 bliebe.’119	The	effect	on	shipping	and	trade	were	given	in	detail	in	the	report	and	the	outlook	was	not	at	all	promising.	Yet,	it	has	to	be	remembered	that	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	painted	a	bleak	picture	without	knowing	the	details	of	a	possible	accession	to	the	customs	 union.	 Its	 decisively	 hostile	 stance	 on	 a	 possible	 accession	 was	merely	founded	 on	 the	 experience	 of	 other	 port	 cities	 in	 the	 customs	 union,	 such	 as	Lübeck	and	the	Prussian	port	of	Stettin.	In	 order	 to	 get	 the	 full	 picture	 of	 arguments	 for	 and	 against	 Bremen’s	accession,	it	is	inevitable	to	also	look	at	the	reports	handed	in	to	the	deputation	by	the	Gewerbekammer	and	by	the	Kammer	für	Landwirthschaft.120	In	contrast	to	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Industry	argued	for	an	accession	to	the	 customs	 union.	 According	 to	 the	 report,	 Bremen’s	 free	 port	 status	 imposed	burdens	on	Bremen’s	industry.	Even	though	the	city	had	to	pay	an	Aversum,	a	lump	sum	amounting	to	3	Marks	per	person,	to	the	Empire	for	its	forgone	tax	revenue,																																																									118	Ibid.,	pp.	24-25	119	Ibid.,	p.	26	120	For	both	reports	Gutachten	der	Bremischen	Gewerbekammer	in	der	Zollanschluß-Frage	(Bremen,	1877)	and	Gutachtliche	Äußerung	der	Kammer	für	Landwirthschaft,	Bremen	den	19ten	September	1877	see	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Bd.	1	
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duty	still	had	to	be	paid	on	Bremen’s	labour	input.121	This	meant	that	customs-free	raw	 materials	 and	 semi-finished	 products	 that	 were	 imported	 to	 Bremen,	processed	 in	Bremen	and	 then	 exported	 to	 the	 customs	union	had	 to	be	 cleared	first.	The	same	was	true	for	goods	which	were	imported	from	the	customs	union	and	 then	 re-exported.	 Besides,	 the	 report	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	merchants	began	 to	 change,	 that	 they	became	 less	 important	 to	 trade	due	 to	 the	improved	 ways	 of	 direct	 communication	 for	 people	 in	 the	 hinterland.	Consequently,	Bremen	had	to	keep	an	eye	on	the	development	of	its	industry.		After	emphasising	this	unsatisfactory	situation,	 the	report	went	 into	detail	on	 the	 disadvantages	 that	 came	with	 the	 free	 port	 status.	 The	 long	 list	 of	 these	disadvantages	 included	 the	narrowness	of	 the	 industry’s	market	area	 in	Bremen.	In	1875,	Vegesack	and	parts	of	Bremen’s	new	town	had	already	become	part	of	the	customs	union.	Hence,	 the	market	 area	 for	 goods	produced	 in	Bremen	had	been	further	downsized.122	This	in	turn	led	to	the	problem	that	economies	of	scale	could	not	 be	 realised	 and	 that	 capital	 for	 mechanisation	 was	 lacking.	 Under	 such	conditions,	 the	 report	 argued,	 it	 was	 hardly	 surprising	 that	 ‘die	 meisten	gewerblichen	 Erzeugnisse	 so	 vertheuert	 warden,	 daß	 die	 hiesigen	Gerwerbetreibenden	 zum	 Theil	 nur	 mit	 großen	 Opfern	 im	 Stande	 sind,	 mit	denjenigen	 aus	 dem	 übrigen	 Deutschland	 zu	 concurriren’.123	The	 Chamber	 of	Industry	also	criticised	the	fact	that	entrepreneurial	spirit	was	lacking	in	Bremen.	This	further	aggravated	the	position	of	Bremen’s	industry.	In	Bremen,	new	trends	were	only	 slowly	 adapted	 and,	 hence,	Bremen’s	more	 affluent	population	had	 to	fall	back	on	imported	goods.	The	Chamber	of	Industry	even	goes	so	far	as	to	attest	to	the	people	of	Bremen	a	‘gewisse[…]	Geschmacksstagnation,	die	man	vielfach	mit	patriarchalischen	Sitten	und	Gewohnheiten	zu	beschönigen	versucht.’124	According	to	 the	Chamber	 of	 Industry,	 the	 people	 of	Bremen	had	 retained	 their	 traditional	taste	rather	than	giving	in	to	predominant	fashion	fads.	In	this	aspect,	the	people	of	
																																																								121	Schwarzwälder,	Geschichte	der	freien	Hansestadt	Bremen,	Bd.	2.,	p.	345	122	Note	that	certain	parts	of	Bremen’s	territory	had	already	become	part	of	the	Zollverein	in	the	1850s,	when	the	discussion	about	Bremen’s	accession	was	first	brought	up.	This	was	done	in	order	to	impede	smuggling.	The	areas	joining	the	Zollverein	in	1857	included	Huchting	and	Grolland	in	Bremen’s	South-West	and	parts	beyond	the	Holler-Deich	in	the	North-East.	123	Gutachten	der	Bremischen	Gewerbekammer	in	der	Zollanschluß-Frage	(Bremen,	1877),	p.	6	124	Ibid.,	p.	8	
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Bremen	remained	true	to	their	patriarchal	customs	and	habits.	This	demonstrates	that	 there	were	 obviously	 still	major	 differences	 between	 the	 people	 of	 Bremen	and	the	people	of	other	regions	of	the	German	Empire.	Interestingly,	in	Hamburg,	the	situation	seems	to	have	been	different,	at	 least	according	to	the	report.	Here,	industry	was	 supported	 by	 the	mercantile	 community,	which,	 unlike	 in	 Bremen,	even	exported	products	on	its	own	account.	Also,	Hamburg’s	trading	connections,	notably	 South	 America,	 showed	 more	 interest	 in	 German	 products	 than	 the	countries	 Bremen	 was	 trading	 with.	 Added	 to	 this	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 Hamburg’s	market	area	was	significantly	larger.		Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Industry	 had	 a	 simple	 solution	 to	 all	 the	 problems:	Bremen’s	accession	to	the	customs	union.	Naturally,	an	accession	would	lead	to	a	boom	 in	 industry	 with	 literally	 unpredictable	 dimensions,	 although	 it	 could	‘freilich	 weder	 durch	 Zahlen,	 noch	 für	 einzelne	 bestimmte	 Gewerbe	 mit	apodictischer	 Gewißheit	 im	 Voraus	 nachgewiesen,	 aber	 nach	 den	 Verhältnissen	und	dem	Vergleich	mit	anderen	Städten	gar	nicht	bezweifelt	werden	[…].’125	Again,	the	 example	 of	 Lübeck	 was	 invoked.	 However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Chamber	 of	Commerce,	the	Chamber	of	Industry	was	anxious	to	show	how	beneficial	Lübeck’s	accession	to	the	customs	union	was	for	its	industry	and	trade.		Still,	while	arguing	that	Bremen’s	trade	would	benefit	from	the	boom	in	industry,	it	was	also	admitted	that	 an	 accession	 could	 only	 take	 place	 ‘wenn	 für	 den	 bremischen	 Handel	diejenigen	 Erleichterungen	 erlangt	 warden	 können,	 deren	 er	 zu	 seiner	 Existenz	und	Weiterentwicklung	bedarf.’126	With	regard	to	the	‘in	den	letzten	Jahren	in	der	Zollgesetzgebung	 zur	Geltung	 gelangten	 liberalen	Grundsätze’,	 it	was	 hoped	 that	these	concessions	would	be	granted	to	Bremen.127			So,	on	the	one	hand,	the	Chamber	of	Industry	claimed	that	it	was	absolutely	essential	 for	 Bremen	 to	 become	 part	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 customs	 union	 from	 an	industrial	point	of	view.	On	the	other	hand,	it	was	realised	that	Bremen’s	accession	was	 only	 feasible	 if	 shipping	 and	 trade	 received	 the	 necessary	 concessions	 from	the	German	Empire.	Hence,	the	report	gives	insight	into	the	arguments	in	favour	of	a	possible	accession	but	it	also	underlines	the	significance	of	trade	and	shipping	to	the	fate	of	Bremen’s	entire	economy	at	the	time.																																																										125	Ibid.,	p.	11	126	Ibid.,	pp.	14–15	127	Ibid.,	p.	15	
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Finally,	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Agriculture	was	also	asked	to	submit	a	report.	The	 City	 of	 Bremen’s	 territory	was	 of	 course	 not	 extremely	 large,	 so	 agriculture	played	a	minor	role	compared	to	the	trade	and	shipping	and	industry.	Hence,	not	too	much	focus	will	be	put	on	this	report.	In	addition	to	this,	the	report	emphasised	that	 the	 goods	 that	 were	 produced	 in	 Bremen	 were	 mostly	 also	 consumed	 in	Bremen.	The	report	was	based	on	the	experiences	made	in	those	parts	of	Bremen	that	had	become	part	of	the	Zollverein	or	the	Empire’s	customs	union	in	1857	and	1875	respectively.		First	 of	 all,	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 in	 those	 areas	 that	 had	 joined	 the	 customs	union	the	disadvantages	decisively	outweighed	the	advantages.	The	only	positive	development	 accepted	 by	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Agriculture	 was	 the	 positive	development	 in	pig	breeding.	 Pig	breeding	had	 already	become	more	popular	 in	some	of	 the	areas	accessed	by	 the	Empire’s	customs	union.	However,	although	 it	was	remarked	that	the	upswing	 led	to	the	creation	of	an	export	market,	 this	was	not	 regarded	 as	 significant	 enough	 to	 justify	 an	 accession	 of	 Bremen	 to	 the	customs	 union.	 Instead,	 an	 accession	 would	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	foodstuffs,	 for	 example,	 colonial	 goods,	 imported	 manufactured	 goods	 and	clothing.	Consequently,	the	Chamber	of	Agriculture	suggested	that	an	accession	‘in	hohem	Grad	 bedenklich	 sein	würde,	wenn	 dabei	 die	Möglichkeit	 auf	 dem	 Spiele	steht	 vorhandene	 Quellen	 des	 Absatzes	 und	 Erwerbes	 aufzugeben	 gegen	 die	unsichere	Aussicht	auf	Erlangung	neuer	Vortheile.’128	In	fact,	 it	was	argued	in	the	report	 that	 farmers	 in	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 German	 Empire	 preferred	 free	 trade	instead	of	protectionism.	Naturally,	this	was	also	the	case	in	Bremen.	All	in	all,	the	conclusion	given	by	the	Chamber	of	Agriculture	is	hardly	surprising.	While	it	was	admitted	 that	 those	 farmers	who	were	breeding	pigs	would	benefit,	 for	all	other	farmers	 ‘würde	 unter	 im	 Übriegen	 gelichen	 Verhältnissen	 die	 Aufgabe	 der	Freihafen-Stellung	Bremen’s,	soviel	erweislich,	nur	Nachtheile	zur	Folge	haben.’129	Hence,	 just	 like	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Agriculture	 argued	resolutely	against	an	accession.		Therefore,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1877,	 the	 deputation	 in	 charge	 of	 discussing	Bremen’s	 Zollanschluss	 was	 in	 possession	 of	 views	 from	 all	 the	 most	 important	branches	 of	Bremen’s	 economy.	The	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 and	 the	Chamber	 of																																																									128	Bericht	Kammer	für	Landwirthschaft,	p.	13	129	Ibid.,	p.15	
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Agriculture	were	both	opposed	to	an	accession.	The	Chamber	of	 Industry,	on	the	other	hand,	was	 fiercely	arguing	 for	 an	accession.	Therefore,	 the	deputation	was	slow	 in	 coming	 to	 a	 final	 evaluation	 about	 the	 pros	 and	 cons	 of	 a	 possible	accession.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 was	 that	 the	 deputation	 decided	 to	 postpone	discussion	 due	 to	 the	 unresolved	 debate	 about	 the	 Imperial	 tobacco	 tax,	 which	could	 have	 influenced	 the	 deputation.	 Hence,	 between	 February	 1878	 and	December	1879,	debates	in	the	deputation	were	put	on	ice.	As	 (bad)	 luck	 would	 have	 it,	 it	 was	 at	 this	 moment	 that	 Bremen’s	government	was	put	 to	 the	real	 test	 regarding	 the	Zollanschlussfrage.	On	May	20	1879,	the	royal	Prussian	envoy	to	Mecklenburg	and	the	Hanseatic	Cities,	Otto	von	Wentzel,	 enquired	 in	confidence	after	Bremen’s	attitude	 towards	an	accession	 to	the	Empire’s	customs	union.	The	letter	pointed	out	that	during	the	making	of	the	constitution	of	the	Norddeutscher	Bund	it	was	noted	‘daß	die	Hansestädte	Bremen	und	 Hamburg	 nicht	 für	 immer	 außerhalb	 der	 gemeinschaftlichen	 Zollgrenzen	bleiben	 würden,	 sondern	 der	 Nichtanschluß	 an	 das	 deutsche	 Zoll-	 und	Handelsgebiet	 ein	 vorübergehender	 sein	 werde.’130	Despite	 acknowledging	 the	right	 granted	 to	 the	 Hanseatic	 Cities	 in	 Article	 34	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 Constitution,	namely	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 moment	 of	 accession	 themselves,	Wentzel	 emphasised	that	there	was	a	wish	for	Bremen’s	accession	not	only	in	the	rest	of	the	Empire	but	also	in	Bremen	itself.	Naturally,	Wentzel	did	not	act	of	his	own	accord.	He	did	not	fail	to	mention	that	Bismarck	had	ordered	contacting	Bremen	in	this	matter.		The	 timing	 of	 this	 letter	 is	 particularly	 remarkable.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	between	1877	and	1879,	Bremen	was	in	more	or	less	constant	discussion	with	the	Empire	 about	 adjustments	 to	 the	 tariff	 conditions	 between	 Bremen	 and	 the	Imperial	 customs	 union.	 Despite	 Bremen’s	 willingness	 to	 enter	 and	 conclude	negotiations	with	 the	 Empire,	 no	 such	 agreement	 had	 occurred	 even	 after	more	than	a	year	of	negotiations.	This	fact	must	have	played	into	the	Empire’s,	or	rather	Bismarck’s,	 hands.	 While	 the	 continued	 negotiations	 between	 the	 Empire	 and	Bremen	left	no	doubt	about	Bremen’s	legitimacy	to	stay	outside	the	customs	union,	Bismarck,	at	 the	same	time,	opened	the	stage	 for	a	profound	change	 in	Bremen’s	status.		
																																																								130	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1,	Königlich	Preußische	Gesandtschaft	in	Mecklenburg	und	den	Hansestädten,	Hamburg,	20.	Mai	1879.	
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The	matter	was	discussed	openly	in	the	next	meeting	of	the	Senate	on	May	27	 1879.131	It	 was	 resolved	 upon	 responding	 ‘weder	 mit	 einem	 einfachen	 nein	noch	 mit	 einem	 einfach	 ja	 […]’.132	The	 reasons	 for	 this	 were	 obvious.	 From	 the	outset,	 it	was	clear	that	Bismarck’s	power	exceeded	that	of	Bremen’s.	By	giving	a	negative	response,	Bremen	would	have	run	the	risk	of	retaliatory	measures	with	respect	 to	 customs	 duties	 and	 the	 Aversum.	 Thus,	 it	 was	 argued	 that	 it	 was	necessary	 ‘sich	 der	 Reichsregierung	 gegenüber	 zu	 commissarischen	Verhandlungen	über	die	Modalitäten	bereit	 zu	 erklären,	unter	denen	Bremen	 im	Stande	 sein	würde	 ohne	 erhebliche	 Schädigung	 seines	Handels	 in	 das	 Zollgebiet	einzutreten.’133		On	May	28	1879,	Bremen’s	Senate	gave	a	response	to	Wentzel.134	In	this,	it	was	indicated	that	the	matter	had	been	forwarded	for	reporting	to	the	Behörde	für	
Handel	 und	 Schiffahrt.	 The	 meeting	 of	 the	 board,	 of	 which	 Friedrich	 Grave	 and	Theodor	Barth	were	members,	took	place	on	June	3,1879.	In	this,	it	was	decided	to	keep	an	eye	on	developments	in	Hamburg,	meaning	that	an	accession	would	only	be	feasible	if	Hamburg	joined	the	customs	union	as	well.	Otherwise,	it	was	argued,	Bremen’s	 trade	 and	 shipping	would	 severely	 suffer.	 Thus,	 Bremen	was	 tactically	invoking	the	example	of	Hamburg.	Even	if	Hamburg	opted	against	an	accession	this	would	 have	 given	 Bremen	 time	 ‘und	 zwar	 vielleicht	 so	 lange,	 bis	 eine	 andere	Leitung	 der	 deutschen	 Handelspolitik	 eingetreten	 sei,	 welche	 den	 Handel	überhaupt	 günstiger	 stelle.’135	In	Bremen,	 it	was	 decided	 to	 either	 agree	with	 an	accession	 in	case	Hamburg	also	 joined	 the	customs	union,	or	 to	attempt	 to	delay	the	discussion	about	an	accession.	From	the	beginning,	it	was	realised	that	Bremen	on	 its	 own	 stood	 little	 chance	 of	 getting	 a	 lucrative	 deal	 from	 the	 Imperial	government.	 Still,	 while	 the	 decision-making	 process	 in	 Hamburg	 played	 an	important	 role	 for	 Bremen,	 it	 was	 also	 regarded	 as	 vital	 to	 not	 simply	 ‘das	Schicksal	Bremen	durchaus	an	das	Hamburgs	zu	ketten.’136		
																																																								131	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1,	Auszug	aus	dem	Senats-Protokolle	de	1879.	Mai	27.	pag.	306.		132	Ibid.	133	Ibid.	134	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1,	Sr.	Excellenz	dem	Königl.	Preußischen	Auß.	Gesandten	u.	Bevollmächstigsten	Minister	Geh.	Legationsrath	Herrn	von	Wentzel,	Bremen,	28.	Mai	1879.	135	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Auszug	aus	dem	Protokoll	der	Versammlung	der	Behörde	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt	vom	3.	Juni	1879.	136	Ibid..	
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Naturally,	the	response	given	to	the	Prussian	envoy	Wentzel	shows	no	sign	of	any	such	doubts	about	Bremen’s	minor	role	compared	to	Hamburg.	Drafted	by	Gildemeister,	 head	of	 the	Behörde	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt,	 and	accepted	by	 the	Senate	 in	 June	1879,	 it	was,	 first	of	all,	made	clear	to	the	envoy	that	Bremen	still	interpreted	Article	34	 in	 such	a	way	 ‘daß	das	Reich	und	namentlich	der	 leitende	Bundesstaat	 die	 nationale	 Bedeutung	 der	 haneatischen	 und	 speciell	 auch	 des	Bremischen	 Handels-	 und	 Schifffahrtsverkehrs	 vollauf	 würdige	 […].’ 137 	Still,	Bremen	did	not	only	want	the	Empire	to	respect	the	rights	granted	in	Article	34;	it	also	asked	for	Imperial	support	for	Bremen’s	trade	and	shipping	industry.	Even	if	there	were	debates	in	Bremen	about	the	necessity	of	staying	outside	the	customs	union,	 the	report	 leaves	no	doubt	 that	 the	needs	of	Bremen’s	 trade	and	shipping	industry	were	of	 the	highest	 importance	 to	 the	city.	This	meant	 that	keeping	 the	status	of	a	 free	port	city	was	vital	 to	the	city.	 In	this	spirit,	 the	report	underlined	that:	 	Dem	 Senate	 ist	 es	 aber	 nicht	 zweifelhaft,	 daß	 der	 werthvollste	 Theil	 des	hiesigen	 Geschäftsbetriebes,	 derjenige	 an	 welchen	 alle	 übrigen	 Theile	 sich	anlehnen,	 auf	 dessen	 Gedeihen	 die	 Existenz	 der	 Bremischen	 Staats	 beruht,	und	welcher	dem	Bremischen	Handel	seine	eigentliche	und	eigenthümliche	Bedeutung	verleiht,	heute	noch	ebenso,	wie	es	 im	 Jahre	1867	und	 im	 Jahre	1871	 der	 Fall	 war,	 derjenigen	 Freiheit	 der	 Bewegung	 bedarf,	 welche	 die	Reichsverfassung	ihm	hat	erhalten	wollen.138			Hence,	Bremen	dared	to	decisively	rebuke	the	Empire’s	attempt	to	suddenly	take	away	the	city’s	right	to	remain	outside	the	customs	union.	After	all,	this	right	had	been	 granted	 in	 1867	 and	 1871.	 Furthermore,	 the	 demise	 of	 Bremen’s	 entire	economy	 –	 and	 in	 fact	 Bremen’s	 existence	 –	 in	 case	 of	 an	 accession	would	 have	been	aggravated	if	Bremen	had	been	the	only	free	port	joining	the	customs	union.	Nonetheless,	 Bremen	 agreed	 to	 negotiate	 ‘ganz	 allgemein	 die	 bestehenden	Freihäfen	 durch	 anderweite	 Verkehrserleichterungen	 zu	 ersetzen,	 ohne	
																																																								137	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1,	Sr.	Excellenz	dem	Königl.	Preußischen	Auß.	Gesandten	u.	Bevollmächstigsten	Minister	Geh.	Legationsrath	Herrn	von	Wentzel,	No	948,	Bremen.	17.	Juni	1879.	138	Ibid..		
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Deutschland	 seinen	 Antheil	 am	 Welthandel	 zu	 verkümmern	 […].’ 139 	So,	 even	though	Bremen	 argued	 to	 act	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 German	 nation,	 the	 city	was	clearly	concerned	of	its	own	vested	interests.	In	this	respect,	the	establishment	of	free	port	areas	or	entrepôts	was	discussed	over	the	following	months.140			 While	 different	 options	 for	 an	 accession	 were	 discussed	 in	 Bremen,	resentment	 began	 to	 swell	 outside	 the	 city-state.	 In	 February	 1880,	 Minister	Resident	 Krüger	 gave	 a	 picture	 of	 the	 attitude	 towards	 Bremen	 in	 Berlin.	Utterances	 by	 Bismarck	 towards	 Bremen	 were	 sparked	 by	 debates	 in	 different	committees	of	the	Federal	Assembly	about	Bremen’s	continued	role	as	a	free	port.	For	 example,	 by	 October	 1879,	 the	 Centralverein	 der	 deutschen	
Wollwarenfabrikanten	 had	 already	 handed	 in	 a	 resolution	 to	 the	 effect	 of	discussing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Hanseatic	 Cities.	 This	 gave	 Bismarck	 a	 perfect	opportunity	 to	 set	 out	 his	 position	 on	 Bremen’s	 free	 port	 status.	 In	 fact,	 it	 was	Adolf	Scholz,	holding	the	position	of	Undersecretary	of	State	in	the	treasury,	who	conveyed	 Bismarck’s	 line	 of	 thinking.	 However,	 Bremen	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 its	struggle	against	Bismarck.	For	example,	the	Bavarian	Ministerialrat	pointed	to	the	fact	 that	 the	 Centralverein	 did	 not	 even	 possess	 the	 competence	 to	 hand	resolutions.	 Bavaria	 was	 obviously	 prepared	 to	 support	 Bremen	 against	 their	common	 enemy	 in	 Berlin.	 Scholz	 replied	 that	 Bismarck	 did	 indeed	 regard	 such	industrial	representative	bodies	as	entitled	to	issue	such	resolutions.			 Scholz	 argued	 that	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 thought	 of	 Article	 34	 only	 as	 a	provisory	measure	and	that	Bismarck	‘bedauere,	daß	die	Hansestädte	anscheinend	ohne	nähere	Untersuchung	sich	ablehnend	gegen	den	Gedanken	verhalten	hätten,	die	Ausnahmestellung	zu	beseitigen	[…].’141	In	response	to	this,	Krüger	pointed	out	that	 there	 had	 not	 been	 any	 problems	 with	 Bremen’s	 status,	 which	 had	 been	accepted	by	the	customs	authority,	before	Bismarck’s	turn	to	protectionism,	‘nicht	nur	als	ein	hanseatisches,	sondern	als	ein	deutsches	Interesse	[…].’142	Thereupon,	Scholz	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 ‘der	 Reichskanzler	 von	 der	 Schädlichkeit	 der	Freihafenstellung	 durchdrungen	 sei,	 weil	 sie	 die	 Hansestädte	 behindern,	 an	 der	wirtschafthlichen	Entwicklung	Deutschlands	vollen	Antheil	 zu	nehmen.’	Both	 the																																																									139	Ibid..	140	See	for	example:	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Grave,	Bremen	im	Februar	1880	and	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Bremen,	Februar	1880,	P.M.	Freihafenstellung	Bremen’s	by	Senator	Lühmann	141	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	No.	22,	Berlin	den	18ten	Februar	1880	142	Ibid..		
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experienced	 tacticians	 that	 were	 Bismarck	 and	 Bremen,	 were	 dressing	 up	 as	altruism	 and	 high-minded	 principle	 as	 their	 respective	 pursuit	 of	 self-interest.	While	 it	 had	 previously	 been	 attempted	 to	 make	 concessions	 to	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen,	this	had	to	end	in	view	of	the	wellbeing	of	the	rest	of	the	Empire.	This	was	
de	facto	a	declaration	of	war	on	the	 free	ports.	The	determination	and	harshness	with	 which	 Scholz	 presented	 Bismarck’s	 attitude	 ‘erregten	 ein	 peinliches	Erstaunen,	 und	 nicht	 bei	mir	 allein.’	 Even	 Scholz	 himself	 seems	 to	 have	 realised	that	 this	 had	 been	 one	 step	 too	 far.	 After	 the	 session,	 Scholz	 apologised	 and	pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 was	 not	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 current	situation	at	all.	Consequently,	Krüger	urged:	‘Bei	alledem	aber	läßt	die	Stellung,	die	der	 Reichskanzler	 eingenommen,	 voraussehen,	 daß	 wir	 einer	 Periode	 ernster	Schwierigkeiten	entgegengehen.’143		 Hence,	 not	 even	 ten	 years	 after	 the	 Imperial	 Constitution	 had	 come	 into	effect,	 Bismarck	was	 pressing	 for	 an	 accession	 of	 both	Hanseatic	 Cities.	 The	 fact	that	 the	 German	 Empire’s	 two	 most	 significant	 port	 cities	 remained	 outside	 its	customs	union	obviously	was	a	thorn	in	the	Chancellor’s	side.	In	order	to	enforce	his	will,	the	Aversum	payments	were	raised	to	5	Marks	per	inhabitant.	This	amount	was	confirmed	by	Scholz,	who,	when	addressed	regarding	this	matter,	claimed:	‘Ich	war	 damals	 ein	 kranker	Mann,	 5	M.	 ist	 eine	 Lumperei.’144	Still,	 even	 though	 this	measure	was	certainly	not	welcomed	in	Bremen,	it	was	not	intended	to	give	in	to	the	 Chancellor’s	 will.	 Instead,	 Gildemeister	 asked	 Krüger	 for	 advice	 and	 stated:	‘Man	 bewegt	 sich	 auf	 unberechenbarem	 Boden,	 wo	 Bewegung	 und	 Stillsitzen	gleich	unrichtig	sein	können.’145			 In	Bremen’s	local	press,	Bismarck’s	measures	were	unanimously	criticised.	Three	major	local	newspapers,	the	Bremer	Nachrichten,	the	Courier	and	the	Weser-
Zeitung,	 all	defended	Bremen’s	 free	port	status.	For	example,	 in	April	1880,	after	the	Prussian	motion	for	the	incorporation	of	Altona	and	St	Pauli	into	the	customs	union,	the	Bremer	Nachrichten	and	the	Courier	published	an	article	that	was	almost	identical.	 In	 this	 it	 was	 argued:	 ‘Der	 einzige	 Vorzug	 also,	 welcher	 heute	 diesem	Handel	 die	 Concurrenz	 mit	 dem	 Auslande	 ermöglicht,	 würde	 durch	 den	
																																																								143	Ibid..		144	Ibid..		145	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Herrn	Ministerresid.	Dr.	Krüger,	Berlin.	Bremen,	den	24.	Februar	1880.	Auszug.	
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Zollanschluß	Hamburgs	und	Bremens	in	sein	Gegentheil	verkehrt.’146	Similarly,	the	
Weser-Zeitung	 also	 pointed	 to	 the	 need	 for	 facilitating	 trade	 in	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen.	 Otherwise,	 it	 was	 assumed	 that	 both	 cities	 would	 lose	 out	 to	 its	competitors.	International	traffic	was	described	as	‘eines	der	freiesten	Wesen	[…]’,	which	 would	 respond	 to	 the	 accession	 as	 follows:	 ‘Du	 hast	 die	 Kraft,	 mich	anzuziehn,	 besessen,	 Doch	 mich	 zu	 halten	 hast	 du	 keine	 Kraft.’147	The	 Bremer	
Nachrichten	 reported	 from	Berlin	 that	 the	 ‘Erfindungen	 zweier	Correspondenten	[…]	 wonach	 in	 den	 Hansestädten	 große	 Zollanschlußparteien	 bestehen	 sollten	haben	 […]	 allen	 Credit	 verloren.’148	Hence,	 in	 1880,	 Bremen’s	 local	 press	was	 in	favour	of	maintaining	Bremen’s	 free	port	status.	Still,	a	 letter	 to	 the	editor	of	 the	Courier	 proved	 that	 Bremen’s	 population	 did	 not	 unanimously	 support	 the	 free	port	status.	In	this	letter,	the	author	quoted	Schiller’s	words	from	a	newspaper	in	Hamburg:	‘Das	Alte	stürzt,	es	ändert	sich	die	Zeit,	Und	neues	Leben	blüht	aus	den	Ruinen.’149	The	author	then	went	on	to	criticise	the	assumption	that	shopkeepers	were	selling	more	goods	in	Bremen	due	to	the	existing	tariff	barriers.		Eventually,	 in	 July	 1880,	 the	 Deputation	 wegen	 der	 Freihafenstellung	
Bremens	 handed	 in	 its	 final	 report.	 The	 conclusion	 reached	 is	 similar	 to	Gildemeister’s	decisiveness	against	simply	caving	in	to	Bismarck’s	will.	At	the	same	time,	 it	 also	 warned	 of	 possible	 measures	 taken	 by	 Bismarck	 against	 Bremen.	Continued	 opposition	 to	 Bismarck	 could	 lead	 to	 more	 pressure,	 the	 Imperial	government	 would	 ‘ihre	 Volle	 Macht	 anwenden	 […],	 um	 ihn	 [the	 accession]	durchzusetzen,	 und	dann	unter	 für	Bremen	weit	 ungünstigeren	Bedingungen	 als	wozu	sie	jetzt	wahrscheinlich	bereit	sein	würde.’150	However,	the	overall	mood	in	the	deputation	remained	in	the	majority	against	a	possible	accession.	The	result	of	a	vote	in	the	deputation	reveals	that	ten	members	voted	for	a	continued	free	port	status,	 while	 four	 members	 voted	 against	 –	 and	 one	 member	 abstained	 from	voting.151	Not	 unsurprisingly,	 Theodor	 Barth	 is	 found	 amongst	 those	 who	 voted	
																																																								146	See	StaB	FB	605,	Bremer	Nachrichten,	Drittes	Blatt.	Sonntag,	2.	Mai	1880.	No.	121;	StaB	FB	1200,	Beilage	zu	No.	122	des	Courier,	Bremen.	Sonntag,	2.	Mai	1880	147	StaB	FB	360,	Weser-Zeitung,	No.	11968,	Bremen,	Dienstag,	4.	Mai	1880,	Morgen-Ausgabe	148	StaB	FB	605,	Bremer	Nachrichten,	No.	116,	Zweites	Blatt,	Diesntag,	27.	April	1880.		149	StaB	FB	1200,	Courier,	No.	17,	Bremen.	Sonnabend	17.	Januar	1880.	Morgen-Ausgabe	150	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Auszug	aus	der	Mittheilung	des	Senats	vom	13.	Juli	1880,	p.	367	151	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Auszug	aus	dem	Beschluß	der	Bürgerschaft	vom	14.	Mai	1879	
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against	an	accession	and	so	is	the	head	of	the	deputation,	Bürgermeister	Friedrich	Grave.		However,	 in	 1881,	 the	 Zollanschlussfrage	 took	 a	 sudden	 turn:	 Hamburg’s	government	began	 to	approach	 the	 Imperial	government	regarding	an	accession.	This	was	a	big	 step,	 as	Hamburg	had	 initially	 responded	with	a	 clear	no	about	a	possible	 accession.	 This	 process	will	 be	 looked	 at	 in	more	 detail	 later	 on	 in	 the	chapter	on	Hamburg.	Therefore,	it	will	suffice	to	point	out	the	main	developments.	By	March	1881,	it	looked	as	though	an	agreement	was	about	to	be	made	between	Hamburg	 and	 the	 German	 Empire.	 After	 discussions	 regarding	 the	 terms	 of	 an	accession,	 the	 Senate	 got	 in	 contact	with	 Hamburg’s	 city	 parliament	 in	 order	 to	bring	 the	 Zollanschlussfrage	 to	 a	 close.	 Even	 Bismarck	 seemed	 to	 be	 willing	 to	diffuse	 the	 situation	 when	 claiming	 that	 ‘[e]r	 glaube	 glaube,	 die	 Angelegenheit	werde	 nun	 einen	 guten	 Fortgang	 nehmen.	 Hamburg	werde	 beim	Reiche	 ein	 viel	größeres	Entgegenkommen	 finden,	als	es	 selbst	voraussetze	 […].’152	So,	Hamburg	was	 in	 Bismarck’s	 favour	 and,	 in	 Bremen,	 one	 	 had	 to	 	 wonder	 what	 this	 new	situation	would	mean	for	the	city.		It	 had	 already	 been	 debated	 in	 Bremen	 to	 tie	 the	 city’s	 fate	 to	 that	 of	Hamburg.	 Now	 that	 Hamburg	 had	 made	 a	 decision,	 it	 was	 only	 reasonable	 to	follow	 this	 path.	 Suddenly,	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 a	 real	 determination	 in	Bremen	 to	 get	 in	 contact	with	 the	 Imperial	 government,	which	 is	 proven	 by	 the	speed	of	the	decision-making	process.	On	April	14	1881,	Otto	Gildemeister	asked	Minister	Resident	Krüger	in	Berlin	to	establish	contact	with	Karl	Hermann	Bitter,	the	Prussian	Minister	of	Finance	who	was	in	charge	of	negotiations	with	Hamburg.	The	matter	was	so	urgent	that	Krüger	was	even	asked	to	send	his	response	as	an	express	 letter.	 Remarkably,	 Gildemeister	 admits	 to	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 confer	with	the	Senat	but	he	took	responsibility	for	this	step.	Gildemeister	expected	‘daß	er	 den	 gethanen	 Schritt	 gutheißen	 wird,	 welcher	 im	 Grunde	 nur	 ein	 Act	 der	Geburtshülfe	 für	 eine	 ohnehin	 bevorstehende	 Kindsnot	 ist.’153	Although	 Bremen	was	now	 forced	 to	 react	 to	 the	 situation,	 it	 still	 felt	 strong	 enough	 to	 determine	some	 points	 that	 were	 regarded	 as	 non-negotiable.	 One	 of	 these	 was	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 free	 port	 area	 in	 Bremen	 and	 not	 just	 in	 Bremerhaven,	 since																																																									152	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	31ten	März	1881,	Lieber	Gildemeister!	153	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Bremen,	14.	April	81.	Lieber	Kr.	
	96	
Bremen	 was	 still	 the	 place	 where	 the	 actual	 mercantile	 trade	 was	 taking	 place.	Furthermore,	Gildemeister	pointed	out	that	similar	negotiations	to	those	between	Hamburg	 and	 the	 Empire	 were	 necessary,	 ‘wenn	 überhaupt	 von	 Verständigung,	nicht	von	Vergewaltigung	die	Rede	sein	soll.’154	In	particular,	the	linguistic	images	and	symbolism	that	Gildemeister	used	in	this	context	are	interesting.	Bremen	was	depicted	as	taking	on	the	role	of	a	woman	in	the	conflict	with	the	male	Empire.	The	role	of	Heimat	was	not	assumed	by	Germania.	Instead,	Gildemeister	regarded	the	German	Empire	as	the	husband	who	was	pestering	and	violating	the	city-state	of	Bremen.	 Still,	 Gildemeister’s	 assumption	 that	 it	 was	 the	 Kaiserreich	 that	desperately	wanted	an	agreement	with	Bremen	proved	to	be	fatal	in	the	course	of	the	negotiations.155			The	 Hanseatic	 Minister	 Resident	 in	 Berlin,	 Krüger,	 promptly	 tested	 the	water	 for	 an	 accession	 of	 Bremen	 to	 the	 customs	 union.	 Within	 a	 day	 of	Gildemeister’s	 request	 to	 get	 in	 contact	 with	 the	 Prussian	 Minister	 of	 Finance	Bitter,	Krüger	had	managed	to	do	so.	According	to	Krüger,	Bitter	stated	that	he	had	been	 willing	 to	 carry	 out	 negotiations	 with	 Bremen	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 in	Hamburg.	 In	 fact,	 Bitter	 had	 even	 visited	 Bremerhaven	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 the	possibilities	for	an	accession	there.	Yet,	Bismarck	seems	to	have	been	far	less	eager	to	realise	the	accession	of	both	Hanseatic	Cities	to	the	customs	union	at	the	same	time.	Bitter	confessed	to	Krüger	that	the	Reich	Chancellor	‘habe	aber	gemeint,	man	solle	 sich	 zunächst	 auf	 Hamburg	 und	 die	 Elbe	 beschränken,	 „dann	werde	 ihnen	Bremen	 wie	 eine	 reife	 Frucht	 in	 den	 Schoß	 fallen.“’156	Again,	 this	 quote	 offers	valuable	 information	 about	 Bismarck’s	 motives.	 Bismarck	 was	 obviously	 more	concerned	with	the	consumption	of	ripe	fruit	than	with	the	question	of	unification.		Whatever	 it	 was	 that	 made	 Bismarck	 approach	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 in	1879,	Hamburg’s	expected	accession	 to	 the	 customs	union	changed	 the	 situation	completely.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 knew	 very	 well	 that	 Bremen’s	position	 was	 severely	 weakened	 by	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 and	 he	 did	 not	 mind	taking	 advantage	 of	 this.	 Still,	 the	 city	 on	 the	 River	 Weser	 was	 at	 least	 able	 to																																																									154	Ibid..		155	See	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Bremen,	14.	April	81.	Gildemeister.	Lieber	Kr.:	‘Unsere	Anfrage	ist	das	logische	Product	der	Sachlage.	Nicht	wir	wünschen,	sondern	das	Reich	wünscht	Änderung	des	Bestehenden;	es	ist	daher	nicht	unbillig	zu	erwarten,	daß	das	Reich	uns	die	Änderung	wenigstens	möglich	macht.’	156	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	15ten	April	1881,	Ew.	Magnificenz	
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secure	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Imperial	 government.	 Bitter	 agreed	 to	 get	negotiations	under	way,	even	though	Oberzollinspektor	Klostermann,	who	already	headed	 the	 accession	 process	 in	 Hamburg,	 was	 still	 involved	 with	 negotiations	between	 the	Empire	and	Hamburg.	 In	 fact,	Bitter	admitted	a	 shortage	of	 capable	staff	but	still	he	was	willing	to	start	discussing	the	matter	with	Bremen.157			 As	 a	 result	 of	 Bremen’s	 unpromising	 situation,	 the	 city’s	 Senate	 officially	decided	 to	 enter	 negotiations	with	 the	 Prussian	Minister	 of	 Finance	 on	 April	 19	1881.158	At	the	same	time,	negotiations	between	Hamburg	and	the	German	Empire	were	held	up	by	Bismarck.	 Since	Bismarck’s	 focus	was	 on	 coming	 to	 terms	with	Hamburg,	 this	meant	 for	 Bremen	 that	 there	was	 only	moderate	 progress	 in	 the	proceedings.	At	 the	same	time,	 there	 is	no	 indication	that	Hamburg	attempted	to	take	advantage	of	this	situation.	Instead,	there	was	lively	communication	between	the	two	cities	and	Hamburg	notified	Bremen	of	every	significant	step	it	took,	such	as	 the	 Senate’s	 motion	 to	 the	 city	 parliament.159	In	 addition,	 Senator	 Versmann	even	offered	to	mediate	between	the	German	Empire	and	Bremen.160			 In	 response	 to	 Bremen’s	 approach	 to	 the	 Empire,	 Bitter	 sanctioned	negotiations	 for	 a	 future	 accession	 of	 Bremen	 between	 the	 city	 and	 the	
Oberzollinspektor	Klostermann	at	the	end	of	April	1881.161	Initially,	it	seemed	like	both	sides	were	able	to	quickly	reach	an	agreement.	Klostermann	did	not	hesitate	to	visit	Bremen.	He	had	already	arrived	in	Bremen	for	exploratory	talks	on	April	29	1881.	 Yet,	 despite	 giving	 in	 to	Bismarck’s	will	 and	 agreeing	 to	 talks,	 the	 opinion	among	 Bremen’s	 elite	 remained	 opposed	 to	 a	 possible	 accession.	 While	 talks	between	 Klostermann	 and	 two	 Bremish	 representatives,	 Senator	 Dr	 Hermann	Henrich	 Meier	 –	 not	 to	 be	 mistaken	 with	 his	 uncle,	 Hermann	 Henrich	 Meier,	founder	 of	 the	Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 –	 and	 Senator	 Carl	 Friedrich	 Christian	 Buff,	were	under	way,	Gildemeister	complained	to	Krüger	that:		 Je	näher	man	die	Anschlußfrage	ansieht,	desto	dümmer	wird	sie.	Die	Coulanz	in	 der	Geldfrage	 vermag	nicht	 die	 in	 der	 Sache	 steckende	 Schwierigkeit	 zu	beseitigen,	 und	 schließlich	 ist	 es	 doch	 auch	 nicht	 sehr	 rationell,	 Geld																																																									157	Ibid..		158	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Auszug	aus	dem	Senats-Protokolle	de	1881.	April	19.	p.	178	159	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Berlin	den	28.	März	81.	Verehrter	Herr	Bürgermeister!	160	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Bremen,	14.	April	81.	Gildemeister.	Lieber	Kr.	161	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Berlin,	den	25.	April	1881,	Bitter,	An	den	Herren	Senator	Meyer	
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aufzugeben,	 um	 etwas	 Besseres	 zu	 ruiniren	 und	 etwas	 Schlechteres	 zu	schaffen.	 Abgesehen	 davon,	 daß	 bei	 aller	 Liberalität	 des	 Reichs	 die	 Städte	selbst	vorzugweise	zahlen	müssen,	um	sich,	wie	gesagt,	zu	verschlechtern.162			By	mid-May	1881,	the	first	round	of	discussion	between	Klostermann	and	Senators	Meier	and	Buff	was	concluded.	Overall,	both	Senators	seem	to	have	been	satisfied	with	the	Imperial	negotiator.163		The	result	of	this	first	meeting	was	a	lengthy	report	but	no	major	progress	could	be	made	in	the	matter.	The	situation	for	Bremen	began	to	be	concerning.	At	this	 point,	 even	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 realised	 how	 important	 it	 was	 for	Bremen	to	sign	an	agreement	with	the	Imperial	government.	It	argued	that	it	was	no	 longer	desirable	 for	Bremen	to	delay	an	accession,	although	 ‘der	Zollanschluß	[…]	 dem	 bremischen	 Handel	 in	 jedem	 Falle	 eine	 schwere	 Schädigung	 zufügen	[werde].’164	At	first,	it	looked	as	if	it	was	also	Bitter’s	intention	to	finalise	Bremen’s	accession	 to	 the	 customs	 union.	When	 asked	 by	 Krüger	 on	 June	 13	 1881	 about	future	negotiations,	the	Prussian	Minister	of	Finance	even	agreed	to	visit	the	city	in	order	to	get	an	idea	of	its	needs.165		Only	 four	 days	 later,	 Krüger	 sent	 another	 report	 to	Bremen	 claiming	 that	Bitter’s	mood	had	changed	entirely.	Bitter	pointed	out	that	he	was	not	able	to	deal	with	 Bremen’s	 accession	 until	 mid-September.	 However,	 the	 reasons	 given	 by	Bitter	 are	 extremely	 dubious.	 According	 to	 Krüger,	 Bitter	 maintained:	 ‘Er	 habe	nicht	 bedacht,	 daß	 er	 noch	 eine	 Reise	 nach	 Ostpreußen	 anzutreten	 habe	 […].	Später	 müsse	 er	 nach	 Tarasp	 in’s	 Bad	 gehen.’ 166 	Unsurprisingly,	 Bitter’s	explanation	seemed	implausible	to	Krüger.	 In	a	strictly	confidential	conversation,	Krüger	 was	 told	 that	 Bitter’s	 attempt	 to	 delay	 proceedings	 ‘einerseits	 in	 der	bevorstehenden	 Abreise	 des	 Reichskanzlers	 nach	 Kissigen,	 andererseits	 in	 dem	Antagonismus	 liegen,	 der	 fortdauernd	 zwischen	 Bitter	 und	 Scholz	 besteht.’167	It	was	 explained	 to	 Krüger	 that	 Bitter	 ‘legt	 größten	Werth	 darauf	 […]	 in	 directem																																																									162	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Bremen,	30/4.	81.	Lieber	Krüger.	163	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Bremen,	15.	Mai	1881.	Gildemeister.	Lieber	Krüger.		164	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Die	Handelskammer	an	den	hohen	Senat,	Bremen,	9.	Juni	1881	165	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft.	Berlin,	den	13ten	Juni	1881.	An	Herrn	Senator	Meier.	166	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft.	Berlin,	den	17ten	Juni	1881.	An	Herrn	Senator	Meier.	167	Ibid..	
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Benehmen	 mit	 dem	 Reichskanzler	 zu	 stehen.’168	Since	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 had	decided	 to	 visit	Bad	Kissingen	 instead	of	 Friedrichsruhe,	Bitter	 could	only	 get	 in	contact	with	Bismarck	by	post.	This	was	no	option	for	Bitter	due	to	the	fact	that	the	
Reichsschatzamt,	 which	 was	 headed	 by	 Adolf	 Scholz,	 would	 be	 notified	 of	 the	negotiations.	 Bitter	 regarded	 Scholz	 as	 ‘einen	 höchst	 gefährlichen,	 zur	 Intrigue	geneigten	 Rivalen	 […].’169	As	 it	 turned	 out,	 Bitter’s	 thinking	 was	 even	 justified,	since	Scholz,	at	that	point	State	Secretary,	actually	took	over	Bitter’s	position	after	his	dismissal	in	1882.	Still,	for	Bremen,	Bitter’s	private	feud	with	Scholz	meant	that	no	 progress	 could	 be	 made.	 Bremen’s	 future	 position	 remained	 unclear,	 even	though	 the	 city	 was	 now	 willing	 to	 follow	 Hamburg’s	 path	 and	 to	 enter	 the	Empire’s	customs	union.		The	 rest	of	1881	passed	by	without	any	 further	negotiations	 taking	place.	Bitter	 continued	 to	 delay	 even	 the	 beginning	 of	 official	 talks.	 At	 the	 end	 of	September,	Krüger	approached	Bitter	once	again.170	The	Prussian	Finance	Minister	even	 promised	 to	 visit	 Bremen	 in	 order	 to	 commence	 proceedings.	 Yet,	 Bitter	continually	found	ways	to	cancel	his	plans.	On	December	31	1881,	Krüger	reported	to	Bremen	that	he	had	approached	Bitter	one	last	time	in	1881,	reminding	him	of	his	promise	to	attend	to	Bremen’s	matter.	During	this	conversation,	Krüger	learnt	that	 Bismarck	 now	 thought	 ‘man	 könne	 Bremerhaven	 ebenso	 wie	 Geestmünde,	zusammt	 der	Hafenbassins	 in	 das	 Zollgebiet	 einschließen	 und	 den	 Freihafen	 auf	das	Gebiet	bei	Bremen	beschränken.’171	Due	to	the	fact	that	Bismarck	was	 ‘erregt	und	 schwer	 zu	 behandeln’,	 Bitter	 did	 not	 attempt	 to	 change	 the	 Chancellor’s	mind.172		The	 possible	 explanations	 given	 for	 Bismarck’s	 new	 attitude	 towards	Bremen	permit	 a	 glimpse	 of	 the	 hidden	political	mechanics	 of	 the	Bismarck	 era.	First,	 Krüger	 noted	 that	 it	 could	 not	 have	 been	 an	 intrigue	 by	 Heinrich	 von	Kusserow,	since	the	Prussian	politician	advocated	a	free	port	area	in	Bremerhaven.	Instead,	Krüger	 concluded	 that	 either	 a	 ‘bloße	Rancüne	gegen	Bremen	vorliegt	 –	die	 Bitter	mit	 Rücksicht	 auf	 die	Wahlschlacht	 und	 deren	 Ergebnis	 allerdings	 für																																																									168	Ibid..		169	Ibid..		170	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Berlin,	29.	Sept.	81.	Krüger.	Verehrter	Freunde!	171	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin	den	31ten	Dezember	1881.	Lieber	Herr	Senator!	172	Ibid..		
	100	
möglich	halt	–’	or	that	Mosle	had	been	involved	in	the	matter.173	Whatever	reason	lay	behind	Bismarck’s	change	of	mind,	Bitter	claimed	that	he	was	still	on	Bremen’s	side	 and	 rejected	 the	 Chancellor’s	 new	 idea.	 In	 his	 response	 to	 Krüger,	 Senator	Meier	 expressed	 the	 conviction	 that	 Mosle	 did	 not	 insinuate	 such	 a	 plan	 to	Bismarck,	as	he	was	also	in	favour	of	a	free	port	in	Bremerhaven	only.174	According	to	Krüger’s	line	of	argument,	this	would	have	meant	that	the	Reich	Chancellor	bore	a	grudge	towards	Bremen.	Then,	in	1882,	Karl	Hermann	Bitter	fell	out	of	Bismarck’s	favour.	During	the	ministerial	 crisis	 of	 1879,	 Bitter,	 at	 that	 time	 Under-Secretary	 of	 State	 in	 the	Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior,	 had	 taken	 over	 the	 position	 of	 Prussian	 Minister	 of	Finance.	His	 predecessor,	Arthur	Hobrecht,	 and	 two	other	 liberal	ministers,	 Falk	and	Friedenthal,	had	resigned	in	protest	over	Bismarck’s	conservative	turn	of	that	year.	 However,	 Bitter	 did	 not	 remain	 in	 office	 for	 long.	 Even	 though	 Bitter	 was	more	 compliant	 than	 other	 ministers,	 for	 example	 Botho	 zu	 Eulenburg,	 he	 had	difficulty	in	pleasing	the	Reich	Chancellor.175	In	fact,	Pflanze	points	out	that	‘Bitter	versuchte,	in	den	ihm	wichtigsten	Fragen	seinen	Standpunkt	gegen	den	Fürsten	zu	behaupten.’176 	One	 of	 these	 questions	 was	 that	 of	 a	 balanced	 budget.	 Bitter	supported	the	conservative	 idea	of	a	balanced	budget,	while	Bismarck	wanted	to	use	 budgets	 in	 deficit	 as	 a	 political	weapon	 in	 order	 to	 introduce	 new	 taxes.	 By	January	1882,	Bitter	was	 fighting	a	 lost	battle	against	Bismarck.	 In	 June	1882,	he	then	asked	the	Reich	Chancellor	for	his	dismissal	out	of	protest	over	new	decrees	that	were	issued	without	his	knowledge.	According	to	Pflanze,	‘Bismarck	hielt	ihn	für	ungeeignet	und	war	froh,	ihn	los	zu	sein.’177		 Inevitably,	 Bitter’s	 struggle	 and	 resignation	 also	 had	 consequences	 for	Bremen’s	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Imperial	 government.	 In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 1882,	there	was	again	no	progress	made	at	all.	Senator	Meier	contacted	Bitter	once	more	in	May.	 Since	 Bismarck	 had	 fallen	 ill	 and	was	 about	 to	 leave	 for	 Bad	 Kissingen,	Bitter	was	not	able	to	deliberate	on	the	matter	with	Bismarck.	The	only	thing	Bitter	could	 do	was	 to	 postpone	 the	 beginning	 of	 proceedings	 until	 September	 of	 that	
																																																								173	Ibid..		174	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Senator	Dr.	Meier,	Bremen	Januar	3,	1882	175	Pflanze,	Bismarck:	Der	Reichskanzler,	p.	299-300	176	Ibid.,	p.	300	177	Ibid.,	p.	300	
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year.178	Since	 Bitter	 had	 resigned	 in	 the	meantime,	 Senator	Meier	 got	 in	 contact	with	 Adolf	 Scholz,	 Bitter’s	 successor,	 asking	 whether	 proceedings	 were	 still	expected	 to	 begin	 in	 September.179	However,	 Scholz	was	 not	 prepared	 to	 simply	carry	 on	without	 stopping.	 Instead,	 Scholz	 suggested	 that	 talks	between	Bremen	and	 Bitter	 ‘vielmehr	 den	 Charakter	 eines	 an	 die	 Person	 meines	 Herrn	Amtsvorgängers	 geknüpft	 gewesenen	 Geschäfts	 gehabt	 haben.’180	According	 to	Meier,	the	purpose	of	this	was	to	force	Bremen	into	making	an	official	request	for	talks	between	Bremen	and	the	Reich	Chancellor.181		After	 Bitter’s	 resignation,	 Bismarck	 did	 not	 want	 to	 acknowledge	 any	agreements	already	made	between	Bitter	 and	Bremen.	 Instead,	 in	October	1882,	Karl	von	Boetticher,	State	Secretary	in	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	let	Krüger	know	that	 Bismarck	 was	 not	 informed	 of	 any	 negotiations	 between	 the	 Reich	 and	Bremen.182	Scholz	explained	 to	Krüger	 that	Bitter	was	authorised	by	Bismarck	 to	head	 negotiations	 neither	with	Hamburg	 nor	 Bremen.	When	 Bitter	 realised	 that	‘seine	 Auffassung	 über	 die	 Regelung	 dieser	 Angelegenheit	 mit	 derjenigen	 des	Reichskanzlers	wesentlich	differire	und	keine	Lorbeeren	bei	derselben	zu	pflücken	seien,’	he	started	to	deliberately	hold	up	the	beginning	of	negotiations.183		Thereupon,	Krüger	approached	Bitter	in	order	to	query	about	the	incident.	Not	unsurprisingly,	Bitter	claimed	that	‘eine	Lächerlichkeit	ihm	zuzutrauen,	daß	er	ohne	Legitimation	Seitens	des	Reichskanzlers	in	Verhandlungen	mit	uns	[Bremen]	eingetreten	 sei.’ 184 	Instead,	 while	 Bitter	 had	 attempted	 to	 solve	 the	 issue	diplomatically,	the	Reich	Chancellor	‘habe	einen	eisernen	Ring	um	die	Städte	legen	wolle,	um	den	Widerstand	durch	die	stärksten	Mittel	zu	brechen	[…]’185According	
																																																								178	See	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Senator	Dr.	Meier,	Berlin	den	17.	Mai	1882.		179	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Sr.	Excellenz	dem	Königl.	Preuß.	Finanzminister	Herrn	Scholz,	Berlin,	Juli	8,	1882.	180	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Scholz	to	Meier,	Berlin	den	20.	Juli	1882.	181	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Senator	Dr.	Meier,	Herrenalb	(Würtemberg)	den	25.	Juli	82.	Hochgeehrter	Herr	Bürgermeister.		182	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	3ten	Oktober	1882.,	Ew.	Magnificenz	183	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	22ten	Oktober	1882.,	Ew.	Hochwohlgeboren	184	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	29ten	Oktober	1882.,	Geehrter	Herr	Senator!	185	Ibid..	
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to	 Bitter,	 after	 Hamburg’s	 agreed	 accession,	 their	 opposing	 approaches	 led	 to	conflict,	which	is	why	negotiations	with	Bremen	were	delayed.186			However,	 worse	 than	 the	 case	 of	 Bitter	 was	 Bismarck’s	 attitude	 towards	Bremen.	 Scholz	 reported	 that	 ‘nach	 seinen	 Wahrnehmungen	 der	 Reichskanzler	sich	von	Bremen	„sehr	verletzt”	[habe]	fühlen	müssen.’187	It	was	emphasised	that	this	was	not	due	to	 the	Bremish	government	but	rather	due	to	 the	 ‘Bevölkerung,	die	ihn	schlecht	behandelt	habe.’	In	this	context,	Scholz	mentioned,	amongst	other	things,	 ‘fortdauernde	 Bekämpfung	 der	 Zollreform	 durch	 die	 Bremer	 Presse	Agitation	gegen	das	Tabackmonopol	und	das	Auftreten	des	Dr.	Barth’.188	However,	as	already	pointed	out,	even	though	Theodor	Barth	was	a	member	of	the	Reichstag,	he	did	not	represent	Bremen.	Thus,	Scholz	made	it	obvious	that	Bismarck	felt	 ill-disposed	 towards	 Bremen.	Whether	 or	 not	 this	was	 a	 strategy	 in	 order	 to	 force	Bremen	into	accepting	a	deal	more	favourable	to	the	German	Empire	than	to	the	city	whose	welfare	Bismarck	was	anxious	to	defend	is	hard	to	say.	Still,	the	liberal	disposition	among	Bremen’s	elite,	such	as	Theodor	Barth,	certainly	continued	to	be	a	thorn	in	Bismarck’s	side.			In	order	to	come	to	terms	with	the	Reich	Chancellor,	Bremen	was	asked	to	file	 a	motion	 for	 official	 proceedings.	 Furthermore,	 Bremen	was	 expected	 to	 cut	back	on	its	previous	demands,	since	the	German	Empire	‘habe	an	Bremens	Eintritt	in	 das	 Zollgebiet	 nicht	 das	 Interesse,	 wie	 an	 dem	 Anschlusse	 Hamburgs.’189	Incidentally,	referring	to	Bremen’s	previous	demands	proves	that	Bismarck	was	at	least	aware	of	the	results	of	the	informational	talks	with	Klostermann	in	1881.	Still,	even	 if	 Bismarck	 had	 been	 aware,	 this	 did	 nothing	 to	 change	 his	mood	 towards	Bremen.	 In	 the	 Chancellor’s	 eyes,	 only	 Hamburg	 was	 a	 port	 city	 of	 global	significance.	 While	 there	 was	 a	 time	 when	 Bismarck	 attached	 importance	 to	Bremen’s	 accession	 to	 the	 customs	 union,	 this	 was	 no	 longer	 the	 case	 after	Hamburg’s	 agreed	 accession.190	Bremen	 was	 notified	 that	 if	 ‘Bremen	 etwa	 es	vorziehen	 sollte,	 in	 seiner	 dermaligen	 Stellung	 zu	 verharren,	 so	 würde	 der																																																									186	Ibid..		187	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	22ten	Oktober	1882.,	Ew.	Hochwohlgeboren	188	Ibid..		189	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	3ten	Oktober	1882.,	Ew.	Magnificenz.		190	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft,	Berlin,	den	27ten	Oktober	1882.,	Geehrter	Herr	Senator!	
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Reichskanzler	 es	 wahrscheinlich	 darin	 nicht	 stören.’ 191 	Consequently,	 Krüger	concludes	 that	 ‘([n]achdem	 wir	 aber	 durch	 Zuwarten	 uns	 in’s	 Hintertreffen	gesetzt,)	werden	wir	die	Situation	nehmen	müssen,	wie	sie	 ist.’192	Thus,	now	that	Bitter	 had	 been	 dismissed,	 Bremen’s	 fate	 was	 entirely	 in	 Bismarck’s	 hands.	Unfortunately	 for	Bremen,	 the	Reich	Chancellor	was	 increasingly	willing	 to	make	use	of	his	superior	position	during	the	process	of	solving	the	Zollanschlussfrage.			 With	 respect	 to	 this	 situation,	 Bremen	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 comply	with	Bismarck’s	will.	Therefore,	 the	city	officially	had	to	request	negotiations	with	the	Reich	 Chancellor,	 which	 was	 done	 at	 the	 end	 of	 November	 1882.	 This	 request	naturally	 met	 Bismarck’s	 approval,	 though	 he	 did	 not	 fail	 to	 emphasise	 that	Bremen	 would	 not	 be	 treated	 like	 Hamburg,	 as	 in	 Hamburg	 ‘Verhältnisse	maßgebend	 gewesen	 sind,	 welche	 hinsichtlich	 Bremens	 zum	 Theil	 überhaupt	nicht,	 zum	Theil	nicht	 in	gleichem	Maße	obwalten.’193	Hence,	 since	Bismarck	had	first	 sought	 contact	 with	 the	 Hanseatic	 Cities	 regarding	 an	 accession	 to	 the	customs	 union	 in	 May	 1879,	 Bremen’s	 basis	 for	 negotiations	 had	 deteriorated	severely.	Hamburg	had	made	the	first	step	and	was	rewarded	accordingly.	Bremen,	on	the	other	hand,	was	in	danger	of	losing	out.			 On	 December	 29	 1882,	 Bremen	 presented	 its	 position	 in	 the	
Zollanschlussfrage	 to	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor,	 as	 he	 had	 requested.	 An	 official	response	 by	 Bismarck	 was	 a	 long	 time	 coming.	 In	 July	 1883,	 Gildemeister	contacted	Emil	von	Burchard,	Scholz’s	successor	as	State	Secretary,	in	order	to	find	out	 about	 the	 state	 of	 affairs.	He	was	 informed	 that	 ‘der	Reichskanzler	 selbst	 ist	völlig	entschieden	der	nämlichen	Ansicht,	daß	ein	Freihafenbezirk	nach	Art	34	der	Reichsverfassung	 Bremen	 nicht	 wird	 concedirt	 werden	 können.’194	Yet,	 it	 was	precisely	 this	point	 that	was	regarded	 in	Bremen	as	a	matter	of	economic	 life	or	death.	Burchard	justified	this	decision	with	the	fact	that	a	free	port	area	could	only	be	 established	 in	 a	 port	 city,	 which,	 in	 his	 eyes,	 Bremen	 was	 not.	 Gildemeister	countered	 that	 ‘beim	 Seeverkehr	 nicht	 das	 Schiff,	 sondern	 die	 Waare	 das	entscheidende	 für	 den	 Begriff	 „Hafen“	 sei,	 daß	 Bremen	 der	 erste	
																																																								191	Ibid..		192	Ibid..		193	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Reichsschatzamt,	Berlin,	den	5.	Dezember	1882.	194	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Gildemeister,	Berlin	5.	Juni	1883.	Hochgeehrter	Herr	Präsident.	
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Bestimmungsplatz	 für	 die	 seewärts	 kommende	 Waare	 sei	 […].’ 195 	Hence,	 the	situation	remained	tense	for	Bremen.			 In	the	end,	another	year	passed	by,	so	that	by	the	end	of	1883,	Bremen	had	still	not	received	an	answer	to	its	request	for	official	proceedings.	Since	the	Reich	Chancellor	stayed	 in	Bad	Gastein	and	Friedrichsruhe	 for	 long	periods	 in	order	 to	recover	 from	health	 issues,	 it	was	difficult	 for	Krüger	 to	even	get	 in	contact	with	him	 in	 Berlin.	 Krüger	 instead	 instructed	 von	 Boetticher,	 State	 Secretary	 and	Bismarck’s	deputy,	and	the	Geheimen	Regierungsrat	Rottenburg	to	press	Bismarck	ahead	with	the	matter.		Eventually,	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 responded	 on	March	 6	 1884,	 around	 14	months	after	Bremen	had	filed	an	application	to	him.196	In	this	response,	Bismarck	advised	Bremen	to	refer	to	the	Federal	Assembly	in	order	to	find	a	solution	to	the	question	 of	 Bremen’s	 accession	 to	 the	 customs	 union.	 All	 of	 a	 sudden,	 even	 the	Reich	Chancellor	was	benevolent	towards	Bremen.	He	pointed	out:		Ich	 bin	 nicht	 befugt	 den	 Beschlüssen	 des	 Bundesrathes	 vorzugreifen,	 aber	gern	bereit,	 in	 dem	weiteren	Verlauf	 der	 Sache	meinerseits	 den	Wünschen	des	 hohen	 Senats	 innerhalb	 meiner	 Kompetenz	 als	 Reichskanzler	entgegenzukommen,	 wenn	 der	 Bundesrath	 durch	 einen	 Antrag	 der	 freien	und	 Hansestadt	 in	 Gemäßheit	 des	 Artikels	 34	 der	 Reichsverfassung	 in	 die	Lage	 gesetzt	 wird	 über	 den	 Einschluß	 Bremens	 in	 das	 Reichszollgebiet	 zu	verhandeln	und	zu	beschließen.197			Krüger	 attempted	 to	 explain	 this	 stark	 change	 in	 Bismarck’s	 attitude	 towards	Bremen	by	highlighting	that	he	never	actually	intended	to	cross	Bremen’s	wish	for	a	free	port	area.	In	this	regard,	Bismarck	had	thought	about	addressing	the	Federal	Assembly	before,	which	he	ended	up	not	doing.	Furthermore,	 the	Chancellor	was	not	 prepared	 to	 once	 again	 head	 negotiations	 about	 a	 subject	 that	 exceeded	 his	knowledge,	 as	 had	 been	 the	 case	 with	 Hamburg’s	 accession.	 According	 to	Boetticher,	 Bismarck	 did	 not	 want	 to	 be	 bothered	 with	 issues	 that	 primarily	concerned	 particular	 governmental	 departments,	 ‘um	 seine	 Thätigkeit	 ganz	 den																																																									195	Ibid..		196	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	2,	Reichsschatzamt,	Friedrichsruh,	den	6.	März	1884.	An	den	Senat	der	freien	Hansestadt	Bremen.	197	Ibid..		
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auswärtigen	 Angelegenheiten	 und	 den	 socialpolitischen	 Reform-Bestrebungen	widmen	 zu	 können.’198	Thus,	 progress	 could	 only	 be	 made	 because	 Bismarck	seemed	 to	 be	 fed	 up	 with	 the	 problems	 caused	 by	 Bremen’s	 accession	 to	 the	customs	 union.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 Empire’s	 growing	 involvement	 in	colonial	 affairs,	 which	 was	 demanded	 in	 circles	 of	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	community,	made	the	Reich	Chancellor	settle	the	dispute	between	the	Kaiserreich	and	 Bremen.	 In	 this	 scenario,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 Bismarck	 who	 made	 use	 of	colonial	interests	in	Bremen	to	pursue	other	objectives.	After	 some	 discussion	 about	 the	 dangers	 of	 waiving	 the	 rights	 stated	 in	Article	34,	it	was	decided	in	Bremen	to	accept	the	Chancellor’s	offer	and,	therefore,	to	file	a	motion	to	the	Federal	Assembly.	This	motion	was	then	filed	on	March	29	1884.	 It	 underlined	 Bremen’s	 wish	 to	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	 to	 grant	 those	concessions	‘welche	die	für	das	Gedeihen	Bremens	eben	so	nothwendige	als	für	die	Interessen	 des	 Reichs	 gewiß	 wünschenwerthe	 Aufrechthaltung	 der	 Stellung	Bremens	 im	Welthandel	 und	 deren	 fortschreitende	 Entwickelung	 unumgänglich	erheischen.’199				Subsequently,	it	looked	like	an	agreement	between	Bremen	and	the	German	Empire	could	be	realised	within	a	short	period	of	 time.	Proceedings	between	the	two	parties	began	at	 the	beginning	of	May	1884.	The	most	disputed	 subject	was	the	 establishment	 of	 a	 free	 port	 area	 in	 Bremen,	 instead	 of	 a	 simple	 bonded	warehouse	or	even	no	free	zone	at	all.	At	the	outset,	it	even	seemed	as	if	it	would	be	easy	for	Bremen	to	obtain	this	living	condition,	as	it	was	regarded	in	Bremen.	In	April	 1884,	 Senator	 Meier	 reported	 to	 Burgomaster	 Gildemeister	 that	 he	 had	discussed	the	matter	with	Burchard	and	that	he	‘habe	nach	einzelnen	Äußerungen,	die	 er	 fallen	 ließ,	 wieder	 große	 Hoffnung,	 daß	 es	 uns	 gelingen	 wird	 einen	stadtbremischen	„Freihafenbezirk“(nicht	bloß	ein	„Freilager“)	zu	erhalten.’200		Due	to	the	fact	that	in	the	following	weeks	no	progress	was	made	regarding	this	 matter,	 Gildemeister	 decided	 to	 pay	 a	 visit	 to	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 in	 June	1884.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 discussion,	 Bremen’s	 treatment	 of	 Bismarck	 came	 up	again,	‘Hinweisungen	auf	die	oppositionelle	Haltung	der	bremischen	Bevölkerung,																																																									198	Ibid..		199	StaB	 2-Ss.4.e.1.	 Bd.	 3,	 Bundesrath.	 No.	 47.	 Session	 von	 1883/1884.	 Antrag	 Bremens.	Bremen,	den	29.	März	1884.	200	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Auszug	aus	dem	Schreiben	des	Herrn	Senator	Dr.	Meier	an	Herrn	Bürgermeister	Dr.	Gildemeister,	d.d.	Berlin	den	7.	April	1884.	
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des	Tabackmonopols	wurde	gedacht,	Samoa’s	und	Dr.	Barths.’201	However,	 in	 the	meantime,	 Theodor	 Barth	 had	 resigned	 from	 his	 position	 as	 Syndikus	 in	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce.	Gildemeister	referred	to	this	as	‘dies	letztere	Gravamen	sei	eliminirt	 […]’	202	Furthermore,	 he	 also	 did	 not	 fail	 to	 emphasise	 that	 Bremen’s	resistance	against	a	tobacco	monopoly	was	necessary	from	the	city’s	point	of	view.	With	regard	to	 the	 free	port	area,	 the	Reich	Chancellor	admitted	that	he	was	not	adequately	informed.	Yet,	he	still	represented	the	opinion	that	‘Bremen	eigentlich	keine	 Seestadt	 sei,	 sondern	 erst	werden	wolle	 […]’203	Hence,	 Bismarck	 promised	support	remained	restrained.	In	fact,	Gildemeister	concluded	that	'wir	uns	auf	ein	wirksames	 Eingreifen	 des	 Fürsten	 zu	 unserm	 Gunsten	 keine	 Hoffnung	 machen	dürfen	und	besten	Falles	 keinen	 entschieden	Widerstand	von	 ihm	zu	befürchten	brauchen	[…]’204		Bismarck	at	least	maintained	this	neutrality	in	the	following	session	of	the	
Zollanschlusskommission	of	the	Federal	Assembly.	Finally,	it	was	resolved	to	grant	a	free	port	area	in	Bremen.	Nonetheless,	the	overall	impression	of	the	proceedings	for	Bremen’s	representatives	was	a	negative	one.	Buff	claims:	‘Es	scheint	sich	eine	Abneigung	 gegen	 Bremen	 festgesetzt	 zu	 haben,	 die	 kaum	 zu	 erklären,	 jedenfalls	nur	 auf	die	 kleinlichsten	Motive	 zurückzuführen	 ist	 […]’205	Even	 if	we	 ignore	 the	question	about	Bremen’s	relationship	to	the	German	nation,	 it	 is	obvious	that,	by	this	 point,	 those	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 city-state’s	 political	 decision-making	process	 were	 frustrated	 with	 the	 German	 nation-state.	 Of	 course,	 it	 cannot	 be	deduced	from	this	that	the	accession	process	necessarily	diluted	or	reduced	(pan-German)	 patriotic	 sentiment	 in	 Bremen.	 Still,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 Senator	Buff’s	 sobering	 conclusions	 would	 have	 enhanced	 goodwill	 towards	 the	 German	nation-state.		This	 point	 is	 proven	 in	 another	 session	 of	 the	 committee,	 in	 which	 the	concerted	 draft	 of	 a	 report	 to	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	 was	 debated.	 In	 this,	particularly	 Bavaria	 and	 Oldenburg,	 but	 also	 Prussia,	 raised	 a	 number	 of	objections,	for	example,	regarding	the	establishment	of	export	industry	in	the	free	port	area,	which	was	not	granted	to	Bremen.	Referring	to	this	matter,	Gildemeister																																																									201	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Gildemeister,	Berlin	17/6.	84.	Geehrter	Herr	College.		202	Ibid..	203	Ibid..		204	Ibid..		205	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Buff,	Bremen,	20.	Juni	84.		
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complained	in	a	letter	to	the	Senate:	‘Nirgends	mehr	als	bei	diesem	Punkte	trat	die	neidische	 Stimmung	 der	 Binnenländischen	 gegen	 die	 Hanseatische	 Freiheit	 aus	deren	 Früchte	 hervor.’206	Eventually,	 the	 committee	 managed	 to	 find	 common	ground	and	its	resolution	would	next	be	accepted	by	the	Bremish	Senate	and	the	
Bürgerschaft.	Hoping	that	‘aus	dem	Zollanschluß	wahrscheinlich	wieder	viel	Segen	für	 Bremen	 erwachsen	 könne	 […]’,	 both	 bodies	 naturally	 accepted	 the	resolution.207		Therefore,	 the	matter	was	 discussed	 again	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 1884.	 There	were	only	a	 few	 final	obstacles	 to	overcome	 for	Bremen.	One	of	 these	addressed	the	wording	of	Bremen’s	motion	to	the	Federal	Assembly.	In	this	motion,	Bremen	was	expected	to	explicitly	state	that	it	would	waive	its	right	to	remain	outside	the	Empire’s	customs	union	guaranteed	in	Article	34.	Gildemeister	commented	on	this;	in	his	opinion,	negligibility	by	pointing	out	that	‘[w]enn	man	beantragt	geköpft	zu	werden,	braucht	man	doch	nicht	ausdrücklich	auf	seinen	Kopf	zu	verzichten.’208	To	say	the	least,	it	is	telling	that	Bremen’s	Burgomaster	compared	Bremen’s	accession	to	 the	 customs	union	with	a	decapitation.	However,	Gildemeister	was	eventually	prepared	to	add	Bremen’s	waiver	of	Article	34.		On	November	6	1884,	Bremen’s	motion	was	finally	approved	by	the	Federal	Assembly.	 In	 order	 to	 get	 the	 official	 confirmation	 for	 Bremen’s	 motion,	 the	Empire’s	subsidy	to	the	building	of	the	new	free	port	area	also	had	to	be	accepted	by	the	Reichstag.	The	total	costs	were	estimated	to	amount	to	around	34.5	million	Marks	 and	 the	 German	 Empire	was	 expected	 to	 contribute	 12	million	Marks.	 In	February	1885,	the	Reichstag	committee	for	Bremen’s	accession	voted	in	favour	of	the	motion.	Only	two	of	the	eleven	members	abstained	from	voting.	Interestingly,	one	 of	 these	 members	 was	 Hermann	 Gebhard,	 Bremerhaven’s	 Stadtdirektor.	Gildemeister	reported	that	Gebhard	made	an	attempt	‘die	Discussion	auf	die	Local-Interessen	 Bremerhavens	 zu	 lenken,	was	 ihm	 freilich	 völlig	misslang,	 aber	 doch	zeitraubende	 Auseinandersetzungen	 zur	 Folge	 hatte.’209	Furthermore,	 Gebhard	complained	about	the	planned	size	and	facilities	of	Bremen’s	free	port	area,	which,	in	his	eyes,	was	too	large	in	comparison	to	Bremerhaven’s	free	port	area.	However,																																																									206	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Gildemeister,	Berlin.	26.	Juni	1884,	Hochgeehrter	Herr	College.	207	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Christoph	Papendiek,	in:	No.	21.	Verhandlungen	der	Bürgerschaft,	Sitzung	vom	17.	September	1884.	208	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Gildemeister	to	Krüger,	Bremen	27/10.	84.		209	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Gildemeister,	Berlin.	11.	Febr.	1885.	Hochgeehrter	Herr	Präsident.	
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the	 committee	 turned	 down	 Gebhard’s	 objections,	 as	 it	 was	 only	 instructed	 to	accept	or	reject	Bremen’s	motion	and	not	 to	make	any	modifications.	Hence,	 this	incident	demonstrates	 that	 there	were	 temporary	 tensions	between	Bremen	and	its	 outpost	 on	 the	 Weser	 estuary.	 However,	 Bremerhaven	 was	 not	 capable	 of	standing	up	to	Bremen.	This	circumstance	legitimises	the	traditional	perspective	of	German	politics	and	historiography	 to	 regard	Bremerhaven	as	a	kind	of	outlying	district	of	Bremen.	When	 Bremen’s	 motion	 was	 resolved	 in	 the	 Reichstag	 at	 the	 end	 of	February	 1885,	 Gildemeister	 noticed	 that	 [a]uf	 der	 Journalistentribüne	 scheint	man	 den	 Vorgang	 kaum	 beachtet	 zu	 haben;	 wenigstens	 finde	 ich	 in	 der	Nationalzeitung	nur	die	dürre	Notiz,	daß	die	Vorlage	angenommen	wurde.’210	So,	while	Bremen’s	position	as	a	free	port	had	led	to	fierce	debates	during	the	1870s,	this	had	seemingly	dwindled	away	by	1885.	Hamburg’s	accession	had	already	been	determined	and	 for	Bremen	 it	had	only	been	a	matter	of	 time	until	 it	 crossed	 its	Rubicon	as	well.	In	March	1885,	the	Empire’s	subsidy	was	then	made	public	in	the	
Reichsgesetzblatt	 and	 in	 September	 that	 year	Bremen’s	 accession	 to	 the	 customs	union	was	also	publicly	announced.211	The	plan	was	 to	 finish	construction	works	until	October	1888,	when	Hamburg	intended	to	enter	the	Empire’s	customs	union.		It	 is	 astonishing	 that	 with	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 new	 free	 port	 area	 in	Bremen,	there	was	also	a	turnaround	in	the	attitude	towards	the	accession.	While	the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 had	 been	 a	 decisive	 opponent	 to	 an	 accession	 to	 the	customs	union,	 it	was	also	quick	 to	adapt	 to	 the	new	situation.	 In	 June	1888,	 the	Chamber’s	 president,	 Gustav	 Pagenstecher,	 praised	 the	 Imperial	 and	 Prussian	governments.	He	enthused:			Sie	möchte	 aber	 schon	heute	 ihre	 hohe	Befriedigung	darüber	 aussprechen,	daß	 seitens	 der	 Reichsregierung	 und	 der	 preußischen	 Regierung	 dem	Wettbewerb	 der	 deutschen	 Nordseehäfen	 gegen	 die	 Rhein-	 und	Scheldehäfen	 in	 neuerer	 Zeit	 ein	 weit	 größeres	 Interesse	 und	Wohlwollen	gezeigt	 wird	 als	 früher,	 das	 insbesondere	 auf	 dem	 Gebiete	 der	Eisenbahnpolitik	 in	 Gewährung	 von	 Frachtermäßigungen	 für	 den	 Import,																																																									210	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Auszug	aus	dem	Schreiben	d.	H.	Bgmstr.	Gildemeister	an	H.	Bürgermeister	Buff	d.	d.	Berlin,	den	22.	Februar	1885.	211	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Reichs-Gesetzblatt.	No.	11.	Gesetz,	betreffend	den	Beitrag	des	Reichs	zu	den	Kosten	des	Zollanschlusses	von	Bremen,	vom	31.	März	1885.		
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wie	 für	den	Export	 seinen	Ausdruck	gefunden	und	durch	dieselben	bereits	erhebliche	Erfolge	zu	Gunsten	der	deutschen	Häfen	errungen	hat.212			After	 all,	 the	 ports	 on	 the	 Rhine	 and	 Scheldt	 had	 been	 able	 to	 maintain	 their	importance	to	the	German	goods	and	passenger	traffic	 from	the	days	of	 the	Holy	Roman	 Empire.213	The	 building	 of	 the	 railway,	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	Empire	and	the	accession	of	the	Hanseatic	Cities	–	and	later	on	the	Mittellandkanal	–	then	led	to	a	shift	from	the	Rhine	and	Scheldt	to	the	ports	of	the	North	Sea	Coast.	Thereafter,	 Pagenstecher	 suggested	 inviting	 Emperor	Wilhelm	 II	 to	 the	 opening	ceremony	 of	 the	 new	 free	 port	 area	 in	October.	 Pagenstecher	was	 sure	 that	 ‘die	bremische	 Bevölkerung	 aber	 wird	 ihren	 Kaiser	 in	 den	 Mauern	 unserer	 alten	Hansestadt	 jubelnd	 begrüßen.’214	Thus,	 by	 1888,	 opposition	 towards	 Bremen’s	accession	 in	 the	Handelskammer	 had	 transformed	 to	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	German	Empire	and	its	Emperor.	Unfortunately	for	Bremen,	Wilhelm	II	preferred	to	pay	a	visit	to	Hamburg’s	opening	ceremony	in	October	1888.			 Summing	up,	examining	the	process	of	Bremen’s	accession	to	the	Empire’s	customs	 union	 has	 produced	 significant	 conclusions	 about	 Bremen’s	 role	within	the	German	Empire	before	1888.	If	it	is	argued	that	the	Zollverein	led	to	economic	integration	 and	 at	 least	 supported	 the	 nation	 building	 process,	 then	 the	 case	 of	Bremen	proves	that	remaining	outside	the	German	customs	union	did	not	have	the	opposite	effect,	but	it	certainly	helped	to	cement	the	idea	of	an	exceptional	status.	In	 line	 with	 this	 argument,	 Bremen’s	 political	 and	 cultural	 integration	 into	 the	German	Empire	was	not	completed	before	the	accession.	This	 is	a	point	that	was	also	emphasised	by	Bismarck.	Hamburg	and	Bremen	were	not	for	nothing	seen	as	‘Brückenköpfe	des	Ausland	auf	deutschem	Boden’.215	From	Bremen’s	point	of	view,	it	is	understandable	not	to	have	felt	entirely	as	part	of	the	German	Empire	prior	to	1888.	Bismarck	led	the	debate	that	broke	out	following	Wentzel’s	enquiry	in	May	1879	 in	 a	 rigorous	 and	 even	 condescending	 manner.	 Despite,	 or	 perhaps	 just	because	of	this,	Bremen	was	forced	into	the	Empire’s	customs	union,	but	it	quickly	
																																																								212	StaB	 2-Ss.4.e.2.b.,	 Acta	 betreffend	 die	 Einweihung	 des	 Freibezirks	 am	 21.	 Oct.	 1888.	Handelskammer	Bremen,	Bremen,	den	30.	Juni	1888	213	See,	for	example:	James	Boyd,	An	Investigation	214	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.2.b.,	Acta	betreffend	die	Einweihung	des	Freibezirks	am	21.	Oct.	1888.	Handelskammer	Bremen,	Bremen,	den	30.	Juni	1888	215	Cited	in	Pflanze,	Bismarck:	Der	Reichskanzler,	p.	254	
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found	a	way	 to	adapt	 to	 the	situation.	By	1888,	 the	era	of	 independence	was	 left	behind	and	even	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	rejoiced	about	advantages	of	the	accession.			
e.	Bremen	and	Germany’s	colonial	adventure			During	 the	1880s,	 another	 crucial	process	 took	place	 in	 the	German	Empire:	 the	beginning	 of	 German	 imperialism.	 Therefore,	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 look	 at	Bremen’s	 involvement	 with	 the	 colonies	 and	 possible	 links	 between	 Bremen’s	accession	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 imperialism.	 This	 section	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	process	 that	 led	 to	 the	establishment	of	Germany’s	 colonial	 empire	and	with	 the	way	Bremen’s	mercantile	community	interacted	with	the	colonies	thereafter.	First	of	all,	it	has	to	be	noted	that	Bremen	promoted	the	acquisition	of	overseas	territory	right	from	the	beginnings	of	the	German	Empire.	In	a	petition	to	the	Reichstag	of	the	Norddeutscher	Bund	dated	November	26	1870,	it	was	recommended	to	acquire	the	port	of	Saigon	from	the	French	after	the	Franco-Prussian	War.	Yet,	the	petition	was	 careful	 not	 to	 link	 this	 request	with	 a	 demand	 for	 colonial	 ventures.	 It	was	argued	 that	 a	 naval	 base	 in	 Saigon	 was	 ‘[w]eit	 entfernt,	 Deutschland	 in	 die	Verwickelungen	einer	Kolonialpolitik	zu	treiben	[…]’216	Instead,	the	German	naval	base	 would	 simply	 provide	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 German	 shipping	 and	 trading	interests	in	Asia.	These	interests	were	in	danger	every	time	there	was	an	upcoming	war	 in	which	 the	French	were	 involved,	 as	 they	were	able	 to	 lay	an	embargo	on	Asian	and	Japanese	ports.			 In	total,	42	petitioners	signed	the	document.	Out	of	these,	37	were	based	in	either	Bremen	or	Bremerhaven.	Amongst	them	were	famous	members	of	Bremen’s	elite,	 such	 as	 Alexander	 Georg	Mosle,	 who	 became	 part	 of	 the	 first	 Reichstag	 in	1871,	D.	H.	Wätjen	&	Co.,	the	largest	private	sailing	ship	company	in	the	world,	and	a	number	of	presidents	of	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce.	At	 the	same	 time	as	Bremen’s	elite	 supported	 the	 idea,	 in	Hamburg,	 there	was	 strong	protest	 against	
																																																								216	AdHB,	Hp	II	90,	Dem	hohen	Reichstage	des	Norddeutschen	Bundes,	Berlin,	den	26.	November	1870.	On	this	topic,	see	also	Hans-Ulrich	Wehler,	Bismarck	und	der	
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this	projected	venture,	as	pointed	out	by	Wehler.217	In	any	case,	 the	petition	was	brought	before	the	Reichstag.		In	 the	 discussion	 that	 followed,	 Hermann	 Henrich	 Meier,	 founder	 of	 the	
Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 and	 member	 of	 the	 Reichstag,	 describes	 his	 stance	 on	 the	petition.	 In	 his	 line	 of	 argument,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 he	was	 against	 acquiring	Saigon	 based	 on	 colonial	 political	 motives.	 In	 fact,	 Meier	 believed	 ‘daß	 die	Kolonialpolitik	 ein	 überwundener	 Standpunkt	 ist	 […]’218	However,	 at	 the	 same	time,	Meier	also	pointed	out:	‘Könnten	wir	es	ohne	Opfer	bekommen,	[…]	könnten	wir	 allein	 Saigon	 behalten,	 so	 glaube	 ich,	 daß	 es	 für	 uns	 im	 Laufe	 der	 Zeit	 doch	recht	 nützlich	 sein	 könnte	 und	 sein	würde.’219	Therefore,	 in	Meier’s	 eyes,	 it	 was	significant	 to	 acquire	 Saigon	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 protect	 German	 mercantile	interests	 in	Asia.	Thus,	while	overseas	 territories	were	not	 reconcilable	with	 the	belief	in	free	trade,	Bremen’s	merchants	approved	of	them	as	protective	measures.	In	 the	 end,	 Leopold	 Freiherr	 von	 Hoverbeck,	 leader	 of	 the	 Deutsche	
Fortschrittspartei,	made	a	request	to	reject	the	petition,	as	he	believed	that	it	was	‘nicht	passend,	 sich	überhaupt	 im	Reichstag	darüber	den	Kopf	 zu	 zerbrechen.’220	The	 Reichstag	 came	 to	 the	 decision	 not	 to	 forward	 the	 petition	 to	 the	 Reich	Chancellor,	which	meant	that	it	had	been	killed	off.221		A	 decade	 later,	 the	 attitude	 in	 Bremen	 towards	 overseas	 territories	 was	different.	In	1880,	the	Reichstag	of	the	German	Empire	became	involved	in	colonial	issues	for	the	first	time,	and	the	reason	for	this	was	the	Samoa-Vorlage.	In	1876,	on	the	basis	of	intensifying	trading	relations	between	the	German	Empire	and	Samoa,	an	 initial	 friendship	 and	 trading	 agreement	 was	 made	 between	 Germany	 and	 a	number	 of	 Samoan	 chiefs.	 These	were	 renewed	 in	 1879.	 In	December	 1879,	 the	Samoan	 Islands	were	 then	 also	 formally	 put	 under	 the	 collective	protectorate	 of	the	United	States,	Great	Britain	and	Germany.	 In	the	trade	with	Samoa	and	other																																																									217	Wehler,	Bismarck,	p.	202	218	1867/70,	15.	Petition,	betr.	die	Erwerbung	der	Flottenstation	Saigon,	Verhandlungen	des	Deutschen	Reichstags,	Reichstagsprotokolle:	http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt3_nb_bsb00018316_00064.html.	Accessed	12/03/2016	219	Ibid..		220	1867/70,	15.	Petition,	betr.	die	Erwerbung	der	Flottenstation	Saigon,	Verhandlungen	des	Deutschen	Reichstags,	Reichstagsprotokolle:	http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt3_nb_bsb00018316_00065.html.	Accessed	12/03/2016	221	See	also:	Wehler,	Bismarck,	p.	203	
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islands	 in	 the	Pacific	Ocean,	 the	 trading	 firm	 Johann	Cesar	Godeffroy	&	Sohn	 from	Hamburg	almost	possessed	a	monopoly	position.	In	1879,	the	firm	employed	1,210	workers	on	plantations	which	covered	4,337	acres	of	land.222	Yet,	in	1879,	the	firm	found	 itself	 in	 financial	 problems	 due	 to	 unwise	 speculations.	 Johann	 Cesar	
Godeffroy	&	Sohn	 became	 indebted	 to	British	 banks,	which	meant	 that	 the	 firm’s	possessions	 were	 pledged	 to	 the	 British	 creditors.	 Henceforth,	 business	 was	carried	 out	 by	 the	 Deutsche	 Handels-	 und	 Plantagengesellschaft,	 which	 was	established	in	1878.	Since	the	German	Navy	had	also	built	a	naval	base	on	Samoa,	the	bankruptcy	of	the	firm	was	seen	as	one	of	national	importance.	Consequently,	it	was	brought	before	the	German	government.		The	Samoa-Vorlage	projected	that	the	German	state	should	furnish	dividend	guarantees	for	a	new	company	in	order	to	cover	the	possibility	that	the	company	did	not	make	enough	profit	independently.	It	was	intended	that	this	newly	founded	company,	 by	 the	 name	 of	Deutsche	 Seehandels-Gesellschaft,	 would	 take	 over	 the	
Deutsche	Handels-	und	Plantagengesellschaft.	The	Empire’s	dividend	guarantee	was	supposed	to	 increase	the	provision	of	private	capital.	Advocates	of	state	financial	intervention	also	had	Reichskanzler	Bismarck	on	their	side.	Generally,	Bismarck	is	not	regarded	as	a	great	supporter	of	colonial	acquisitions.	For	example,	in	1881,	he	still	declared	that	‘for	as	long	as	I	remain	Chancellor,	we	will	not	become	involved	in	 colonialism.’223 	Hence,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasise	 that	 the	 plan	 did	 not	envisage	direct	German	rule	of	any	colonial	acquisitions	but	only	financial	aid	for	the	overseas	ventures	of	the	Deutsche	Seehandels-Gesellschaft.	Regarding	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 move	 by	 Bismarck,	 Francesca	 Schinzinger	has	argued	that	 it	 ‘ist	zu	vermuten,	daß	Bismarck	die	Hansestädte	stärker	an	das	Reich	 binden	 wollte,	 indem	 er	 ihnen	 hier	 entgegen	 kam.’ 224 	According	 to	Schinzinger,	 this	was	 necessary,	 since	 the	Hanseatic	 Cities	 remained	 outside	 the	Empire’s	 customs	 union	 and	 ‘sie	 traditionell	 ökonomisch	 und	 politisch	 anders	ausgerichtet	 waren	 als	 das	 kontinentale	 Brandenburg-Preußen.’225	Considering	that	Bremen	was	informed	that	the	Samoa-Vorlage	was	brought	before	the	Federal																																																									222	Horst	Gründer,	Geschichte	der	deutschen	Kolonien	(Paderborn,	1995),	p.	90.	For	the	whole	process	see	also:	Hoffmann,	Das	Haus,	pp.	403–414	223	Sebastian	Conrad,	German	Colonialism:	A	Short	History	(Cambridge,	2012),	p.	21	224	Francesca	Schinzinger,	Die	Kolonien	und	das	Deutsche	Reich:	Die	wirtschaftliche	
Bedeutung	der	deutschen	Besitzungen	in	Übersee	(Stuttgart,	1984),	p.	17	225	Ibid.,	p.	17	
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Assembly	 and	 the	 Reichstag	 in	 January	 1880,	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 argue	 that	Bismarck	regarded	the	motion	as	an	offer	to	Bremen	to	make	it	compliant.	While	Hamburg	had	already	given	a	negative	response	to	Wentzel’s	request	regarding	an	accession	from	May	1879,	the	problem	was	still	shelved	in	Bremen.	Certainly,	it	is	still	entirely	possible	that	Bismarck	attempted	to	expand	support	for	an	accession	in	both	cities.		If	 this	was	 the	Reich	Chancellor’s	 intention,	he	must	have	been	more	 than	disappointed	with	the	result.	In	April	1880,	very	shortly	before	the	motion	was	put	to	the	vote	in	the	Federal	Assembly,	Gildemeister	asked	Minister	Resident	Krüger	for	 his	 opinion	 on	 the	matter.	 Krüger	 underlined	 that	most	 states	 agreed	 to	 the	motion	and	warned	Bremen	to	take	a	‘prinzipielle	Stellung	zu	dem	Antrage’.226	He	admitted	 that	 it	 ‘ist	 ja	 richtig,	 daß	 die	 Subventionierung	 eines	 privaten	Unternehmens	 aus	 öffentlichen	 Mitteln	 den	 von	 uns	 bisher	 vertretenen	Grundsätzen	widerspricht.‘227	At	the	same	time,	Krüger	pointed	out	that	a	rejection	of	this	motion	could	potentially	ruin	Bremen’s	future,	for	example	with	respect	to	the	 competition	 of	 subsidised	 shipping	 lines	 in	 Great	 Britain,	 Belgium,	 the	Netherlands	and	other	countries.	Since	the	Reich	Chancellor	himself	stood	up	for	the	 Samoa-Vorlage,	 a	 rejection	 by	 Bremen	 would	 make	 the	 city	 fall	 out	 of	Bismarck’s	favour.	Krüger	argued:			Er	 wird	 vielmehr	 über	 Kurzsichtigkeit	 und	 Undank	 der	 Handelskreise	klagen,	 die	 ihn	 im	 Stiche	 gelassen,	 er	 wird	 darin	 unsererseits	 einen	kleinlichen	 Revancheact	 für	 seine	 Zollpolitik	 erblicken	 und	 damit	 zu	 dem	Entschlusse	 kommen,	 für	 die	 Handels-Interessen	 keinen	 Finger	 mehr	 zu	rühren.	Der	entgegengesetzten	Besorgniß,	daß	er	ermuthigt	werden	könnte,	ein	 zweites	 Samoa	 zu	 gründen,	 wird	 schon	 der	 Reichstag	 vorzubringen	wissen.228			Thus,	for	Krüger,	the	only	option	for	Bremen	was	not	to	oppose	the	motion.	In	case	there	was	a	formal	vote,	he	advised	Gildemeister	either	to	abstain	from	voting	or	to	approve	 of	 the	 motion.	 Since	 all	 states	 approved	 of	 the	 Samoa-Vorlage	 in	 the																																																									226	StaB	3-R.1.a	No.	160,	Hanseatische	Gesandtschaft.	Berlin,	den	11ten	April	1880.	Lieber	Gildemeister.		227	Ibid..		228	Ibid..	
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Federal	Assembly,	Bremen	also	decided	to	vote	in	favour	of	it.	Still,	Bremen	did	not	fail	 to	make	 it	clear	 in	 the	protocol	 that	 ‘Bremen	Angesichts	der	Stellung,	welche	die	 Reichsregierung	 und	 der	 Herr	 Reichskanzler	 persönlich	 zu	 dem	 bereits	begründeten	Unternehmen	 eingenommen,	 seine	 Bedenken	 zurückhalte	 und	 dem	Antrage	nicht	entgegentreten	wolle.’229	In	contrast,	general	opinion	in	Bremen	was	less	diplomatic.	On	January	18	1880,	the	Weser-Zeitung	published	a	detailed	article	on	 the	 Samoa-Vorlage.230	In	 this	 article,	 the	 newspaper	 criticised	 the	 plan	 to	subsidise	 a	 private	 firm.	 The	 curious	 fact	 about	 the	motion	was	 that	 it	 was	 not	directed	at	‘Gewinnsucht,	sondern	an	den	Patriotismus	des	Publikums	[…]	und	von	vornherein	 mit	 annerkennenswerter	 Aufrichtigkeit	 zu	 verstehen	 giebt,	 daß	 den	Zeichnern	 ein	 gutes	 Geschäft	 nicht	 in	 Aussicht	 gestellt	 werden	 könne.’ 231	Consequently,	it	was	wondered	whether	it	was	not	also	in	the	national	interest	for	‘opferfreudige	 Patrioten’	 to	 invest	 in	 ventures	 that	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 be	profitable.232	In	the	Courier,	on	the	other	hand,	coverage	of	the	Samoa-Vorlage	was	less	hostile.	The	newspaper	itself	remained	neutral	in	its	reporting	on	the	motion.	Instead,	 the	Courier	 quoted	 the	Norddeutsche	Allgemeine	Zeitung	when	 reporting	about	 news	 regarding	 the	 motion.	 For	 example,	 in	 late	 April,	 the	 Courier	emphasised,	 in	 reference	 to	 the	Norddeutsche	Allgemeine	Zeitung,	 that	 the	 Reich	Chancellor	 supported	 the	 Samoa-Vorlage	 and	 that	 it	 was	 in	 the	 ‘Interesse	 der	deutschen	Schifffahrt	und	der	Erhaltung	ihres	Besitzstandes	in	der	Südsee	[…].’233		In	the	end,	after	having	been	approved	in	the	Federal	Assembly,	the	motion	was	submitted	to	the	Reichstag.	On	April	27	1880,	the	Reichstag	then	rejected	the	
Samoa-Vorlage	by	128	to	112	votes.	Interestingly,	Mosle,	Bremen’s	member	of	the	Reichstag,	 voted	 for	 the	motion.	 In	 line	with	 the	 position	 the	Weser-Zeitung	 had	assumed,	 the	Bremer	Nachrichten	 reported	 after	 the	Reichstag	 vote:	 ‘Die	 Samoa-Vorlage	ist	gefallen,	der	„doctrinäre	Sieg“	ist	errungen	und	Herr	Mosle	hat	sich	also	
																																																								229	StaB	3-R.1.a	No.	160,	Auszug	aus	dem	Protokoll	der	neunzehnten	Sitzung	des	Bundesraths	vom	14.	April	1880.	Gesetz-Entwurf	wegen	Unterstützung	der	deutschen	Seehandelsgesellschaft.	S.	253	230	StaB	FB359,	Weser-Zeitung,	1.10.1879-14.2.1880.	No.	11862	Bremen,	Sonntag,	18.	Januar	1880.	Morgen-Ausgabe	231	Ibid..		232	Ibid..		233	See	StaB	FB	1200,	Courier,	1.1.1880-30.6.1880.	In	particular:	Courier,	No.	117.	Bremen.	Dienstag,	27.	April	1880.	Mittags-Ausgabe	and	Courier,	No.	118.	Bremen.	Mittwoch,	28.	April	1880.	Morgen-Ausgabe	
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einmal	 mit	 dem	 Reichskanzler	 geirrt	 […].’234	As	 already	 mentioned,	 Mosle	 had	already	affiliated	himself	to	Bismarck’s	policies	during	the	debate	on	protectionist	measures.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 Hermann	 Henrich	 Meier.	 The	 Bremish	businessman	 and	 member	 of	 the	 Nationalliberale	 Partei,	 who	 represented	Schaumburg-Lippe	in	the	Reichstag,	voted	against	the	motion.	Overall,	members	of	the	right	wing	of	the	National	Liberals	and	the	Conservatives	voted	in	favour,	while	progressive	 liberalists	and	members	of	the	Centre	Party	rejected	it.235	In	the	end,	the	 Deutsche	 Handels-	 und	 Plantagengesellschaft	 could	 be	 saved	 from	 a	 British	take-over	by	a	group	of	financiers.	Thus,	in	1880,	there	was	still	a	large	opposition	to	 any	 colonial	 undertakings	 in	 the	 Reichstag.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	Gründer	argues,	‘die	Anhänger	des	Wirtschaftsliberalismus	in	der	„Samoa-Vorlage”	nur	den	Auftakt	für	erste	koloniale	Experimente	sahen.’236		As	we	have	seen	in	the	context	of	the	Zollanschlussfrage,	Bismarck	deplored	Bremen’s	dismissive	attitude	towards	the	Samoa-Vorlage.	If	the	Reich	Chancellor’s	intention	was	 to	bind	 the	Hanseatic	Cities	 to	 the	German	Empire,	 as	 Schinzinger	has	suggested,	then	this	was	a	complete	and	utter	failure.	In	her	book,	Schinzinger	goes	 on	 to	 argue	 that	 her	 argument	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 another	 incident:	Bismarck’s	 enquiry	 of	 the	Hanseatic	 Cities	 about	necessary	 steps	by	 the	German	Empire	in	order	to	secure	the	Hanseatic	trade	with	Africa	in	August	1883.	237	Yet,	if	we	 look	at	 the	chronology	of	Bremen’s	accession	 to	 the	Empire’s	 customs	union,	Schinziger’s	 argument	 falls	 apart.	 By	 1883,	 Bismarck	 had	 already	 received	 an	official	 request	 by	 Bremen	 to	 open	 negotiations	 about	 its	 accession.	 Bismarck	ignored	this	request	throughout	1883.	Thus,	there	would	have	been	much	simpler	ways	for	the	Chancellor	to	integrate	Bremen	into	the	German	Empire	than	to	offer	colonies.	 It	 follows	 from	 this	 that	 we	 need	 to	 look	 again	 at	 the	 origins	 and	mechanics	of	German	colonialism.	First	 of	 all,	 contrary	 to	 Schinzinger’s	 depiction,	 Bremen	was	 contacted	 by	the	 Prussian	 envoy,	 Otto	 von	Wentzel,	 on	 April	 16	 1883	 rather	 than	 in	 August	1883.238	The	 reason	 for	 Wentzel’s	 approach	 was	 an	 agreement	 regarding	 the																																																									234	StaB	FB	605,	Bremer	Nachrichten.	No.	117.	Zweites	Blatt.	Mittwoch,	28.	April	1880	235	Gründer,	Geschichte	der	deutschen	Kolonien,	p.	91	236	Ibid.,	p.	91	237	Schinzinger,	Die	Kolonien,	p.	17	238	StaB	3-A.3.A.2.	No.	45,	Königlich	Preußische	Gesandtschaft	in	Mecklenburg	und	den	Hansestädten,	Hamburg,	16.	April	1883.	Wentzel	
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demarcation	of	colonial	territories	on	the	African	West	Coast,	 in	particular	Sierra	Leone,	 between	 France	 and	 Great	 Britain,	 which	 was	 signed	 in	 June	 1882.	Furthermore,	 the	 agreement	 also	 ensured	 equal	 financial	 treatment	 of	 both	countries	 in	 their	 territories	 in	Western	Africa.	As	 a	 result,	Wentzel	 asked	about	any	 grievances	 or	 wishes	 amongst	 the	 Bremish	 mercantile	 community,	 that	 it	would	want	the	German	government	to	address	to	the	French	and	British.239	In	its	response,	 Bremen’s	 Senate	 made	 it	 obvious	 that	 ‘geschäftliche	 Beziehungen	zwischen	bremischen	Handlungshäusern	und	jenem	Bezirke	an	der	Westküste	von	Afrika	 zur	 Zeit	 nicht	 bestehen.’240	In	 other	words,	 the	 Senate	 could	 not	 find	 any	relevant	material	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 Anglo-French	 agreement	 on	 Bremen’s	trade.	Bremen’s	lack	of	interest	in	colonial	matters	was	thus	still	as	noticeable	as	it	had	been	in	the	days	of	the	Samoa-Vorlage	in	1880.		However,	 Wentzel	 remained	 determined.	 In	 a	 second	 letter	 to	 Bremen’s	Senate,	he	highlighted	that	his	enquiry	related	to	the	entire	African	West	Coast	and	was	 not	 limited	 to	 only	 Sierra	 Leone.241	The	matter	was	 forwarded	 to	 Bremen’s	Chamber	 of	 Commerce.	 In	 the	 report	 given	 by	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 it	 is	stressed	that	there	were	no	problems	at	all	between	Bremish	mercantile	interests	and	 colonial	 administration	 in	 British	 territories.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 those	territories	not	claimed	by	any	colonial	power,	more	precisely	between	modern-day	Aného	 (Togo)	 and	 Grand-Popo	 (Benin),	 German	 factories	 experienced	 troubles	that	 ‘zum	 nicht	 geringen	 Theile	 auf	 Intrigen	 der	 französischen	 Händler	zurückzuführen	 sind,	 welche	 die	 Concurenz	 der	 deutschen	 Häuser	 durch	Aufwiegelung	 der	 einheimischen	 Häuptlinge	 wirksamer	 zu	 begegnen	 hoffen.’242	For	 the	purpose	of	protection	of	 these	mercantile	 interests,	a	number	of	German	factories	had	already	 issued	a	petition	 to	 the	Empire’s	Foreign	Office.	 In	 this,	 the	factories	 demanded	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 naval	 vessel	 in	 the	 area	 in	 order	 to	 show	Germany’s	 military	 power.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 German	 vessel	 would	 be	 able	 ‘mit	
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dortigen	 Häuptlingen	 auch	 eine	 Art	 Vertrag	 zur	 Verhinderung	 willkürlicher	Störungen	des	deutschen	Handels	zu	schließen.’243		Additonally,	 the	Handelskammer	 did	 not	 fail	 to	mention	 another	 overseas	enterprise	 by	 a	Bremish	merchant,	 Adolf	 Lüderitz.	He	 possessed	 territory	 in	 the	bay	of	Angra	Pequeña,	later	named	Lüderitzbucht,	in	South	West	Africa.	On	May	1	1883,	this	territory	was	bought	for	him	by	Heinrich	Vogelsang,	another	merchant	from	 Bremen,	 from	 Josef	 Fredrik,	 a	 chief	 of	 the	 Nama	 people.	 According	 to	 the	Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 the	 ‘Hauptreichthum	 jener	 Gegend	 bilden	 Vieh,	 Strauße	und	angeblich	leicht	zu	förderndes	Kupfer.’244	It	was	pointed	out	that	the	company	was	still	in	the	start-up	phase	and	that	a	factory	was	under	construction.	Since	the	company	was	 being	 financed	privately,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 asked	merely	for	 political	 protection.	 In	 his	 response	 to	 the	 report	 of	 the	 Handelskammer,	Wentzel	 informed	 Bremen’s	 Senate	 that	 it	 was	 planned	 to	 establish	 a	 consular	representation	in	South	West	Africa	as	well	as	the	permanent	deployment	of	naval	vessels	in	the	area.245	One	of	the	consul’s	future	roles	would	then	be	to	‘[d]er	von	dem	 Hanseatischen	 Handelsstande	 beantragte	 Abschluß	 von	 Verträgen	 mit	anderen	 unabhängigen	 Negerstaaten	 […]’246	For	 the	 moment,	 the	 S.M.S.	 Sophie	intended	to	pay	a	visit	to	South	West	Africa	in	order	to	protect	German	interests	in	the	area.		Eventually,	 Lüderitz	 himself	 requested	 official	 “protection”	 for	 his	territorial	acquisitions	from	the	Auswärtiges	Amt	in	April	1884.	On	April	24	1884,	Bismarck	officially	put	Lüderitz’	acquisitions	under	the	“protection”	of	the	German	Empire.	 In	 order	 to	 gain	 international	 recognition	 for	 this,	 especially	 from	Great	Britain,	Germany	sent	out	warships	to	South	West	Africa.	With	the	hoisting	of	the	German	Imperial	flag	in	the	bay	of	Angra	Pequeña	in	August	1883,	Germany	began	to	establish	itself	as	a	colonial	power.247	In	October	1883,	German	territorial	claims	were	also	consolidated	by	an	official	“protection”	agreement	between	the	German	Empire	and	Josef	Fredriks.	Lüderitz’s	overseas	ventures	promptly	ended	with	his	death,	 probably	 by	 drowning	 in	 the	 Orange	 River,	 in	 1886.	 Already	 before	 his																																																									243	Ibid..		244	Ibid..		245	StaB	3-A.3.A.2.	No.	45,	Königlich	Preußische	Gesandtschaft	in	Mecklenburg	und	den	Hansestädten.	Hamburg,	den	26.	December	1883.	Wentzel	246	Ibid..		247	Wilfried	Westphal,	Geschichte	der	deutschen	Kolonien	(München,	1984),	pp.	20–35	
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death,	 in	 1885,	 Lüderitz	 had	 to	 sell	 his	 overseas	 possessions	 to	 the	 Deutsche	
Kolonialgesellschaft	für	Südwestafrika,	which	was	founded,	with	the	involvement	of	Bismarck,	in	order	to	avoid	an	early	colonial	embarrassment.	Otherwise,	Lüderitz	would	probably	have	sold	his	overseas	possessions	to	potential	British	buyers.248	However,	 since	 the	 company	 did	 not	 want	 to	 assume	 any	 sovereign	 rights,	 the	German	Empire	had	 to	 send	out	an	 Imperial	Commissioner,	Dr	Ernst	Göring,	 the	father	 of	 Hermann	 Göring,	 to	 South	 West	 Africa.	 From	 that	 point	 onwards,	 the	German	Empire	was	also	formally	a	colonial	power.		Hence,	 it	 was	 shown	 that	 Germany’s	 opening	 colonial	 venture	 could	 not	have	been	intended	as	a	way	to	integrate	Bremen	into	the	German	Empire.	When	Bismarck	 enquired	 about	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	 activities	 in	 Africa,	 the	
Zollanschlussfrage	was	still	not	resolved.	This	was	because	Bismarck	did	not	want	to	resolve	it,	even	though	he	could	have.	Neither	did	Bremen’s	Senate	express	any	real	interest	in	the	matter.	Instead,	it	was	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	that	engaged	in	 the	 question.	 Rather	 than	 concerning	 all	 of	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	 community,	only	 a	 small	 group	 of	 merchants	 that	 was	 actually	 affected	 by	 this	 matter.	However,	this	small	group	was	particularly	active	in	looking	for	support	from	the	German	government.		This	point	is	also	supported	by	Wehler’s	analysis	of	Lüderitz’	promotion	of	his	 colonial	 venture	 in	 Berlin.249	Wehler	 reveals	 that,	 prior	 to	Wentzel’s	 enquiry	regarding	 Bremen’s	 interest	 on	 the	 West	 African	 coast,	 Lüderitz	 had	 already	approached	the	Auswärtige	Amt.	In	January	1883,	Lüderitz	asked	for	protection	of	his	business	from	the	German	consul	in	Cape	Town	and,	if	possible,	a	German	naval	vessel.	 In	 fact,	 the	Auswärtige	Amt	 had	 already	 started	 to	 gather	 information	 on	Lüderitz	 after	 he	 had	 requested	 official	 protection	 for	 his	 planned	 factory	 in	November	 1882.	 For	 the	 Auswärtige	 Amt,	 Lüderitz	 was	 judged	 by	 the	 Prussian	consul	 general	 in	 Bremen,	 ‘der	 den	 »eigenartigen«	 und	 in	 der	 Hansestadt	 nicht	sonderlich	 gelittenen	 Kaufmann	 ziemlich	 wohlwollend	 beurteilte	 […]’250	At	 least	Lüderitz	was	able	to	receive	 ‘»eine	allgemein	gehaltene	mündliche	Zusage«’	 from																																																									248	In	February	1885,	when	Lüderitz	threatened	to	sell	his	overseas	possession	to	British	buyers,	Bismarck	got	involved.	As	Wehler	pointed	out:	‘Zu	diesem	Zeitpunkt	schaltete	sich	Bismarck	Bismarck	mit	dem	Auswärtigen	Amt	ein,	um	die	soeben	inaugurierte	»deutsche	Kolonialpolitik	gegen	Kompromittierung«	zu	schützen.	See	Wehler,	Bismarck,	pp.	283–284	249	For	an	examination	of	Lüderitz’	ventures	in	South-West	Africa	see	Wehler,	Bismarck,	pp.	263–292	250	Wehler,	Bismarck,	p.	266	
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State	Secretary	Paul	von	Hatzfeldt,	which	was	confirmed	by	Bismarck.251	However,	despite	being	a	small	group,	those	merchants	pressing	for	colonial	commitment	of	the	German	Empire	eventually	succeeded.		
f.	Bremen’s	memory	of	Bismarck	–	the	Bismarck	monument		Bremen’s	relationship	twith	Bismarck	was	extremely	difficult	during	the	lead-up	to	the	city’s	accession	to	the	customs	union.	Prior	to	the	Zollanschlussfrage,	after	the	Franco-Prussian	War,	Bremen	had	already	made	Bismarck	an	honorary	citizen	for	its	 service	 to	 the	German	nation	–	 just	 like	Bismarck	was	 an	honorary	 citizen	of	Hamburg,	 Lübeck	 and	 many	 other	 German	 cities.	 However,	 during	 the	
Zollanschlussfrage,	Bismarck	simply	ignored	Bremen’s	wish	to	become	part	of	the	Empire’s	customs	union	for	a	long	time.	Even	worse,	the	Reich	Chancellor	was	not	shy	 to	 insult	 Bremen’s	 pride	 by	 stating	 that	 it	 ‘eigentlich	 keine	 Seestadt	 sei,	sondern	erst	werden	wolle	[…]’252	Therefore,	 it	 is	 worth	 looking	 at	 how	 Bismarck	 was	 commemorated	 in	Bremen	 after	 his	 death	 on	 July	 30	 1898.	 Looking	 at	 how	 Bismarck	 was	remembered	also	gives	 insight	 into	 the	way	the	people	of	Bremen	thought	about	the	 city’s	 accession	 ten	 years	 after	 it	 had	 been	 finalised.	 After	 all,	 Bismarck	 had	been	the	driving	force	behind	this	process.		Certainly,	a	monument	dedicated	to	the	former	Reich	Chancellor	was	not	at	all	unique	 in	 the	German	Empire.	Bismarck’s	death	was	one	of	a	couple	of	events	that	 led	to	an	upsurge	 in	the	construction	of	Bismarck	 monuments	 throughout	 Germany.	 Other	 events	 included	 the	
Reichsgründung,	 the	 dismissal	 of	 Bismarck	 on	 March	 20	 1890,	 and	 his	 80th	birthday	on	April	1	1895.	 In	particular,	Bismarck’s	dismissal	was	a	starting	point	for	 an	 impressive	 cult	 of	 worshipping	 for	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor.	 Overall,	 as	highlighted	 in	 Alings’	 study,	 ‘217	 Standorte	 figürlicher	 oder	 architektonischer	Denkmäler	 konnten	 erfaßt	 weren.’253	However,	 while	 the	 Kriegerdenkmal	 in	 the	1870s	 was	 a	 way	 of	 illustrating	 Bremen’s	 independence	 and	 the	 national	unification	in	a	unique	fashion,	the	expression	of	national	belonging	had	changed	in	Bremen	by	the	1890s.	This	fact	is	proven	by	Bremen’s	Bismarckdenkmal.																																																										251	Ibid.,	p.	266	252	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.	Bd.	3,	Gildemeister,	Berlin	17/6.	84.	Geehrter	Herr	College.	253	Alings,	Monument	und	Nation,	p.	130.	For	a	discussion	on	the	Bismarck	monuments	see:	Alings,	Monument	und	Nation,	pp.	128–142.		
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	 Soon	 after	 Bismarck’s	 death,	 in	 August	 1898,	 Burgomaster	 Alfred	Dominicus	Pauli	and	Franz	Ernst	Schütte,	a	Bremish	merchant,	took	charge	of	the	erection	 of	 a	monument	 dedicated	 to	 Bismarck.	 In	 a	 first	meeting	 on	 August	 23	1898,	 during	 which	 a	 committee	 was	 set	 up,	 it	 was	 highlighted	 that	 ‘[j]eder	patriotisch	fühlende	Einwohner	Bremens	werde	dem	Gedanken	der	Errichtung	des	Denkmals	für	den	großen	Todten	freudig	zustimmen.’254	The	monument	was	to	be	financed	 by	 contributions	 from	 the	Bremish	 population.	 Progress	 seems	 to	 have	been	made	quickly:	the	committee’s	account	book	shows	that	by	the	end	of	1898,	more	than	150,	000	Marks	of	the	200,	000	Marks	required	for	the	monument	had	been	 collected.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Bremer	 Courier	 proudly	 exclaimed	 that	 the	people	 of	 Bremen	 were	 able	 to	 tolerate	 small	 mistakes	 for	 the	 bigger	 picture:	‘Bismarcks	 Schwächen	 treten	 zurück,	 auch	 da,	 wo	wir	 selbst	 darunter	 zu	 leiden	hatten,	und	vor	unserem	geistigen	Auge	erhebt	sich	die	durch	den	Tod	verklärte	Heldengestallt	des	Einigers	unseres	Vaterlandes.’255			 Even	 though	 the	 committee	was	 able	 to	 rapidly	 collect	 the	money	 for	 the	planned	monument,	the	construction	was	delayed.	One	of	the	main	reasons	for	this	was	 the	 question	 of	where	 the	monument	 should	 be	 placed.	 It	was	 decided	 that	only	the	best	place	was	good	enough	for	the	erection	of	a	monument	dedicated	to	the	 former	 Reich	 Chancellor.	 Inevitably,	 this	 took	 some	 time.	 After	 September	1898,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 February	 1902	 that	 the	 committee	 next	 met,	 ‘[a]ngeregt	durch	 den	 höchst	 bedeutungsvollen	 Wettbewerb	 um	 das	 Denkmal	 des	 Fürsten	Bismarck,	 das	 Hamburg	 zu	 errichten	 beabsichtigt.’ 256 	Amongst	 a	 number	 of	possible	 locations,	 the	argument	against	placing	 the	monument	next	 to	 the	River	Weser,	 on	 the	 Altmannshöhe,	 was	 rejected,	 as	 it	 was	 similar	 to	 the	 place,	 ‘den	Hamburg	für	sein	Denkmal	bestimmt	hat,	und	würde	mit	ihrem	Denkmal	vielleicht	als	eine	verkleinerte	Nachahmung	des	Hamburg	Werkes	erscheinen.’257	Eventually,	a	decision	was	not	made	until	 1904,	when	a	 group	of	 artists	 and	experts	 visited	Bremen.	 Adolf	 Hildebrand,	 a	 famous	 sculptor	 at	 the	 time,	 recommended	positioning	 the	 monument	 at	 the	 foot	 of	 Bremen’s	 cathedral.	 Additionally,																																																									254	StaB	3-B.13.No.	1a.	7,	Auszug	aus	dem	Bremer	Courier	vom	Dienstag,	den	23.	August	1898.	No.	231.	Morgen	Ausgabe,	1.	Blatt.		255	StaB	3-B.13.No.	1a.	7,	Auszug	aus	dem	Bremer	Courier	vom	Sonntag,	den	9.	Oktober	1898.	No	278.	Drittes	Blatt.	53.	Jahrg.	256	StaB	3-B.13.No.	1a.	2,	Denkmal	des	Fürsten	Bismarck,	Bericht	der	Commission	der	Sachverständigen	an	das	geschäftsführende	Comité,	Bremen,	5.	Februar	1902.	257	Ibid..		
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Hildebrand	proposed	an	equestrian	statue,	which	had	hitherto	been	disapproved	of	 on	 the	 grounds	 that,	 in	 Prussia,	 only	 rulers	 received	 an	 equestrian	 statue.258	Bremen’s	inhabitants	did	not	unanimously	support	this	envisaged	location	but,	in	the	end,	they	did	not	get	a	say	in	the	matter.259			 A	second	reason	for	the	delay	in	construction	was	the	fact	that	the	collected	money	 was	 misappropriated.	 In	 1904,	 the	 firm	 St.	 Lürman	 &	 Sohn,	 which	 was	administering	 the	 total	 sum	 of	 more	 than	 200,000	 Marks	 for	 the	 Bismarck	monument,	 filed	 for	 insolvency.	Lürman	simply	 fled	abroad	with	 the	entire	 fund.	Thereupon,	 the	 committee,	 in	 particular	 Franz	 Schütte,	 was	 quick	 to	 find	 new	donors	 amongst	 Bremen’s	 notable	 citizens	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 public	embarrassment.	 Franz	 Schütte	 and	 Hermann	 Melchers,	 a	 member	 of	 a	 famous	Bremish	merchant	family,	together	donated	60,	000	Marks.260		Thanks	 mainly	 to	 Franz	 Schütte’s	 effort,	 the	 committee	 was	 able	 to	commission	Adolf	Hildebrand	 to	build	 the	Bismarck	monument.	This,	again,	 took	so	much	 time	 that	Bremen	was	only	able	 to	present	 the	Bismarckdenkmal	 to	 the	public	in	1910.	On	July	9	1910,	the	statue	was	solemnly	uncovered.	In	the	face	of	the	 monument,	 the	Hamburgische	 Corresspondent	 enthused	 Hildebrand	 ‘braucht	[…]	den	Vergleich	mit	den	besten	Reiterstandbildern	nicht	zu	scheuen,	selbst	wenn	man	den	Colleoni	in	Venedig	oder	Marc	Aurel	in	Rom	zum	Vergleich	nimmt.’261		All	 in	 all,	 Bremen	 was	 certainly	 not	 a	 special	 case	 with	 respect	 to	 its	commemoration	 of	 Bismarck’s	 achievements	 after	 his	 death.	 Bremen	 already	acknowledged	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor’s	 involvement	 in	 the	 unification	 process	 in	1871	by	naming	him	honorary	 citizen	of	Bremen.	 Still,	 if	 a	 line	of	 comparison	 is	drawn	 between	 the	 Kriegerdenkmal	 and	 the	 Bismarckdenkmal,	 it	 becomes	apparent	 that	 the	way	the	German	nation	was	perceived	and	celebrated	changed																																																									258	StaB	3-B.13.No.	1a.	7,	Auszug	aus	der	„Weser	Zeitung“		vom	Donnerstag,	den	24.	März	1904.	No.	20612,	1.	Beil.	zur	2.	Morg.-Ausg.	259	In	an	article	in	the	Bremer	Nachrichten,	entitled	‘Das	Bismarckdenkmal	und	die	Volksstimme’,	the	decision	to	erect	the	monument	next	to	Bremen’s	cathedral	was	heavily	criticised.	The	author	pointed	out:	‘Nun	soll	das	Bismarckdenkmal	an	der	Nordseite	des	Doms	aufgestellt	werden	und	was	das	Volk	dazu	sagt,	ist	ganz	gleichgültig,	obgleich	es	zu	dem	jetzt	bei	der	Bremer	Bank	wohlverwahrten	Fonds	beigesteuert	hat.	[…]	Hoffentlich	versagt	in	erster	Linie	der	Dom	seine	Zustimmung	–	wenn	man	Luther	dort	aufgestelllt	hätte,	würde	es	seine	Berechtigung	haben,	aber	Bismarck	am	Dom	will	uns	–	absolut	nicht	gefallen	[…].’	See	StaB	3-B.13.No.	1a.	7,	Auszug	aus	den	„Bremer	Nachrichten“		vom	Dienstag,	den	29.	März	1904.	2	Blatt,	162.	Jahrg.,	No.	89	260	For	more	information	see	StaB	2-P.2.m1.k.	261	StaB	9,	S	0	–	1294,	Hamb.	Correspondent.	No.	361	Abend-Ausg.	vom	19.	Juli	1910.		
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dramatically	between	the	1870s	and	the	early	1900s.	Bismarck	was	unanimously	regarded	as	the	unifier	of	the	German	nation.	Therefore,	worshipping	Bismarck	in	this	manner,	such	as	racing	to	become	the	first	Hanseatic	City	before	Hamburg	and	Lübeck	 to	 erect	 a	 monument,	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 a	 celebration	 of	 the	German	nation.	The	way	Bismarck	was	regarded	in	Bremen	after	his	death,	despite	the	 many	 problems	 the	 city	 had	 with	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor,	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	attitude	towards	the	German	nation	around	the	turn	of	the	century.	In	comparison	to	the	Kriegerdenkmal,	Bremen’s	population	was	now	overwhelmed	by	t	patriotic	and	 nationalistic	 feelings.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Reinhard	 Alings	 has	 pointed	 out:	 ‘Das	Politikum,	 daß	 ihm	 erstmals	 im	 Reich	 ein	 Reiterstandbild	 gewidmet	 ist,	unterstreicht	 diese	 mehr	 ins	 allgemeinere	 gehende,	 abgehobenere	 Ehrung	 des	nationalen	 Helden.’262	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 equestrian	 statue	 was	dedicated	 to	 Bismarck	 means	 that	 the	 Iron	 Chancellor	 was	 ‘als	 Politiker	 und	nationale	 Integrationsfigur	 auf	 eine	 Stufe	mit	 dem	Monarchen	 gesetzt.’263	As	 we	have	seen,	this	process	of	national	integration	and	national	enthusiasm	began	with	Bremen’s	accession	to	the	Empire’s	customs	union	in	1888.		
	
g.	Bremen’s	trading	partners		 	After	having	examined	the	process	of	Bremen’s	economic	and	cultural	integration	into	the	Kaiserreich,	it	will	be	significant	to	also	look	at	changes	and	continuities	in	Bremen’s	 trade	 statistics,	 in	 particular	Bremen’s	 trading	 partners.	 From	October	1888,	Bremen	was	part	of	 the	Empire’s	 customs	union.	However,	 to	what	extent	did	 this	 mean	 that	 Bremen	 also	 became	 integrated	 closer	 into	 the	 Empire’s	economy?	For	this,	we	will	look	at	Bremen’s	sea	trade	and	also	at	Bremen’s	overall	trade,	meaning	overland	trade	and	river	trade.	It	has	to	be	noted	that	the	statistics	below	 include	 the	 port	 of	 Bremerhaven.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	Bremerhaven’s	 docks	 remained	 outside	 the	 Empire’s	 customs	 union,	 any	noticeable	 changes	 to	 Bremen’s	 trading	 structure	 must	 have	 been	 caused	 by	Bremen’s	accession.	In	fact,	the	channelisation	of	the	Lower	Weser,	which	began	in	the	1880s,	would	have	compounded	the	effect	of	Bremen’s	accession	on	the	city’s	
																																																								262	Alings,	Monument	und	Nation,	p.	462	263	Ibid.,	p.	462	
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trade	statistics.	Therefore,	since	the	status	of	Bremerhaven’s	port	did	not	change	after	1888,	Bremerhaven’s	share	in	the	trade	statistics	can	be	treated	as	constant.			
Figure	2.4:	Bremen’s	trading	partners	
	Source:	 Jahrbuch	 für	 Bremische	 Statistik,	 II.	 Heft:	 Zur	 allgemeinen	 Statistik	 des	 Jahres	1875-1914	(Bremen,	1876-1915)		The	 graph	 above	 illustrates	 Bremen’s	 overall	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 tonnage	between	1871	and	1913.	Additionally,	 it	also	depicts	 the	share	of	certain	 trading	partners.	One	fact	is	immediately	obvious	and	that	is	the	importance	to	Bremen	of	its	trade	with	the	United	States	and	with	Great	Britain.	For	example,	in	1872,	both	countries	made	 up	 around	 70%	 of	 Bremen’s	 total	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 trade,	which	may	be	why	Bismarck	viewed	Bremen	as	a	bridgehead	of	foreign	countries.	Even	a	decade	later,	in	1882,	this	figure	remained	stable.	The	main	reason	for	this	was	that	trade	with	the	United	States	increased,	so	that	it	made	up	about	46%	of	Bremen’s	total	incoming	and	outgoing	trade.	Furthermore,	it	can	also	be	gathered	from	 the	 graph	 that	 the	 share	 of	 the	 German	 Empire	 in	 Bremen’s	 total	 trade	increased	over	the	years.	At	the	same	time,	trade	with	Great	Britain	and	the	United	States	gradually	declined.	This	was	primarily	caused	by	Great	Britain’s	diminishing	role	in	Bremen’s	total	trade.	
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	 If	Bismarck	saw	the	Zollanschluss	as	a	necessary	step	in	order	to	 integrate	Bremen	 into	 the	Empire’s	 economy,	 then	we	would	 have	 to	 expect	 some	 sort	 of	change	 in	 the	 trading	 pattern.	 In	 the	 case	 that	 Bremen	 had	 not	 dealt	 in	 the	“national	interest”	prior	to	the	Zollanschluss,	the	choice	of	trading	partners	would	have	 changed	 so	 that	 Bremen	 was	 providing	 what	 was	 needed	 in	 the	 Empire.	Comparing	the	share	of	Bremen’s	trading	partners	in	1872,1898	and	1913	results	in	the	following:			
Figure	2.5:	Share	of	Bremen’s	trading	partners			 Germany	 Great	Britain	 Rest	of	Europe	 USA	 Africa/Australia	1872	 9.2%	 29.0%	 10.9%	 40.0%	 0.6%	1898	 18.5%	 21.5%	 11.8%	 33.8%	 2.6%	1913	 21.1%	 17.3%	 15.2%	 28.9%	 4.5%	Source:	 Jahrbuch	 für	 Bremische	 Statistik,	 I.	 Heft:	 Zur	 Statistik	 des	 Schiffs-	 und	Waarenverkehrs	1875,	 1898	 and	1913	 (Bremen,	 1876,	 1899	 and	1914);	 the	percentage	figures	were	calculated	by	the	author		The	 table	 above	 reveals	 that	 sea	 trade	 with	 other	 German	 port	 cities	 actually	increased	as	a	result	of	Bremen’s	accession.	This	would	support	the	argument	that	Bremen’s	 accession	was	 essential	 for	 the	whole	 of	 Germany.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	trade	with	Great	Britain	decreased	significantly	 from	1872.	Since	the	table	above	also	 includes	 unloaded	 vessels,	 Great	 Britain’s	 share	 of	 Bremen’s	 overall	 traded	tonnage	is	even	lower.	In	1913,	vessels	with	a	total	tonnage	of	1,376,148	register	tons	 left	 for	 Great	 Britain	 from	 Bremen.	 Yet,	 of	 this	 total,	 977,783	 register	 tons	were	not	loaded.		In	addition,	with	respect	to	Bremen’s	trade	with	the	rest	of	Germany,	it	also	has	 to	be	considered	 that	 the	majority	of	 trade	was	conducted	with	Hamburg.	 In	1872,	out	of	a	total	152,852	register	tons	directed	to	and	from	Germany,	around	40	%	were	 going	 to	 and	 coming	 from	 Hamburg.	 In	 1898,	 more	 than	 two	 thirds	 of	Germany’s	trade	was	with	the	Hanseatic	City	on	the	River	Elbe.	Of	these	two	thirds,	25%	were	unloaded	vessels;	just	as	large	proportions	of	vessels	going	to	European	destinations	were	unloaded.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 comparison	 to	1872	and	1882,	trade	with	Great	Britain	and	the	United	States	certainly	decreased	in	total.	Hence,	with	 respect	 to	 sea	 trade,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 concluded	 that	 Bremen’s	 accession	 to	 the	Empire’s	 customs	 union	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 distinctive	 change	 in	 the	 city’s	 trade	statistics.			
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	 Yet,	simply	analysing	Bremen’s	sea	trade	with	the	rest	of	Germany	would	be	missing	 the	 point.	 In	 addition	 to	 sea	 trade,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 examine	 Bremen’s	overall	trade	with	the	rest	of	Germany.		
Figure	2.6:	Total	Value	of	Imports	in	Marks	(on	average	per	year)		 1867–1871	 1877–1881	 1892–1896	 1907–1911	Total	 352,796,268	 493,577,318	 753,062,020	 1,861,913,999	Sea	 231,057,431	 346,009,810	 502,583,449	 1,276,316,075	Land	 118,379,680	 145,429,449	 238,536,886	 552,781,166	Land	&	River	 121,738,837	 147,567,508	 250,478,571	 585,597,924	Germany	 118,879,225	 142,614,653	 264,312,197	 646,819,631	Great	Britain	 52,634,079	 58,555,073	 48,165,820	 70,822,649	Europe	 28,466,275	 40,656,517	 60,952,922	 164,443,346	USA	 92,421,160	 166,699,722	 213,169,879	 648,091,489	Africa	 2,087,020	 4,313,023	 12,000,905	 27,589,341	Australia	&	Islands	 696,710	 445,795	 19,901,437	 93,513,548	Source:	 Jahrbuch	 für	 Bremische	 Statistik,	 I.	 Heft:	 Zur	 Statistik	 des	 Schiffs-	 und	Waarenverkehrs	im	Jahre	1898	(Bremen,	1899),	p.	129;	Jahrbuch	für	Bremische	Statistik,	I.	Heft:	Zur	Statistik	des	Schiffs-	und	Waarenverkehrs	im	Jahre	1914	(Bremen,	1915),	p.	50		
Figure	2.7:	Total	Value	of	Exports	in	Marks	(on	average	per	year)		 1867–1871	 1877–1881	 1892–1896	 1907–1911	Total	 330,326,472	 473,870,721	 721,573,422	 1,796,283,536	-Sea	 139,584,356	 161,907,075	 328,728,444	 874,113,078	Land	 181,562,258	 303,029,848	 376,218,126	 872,586,451	Land	&	River	 311,963,646	 311,963,646	 392,844,978	 922,170,458	Germany	 165,409,933	 271,855,729	 410,915,135	 914,157,185	Great	Britain	 16,551,139	 26,288,422	 29,826,447	 145,351,586	Europe	 65,400,026	 87,439,723	 103,202,378	 349,345,527	USA	 69,924,756	 71,291,252	 117,420,535	 198,355,301	Africa	 460,372	 686,633	 1,088,573	 5,208,654	Australia	&	Islands	 672,868	 1,030,707	 9,132,407	 34,605,034	Source:	 Jahrbuch	 für	 Bremische	 Statistik,	 I.	 Heft:	 Zur	 Statistik	 des	 Schiffs-	 und	Waarenverkehrs	im	Jahre	1898	(Bremen,	1899),	S.	278;	Jahrbuch	für	Bremische	Statistik,	I.	Heft:	 Zur	 Statistik	des	 Schiffs-	 und	Waarenverkehrs	 im	 Jahre	1914	 (Bremen,	 1915),	 p.	179		
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Both	 tables	 present	 interesting	 results.	 While	 the	 majority	 of	 imports	 came	 to	Bremen	 via	 the	 sea	 route,	 Bremen’s	 landwards	 exports	 were	 higher	 than	 its	seawards	exports	in	all	four	periods.	Not	unsurprisingly,	imports	to	Bremen	from	the	United	States	of	America	were	high	throughout	all	periods,	averaging	at	least	a	quarter	of	total	import	values.	However,	what	is	surprising,	particularly	in	the	light	of	 discussions	 about	 Bremen’s	 role,	 is	 that	 Bremen’s	 trade	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	German	Empire	 remained	 significant	during	 the	whole	 time,	 from	1867	 to	1911.	Even	 prior	 to	 Bremen’s	 accession,	 from	 1877	 to	 1881,	 the	 city’s	 exports	 to	Germany	amounted	to	more	than	57%.	During	the	same	period,	imports	to	Bremen	from	 Germany	 were	 worth	 around	 41%	 of	 total	 imports.	 Hence,	 Bremen’s	economic	links	to	the	rest	of	Germany	were	already	consolidated,	even	though	the	city	was	 not	 yet	 part	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 customs	 union.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	 not	 even	 a	drastic	 change	 in	 Bremen’s	 trade	 statistics	 between	 before	 and	 after	 Bremen’s	accession.			
h.	Bremen’s	role	in	the	German	Empire		In	summary,	this	chapter	set	out	to	analyse	Bremen’s	role	in	the	German	Empire.	It	is	undeniable	that	during	the	1870s	and	the	early	1880s,	Bremen’s	elite	–	political	and	economical	–	was	still	 focused	on	its	particularistic	role	outside	the	Empire’s	customs	union.	Not	without	reason	did	Arnold	Duckwitz,	a	Bremish	merchant	and	Burgomaster,	 point	 out	 in	 1842:	 ‘Ein	 Kaufmann	 macht	 keine	 Geschächte	 aus	Patriotismus,	sondern	er	sie	nur	dann,	wenn	er	glaubt,	dabei	Vortheil	zu	haben.’264	Duckwitz’s	view	did	not	change	until	the	1870s,	when	he	expressed:		 Ein	kleiner	Staat	wie	Bremen	muß	die	öffentliche	Meinung	für	sich	heben.	Er	darf	 nie	 als	 ein	Hinderniß	 des	Wohlergehens	 der	Gesammtheit	 erscheinen.	Vielmehr	 soll	 er	 seine	 Stellung	 in	 solcher	 Weise	 nehmen,	 daß	 seine	Selbständigkeit	 als	 ein	 Glück	 für	 das	 Ganze,	 seine	 Existenz	 als	 eine	Nothwendigkeit	angesehen	wird.	Darin	liegt	die	sicherste	Bürgschaft	seinen	Bestehens.265																																																											264	Rolf	Engelsing,	Bremen	als	Auswandererhafen,	1683-1880	(PhD,	Göttingen,	1954),	p.	218	265	Ibid.,	p.	219	
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It	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 particularistic	 views	 in	Bremen	during	 this	 time	did	 not	 mean	 that	 Bremen’s	 inhabitants	 were	 distinctively	 unpatriotic.	 On	 the	contrary,	there	was	certainly	a	bond	to	the	unified	German	nation	and	the	fact	that	Bismarck	 became	 an	 honorary	 citizen	 proves	 this.	 Bremen	 did	 not	 want	 to	 be	excluded	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 German	 nation.	 Yet,	 the	 example	 of	 the	
Kriegerdenkmal	also	emphasises	that	Bremish	people	 felt	at	 least	 just	as	strongly	for	their	Hanseatic	City	as	for	the	German	nation.	Thus,	from	a	cultural	perspective,	it	 cannot	 be	 argued	 that	 Bremen	 was	 already	 fully	 integrated	 into	 the	 German	Empire.	Ideas,	such	as	those	represented	by	Theodor	Barth,	were	still	going	strong	in	Bremen	of	the	1870s	and	early	1880s.			 Ironically,	 Bremen	 was	 already	 well	 integrated	 into	 the	 economy	 of	 the	German	Empire,	as	a	look	at	Bremen’s	trade	statistics	reveals.	In	view	of	this	fact,	Bremen’s	accession	 to	 the	Empire’s	customs	union	was	no	more	 than	a	symbolic	act.	When	Bismarck	had	conceived	to	make	Hamburg	and	Bremen	join	the	customs	union,	 Bremen	 first	 reaction	 was	 one	 of	 reservation.	 In	 the	 end,	 it	 was	 this	reservation	that	led	to	a	difficult	period	with	the	Reich	Chancellor.	Once	Hamburg	had	joined,	Bismarck	must	have	realised	that	it	was	inevitable	for	Bremen	to	also	become	part	of	the	customs	union.	It	took	Bremen	about	four	more	years	to	come	to	 terms	 with	 the	 Imperial	 government	 regarding	 its	 accession.	 In	 terms	 of	Bismarck’s	 unexpected	 approval	 of	 Bremen’s	 accession	 in	 1884,	 it	 may	 well	 be	argued	 that	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 regarded	 this	 issue	 as	 thwarting	 his	 plans	 for	colonial	ventures.	There	was	a	group	of	definite	supporters	of	colonial	ventures	in	Bremen.	Bismarck	 could	have	used	 these	 in	order	 to	pursue	 foreign	policy	 goals	that	were	 achieved	 by	 giving	 official	 “protection”	 to	 the	 overseas	 acquisitions	 of	Hanseatic	 merchants.	 Eventually,	 in	 1888,	 the	 last	 step	 of	 Bremen’s	 official	economic	 integration	 was	 made	 with	 Bremen’s	 official	 joining	 of	 the	 Imperial	customs	union.			 As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 it	 was	 not	 Bremen’s	 trade	 statistics	 that	 changed	 but	rather	 the	 cultural	 and	 political	 discourse.	 Bremen’s	 prospects	 as	 part	 of	 the	Empire’s	 economy	 were	 praised,	 and	 Bismarck,	 the	 person	 who	 had	 caused	 so	many	problems	in	Bremen,	was	celebrated	as	a	national	hero.	As	soon	as	Bremen’s	economic	 integration	 into	 the	 Kaiserreich	 was	 also	 symbolically	 executed,	patriotism	 and	 nationalism	 seemed	 to	 be	 on	 the	 rise.	 This	 was	 certainly	 also	supported	by	Bremen’s	pioneering	role	in	Germany’s	colonial	venture,	which	gave	
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Bremen	the	important	task	of	opening	up	the	colonial	markets.266	While	promoting	colonial	ventures	of	the	German	Empire	was	at	first	only	practised	by	a	particular	group	of	merchants,	the	colonial	community	of	interest	grew	significantly	until	the	First	World	War.		
																																																								266	There	were,	for	example,	two	firms	in	Bremen	that	dealt	with	the	economic	development	of	the	colonies	in	the	South	Seas.	These	two	firms	were	the	Bremer	Südsee-
Gesellschaft	m.b.H.	and	the	Deutsche	Südeseephosphat-Aktiengesellschaft.	The	latter	was	a	syndicate	with	the	participation	of	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd,	which	was	founded	in	1907.	The	syndicate’s	aim	was	to	find	and	exploit	phosphate	sources	in	the	South	Seas,	which	were	found	on	the	island	Angaur,	the	most	southern	of	the	island	group	of	Palau.	See	Anneliese	Scharpenberg,	‘Die	Deutsche	Südseephosphat-Aktiengesellschaft	Bremen’,	in	
Bremisches	Jahrbuch	55	(1977),	pp.	127–219.	However,	Bremen’s	merchants	were	also	active	in	Germany’s	African	colonies.	Bremen’s	merchants	sought	to	support	financially	existing	ventures,	and	secondly	to	expand	Bremen’s	role	in	the	overall	cotton	trade.	In	particular,	the	Bremer	Baumwollbörse	financially	supported	the	promotion	of	the	cotton	cultivation	in	the	colonies,	which	was	led	by	the	Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches	Komitee.	The	
Bremer	Baumwollbörse	had	come	into	existence	in	1872	as	the	Comité	für	den	Bremer	
Baumwollhandel,	which	it	was	called	until	1877.	Overall,	the	Baumwollbörse	had	a	crucial	importance	not	only	for	Bremen’s	cotton	trade	but	also	for	the	entire	German	textile	industry.	The	Baumwollbörse	began	to	regularly	subsidise	the	projects	for	the	cultivation	of	cotton	in	the	colonies	in	1904	and	continued	to	do	so	until	the	First	World	War.	Until	then,	the	Baumwollbörse	had	committed	itself	to	pay	yearly	subsidies	in	the	total	amount	of	104,	000	Marks.	The	Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches	Komitee	used	these	subsidies	to,	for	example,	operate	experimental	cotton	enterprises	in	Togo	and	German	East	Africa,	which	were	launched	in	1901.	See,	for	example,	Karl-Heinz	Schildknecht,	Bremen	und	Baumwolle	
im	Wandel	der	Zeiten	(Bremen,	1999),	p.	19	
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III.	Emden			The	Prussian	annexation	of	the	Hanoverian	Kingdom	in	1866	was	well	received	in	Emden.	 Hanoverian	 rule	 had	 been	 short-lived,	 from	 1815	 to	 1866,	 and	 it	 was	perceived	as	a	period	of	economic	stagnation.	There	was	therefore	a	lot	of	hope	for	an	 economic	 upturn	 connected	with	 the	 Prussian	 annexation.	 As	we	 shall	 see	 in	this	chapter,	 this	hope	was	not	entirely	unjustified.	Emden	did	 indeed	manage	to	improve	 its	 size	 and	 status,	 growing	 from	a	 small	 port	 city	on	 the	western-most	fringes	of	Germany	to	a	competitive	port	on	the	North	Sea	Coast.	After	the	turn	of	the	 century,	 Emden	 even	 attempted	 to	 challenge	 Bremen	 and	 Hamburg	 in	 their	traditional	emigration	business.	In	the	end,	this	undertaking	failed,	with	Hamburg	and	Bremen	able	to	consolidate	their	position.	However,	overall	Emden	was	able	to	make	use	of	 its	geographically	valuable	position.	After	all,	 the	River	Ems	directly	connected	Emden	to	Westphalia.	While	the	port	city’s	trade	and	shipping	in	1871	was	not	worth	mentioning,	Emden	managed	to	put	itself	back	on	the	map	by	1914.	Thus,	 in	 1909,	 with	 regard	 to	 total	 loaded	 tonnage,	 Emden	 was	 the	 third	 most	frequented	 port	 city	 on	 the	 North	 Sea	 coast,	 behind	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	(including	 Bremerhaven).	 Emden’s	 share	 of	 the	 total	 41.3	 million	 register	 tons	traded	was	at	2.7%.1	This	chapter	focuses	on	Emden’s	comeback	after	a	period	of	stagnation	of	several	centuries.			
a.	Emden’s	return	to	Prussian	rule			On	 October	 3	 1866,	 King	 Wilhelm	 I	 of	 Prussia	 made	 public	 that	 Prussia	 would	annex	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 former	 Kingdom	 of	 Hanover.	 This	 also	 included	 the	Principality	 of	 East	 Friesland	 and,	 therefore,	 Emden.	 In	 June	 1866,	 the	 Austro-Prussian	War	 had	 led	 to	 Hanoverian	 defeat.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 this	 defeat,	 the	 East	Frisian	province	sent	an	address	to	King	Wilhelm.	In	this	note,	it	was	pointed	out	that	 ‘[d]ie	 Trennung	 von	 der	 Krone	 Preußens	 [in	 1815]	 geschah	 wahrlich	 nicht	
																																																								1	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte,	pp.	90–91	
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nach	 dem	Wunsche	 der	 Provinz.’2	Certainly,	 this	 might	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 purely	opportunist	move	by	the	East	Frisians.	However,	in	the	process	that	followed,	the	Hanoverian	defeat	and	the	upcoming	Prussian	annexation,	it	became	obvious	that,	particularly	in	Emden,	the	annexation	was	accepted	with	relief.		In	 August	 1866,	 prior	 to	 this	 official	 proclamation	 of	 the	 Prussian	annexation,	 it	was	already	being	discussed	 in	Emden’s	Bürgervorsteherkollegium,	the	 city	 assembly,	 how	 to	 react	 to	 the	 likely	 annexation.	 The	
Bürgervorsteherkollegium	requested	from	Emden’s	Magistrat,	the	city	council,	‘daß	derselben	 baldthunlichst	 und	 bei	 erster	 Gelegenheit	 die	 Möglichkeit	 gewährt	werde,	diesen	Sympathien	durch	Aushängen	von	Flaggen	öffentlichen	Ausdruck	zu	verleihen.’3	The	 fact	 that	 the	 upcoming	 Prussian	 annexation	 led	 to	 high	 spirits	among	Emden’s	elites	was	not	a	secret.	For	example,	the	head	of	Emden’s	Chamber	of	 Commerce,	 Carl	 Dantziger,	 asked	 the	 city	 council	 and	 the	 city	 assembly	 to	organise	 a	 ball	 in	 Emden’s	 town	 hall	 after	 the	 proclamation	 of	 the	 annexation.4	Eventually,	 the	 city	 council	 rejected	 this	 proposal	 and	 ceded	 this	 undertaking	 to	private	initiatives.	While	the	hoisting	of	Prussian	flags	was	encouraged	only	after	the	official	proclamation,	the	city	council	additionally	agreed	to	send	a	deputation	to	 Berlin	 in	 order	 to	 express	 ‘den	 Dank	 der	 Stadt	 für	 die	 freudig	 begrüßte	Wiedervereinigung	Ostfrieslands	mit	dem	Preußischen	Königreiche.’5		On	 September	 29	 1866,	 Emden’s	 mayor,	 Ernst	 Hantelmann,	 and	 other	members	of	the	city	council	and	city	assembly	were	received	by	the	Prussian	King.	In	this,	Hantelmann	pointed	out	to	the	King:			Aber	nach	der	Weise	des	Volksstammes,	von	welchem	die	Provinz	bewohnt	wird,	der	einmal	Erfaßtes	und	Liebgewonnenes	im	Herzen	fort	und	fort	hegt	und	 pflegt,	 wirkte	 die	 alte	 Anhänglichkeit,	 von	 Vater	 auf	 Sohn	 und	 Enkel	übertragen,	kräftiglich	weiter.	Und	 so	 konnte	 es	 denn	 geschehen,	 daß	 jüngst	 schon	 die	 Eröffnung	 einer	Aussicht	auf	Wiedervereinigung,	auf	Wiederanknüpfung	der	alten	Bande	die																																																									2	StE	IV	174,	Allerdurchlauchtigster,	Großmächstigster	König!	Allergnädigster	König	und	Herr!	Emden,	Leer	u.s.w.	im	Juli	1866.		3	StE	IV	174,	An	Einen	Wohllöblichen	Magistrat	hieselbst,	24.8.66.	4	StE	IV	174,	Emden,	den	30.	August	1866	5	StE	IV	174,	An	Einen	Wohllöblichen	Magistrat	hieselbst,	24.8.66.	See	also	StE	IV	174,	Auszug	aus	dem	Plenar-Protokoll	des	Magistrats	und	Bürger-Vorsteher	vom	31.	August	1866	
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ganze	Provinz	 in	die	 froheste	Aufregung	versetzte	und	die	Freude	 in	heller	und	 unmißverständlicher	 Weise	 sich	 bethätigte,	 als	 jene	 Aussicht	 durch	unerhörte	wunderbare	Thaten	sich	zur	Gewißheit	gestaltete.6			The	reference	to	the	‘Wiedervereinigung’	is	worth	highlighting	in	this	context.	First	and	 foremost,	 Emden	 was	 celebrating	 the	 re-unification	 with	 the	 Prussian	Kingdom	and	not,	for	example,	the	foundation	of	the	North	German	Confederation.	Naturally,	 the	 Prussian	 King	 replied	 to	 this	 extravagantly	 loyal	 address	 by	highlighting	that	‘[a]ber	auch	Seinem	seligen	Vater	sei	es	sehr	schwer	geworden,	in	diese	Trennung	einzuwilligen.’7	Additionally,	he	pointed	out	that	it	had	never	been	his	 intention	 to	 annex	 the	Kingdom	of	Hanover.	However,	 his	 cousin,	Georg	V	of	Hanover,	 focussed	 so	much	 on	 the	 South,	 which	 did	 not	 allow	 anything	 but	 his	abdication.	Overall,	the	result	of	the	deputation’s	trip	to	Berlin,	including	meeting	with	Prussian	ministers,	was	regarded	with	satisfaction	in	Emden.	Thus,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	a	Prussian	annexation	that	was	more	yearned	for	than	that	of	Emden.	It	is	therefore	important	to	look	at	the	reasons	why	people	like	Dantziger	favoured	a	Prussian	 annexation	 and	 how	 the	 people	 of	 Emden	 approached	 the	 idea	 of	 a	German	nation.		Certainly,	there	was	already	a	noticeable	upsurge	of	liberal-national	feelings	during	the	revolution	of	1848–49.	This	upsurge,	however,	ended	rapidly	after	the	repression	of	the	revolution.8		A	quote	from	a	regional	newspaper,	the	Ostfriesische	
Zeitung,	 put	 this	 in	 a	 nutshell:	 ‘Sieht	 der	 Ostfriese	 im	 allgemeinen	 Leben	Deutschland	 auch	 als	 ein	 fremdes	 Land	 an,	 so	 ist	 er	 doch	 in	 der	 Stunde	 der	Bewegung	 und	 Gefahr	 immer	 für	 Deutschland	 an	 seinem	 Platz.’ 9 	Certainly,	national-liberal	feelings	still	existed	in	East	Friesland	after	the	revolution	of	1848–49	 but	 they	 remained	 below	 the	 surface	 for	 most	 of	 the	 time.	 Instead,	 Emden	envied	Prussia’s	economic	achievements.	In	line	with	this,	the	wish	for	a	return	to	Prussia	 was	 based	 on	 the	 hope	 of	 economic	 recovery.	 Economic	 and	 social	progress	had	ground	to	a	halt	 in	Emden,	with	the	number	of	 inhabitants	actually	decreasing	 from	12,	 500	 to	 12,	 050	 between	 1852	 and	 1864.	 Neither	Hanover’s																																																									6	StE	IV	174,	Ostfriesische	Zeitung.	Emden,	Donnerstag,	11.	Oktober	1866.	S.	3	7	Ibid.		8	Heinrich	Schmidt	has	already	analysed	Emden’s	relationship	to	the	Hanoverian	and	Prussian	Kingdom	in	his	publication	on	the	Politische	Geschiche	Ostfrieslands.	See:	Schmidt,	
Politische	Geschichte	9	Ibid.,	pp.	424–425	
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accession	to	the	Zollverein	in	1851	nor	Emden’s	connection	to	the	railway	system,	the	Westbahn,	were	able	to	produce	relief.10	Schmidt	argues	that	‘Hafen	der	kräftig	aufsteigenden	westdeutsch-preußischen	Industrie	zu	werden,	war	ein	Wunsch,	in	dem	 sich	 das	 Emder	 Geschäftsbedürfnis	 national	 rechtfertigen	 konnte.’11	In	 the	Hanoverian	 Kingdom,	 Emden	 was	 situated	 as	 far	 removed	 from	 the	 Kingdom’s	industry	as	was	possible	without	 falling	off	 the	edge	of	 the	Hanoverian	world.	At	the	same	time,	the	industrial	heartland	of	the	Prussian	Kingdom	–	the	Ruhr	area	–	lay	tantalisingly	close	to	Emden.		As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 Prussia’s	 rule	 over	 Emden	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	became	glorified.	However,	Schmidt	is	certainly	right	in	highlighting	that	it	was	not	simply	 the	 memory	 of	 Prussian	 rule	 that	 was	 decisive	 but	 rather	 ‘die	 aktuelle,	preußisch-national	 gerichtete,	 liberale	 Zutsimmung	 zur	 preußischen	WIrtschaftspolitik	[…].’12	Being	in	agreement	with	contemporary	Prussian	politics,	the	East	Frisians	found	a	way	of	expressing	their	hopes	put	in	Prussia	by	referring	to	 their	 joint	 history.	 Still,	 Emden	 was	 definitely	 a	 stronghold	 of	 Prussian	sympathisers,	 compared	 to	 other	East	 Frisian	 cities,	 such	 as	 Leer.	As	 a	 result,	 in	1863,	 Georg	 Bacmeister,	 Hanoverian	 Landdrost	 in	 East	 Friesland,	 was	 able	 to	emphasise	that	the	province	was	 ‘zu	keiner	Zeit	besser	Hannöverisch	gewesen’.13	Two	 years	 later,	 East	 Friesland	 even	 celebrated	 the	 fiftieth	 anniversary	 of	belonging	to	the	Hanoverian	Kingdom.	However,	despite	all	this,	the	East	Frisians’	sympathy	 for	Prussia	was	again	omnipresent	 in	1866.	Hence,	 it	 is	not	 surprising	that	 Emden’s	Nationalverein	 demanded	 on	 June	 19	 1866:	 ‘Sobald	 daher	 für	 das	nordwestliche	 Deutschland	 Parteinahme	 geboten	 erscheint,	 darf	 diese	 nur	 für,	niemals	gegen	Preußen	erfolgen.’14	As	correctly	pointed	out	by	Schmidt,	this	view	was	based	as	much	on	a	national-liberal	stance	as	it	was	on	a	desire	for	economic	recovery	 in	Emden.	Furthermore,	siding	with	Prussia	 in	the	Austro-Prussian	War	also	gave	‘Abneigung	gegen	Hannover	einen	positiven	Gefühlswert.’15	Therefore,	in	view	of	these	aspects	of	antipathy	against	Hanover	and	sympathy	for	Prussia,	the	aforementioned	 euphoria	 in	 light	 of	 the	 Prussian	 annexation	 was	 expected.	 In																																																									10	Ibid.,	pp.	428–429	11	Ibid.,	p.	428	12	Ibid.,	p.	429	13	Ibid.,	p.	431	14	Ibid.,	p.	431	15	Ibid.,	p.	432	
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Emden,	 Prussian	 rule	 was	 closely	 tied	 to	 expectations	 of	 economic	 recovery.	Whether	these	expectations	were	justified	will	be	discussed	later.	The	glorification	of	Prussian	rule	certainly	persisted	in	Emden.		In	 1891,	 solemnities	 for	 the	 twenty-fifth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 Prussian	annexation	were	organised	in	Emden.	Carl	Dantziger	and	others,	who	had	already	been	 pushing	 for	 festivities	 in	 Emden	 in	 1866,	 proposed	 that	 the	 city	 council	should	organise	these	solemnities	in	an	official	manner.16	However,	once	again,	the	city	 council	 rejected	 the	 idea.	 Even	 worse,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 also	 declined	Dantziger’s	 request	 for	 a	 financial	 contribution	 to	 the	 solemnities	 amounting	 to	100	Marks.17	Emden’s	 local	 newspapers,	 the	Emder	Zeitung	 and	 the	Ostfriesische	
Zeitung,	 wrote	 with	 full	 of	 joy	 about	 the	 anniversary.18	The	 Emder	 Zeitung,	 for	example,	noted	that	it	was			nicht	 zu	 verwundern,	 wenn	 der	 heutige	 Tag	 von	 jedem	 königstreuen	Ostfriesen,	 von	 allen,	 deren	 Herzen	 für	 des	 Vaterlandes	 Größe	 und	Herrlichkeit	 schlagen,	 festlich	 begangen	 wird,	 wenn	 dem	 Dank	 an	 den	Allmächtigen,	 der	 Preußens	und	Deutschlands	Geschicke	 so	 gnädig	 gelenkt	hat,	jubelnde	Freude	folgt,	die	sich	in	patriotischen	Kundgebungen	äußert.19				Even	 after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	German	Empire,	 the	 Prussian	 “reacquisition”	 of	Emden	 in	 1866	was	 still	 of	 paramount	 importance	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Emden.	 The	Prussian	Kingdom	–	not	the	German	Empire	–	remained	the	point	of	reference	in	Emden.	In	the	end,	the	group	around	Dantziger	managed	to	organise	‘eine	würdige	Feier	 […],	die	 in	einem	Festcommers	 ihren	Abschluß	 fand.’20	Even	Wilhelm	II	did	not	fail	to	send	a	telegram	to	Emden.	Similar	to	his	grandfather	in	1866,	Wilhelm	expressed	his	appreciation	of	Emden’s	memory	of	 its	Prussian	past	and	 ‘daß	das	Gedenken	an	 große	 gemeinsam	verlebte	Zeiten	 sich	 vereinigt	mit	 dem	Ausdruck	der	Befriedigung	über	die	vor	25	Jahren	neubegründete	enge	Verbindung.’21	After																																																									16	StE	IV	201,	An	den	Wohllöblichen	Magistrat	hier.	Emden	d.	29.	August	1891	17	StE	IV	201,	An	den	Wohllöblichen	Magistrat	hier.	Emden	d.	26.	Septbr.	1891	18	See	StE	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	No.	232,	Emden,	Sonnabend,	den	3.	October	1891	and	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	232,	Sonnabend,	den	3.	October	1891	19	StE	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	232,	Sonnabend,	den	3.	October	1891	20	StE	IV	201,	Deutscher	Reichs-Anzeiger	und	Königlich	Preußischer	Staats-Anzeiger.	Berlin,	Donnerstag,	den	8.	Oktober.	Abends.	1891.	S.	1	21	StE	IV	201,	Telegraphie	des	Deutschen	Reiches.	Amt	Emden.	4/10	1891.	i.a.v.	Moltke	Flügel	Adjutant	vom	Dienst.		
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all,	not	all	parts	of	the	former	Hanoverian	Kingdom	were	as	enthusiastic	about	the	Prussian	annexation.	This	is	demonstrated	by	the	electoral	behaviour	in	favour	of	the	Guelph	opposition	to	Prussian	rule.22			 However,	 even	 though	 there	 was	 much	 euphoria	 about	 the	 Prussian	annexation	of	 1866,	 Emden	 took	 its	 time	with	 erecting	monuments	dedicated	 to	the	newly	founded	nation	or	the	victorious	Franco-Prussian	War,	unlike	Bremen’s	
Kriegerdenkmal.	 In	 fact,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 September	 1874	 that	 the	 city	 council	established	a	commission	to	discuss	the	erection	of	a	monument	in	honour	of	the	fallen	 soldiers	 of	 1870–71.	 The	 council	 decided	 to	 use	 parts	 of	 the	 reparation	payments	 that	 Emden	 would	 receive	 for	 its	 service	 during	 the	 Franco-Prussian	War.	In	the	end,	the	city	council	and	city	assembly	decided	to	safely	invest	the	total	amount	 of	 17,	 000	 Thaler,	 rather	 than	 budgeting	 parts	 of	 this	 for	 the	 projected	monument.	At	 this	point,	 the	commission	was	still	busy	with	contacting	different	artists.	One	of	 these	artists	was	Ludwig	Brunow	of	Berlin,	who	was	also	engaged	with	 completing	 the	 first	 monument	 for	 Helmuth	 von	 Moltke	 in	 the	 general’s	birthplace	Parchim.	However,	 the	commission	eventually	refrained	 from	the	 idea	of	 erecting	 a	monument	 in	memory	 of	 the	 Franco-Prussian	War.	 Instead,	 it	 was	decided	 to	 plan	 a	 monument	 dedicated	 to	 Wilhelm	 I	 made	 of	 bronze.	 While	 in	Bremen	 there	 was	 a	 monument	 dedicated	 to	 the	 fallen	 sons	 of	 the	 city,	 Emden	planned	to	erect	a	monument	in	honour	of	its	Prussian	sovereign.	So,	in	both	cities	national	 aspects	 of	 the	 monument,	 such	 as	 the	 German	 Empire,	 played	 a	subordinate	role.	For	this	matter,	 the	commission	even	received	an	estimation	of	costs	 from	 Ludwig	 Brunow.	 The	 costs	 amounted	 to	 20,	 500	 Thaler	 plus	transportation	 costs	 and	 costs	 for	 a	 fence	 surrounding	 the	 monument.	 Yet,	Brunow’s	offer	appears	to	have	deterred	the	commission,	as	there	was	no	further	planning	in	this	direction.			 Still,	the	project	of	a	monument	in	Emden	was	not	entirely	buried	just	yet.	A	year	 later,	 in	1876,	plans	were	made	 for	celebrating	the	tenth	anniversary	of	 the	78th	East	Frisian	Infantry	Regiment.	This	anniversary	was	celebrated	on	November	10	1876.	It	was	also	thought	to	be	a	fitting	event	for	laying	the	foundation	stone	for	the	 new	 monument.	 Once	 again,	 artists	 were	 asked	 to	 submit	 plans	 for	 a	monument	 dedicated	 either	 to	 the	 fallen	 soldiers	 or	 to	Wilhelm.	 In	 addition,	 the																																																									22	See,	for	example:	Ernst	Gottfried	Mahrenholz,	Ein	Königreich	wird	Provinz:	Über	
Hannovers	Schicksalsjahr	1866	(Göttingen,	2012),	pp.	84–88	
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commission	also	left	open	the	possibility	of	a	joint	monument	to	the	fallen	soldiers	as	 well	 as	Wilhelm	 I.	 Ultimately,	 this	 whole	 plan	 led	 to	 nothing,	 as	 Emden	 was	informed	that	official	anniversary	celebrations	were	not	common	in	the	Prussian	army.			 Thereafter,	 the	project	 once	 again	 ground	 to	 a	 halt.	 This	was	 caused	by	 a	number	 of	 reasons,	 such	 as	 ‘wichtige	 Verhandlungen	 über	 die	 Hafenfrage,	 die	Invasion	der	Rinderpest,	die	drohende	Verlegung	der	Garnison,	die	Sturmfluth	des	Jahres	 1877,	 der	 Untergang	 des	 Lootsenschooners	 Ems	 […]’ 23 	Consequently,	‘weder	 Muße	 noch	 Stimmung’	 were	 available	 for	 planning	 a	 monument	 in	Emden.24	Still,	contact	with	two	artists	was	maintained.	When	one	of	them,	Heinz	Hoffmeister,	was	 able	 to	make	 an	 affordable	 offer	 for	 a	 statue	 of	Wilhelm	 I,	 the	matter	 was	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 local	 Gesellschaft	 für	 bildende	 Kunst	 und	
vaterländische	Altertümer	zu	Emden	in	order	to	speed	up	the	process.	In	this	way,	it	was	 believed	 that	 the	 project	 could	 gain	 ‘einen	 weniger	 localen,	 sondern	ostfrisisch-patriotischen	 Charakter	 […].’25	Since	 Wilhelm	 I	 and	 his	 wife	 Augusta	were	 celebrating	 their	 golden	 wedding	 anniversary,	 this	 was	 seen	 as	 another	fitting	 opportunity	 to	 erect	 a	 statue	 dedicated	 to	 the	 Emperor.	 Meanwhile,	 the	erection	of	a	monument	was	regarded	as	constituting	‘eine	Ehrenschuld	der	Stadt	Emden	 […],	 deren	 Abtragung	 nunmehr	 nicht	 länger	 verzögert	werden	 darf	 […]’;	especially	 since	 other	 East	 Frisian	 cities,	 such	 as	 Aurich,	 Norden	 and	 Leer,	 had	already	carried	out	this	duty.26			 Subsequently,	 the	 commission,	which	was	 informed	of	 the	whole	 process,	requested	 from	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 and	 city	 assembly	 to	 resume	 control	 of	erecting	the	monument.	Rather	than	leaving	it	to	private	initiatives,	the	city	simply	took	over	from	the	Gesellschaft	für	bildende	Kunst.	At	first,	there	were	discussions	to	 finance	the	monument	through	donations.	This	plan	was	discarded	by	the	city	council,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	matter	was	supposed	to	only	concern	Emden	and	not	the	whole	of	East	Friesland,	as	envisaged	by	the	Gesellschaft	für	bildende	Kunst.	Instead,	 the	 contract	 sum	 of	 9,	 000	Marks	 plus	 additional	 costs	 of	 up	 to	 3,	 000	Marks	 were	 made	 available	 from	 the	 city’s	 reparation	 fund. 27 	Thus,	 a	 new																																																									23	StE	IV	193,	Bericht,	Emden,	den	26.	April	1879,	p.	3	24	Ibid.,	p.	3	25	Ibid.,	p.	4	26	Ibid.,	p.	4	27	StE	IV	193,	Geschehen	Emden,	in	der	Magistrats-Sitzung	am	28.	April	1879.		
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agreement	 between	 Emden	 and	 Hoffmeister	 was	 concluded,	 provided	 that	 the	Emperor	graciously	permitted	erecting	a	statue	of	himself	in	Emden.				 Accordingly	 a	 letter	 was	 sent	 to	 the	 Palace	 in	 distant	 Berlin.	 It	 was	highlighted	that	the	people	of	Emden	adored	Wilhelm	I	as	‘den	König	und	Helden	[…],	der	durch	sein	starkes	Schwert	uns	wieder	mit	dem	Vaterlande	vereinigt	hat	[…].’28	A	 statue	 of	 the	 Emperor	 in	 Emden,	 situated	 in	 the	 North	West	 corner	 of	Prussia,	was	advertised	as	an	embodiment	of	the	Hohenzollern	phrase:	 ‘Vom	Fels	zum	Meer.’29	However,	 the	 response	 Emden’s	 representatives	 received	 from	 the	
Ministerium	 der	 geistlichen,	 Unterrichts-	 und	 Medicinal-Angelegenheiten,	 the	Prussian	ministry	 of	 culture,	must	 have	 been	 highly	 disappointing.	 The	 Prussian	ministry	 of	 culture	 informed	 Emden’s	 representative:	 ‘Seine	Majestät	 haben	 den	Grundsatz,	 nicht	 zu	 gestatten,	 daß	während	Allerhöchstderen	 Lebenszeit	 eine	 in	voller	Plastik	hergstellte	 Statue	Allerhöchstihrer	Person	hergestellt	werde	 […].’30	Only	once	had	an	exception	had	been	allowed:	an	equestrian	statue	of	Wilhelm	I	in	Cologne.	This	statue	had	been	permitted	because	there	was	already	an	equestrian	statue	of	Friedrich	Wilhelm	IV.		Thus,	there	was	nothing	left	to	do	for	Emden	other	than	to	cancel	its	plans	for	a	Wilhelm	monument	in	Emden.	The	contract	with	Hoffmeister	was	cancelled	and	the	artist	received	a	compensation	of	150	Marks	for	his	preliminary	studies.	In	return,	 Emden	 wanted	 to	 keep	 Hoffmeister’s	 model	 of	 the	 planned	 monument.	There	were	considerations	to	display	this	model	in	Emden’s	city	hall	but	objections	against	this	were	raised	as	this	would	have	been	a	public	display	of	the	monument	for	Wilhelm	 I.31	In	 the	 end,	 there	 was	 no	 agreement	 on	 a	 suitable	 place	 for	 the	model.	Hoffmeister	was	eventually	asked	to	take	back	his	model.	In	early	1880,	the	model	was	returned	with	a	remark	that	 ‘man	die	Idee	wegen	späterer	Errichtung	eines	 Kaiser	 Denkmals	 definitiv	 aufgegeben	 habe.’32	This	 turned	 out	 not	 to	 be	entirely	 true.	 After	 Wilhelm’s	 death	 in	 1888,	 the	 plan	 to	 erect	 a	 monument	dedicated	to	the	first	Emperor	came	up	again.	And	this	time,	they	were	actually	put	into	practice.																																																										28	StE	IV	193,	Allerdurchlauchtigster	Großmächtigster	Kaiser,	Allergnädigster	Kaiser,	König	und	Herr!	11.	Mai.	1879.		29	Ibid.	30	StE	IV	193,	Ministerium	der	geistlichen,	Unterrichts-	und	Medicinal-Angelegenheiten,	Berlin,	den	29.	Mai	1879		31	StE	IV	193,	Geschehen	Emden,	in	der	Magistrats-Sitzung	am	20.	October	1879.			32	StE	IV	193,	Emden,	in	der	Magistrats-Sitzung	am	26.	Januar	1880	
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Still,	 more	 interesting	 than	 the	 fact	 that	 Emden	 eventually	 received	 a	Wilhelm	monument	is	the	fact	that	Emden	did	not	erect	a	monument	to	the	fallen	soldiers	of	the	Franco-Prussian	War.	This	circumstance	sheds	light	on	patriotic	and	nationalistic	 feelings	 prevalent	 in	 Emden	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	
Norddeutscher	Bund	and	the	Kaiserreich.	 It	 is	telling	that,	even	though	there	were	plans	for	a	monument	to	the	fallen	soldiers,	Emden	did	not	erect	a	war	memorial	to	the	Franco-Prussian	War,	the	war	that	unified	Germany.	Instead	of	celebrating	the	unification	of	the	German	nation,	the	people	of	Emden	glorified	Wilhelm	I	for	absorbing	Emden	into	the	 industrialised	Prussian	state.	Thus,	Emden’s	allegiance	was	 less	 with	 the	 German	 nation	 than	 with	 the	 Prussian	 state,	 which	 promised	economic	recovery.	With	this	in	mind,	it	will	be	particularly	interesting	to	see	if	the	expectations	of	economic	recovery	actually	materialised.			
	
b.	The	state	of	Emden’s	port	prior	to	1875		Indeed,	looking	at	Emden’s	trade	around	the	time	of	the	Reichsgründung,	it	is	easy	to	 understand	 why	 the	 Prussian	 annexation	 raised	 so	 much	 hope.	 During	 the	period	of	the	Hanoverian	rule,	Emden	had	hardly	made	any	progress	regarding	its	shipping	traffic.	The	table	below	shows	the	loading	capacity	of	sea	vessels	coming	and	going	out	of	Emden	between	1850	and	1870:			
Figure	3.1:	Emden’s	trade	before	the	German	Empire		 Arrivals	(capacity	in	1000t)	 Departures	(capacity	in	1000t)	1850	 27.4	 27.4	1860	 22.1	 24.0	1870	 36.1	 35.0	Source:	Kunz,	Scholl,	Deutsche	Seeschiffahrt,	pp.	154,	160		Even	though	Emden	was	able	to	increase	its	trade	in	the	20-year-period	between	1850	and	1870,	this	increase	was	only	marginal.	Compare	this	with	the	capacity	of	sea	vessels	going	into	Bremen	which	increased	from	307,	800	tons	in	1850	to	710,	000	tons	 in	1870.	During	 the	same	period,	 the	capacity	of	departing	vessels	rose	
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from	311,	600	tons	to	697,	700	tons.33	Thus,	Emden’s	port	had	fallen	far	behind	its	competitor	 on	 the	 River	 Weser	 by	 the	 time	 of	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 German	Empire.			 Naturally,	 Emden’s	mercantile	 community	 was	 not	 unaware	 of	 this.	 Soon	after	 the	Prussian	 annexation,	 voices	of	 displeasure	became	 louder	 in	Emden.	 In	1868,	Emden’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	published	a	memorandum	on	the	situation	of	Emden’s	port,	entitled	Denkschrift	betreffend	die	Anlage	eines	den	Anforderungen	
großer	Seeschiffe	genügenden	Hafens	an	der	Unter-Ems.34	In	this	memorandum,	it	is	described	 that	 most	 port	 cities,	 particularly	 those	 with	 a	 railway	 connection,	experienced	 an	 upswing	 of	 trade	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	 steam	 vessels.	 On	 the	other	hand,	Emden,	which	had	had	a	railway	connection	since	1855,	did	not	benefit	in	 the	 same	way	 as	 port	 cities	 like	Bremen	or	 Stettin,	 for	 example.	 Amongst	 the	manifold	 reasons	 for	 this	 deplorable	 state	 of	 affairs,	 Emden’s	 Carl	 Dantziger,	president	of	the	Chamber	and	member	of	Emden’s	Senate,	argued	that	the	railway	was	 built	 too	 late.	 However,	 even	more	 importantly,	 Dantziger	 pointed	 out	 that	Emden’s	 port	 did	 not	 meet	 the	 standards	 of	 other	 leading	 international	 port	cities.35	It	is	hardly	surprising	that	Emden’s	position	in	competition	with	port	cities	on	the	rivers	Weser	and	Elbe	was	poor.	The	memorandum	explains	that	‘daß	jetzt	alle	 größeren	 Seeschiffe	 die	 Ems	 so	 viel	 als	möglich	meiden	 und	dieselbe	 ferner	meiden	werden,	so	lange	es	hier	an	einem	für	die	große	Seeschifffahrt	berechneten	Hafen	mangelt.’36	In	 fact,	 the	 report	 claims	 that	 ‘[g]rößere	 Schiffe	 aber	 finden	 an	der	Ems	zur	Zeit	keinen	preußischen	Hafen,	der	ihnen	gestattet,	mit	voller	Ladung	einzulaufen.’37	While	Emden’s	 location	on	 the	River	Ems	and	 its	proximity	 to	 the	Ruhr	area	was	beneficial,	this	advantage	was	undone	by	the	fact	that	traders	and	shippers	also	had	to	pay	high	costs	for	lighters.			 The	effect	of	the	poor	state	of	Emden’s	port	on	actual	trade	is	shown	using	the	 example	 of	 Emden’s	 wood	 trade.	 Since	 the	 Province	 of	Westphalia,	 with	 its	significant	 industry,	was	not	able	to	satisfy	its	demand	with	wood	from	Southern																																																									33	Kunz,	Scholl,	Deutsche	Seeschiffahrt,	pp.	232,	238	34	StE	IV	1450,	Handelskammer	Emden,	Denkschrift	betreffend	die	Anlage	eines	den	Anforderungen	großer	Seeschiffe	genügenden	Hafens	an	der	Unter-Ems,	1868	35	Ibid.,	pp.	4-5	36	Ibid.,	p.	12	37	Ibid.,	p.	12	
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Germany,	 it	 had	 to	 start	 importing	 from	 Scandinavia,	 Russia	 and	 Prussian	provinces	 on	 the	 Baltic	 Sea.	Most	 of	 this	 trade	was	 carried	 out	with	 the	 help	 of	traders	 on	 the	 rivers	Weser	 and	 Ems.	 Still,	 it	 is	 surprising	 that	 Emden’s	 traders	played	 a	 small	 role	 compared	 to	 traders	 on	 the	 River	 Weser,	 particularly	 with	regard	to	Emden’s	proximity	to	Westphalia.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	prior	to	the	Prussian	 annexation	of	East	 Friesland,	 freight	 rates	 from	Emden	 to	 the	Ruhr	area	had	not	been	competitive.	 In	 fact,	even	 the	area	around	Dortmund	could	be	provided	more	cheaply	with	wood	imported	via	Dutch	ports	than	via	Emden.	After	the	annexation	of	East	Friesland	and	a	petition	to	the	Prussian	Ministry	of	Trade,	freight	 rates	 to	 the	Ruhr	 area	were	 reduced.	 Emden’s	 traders	 could	 thus	 extend	their	 area	 of	 influence	 to	 Essen	 and	 Elberfeld,	 part	 of	 present-day	 Wuppertal.	However,	 the	 problem	 remained	 that	 larger	 vessels	 ‘verlangen	 nach	 der	 Ems	höhere	 Frachten,	wenn	 deren	 Capitaine	 bzw.	 Rheder	 überhaupt	 ihre	 Abneigung,	nach	der	Ems	zu	segeln,	soweit	überwinden,	daß	sie	zu	einer	Frachtforderung	sich	herbeilassen.’38	This	was	due	to	the	fact	that	larger	vessels	were	not	able	to	call	at	Emden’s	port.		 Hence,	even	though	there	was	the	chance	for	Emden	to	compete	with	Dutch	ports,	such	as	Rotterdam,	Amsterdam	and	Dordrecht,	this	possibility	could	not	be	exploited	 by	 Emden’s	 mercantile	 community.	 Naturally,	 this	 also	 had	 adverse	effects	on	the	railway	business.	While	vessels	of	normal	size	could	transport	wood	equal	 to	 115	 wagonloads,	 those	 vessels	 that	 were	 able	 to	 call	 at	 Emden	 only	carried	 between	 one	 eighth	 and	 one	 quarter	 of	 the	 normal	 load.	 Therefore,	 the	expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 to	 the	 size	 of	 a	 seaport	 was	 essential	 not	 only	 for	Emden’s	mercantile	 community	 but	 also	 for	 other	 business	 sectors,	 such	 as	 the	railway.	 After	 all,	 Emden	 represented	 ‘für	 den	 außerordentlich	 productiven	Industrie-Rayon	 zwischen	Hamm,	Dortmund,	 Bochum,	 Essen	und	Witten,	Hagen,	Barmen,	Elberfeld,	wie	 für	das	Siegener	Land	 […]	das	natürliche	Seethor.’39	Since	there	had	not	been	an	adequate	strategy	to	connect	Emden	with	the	Ruhr	area,	the	railway	distance	 from	 the	Ruhr	area	 to	Emden	was	 in	most	 cases	 longer	 than	 to	Rotterdam	 or	 Amsterdam.	 One	 of	 the	 few	 advantages	 for	 Emden	 was	 that	 the	Netherlands	 was	 outside	 the	 customs	 union,	 which	 made	 certain	 clearing	formalities	necessary.	The	memorandum	also	did	not	 fail	 to	emphasise	 that	with																																																									38	Ibid.,	p.	13	39	Ibid.,	p.	14	
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respect	to	other	German	ports,	like	Bremerhaven	or	Heppens,	part	of	present-day	Wilhelmshaven,	 Emden	 was	 in	 a	 favourable	 geographical	 position	 due	 to	 its	proximity	to	the	industrial	Ruhr	area.		Consequently,	Emden’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	argued	for	the	establishment	of	a	seaport	that	was	capable	of	competing	with	Rotterdam	and	Amsterdam’s	role	as	gateways	to	the	Ruhr	area.	With	reference	to	Emden’s	history	it	was	emphasised	‘daß	 namentlich	 unsere	 holländischen	 Nachbarn	 beim	 Aufkommen	 neuer	Unternehmungen	 in	 Emden	 alsbald	 eine	 Concurrenz	 auf	 Tod	 und	 Leben	begannen.’40	After	 both	 sides	 had	 prevailed	 in	 this	 life-or-death	 struggle,	 it	 was	said	to	be	usual	for	both	sides	to	agree	on	acceptable	terms	and	not	interfere	in	the	other’s	business.	However,	for	this	to	happen	it	was	essential	for	Emden	to	first	of	all	 challenge	 its	 competitors.	 Besides	 purely	 economical	 reasons,	 such	 as	 the	advantages	 for	 the	 Westphalian	 railway,	 Emden’s	 Handelskammer	 also	 brought	forward	 more	 emotional	 arguments	 for	 an	 expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port.	 One	example	for	this	is	the	following	excerpt:			Diese	 in	 jeder	 Hinsicht	 unzurechtfertigende	 Vernachlässigung	 der	 Ems	 ist	allein	 ein	 genügender	 Grund,	 die	 Sünden	 der	 Vergangenheit	 gegenüber	Emden	dadurch	wieder	gut	zu	machen,	daß	Preußen	jetzt	nicht	ebenfalls	als	nur	 nach	 büreaukratischen	 Ansichten	 handelnder	 Fiscus,	 sondern	 als	 eine	über	 den	 Parteien	 und	 Interessen	 stehende	 Staatsregierung	 verfährt	 und	dabei	 nach	 Rücksichten	 der	 Billigkeit	 und	 des	 moralischen	 Rechts	 ein	solches	 Abkommen	mit	 der	 Stadt	 Emden	 zu	 schließen	 sucht,	 das	 nicht	 am	Ende	die	Stadt	 in	neue	Verlegenheit	bringt,	die	 ihrer	Einwohnerschaft	 zum	Druck	 und	 schließlich	 auch	 dem	 Staate	 selbst	 zum	 größten	 Nachtheil	gereichen	würde.41			Thus,	according	 to	 the	opinion	of	people	 in	Emden,	 it	was	not	only	economically	sensible	to	invest	in	its	port	but	also	morally	imperative	to	financially	support	East	Friesland.	In	fact,	there	was	more	to	this	than	just	Emden’s	fate	as	a	port	city.	In	the	eyes	 of	 Emden’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 supporting	 Emden	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	become	 a	 major	 seaport	 on	 the	 North	 Sea	 coast	 constituted	 as	 ‘eine	 Förderung	
																																																								40	Ibid.,	p.	16	41	Ibid.,	p.	27	
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hochwichtiger	staats-	und	nationalöconomischer	Interessen	[…]’42	It	was	perfectly	possible	to	supply	the	Ruhr	area	via	Dutch	ports.	So,	 there	was	no	direct	need	to	import	goods	destined	for	the	Ruhr	area	via	Emden,	which	would	have	needed	an	expensive	 expansion.	 	 Hence,	 when	 talking	 about	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 state	economy	and	the	national	economy,	Emden’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	pointed	to	the	importance	 of	 prioritising	 Prussian	 interests	 over	 Dutch	 interests.	 For	 Emden,	which	was	in	a	geographically	favourable	position,	it	was	unacceptable	that	Dutch	port	cities	were	benefitting	from	the	Ruhr	area’s	industrial	success	–	the	Ruhr	area	was	Prussian	after	all.				 In	light	of	Emden’s	lack	of	ambition	to	celebrate	the	new	nation	in	the	form	of	 a	 monument,	 this	 point	 of	 view	 is	 noticeable.	 From	 the	 beginning,	 Emden	focussed	on	its	role	as	a	seaport	within	the	Prussian	state.	This	view	seems	to	have	prevailed	after	the	foundation	of	the	German	Empire,	as	we	have	seen	by	looking	at	 the	debates	regarding	 the	erection	of	a	monument.	Prussia	 remained	Emden’s	focal	 point,	 yet,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 condition	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 facilities,	 this	 is	hardly	surprising.	Under	Hanoverian	rule,	Emden’s	port	was	neglected	and	other	port	 cities	 became	 the	 focus,	 such	 as	 Harburg	 and	 Geestemünde.	 Seeing	 that	Harburg	 is	 located	 on	 the	 River	 Elbe	 and	 Geestemünde	 on	 the	 River	Weser,	 the	decision	to	favour	these	two	places	was	most	likely	based	on	economic	reasoning.	Now,	after	the	annexation,	there	was	the	chance	for	Emden	to	take	advantage	of	its	proximity	 to	 the	 industrial	 Ruhr	 area.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 in	order	to	pursue	this	goal,	Emden	had	to	take	on	a	less	liberal	stance	than	Bremen,	for	 example,	which	 had	 already	 established	 itself	 as	 a	major	 seaport.	 There	was	simply	no	room	for	liberalism	and	enthusiasm	for	the	new	nation-state	as	long	as	Emden	was	struggling	with	its	poor	position	as	a	port	city	on	the	North	Sea	Coast.			 The	actual	condition	of	Emden’s	port	 is	best	described	by	 looking	at	some	complaint	letters.	Carl	Dantziger	stands	out	as	a	critic	of	the	situation	and	an	active	advocate	for	new	port	facilities	in	Emden.	In	a	letter	to	the	city	council,	Dantziger	complained	that	‘[l]eider	sind	wir	im	Gefühle	der	Zufriedenheit	bereits	auf	eine	so	niedrige	Stufe	angelangt,	daß	mir	z.	B.	das	glückliche	Einlaufen	der	Banadotte	ohne	das	 übliche	 Festsitzenbleiben	 sehr	 viel	 Freude	 bereitete.’43	However,	 Dantziger’s	relief	 was	 only	 short-lived.	 Before	 being	 able	 to	 enter	 the	 port	 of	 Emden,	 the																																																									42	Ibid.,	p.	28	43	StE	IV	1450,	Emden,	den	30.	März	1870,	An	Wohllöblichen	Magistrat	hierselbst.	
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Banadotte	had	to	make	use	of	lighters	in	order	to	have	fewer	draughts.	This	led	to	additional	costs	of	800	Thaler.	In	addition	to	this,	the	vessel’s	exposure	time	had	to	be	 extended,	 leading	 to	 even	 higher	 costs.	 Cause	 for	 complaint	 was	 given	 to	Dantziger	by	 the	 fact	 that	Emden’s	port	 should	have	had	a	depth	of	at	 least	14.5	Hanoverian	feet.44	In	another	incident,	the	Russian	vessel	Concordia	was	lightered	to	 10.5	 feet	 draught	 and	 still	 could	 not	 reach	 its	 designated	 quay.	 Here	 again,	additional	costs	arose	for	Dantziger.	These	costs	had	to	be	paid	by	himself,	as	‘[d]er	Empfänger	 findet	 die	 Berechnung	 der	 Letzteren	 [Lichterkosten]	 lächerlich	 	 und	verweigert	 die	 Erstattung.’45	Thereupon,	 Dantziger	was	 even	 advised	 to	 relocate	his	business	to	Papenburg,	which	is	situated	south	from	Emden	on	the	River	Ems,	or	 to	 at	 least	 establish	 a	 local	 branch	 there.	 Dantziger	 points	 to	 the	 fact	 that	competition	 from	 Papenburg	 was	 becoming	 overwhelming.	 So,	 instead	 of	 being	able	 to	 challenge	 Dutch	 ports,	 or	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen,	 in	 reality,	 Emden	 was	struggling	to	fight	off	small	ports	in	the	region,	such	as	Papenburg.	Consequently,	Dantziger	was	harsh	in	his	criticism	of	the	city	council.	He	highlighted:			 […]	 andererseits	 ist	 hier	 ein	 Sparsystem	eingerissen,	 das	 überall	 spart	 und	selbst	 am	 unrechtesten	 Orte:	 an	 unserem	 Fahrwasser,	 der	 nährenden	Hauptader,	wenn	Emden	nicht	etwa	zur	Ackerstadt	herabsinken	soll,	welche	lediglich	 aus	 der	 Ausbeutung	 der	 Production	 und	 Befriedigung	 der	Consumtion	der	nächsten	Umgegend	ein	unrühmliches	Dasein	fristet.46		Apart	 from	 urging	 the	 city	 council	 to	 arrange	 a	 refurbishment	 of	 Emden’s	 port,	Dantziger	 also	 suggested	 the	 abolition	 of	 harbour	 dues.	 Only	 	 this	 way,	 it	 was	argued,	would	Emden	be	able	to	withstand	competition	from	other	port	cities.		 	It	was	 not	 only	Dantziger	who	 had	 reason	 to	 complain	 about	 the	 state	 of	Emden’s	 port.	 In	 May	 1870,	 one	 of	 Emden’s	 harbour	 pilots,	 G.	 Dirks,	 was	interviewed	 in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 had	 been	impossible	for	his	colleague,	B.	H.	Loop,	to	navigate	the	Caesar	to	the	railway	quay.	Dirks	declared	 that	 the	Caesar	 had	a	draught	of	 eleven	 feet.	At	high	 tide,	 the	 sea	level	rose	by	about	9.5	to	10	feet.	Yet,	the	problem	was	that,	when	the	tide	was	out,	sludge	protruded	from	the	sea	level	by	about	1.5	feet.	Thus,	vessels	like	the	Caesar																																																									44	14.5	Hanoverian	feet	are	equal	to	around	4.2m	45	Ibid.		46	Ibid.		
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were	 not	 able	 to	 enter	 Emden’s	 port.	 Even	 vessels	with	 no	more	 than	 9.25	 feet	draught	 got	 stuck	 in	 the	 sludge.	 Dirks	 concluded:	 ‘Der	 Zustand	 im	Dock	 ist	 also	miserabel.’47	This	list	of	complaints	could	be	extended	endlessly.		Overall,	what	all	 these	examples	make	clear	 is	 that	Emden’s	port	was	 in	a	miserable	state	when	the	German	Empire	was	founded.	So,	even	though	it	had	only	been	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time,	 the	 Prussian	 annexation	 had	 not	 yet	 led	 to	 any	improvement	 of	 the	 situation.	 Eventually,	 due	 to	 the	 amount	 of	 complaints,	Emden’s	city	council	decided	to	get	in	contact	with	the	Prussian	Ministry	of	Trade	in	June	1870.	This	was	done	after	the	Centralverein	für	Hebung	der	Deutschen	Fluss-	
und	Kanalschifffahrt	had	already	pointed	out	the	bad	state	of	Emden’s	port	to	the	Ministry	in	March	1870.48	In	the	city	council’s	note	to	the	Minister	of	Trade,	it	was	explained	that	the	city	had	commissioned	a	Dutch	engineer	to	present	a	solution	to	the	 sanding	 up	 of	 Emden’s	 port.	 Naturally,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 highlighted	 the	seriousness	of	the	situation	by	pointing	out	that	‘wir	jetzt	von	der	tiefen	Stromrille	fast	 ganz	 abgeschnitten	 sind,	 und	 vollständig	 abgeschnitten	werden,	wenn	 nicht	bald	 etwas	 Nachhaltiges	 geschieht.’49	The	 plan	 suggested	 by	 the	 Dutch	 engineer	envisaged	 embanking	 certain	 parts	 of	 land,	 which	 was	 not	 owned	 by	 Emden.	Without	going	 into	 further	detail	about	 the	exact	plan,	 the	city	council	asked	 the	Prussian	Ministry	to	assign	this	 land	to	Emden.	When	leaving	the	matter	entirely	up	to	the	Prussian	state,	the	city	council	was	concerned	‘daß	noch	eine	mehr	oder	minder	 längere	 Zeit	 verstreichen	 werde,	 bevor	 zu	 ausführenden	 Thaten	geschritten	 wird.’50	However,	 it	 seems	 that	 due	 to	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Franco-Prussian	War	 in	 July	1870,	 the	plan	 to	 improve	Emden’s	 situation	ultimately	 ran	out	of	resources.		After	 the	 Franco-Prussian	 War,	 the	 Prussian	 government	 only	 pressed	ahead	with	 the	matter	 slowly.	 In	 the	meantime,	 the	 shipping	 channel	 had	 to	 be	constantly	 dug	 mechanically.	 It	 was	 not	 clear	 who	 had	 to	 pay	 for	 these	 works,	either	 the	 city	 or	 the	 state.	 In	 August	 1871,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 was	 informed	about	 the	 position	 that	 the	 Prussian	 Minister	 of	 Trade,	 Heinrich	 Friedrich	 von	Itzenplitz,	 had	 taken	 in	 the	 matter.	 According	 to	 the	 Landdrostei	 in	 Aurich,																																																									47	StE	IV	1450,	Geschehen	Emden,	im	Secretäriate	der	Handelskammer	am	18.	Mai	1870.	48	See	StE	IV	1450,	Centralverein	für	Hebung	der	Deutschen	Fluss-	und	Kanalschifffahrt,	Berlin	17.	März	1870.	49	StE	IV	1450,	Magistrat	zu	Emden.	Emden,	d.	20.	Juni	1870.	50	Ibid.	
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Itzenplitz	 harboured	 some	 doubt	 about	 fundamental	 construction	 works	 on	Emden’s	 port	 facilities.	 Itzenplitz	 stated	 that	 ‘nach	 dem	 jetzigen	 Stande	 der	Ermittelungen	 über	 die	 Ausführbarkeit	 der	 Verbesserung	 des	 Emdener	Fahrwasser	 auf	 ein	 gewagtes	 unzulässiges	 Experiment	 hinauslaufen.’ 51 	While	Emden	had	planned	to	deepen	its	port	to	24	feet	in	order	to	accommodate	larger	vessels,	 the	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 regarded	 this	 as	 being	 too	 expensive	 to	 keep	 up.	Itzenplitz	 came	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 no	 fundamental	 expansion	 works	 should	take	 place	 in	 Emden	 until	 there	was	 certainty	 about	 the	 success	 of	 such	works.	Here,	 Itzenplitz	 was	 referring	 to	 construction	 works	 that	 had	 been	 undertaken	under	 Hanoverian	 rule	 in	 the	 1840s.	 Evidently,	 these	 had	 not	 led	 to	 permanent	relief	 for	 Emden’s	 port.	 Still,	 it	 was	 regarded	 as	 necessary	 to	 produce	 at	 least	 a	temporary	improvement	of	the	situation	by	carrying	out	excavation	works.	However,	 the	 start	 of	 these	 works	 was	 again	 delayed.	 In	 January	 1872,	Emden’s	Kaufmännische	Deputation	 notified	 the	 city	 council	 that	 the	 number	 of	complaints	about	Emden’s	port	had	still	not	dissipated.	In	fact,	it	was	emphasised	that	 ‘der	 Nothstand,	 der	 sie	 hervorruft,	 [ist]	 wohl	 auch	 noch	 nie	 auf	 der	gegenwärtigen	Höhe	gewesen.’52	It	was	only	possible	for	vessels	with	around	9	feet	draught	 to	enter	 the	port	of	Emden.	As	a	 result	of	 this,	 the	deputation	urged	 the	city	 council	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 the	 planned	 works	 were	 carried	 out	 as	 soon	 as	possible.	 Otherwise,	 Emden’s	 future	 would	 look	 grim:	 ‘Haben	 erst	 die	 Hafen-Verhältnisse	ein	überseeisches	Geschäft	für	Emden	unmöglich	gemacht	–	und	wir	scheinen	 uns	 diesem	 Punkte	 jetzt	 mit	 Riesenschritten	 zu	 nähern	 –	 so	 wird	 es	ungeheuer	schwer	fallen,	das	verlorene	Feld	wieder	zu	gewinnen.’53	In	this	regard,	the	Kaufmännische	Deputation	also	contacted	the	Minister	of	Trade.	 In	 a	 note	 to	 Itzenplitz,	 the	 deputation	 asked:	 ‘Wie	 sollen	 überseeische	Geschäfte	 möglich	 bleiben,	 wenn	 schon	 Schiffe	 von	 noch	 nicht	 6	 Fuß	 Tiefgange	Lichterkosten	erfordern.’54	Due	to	the	urgency	of	the	matter,	Itzenplitz	was	asked	to	 take	 immediate	 action	 and	 telegraph	 the	 responsible	 authority	 in	 Emden.	Indeed,	 this	 letter	 seems	 to	have	made	an	 impact	 in	Berlin.	 Itzenplitz	 responded	that	the	royal	authorities	in	Aurich	had	already	been	ordered	to	produce	relief	in																																																									51	StE	IV	1450,	Abschrift,	Aurich,	d.	29.	August,	No.	1975	52 	StE	 IV	 1450,	 Emden,	 d.	 17.	 Januar	 1872,	 Kaufmännische	 Deputation,	 Betr.	 die	Beschaffenheit	der	Ems	vor	der	Mündung	des	hiesigen	Fahrwassers	53	Ibid.	54	StE	IV	1450,	Kaufmännische	Deputation,	Emden,	d.	15.	Febr	1872.	
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Emden.	In	fact,	it	looks	like	the	persistence	of	Emden’s	mercantile	community	and	the	added	note	of	desperation	finally	paid	off.	In	October,	Emden’s	city	council	was	informed	 about	 the	 extremely	 positive	 impact	 of	 the	 excavations	 works	 on	Emden’s	port.	Now,	 the	deputation	even	went	a	 step	 further	and	demanded	 that	the	 city	 council	 press	 ahead	 with	 plans	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port	facilities.55	This	request	turned	out	to	be	overhasty	and	it	came	to	nothing.			 A	year	on,	in	September	1873,	it	was	the	city	of	Emden	which	seems	to	have	neglected	 its	 duty	 to	 keep	 its	 part	 of	 the	 port	 in	 good	 condition.	 In	 order	 to	illustrate	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 situation,	 the	 following	 example	 is	 given:	 ‘Ein	Dampfschiff	 hat	 einem	 festgerathenen	 Segelschiff	 das	 ganze	 Heck	 eingerammt	[…].’56	From	these	reports,	one	gets	the	impression	that	the	situation	in	Emden	at	the	 time	was	chaotic.	Not	even	after	 this	bleak	description	of	 the	port’s	state	did	the	city	 council	 react	and	still	 the	Hanoverian	Kingdom	was	blamed	 for	Emden’s	misery.	Now	 that	 the	 city	was	 under	 Prussian	 rule,	 it	was	 expected	 that	 Prussia	would	 take	 care	 of	 improving	 Emden’s	 situation.	However,	 since	 there	 seems	 to	have	 been	 no	 comprehensive	 plan	 for	 Emden	 by	 the	 Prussian	 state	 to	 do	 this,	Emden	remained	in	an	economic	standstill.	Without	any	official	plans	for	the	port’s	development,	extensive	investments	by	Emden’s	city	council	made	little	sense.	 In	May	1874,	 the	Kaufmännische	Deputation	 sent	 another	 letter	 of	 complaint	 to	 the	city	council.	Once	again,	it	was	emphasised	that	‘daß	während	der	nun	begonnenen	eigentlichen	Schlammbildungs-Periode	ein	förmlicher	Nothstand,	schlimmer	als	je	zuvor,	sich	ausgestalten	werde.’57	In	response	to	this,	 the	city	council	argued	that	the	 situation	was	not	 as	disastrous	 as	pointed	out	 by	 the	mercantile	 deputation.	According	 to	Emden’s	 city	 council,	 it	was	 ‘von	 sachverständiger	 Seite	 anerkannt,	daß	der	Zustand	erheblich	besser	ist,	als	zuvor.’58	Due	to	a	depth	of	10.5	to	12	feet,	even	 vessels	 of	 11.5	 feet	 draught	were	 said	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 easily	 entering	 the	port.			 With	regard	to	the	quantity	of	reports	about	the	severity	of	the	situation,	it	has	 to	 be	 wondered	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 city	 council’s	 depiction	 was	 truthful.	Overall,	 what	 all	 these	 reports	 highlight	 is	 that	 by	 1874	 the	 Prussian	 state	 and	Emden’s	 city	 council	 had	 still	 not	 been	 able	 to	 find	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem																																																									55	StE	IV	1450,	Kaufmännische	Deputation,	Emden,	d.	26.	October	1872	56	StE	IV	1450,	Kaufmännische	Deputation,	Emden,	d.	4.	Septbr.	1873	57	StE	IV	1450,	Kaufmännische	Deputation,	Emden,	d.	5.	Mai	1874	58	StE	IV	1450,	Der	Magistrat,	Emden,	den	12.	Mai	1874	
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concerning	 Emden’s	 mercantile	 community,	 namely	 the	 state	 of	 Emden’s	 port.	Irrespective	of	which	side	had	to	be	blamed	for	this,	the	status	quo	must	have	felt	like	a	massive	blow	 to	Emden’s	merchants.	The	 subsequent	 frustration	with	 this	situation	is	demonstrated	by	Carl	Dantziger.	In	a	letter,	Dantziger	let	his	emotions	and	 thoughts	 run	 free.	 Dantziger	 signalled	 that	 it	 was	 simply	 impossible	 to	maintain	 the	 intended	 depth	 of	 14	 feet	 in	 Emden’s	 port.	 Dantziger	 blamed	 the	Prussian	state	for	not	meeting	its	obligations:	‘Eben	so	klar	ist	es,	daß	die	Stadt	den	Faldern-Delft	 nicht	 reinhalten	 kann,	 wenn	 der	 Staat	 seine	 übernommenen	Pflichten	 hinsichtlich	 Offenhaltung	 der	 Strecke	 von	 der	 Dockmündnung	 bis	 zur	sogenannten	 Netzbrücke	 ungenügend	 erfüllt.’ 59 	In	 addition	 to	 describing	 the	deficiencies	of	the	construction	works	in	Emden’s	port,	Dantziger	also	mentioned	an	extremely	 interesting	 fact.	Dantziger	 admitted	 that	 ‘unter	 solchen	Umständen	der	Stadt	nur	das	sogenannte	Binnenspyten	[übrigblieb].’60	This	means	that	Emden	decided	 to	 flood	 its	 port	 with	 water	 from	 the	 inland	 thereby	 draining	 inland	waterways.	What	consequences	this	decision	would	have	had	if	it	had	been	made	public	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 following	 statement:	 ‘Über	 diesen	 Act	 verzweifelter	Selbsthülfe	 wird	 man	 allerdings	 schweigen	 müssen,	 wenn	 man	 nicht	 die	 üblen	Folgen	als	indirecte	durch	die	Unterlassungen	der	König.	Verwaltung	hinzustellen	Willens	ist.’61		This	is	the	situation	in	which	Emden	found	itself	prior	to	1875,	when	there	was	 a	 significant	 change	 in	 the	 city’s	 political	 scene.	 In	 1875,	 Leo	 Fürbringer	assumed	the	office	of	Mayor	of	Emden	and	was	able	to	revive	Emden’s	status	as	a	port	 city.	 It	 was	 essential	 to	 look	 at	 the	 circumstances	 prior	 to	 Fürbringer’s	assumption	 of	 office	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 impact	 that	 Fürbringer	 had	 on	Emden.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 it	 had	 been	 almost	 nine	 years	 since	 the	 Prussian	annexation	and	there	was	still	no	sign	of	permanent	relief	 in	Emden.	Frustration	with	the	way	Emden’s	port	was	maintained	was	beginning	to	grow.				
	
	
																																																									59	StE	IV	1450,	Undated	letter	(probably	written	between	May	and	August	1874),	Die	hiesigen	Hafenanlagen…	60	Ibid.	61	Ibid.		
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c.	Emden,	quo	vadis?		In	 spring	 1875,	 Emden’s	 Oberbürgermeister,	 Ernst	 Hantelmann,	 went	 into	retirement.	 Hantelmann	 wanted	 to	 return	 to	 his	 home	 city	 Hanover,	 where	 he	continued	 to	work	 as	 a	 notary.	 Leo	 Fürbringer,	who	was	 at	 that	 point	mayor	 of	Weimar,	 applied	 for	 the	 vacant	 job	 as	mayor	 of	 Emden.	 Fortunately	 for	 the	 city,	Wilhelm	I	accepted	Fürbringer’s	application,	so	that	his	long	tenure	of	office	could	begin	on	July	18	1875.	Before	looking	at	how	Fürbringer	changed	Emden’s	fate	as	a	port	city,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	it	was	not	just	trade	and	shipping	upon	which	Fürbringer	focused.	Instead,	Fürbringer	began	early	to	set	a	comprehensive	course	for	putting	Emden	back	on	the	map.	As	Rolf	Uphoff	has	shown,	by	centralising	the	city’s	 administration	 on	 him,	 Fürbringer	 was	 able	 to	 make	 it	 more	 efficient.	Furthermore,	 Fürbringer	 got	 involved	 with	 turning	 Emden	 into	 a	 centre	 for	telegraphy.	 In	 1879,	 after	 long	 negotiations	with	 the	 imperial	 post,	 the	 post	 and	telegraphy	office	made	Emden	the	connecting	point	 for	overseas	 telegraphy.	One	reason	 for	 this	was	 that	 Emden’s	 new	mayor	 lobbied	 intensively	 for	 the	 city.	 In	order	to	realise	his	plans,	Fürbringer	befriended	the	State	Secretary	in	the	Imperial	Post	Office,	Heinrich	von	Stephan,	to	whom	he	also	dedicated	a	square	in	Emden.62	Not	 only	 that,	 Fürbringer’s	 network	 included	 important	 figures	 in	 the	 Prussian	government	 as	 well	 as	 Prussia’s	 royal	 house.	 The	 mark	 that	 Fürbringer	 left	 on	Emden	is	impressive	and	will	be	further	examined	below.		 It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 Fürbringer	 did	 not	 start	 at	 zero.	 For	example,	plans	for	the	construction	of	the	Ems-Jade-Kanal,	which	was	in	line	with	developing	 Wilhelmshaven	 as	 the	 base	 for	 the	 Imperial	 Navy	 in	 the	 North	 Sea,	were	made	in	the	early	1870s.	In	1874,	Emden	was	informed	by	the	Landdrostei	in	Aurich	 that	 the	 Prussian	 Minister	 of	 Trade	 wanted	 to	 discuss	 ‘den	 Plan	 zur	Verbesserung	 der	 Emdener	Hafenanstalten	 in	 Verbindung	mit	 Umgestaltung	 des	Treckfahrt-Canals	 zu	 einem	 Bestandtheile	 des	 zwischen	 Emden	 und	Wilhelmshaven	 anzulegenden	 Schifffahrts-Kanals,	 wodurch	 eine	 gründliche	Verbesserung	 der	 Abwässerungsverhältnisse	 im	 Emden’er	 Pegelverbande	 in	
																																																								62	Ostfriesische	Landschaft,	Rolf	Uphoff,	‘Leo	Fürbringer’:	http://www.ostfriesischelandschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/BIBLIOTHEK/BLO/Fuerbringer.pdf	Accessed:	18/04/2016	
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Aussicht	steht	[…].’63	As	pointed	out	by	Uphoff,	 the	Ems-Jade-Kanal	was	seen	as	a	way	to	connect	Wilhelmshaven	indirectly	to	the	Ruhr	area.64	Therefore,	one	has	to	be	careful	when	construing	the	canal’s	construction	as	a	Prussian	plan	to	 further	Emden’s	 connection	 to	 its	 hinterland	 or	 to	 even	 just	 fulfil	 the	 needs	 of	 Emden’s	mercantile	community.	Certainly,	Emden	benefitted	from	this	situation,	while	the	primary	concern	of	 these	plans	was	Wilhelmshaven.	Having	said	 this,	Fürbringer	still	emphatically	pursued	his	own	plan	of	improving	the	state	of	Emden’s	port.			 However,	 even	 Leo	 Fürbringer	 could	 not	 work	 wonders.	 The	 road	 to	improvement	 for	 Emden’s	 port	 was	 a	 long	 one.	 Right	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	Fürbringer’s	tenure,	the	Kaufmännische	Deputation	was	pressing	for	a	more	active	course	 of	 action	 with	 regard	 to	 Emden’s	 port.	 In	 January	 1876,	 the	 deputation	requested	 of	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 ‘bei	 der	 königlichen	 Regierung	 [Discussion]	beantragen	[zu]	wollen,	daß	die	gänzliche	Klarstellung	des	Emder	Hafenprojektes	nunmehr	erfolge	und	seine	Ausführung	alsdann	umgesäumt	in	Angriff	genommen	werde.’65	Still,	 the	 Prussian	Minister	 of	 Trade,	 Heinrich	 von	 Achenbach,	 was	 not	convinced	 about	 the	 necessity	 of	 modernising	 Emden’s	 port.	 In	 response	 to	Emden’s	 efforts,	 Achenbach	 informed	 the	 city	 that	 he	 needed	 more	 detailed	information	 on	 the	 practicality	 of	 any	 works	 on	 the	 port	 of	 Emden,	 ’damit	übersehen	 werden	 kann	 in	 welchem	 Verhältniß	 der	 beanspruchte	 bedeutende	Aufwand	zu	den	dadurch	erreichenden	Zwecken	steht.’66			 In	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 convince	 Achenbach	 and	 to	 promote	 construction	works	 on	 Emden’s	 port,	 the	 municipal	 authorities	 of	 Emden	 produced	 a	memorandum,	signed	by	Fürbringer.	It	gives	insight	into	the	plan	that	was	worked	out	in	Emden.	Being	divided	into	two	parts,	the	first	part	discussed	the	volume	and	importance	 of	 Emden’s	 trade	 and	 shipping.	 The	 second	 part	 then	 dealt	with	 the	prerequisites	that	justified	expectations	about	an	upswing	of	trade	and	shipping	in	Emden	 after	 the	 expansion	 of	 its	 port	 facilities.	 From	 the	 beginning,	 it	 becomes	apparent	 that	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 arguments	 were	 put	 had	 changed	 since	Hantelmann’s	office.	The	memorandum	was	written	in	a	decisive	and	determined																																																									63	StE	IV	1431,	Königliche	Landdrostei,	Aurich,	den	7.	April	1874	64	Ostfriesische	Landschaft,	Rolf	Uphoff,	‘Leo	Fürbringer’:	http://www.ostfriesischelandschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/BIBLIOTHEK/BLO/Fuerbringer.pdf	Accessed:	18/04/2016	65	StE	IV	1450,	Kaufmännische	Deputation	betr.	die	Hafenfrage,	Emden,	13.	Januar	1876	66	StE	IV	1450,	Königliche	Landdrostei	Aurich,	Aurich,	den	19ten	April	1876.	
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way.	 For	 example,	 it	 set	 out	 by	 asking	 if	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce’s	 annual	reports	had	led	Achenbach	to	believe	‘entweder,	daß	die	dieselben	zu	wenig	über	den	 Handel	 und	 die	 Schifffahrt	 Emden’s	 enthielten,	 daß	 sie	 sachlich	 zu	 dürftig	seien,	 oder	 aber,	 daß	 das	 Bild	 […]	 es	 nicht	 rechtfertigen	 könne’	 to	 allow	 the	expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 facilities.67	For	 this	 reason,	 the	 memorandum	 once	again	explains	the	situation	of	Emden’s	port.	Naturally,	the	picture	that	is	given	is	not	 as	 disastrous	 as	 many	 of	 the	 complaints	 of	 the	 Kaufmännische	 Deputation	suggest.		Instead,	it	is	pointed	out:		 daß	 der	 Schiffsverkehr	 im	 Hafen	 von	 Emden	 sich	 in	 aufsteigender	 Linie	bewegt,	 daß	 namentlich	 der	 Verkehr	 mit	 außerdeutschen	 Häfen	 erheblich	zugenommen	 hat,	 desgleichen,	 daß	 die	 Emder	 Kaufleute	 von	 Jahr	 zu	 Jahr	mehr	 bestrebt	 sind,	 sich	 für	 ihren	 Seehandel	 die	 Vortheile	 größerer	Fahrzeuge	 zuzueignen,	 soweit	 die	 Hafenverhältnisse	 dies	 überhaupt	gestattet	haben,	daß	endlich	unserm	Handel	nicht	blos	die	natürlichen	und	historischen	 Grundlagen,	 die	 Getreide-	 und	 Prodcuten-Ausfuhr	 treu	geblieben,	 sondern	 sich	 auch	 im	 Holzhandel	 eine	 neue	 Branche	 des	Eigenhandels	 herausgebildet	 hat,	 durch	 welche	 Emden	 schon	 jetzt	 im	Welthandel	eine	ansehnliche	Stellung	einnimmt	und	im	Begriffe	ist,	sich	eine	noch	größere	zu	erobern	und	den	Markt	mit	zu	beherrschen	[…]68		It	 highlighted	 that	 under	 the	 current	 state	 of	 Emden’s	 port,	 these	 achievements	were	 only	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 strenuous	 efforts	 of	 Emden’s	 mercantile	community.			 The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 memorandum	 neatly	 follows	 on	 from	 there.	 The	determination	 of	 Emden’s	 merchants	 is	 given	 as	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	expectations	of	a	brighter	future	after	an	expansion	of	the	port.	Other	reasons	are	of	 historic,	 geographic,	 trade	 political	 and	 commercial	 nature.	 It	was	 underlined	that	even	after	Emden’s	misfortunes,	which	included	foreign	rule,	the	city	was	still	active	 in	 trade	 and	 shipping.	 More	 importantly,	 Emden’s	 history	 and	 geography	met	 all	 conditions	 which	 ‘zur	 Bildung	 eines	 großen	 Marktes	 oder	
																																																								67	StE	IV	1432,	Denkschrift	über	den	Umfang	und	die	Bedeutung	des	Handels	und	der	Seeschifffahrt	von	Emden	mit	Bezug	auf	die	Nothwendigkeit	einer	Umgestaltung	des	Emder	Hafens,	Emden,	den	31.	Mai	1876	68	Ibid.		
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Handelsemporiums	erforderlich	sind.’69	Emden	still	 regarded	 itself	as	 the	natural	port	 for	 the	 Rhineland	 and	 Westphalia.	 Despite	 competition	 from	 Antwerp,	Rotterdam	and	Bremen,	there	can	be	no	doubt	about	the	high	ambitions	and	hopes	connected	to	Emden’s	role	in	the	Prussian	state.	After	all,	Emden’s	merchants	‘sind	so	zu	sagen	 im	Welthandel	zu	Hause	und	wußten	von	 jeher	alle	Chancen,	die	sie	der	politischen	Ereignisse	und	der	Lage	des	Welthandels	abgewinnen	konnten,	für	sich	 auszubeuten.’70	Proof	 of	 this	 was	 given	 by	 a	 projected	 shipping	 line	 from	Emden	 to	 Great	 Britain	 and	 even	 to	 New	 York,	 in	 competition	 with	 Bremen’s	connection	 to	 the	United	States.	 In	 the	end,	all	 these	projects	had	 to	be	dropped.	Instead,	the	shipping	service	to	New	York	was	established	from	Stettin.71	Still,	with	this	 memorandum,	 Emden’s	 authorities	 resolutely	 backed	 demands	 for	 an	expansion	of	its	port	facilities.		 At	this	point,	the	situation	of	Emden	and	other	ports	on	the	River	Ems	was	also	 openly	 discussed	 in	 a	 four-part	 newspaper	 article	 on	 Die	 zukünftige	
Konkurrenzfähigkeit	der	Emshäfen.72	In	the	first	part,	it	asked	why	the	ports	on	the	River	 Ems	 were	 not	 able	 to	 benefit	 from	 its	 geographical	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	industrial	region	of	Westphalia.	Instead	of	German	ports,	Dutch	ports	were	taking	advantage	of	 the	German	Empire’s	 industrialisation.	With	 regard	 to	 this	 fact,	 the	article	 highlighted:	 ‘Man	 mag	 Holland	 alles	 Gute	 wünschen,	 aber	 so	 lange	 es	festgefügte	 Staatengebilde	 giebt,	 wird	man	 den	 Verkehr	 lieber	 im	 eignen	 Lande	behalten,	 soweit	 es	 ohne	 Vertheuerung	 desselben	 möglich	 ist.’73	However,	 even	though	the	Dutch	also	had	problems	with	accessibility	for	large	vessels,	the	Dutch	state	made	an	effort	to	produce	relief	in	this	matter	–	unlike	the	Prussian	state.	Due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 planning	 of	 the	 Ems-Jade-Kanal	 was	 being	 held	 up,	 it	 was	 also	feared	that	plans	for	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	were	not	going	to	be	realised.	The	 article	 expressed	 that	 it	 was	 ‘jetzt	Mode,	 von	 der	 Ebbe	 in	 den	 preußischen	
																																																								69	Ibid.		70	Ibid.		71	The	memorandum	only	mentioned	that	Y&B	Brons,	a	shipping	company	from	Emden,	had	repeatedly	received	offers	for	the	establishment	of	shipping	lines	from	Emden	to	Great	Britain	and	‘ein	Mal	wurde	sogar	der	Plan,	Dampfer	zwischen	hier	und	Newyork	in	Concurrenz	mit	Bremerhaven	laufen	zu	lassen,	ernstlich	ventilirt.’	72	StE	IV	1450,	Die	Konkurrenzfähigkeit	der	Emshäfen	I.-IV.,	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Emden,	9.-12.	August	1876,	No.	185–188	73	StE	IV	1450,	Die	Konkurrenzfähigkeit	der	Emshäfen	I.,	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Emden,	9.	August	1876,	No.	185	
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Staatskassen	 zu	 reden,	 als	 wenn	 auf	 Ebbe	 nicht	 allemal	 die	 Fluth	 folgte.’74	Still,	since	Emden	had	fulfilled	its	task	of	proving	that	expanding	the	port	would	lead	to	economic	upswing,	 the	Prussian	state	was	seen	as	morally	obliged	 to	do	 its	part.	Not	without	reason	did	the	article	wonder:			 Was	geschieht	nun	und	 ist	bis	 jetzt	 in	Deutschland	geschehen,	dem	großen	Weltreiche,	bezw.	 in	Preußen,	dem	Führer	Deutschlands,	um	sich	nicht	von	Holland,	dem	kleinen	hauptsächlich	von	Kolonien	mächtigen	Weltstaate,	die	Butter	vom	Brot	nehmen	zu	lassen?75		Since	 Prussia	 had	made	 some	 attempts	 to	 facilitate	 trade	 in	 other	 German	 port	cities,	East	Frisians	now	also	expected	an	 improvement	of	 the	port	conditions	on	the	 River	 Ems.	 After	 all,	 ‘[v]om	 vaterländischen	 Standpunkte	 aus	 ist	 aber	 ganz	besonders	zu	wünschen,	daß	sie	ihre	Konkurrenzfähigkeit	gegen	holländische	und	belgische	Häfen	ausüben	[…].’76			 Needless	 to	 say,	 there	were	 also	 voices	 against	 the	 expansion	 of	 Emden’s	port.	However,	as	the	article	points	out,	these	people	did	not	make	their	criticism	public.	This	minority	opinion	was	then	simply	dismissed	with	the	following	words:	‘Es	 muß	 aber	 auch	 solche	 Käuze	 geben,	 die	 gern	 im	 Dunkeln	 munkeln.’77	More	worrying	than	the	critics	was	the	fact	that	a	noticeable	impoverishment	had	taken	place	 in	East	 Friesland	 for	 some	 time.	The	 expansion	of	 ports	 on	 the	River	Ems,	particularly	in	Emden,	was	regarded	as	a	last	resort	in	order	to	lead	the	region	to	recovery,	 ‘denn	ein	guter	Hafen	 ist	 für	den	Kaufmann	dasselbe,	was	verbessertes	Handwerkszeug	 für	 den	 Handwerker	 und	 verbesserte	 Maschinen	 für	 den	Großindustriellen	bedeuten.’78	All	 in	all,	 it	was	seen	as	a	duty	of	 the	state	 to	care	for	 its	 subjects	 by	 facilitating	 trade	 in	 East	 Friesland.	 By	 linking	 it	 to	 the	world	market,	this	would	serve	the	inland	even	more	than	protective	tariffs.	Hence,	this	series	 of	 newspaper	 articles,	 together	 with	 the	 aforementioned	 memorandum,	illustrate	 that	 the	people	of	Emden	and	East	Friesland	were	now	willing	 to	go	 to																																																									74	StE	IV	1450,	Die	Konkurrenzfähigkeit	der	Emshäfen	II.,	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Emden,	10.	August	1876,	No.	186	75	Ibid.		76	StE	IV	1450,	Die	Konkurrenzfähigkeit	der	Emshäfen	III.,	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Emden,	11.	August	1876,	No.	187	77	StE	IV	1450,	Die	Konkurrenzfähigkeit	der	Emshäfen	IV.,	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Emden,	12.	August	1876,	No.	188	78	Ibid.		
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any	 length	 to	make	 the	Prussian	 state	 assume	 its	 responsibility	of	 caring	 for	 the	people	of	Emden.			 Still,	 the	 success	 of	 this	 public	 pressure	was	 limited.	 One	 of	 the	 points	 at	issue	was	the	fact	that	Emden	planned	to	hand	over	ownership	of	the	port	to	the	Prussian	 state.	 In	1846,	when	parts	 of	 the	port	were	 reconstructed,	Emden	 took	over	the	liability	for	its	maintenance	from	the	Hanoverian	Kingdom	in	return	of	a	reimbursement	of	4500	Marks.	By	the	1870s,	 it	was	realised	that	this	had	been	a	huge	mistake,	as	the	city	would	not	have	been	able	to	afford	the	port’s	expansion	and	 its	 maintenance.	 So,	 realising	 the	 plan	 of	 developing	 Emden	 into	 a	 major	seaport	 would	 have	meant	 a	 Prussian	 takeover	 of	 the	 port.	 In	 November	 1876,	Achenbach	took	a	firm	stand	in	the	matter	by	stating	that	the	Prussian	state	would	not	be	able	to	take	over	Emden’s	port	 facilities.	 Instead,	 the	city	had	to	carry	out	the	 development	 of	 its	 port	 itself.	 Fortunately,	 the	Minister	 of	 Trade	 offered	 his	support	in	promoting	the	project.79	Hence,	even	though	the	Prussian	annexation	of	1866	had	 raised	 expectations	 among	Emden’s	 population,	 the	Prussian	 state	 did	not	have	any	plans	to	expand	Emden’s	port.	While	the	people	of	Emden	had	hoped	that	 the	 city	would	 become	Prussia’s	 state-run	 port	 on	 the	North	 Sea	 coast,	 this	dream	was	shattered	by	Prussia’s	 firmly	negative	attitude.	At	this	point,	Emden’s	port	was	 certainly	 not	 part	 of	 a	 Prussian	 economic-political	 project.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	doubtful	 whether	 there	 actually	 were	 any	 comprehensive	 plans	 for	 promoting	shipping	 within	 the	 Prussian	 government	 prior	 to	 the	 memorandum	 on	 inland	waterways	 of	 1877.	 After	 all,	 the	 Prussian	 government	 was	 for	 a	 long	 time	suspicious	of	expensive	waterways	projects80	and	the	naval	port	of	Wilhelmshaven	certainly	 took	 priority.	 Therefore,	 local	 and	 regional	 efforts	 had	 to	 enable	 this	development.		 Here,	another	significant	politician,	decisive	 for	Emden’s	 future,	 came	 into	play:	Carl	Schweckendieck.	Although	his	mother’s	roots	lay	in	Southern	Germany,	Schweckendieck	 felt	 closely	 connected	 to	 Emden	 through	 his	 grandparents81	His																																																									79	StE	IV	1450,	Der	Minister	für	Handel,	Gewerbe	und	öffentliche	Arbeiten,	Berlin,	den	10.	November	1876	80	Karl	Löbe,	‘Ein	Fluß	belebt	seine	Landschaft’,	in:	Jahrbuch	der	Hafenbautechnischen	
Gesellschaft	25/26	(1958/61),	pp.	92–137,	here	p.	98	81	Ostfriesische	Landschaft,	Rolf	Uphoff,	‘Carl	Schweckendieck’:		http://www.ostfriesischelandschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/BIBLIOTHEK/BLO/Schweckendieck.pdf		Accessed:	20/04/2016	
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grandfather	 ran	 a	 trading	 company	 in	 Emden	 and	 his	 father,	 Heinrich	 Wilhelm	Schweckendieck,	was	head	of	the	Gesellschaft	für	bildende	Künste.	Schweckendieck	favoured	 a	 political	 career	 and	 became	 Regierungsassessor	 at	 the	 Prussian	
Landdrostei	 in	 Aurich	 in	 1867.	 From	 there,	 Schweckendieck	moved	 to	 Berlin	 to	work	for	the	Ministerium	für	Öffentliche	Arbeiten,	where	he	became	Regierungsrat	in	 1880.	 In	 May	 1875,	 Schweckendieck	 was	 entrusted	 with	 promoting	 the	development	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 facilities	 by	 the	 Landdrostei.	 Technical	 matters	would	be	dealt	with	by	Baurat	Müller.		 With	 regard	 to	Achenbach’s	negative	 response,	Schweckendieck	contacted	Fürbringer,	 to	 whom	 he	 had	 a	 close	 connection,	 and	 suggested	 that	 the	 best	solution	 would	 be	 ‘wenn	 die	 Stadt	 zunächst	 auf	 Grundlage	 des	 Ministerial-Rescriptes	die	Verhandlungen	 fortsetzt,	ohne	den,	 zur	Zeit	 jedenfalls	 fruchtlosen,	Versuch	 zu	machen,	 die	 Übernahme	 der	 Hafenanstalten	 sofort	 durchzusetzen.’82	To	Schweckendieck,	it	was	clear	that	the	Ems-Jade-Kanal	would	have	to	be	built	in	any	case.	In	Schweckendieck’s	eyes	this	also	made	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	inevitable.	He	was	still	optimistic	‘daß	bei	fortgesetzten	eifrigen	Bemühungen	der	Staat	 doch	 schließlich	 die	 Hafenanstalten	 wieder	 übernimmt	 oder	 doch	 eine	entsprechend	 höhere	 Rente	 zahlt.’83	Just	 as	 Schweckendieck	 had	 not	 lost	 hope,	neither	 had	 Carl	 Dantziger.	 In	 December	 1876,	 Carl	 Dantziger	 and	 the	
Kaufmännische	 Deputation	 approached	 the	 Minister	 of	 Trade,	 Achenbach.	 Once	again,	 Achenbach	 was	 asked	 to	 ensure	 that	 Prussia	 assumed	 responsibility	 for	Emden’s	port.84	However,	Emden’s	efforts	to	convince	the	Prussian	government	to	take	 action	 in	 Emden	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 uncoordinated.	 In	 another	 letter	 to	Fürbringer,	Schweckendieck	complained	about	a	report	from	Emden’s	city	council	to	the	Minister	of	Trade	and	the	Minister	of	Finance.	He	pointed	out	‘daß	dieselben	in	der	vorliegenden	Form	beide	Minister	gegen	die	Anlage	aufbringen	werden.’85			 Instead,	the	people	of	Emden	were	urged	to	act	true	to	the	motto:	‘Fortiter	in	 re,	 suaviter	 in	modo!’	 –	 or	 as	 ‘der	 gute	 Ostfriese	 sagt	 „anhollen	 deit	 kriegen“	[…].’86	Schweckendieck	was	still	convinced	that	the	Ems-Jade-Kanal,	which	was	still																																																									82	StE	IV	1432,	Aurich,	25.11.76.Verehrter	Herr	Bürgermeister!	83	StE	IV	1432,	Aurich,	30	Nobr.	1876.	Verehrter	Herr	Bürgermeister!	84	StE	IV	1432,	Kaufmännische	Deputation,	Emden,	13.	Decbr.	1876	85	StE	IV	1432,	Aurich,	17.	Debr.	1876	86	This	Frisian	proverb	translates	as:	slow	and	steady	wins	the	race.	See	StE	IV	1432,	Aurich,	17.	Debr.	1876	
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in	its	planning	stage,	would	have	to	entail	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	facilities.	In	 March	 1877,	 Achenbach	 then	 approved	 of	 the	 Ems-Jade-Kanal,	 which	 was	dependent	on	the	Minister	of	Finance’s	consent.	As	forecasted	by	Schweckendieck,	this	 also	 led	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 expanding	 Emden’s	 port,	 of	 which	 Emden	 was	informed	 in	May	1877.	However,	 the	question	of	whether	 the	Prussian	state	was	going	to	assume	liability	for	the	port	was	still	undecided.	It	was	highlighted	that	a	Prussian	 assumption	 together	 with	 a	 possible	 continuation	 of	 annual	compensation	payments	‘werde	nur	aus	Gründen	des	allgemeinen	Staatsinteresses	unter	 Berücksichtigung	 der	 gesammten	 jetzigen	 Lage	 der	 Stadt	 gerechtfertigt	werden	können.’87	Furthermore,	 it	was	stated	explicitly	 ‘„daß	die	 in	ungeeigneter	Weise	 nach	 einer	 angeblich	 „gesetzlichen,	 moralischen	 und	 politischen	Verpflichtung“	 der	 Staatsregierung	 gestellte	 desfallige	 Forderung	 jeder	Begründung	entbehre.“’88	Thus,	the	Prussian	government	was	still	careful	when	it	came	to	assuming	liability	for	Emden’s	port.			 In	contrast	to	Schweckendieck,	Emden’s	public	opinion	was	less	calm	about	the	situation.	On	the	subject	of	the	deferred	decision	regarding	the	construction	of	the	Ems-Jade-Kanal,	the	Emder	Zeitung	wondered	on	November	25	1878:			 Und	nun	soll	durch	das	ganze	für	den	Staat	vorteilhafte	und	für	die	Erhaltung	des	Wohlstandes	geschweige	für	die	weitere	Entwicklung	der	Verkehrs-	und	Erwerbsverhältnisse	 in	 unserer	 seit	 langer	 Zeit	 immer	 nur	 stiefmütterlich	behandelten	Landschaft	so	hochwichtige	Project	einfach	ein	Strich	gemacht	sein?	 […]	 Wird	 nicht	 namentlich	 Ostfriesland	 durch	 die	 niemals	 zu	verschmerzende	 Absonderung	 Hollands	 vom	 alten	 Deutschen	 Reich	gedrückt	 und	 werden	 hier	 nicht	 die	 Ideen	 einer	 größeren	 nationalen	Wirtschaftspolitik	 auch	 im	neuen	deutschen	Reiche	 durch	 die	 verderbliche	Ausnahmestellung	der	Hansestädte	niedergehalten?89		Thus,	 by	 this	 point,	 there	was	 a	 noticeable	 degree	 of	 discontent	 about	 Prussia’s	failure	to	address	the	problems	of	Emden’s	port.	 It	had	been	more	than	a	decade	since	the	people	of	Emden	celebrated	the	return	of	Prussian	rule,	which	was	tied	to	
																																																								87	StE	IV	1432,	Abschrift,	Aurich,	den	28.	Mai	1877	88	Ibid.	89	StE	IV	1434,	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	276,	Montag	den	25.	November	1878.		
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economic	recovery.	However,	there	was	obviously	no	Prussian	strategic	economic	planning	that	embraced	Emden.	After	all	 these	complications,	Emden	was	able	to	reach	an	agreement	with	the	 Prussian	 state	 in	 December	 1879.	 The	 treaty	 between	 the	 two	 parties	 gives	insight	into	the	importance	that	the	Prussian	government	ascribed	to	Emden	as	a	port	city.	Paragraph	three	of	the	treaty	emphasised	that	a	‘rechtliche	Verpflichtung	zur	fortdauernden	Unterhaltung	des	Hafens	[…]	Seitens	der	Staatsregierung	nicht	übernommen	 [wird].’90 	Instead,	 the	 Prussian	 state	 government	 only	 assumed	liability	 for	 the	 time,	 ‘während	 welcher	 die	 Staatsregierung	 es	 für	 begründet	erachtet.’ 91 	There	 was	 still	 no	 Prussian	 plan	 to	 take	 over	 Emden’s	 port	permanently.	Eventually,	the	Prussian	state	took	over	the	port	of	Emden	on	April	1	1888.	Only	a	few	weeks	after	this,	on	June	5	1888,	the	Ems-Jade-Kanal	was	officially	put	 into	operation.	Since	Emden	had	not	been	able	 to	 fulfil	a	part	of	 the	contract	stating	 that	 the	 city	 had	 to	 look	 after	 a	 new	 canalisation	 system,	 the	 Prussian	government	had	suspended	construction	works	for	some	time.	It	took	Emden	one	and	a	half	years	to	approach	the	Prussian	planning	department	and	to	reveal	that	the	city	simply	could	not	afford	the	construction	of	a	new	canalisation	system.	The	costs	of	the	new	system	were	estimated	at	around	half	a	million	Marks.	Ultimately,	the	 Prussian	Diet	 agreed	 to	 pay	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 estimated	 costs	 and	 even	then,	only	construction	works	were	able	to	continue.		The	 timing	of	 this	 treaty	 is	 interesting.	At	 this	point,	 the	Reich	Chancellor	had	already	enquired	of	both	Hanseatic	cities	their	opinion	on	an	accession	to	the	Empire’s	customs	union.	Even	this	situation	did	not	change	Emden’s	status	within	Prussia	and	the	Empire,	although	the	city	regarded	itself	as	a	legitimate	competitor	to	 the	Dutch	ports	as	well	 as	 to	Bremen	and	Hamburg.	With	 regard	 to	economic	policy,	Emden	did	still	not	play	a	role	as	Westphalia’s	natural	 seaport.	 In	 light	of	Bismarck’s	turn	to	protectionism	at	the	end	of	the	1870s,	this	foot-dragging	by	the	Prussian	 government	 is	 not	 quite	 understandable.	 After	 all,	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	Nipperdey,	‘[g]anz	wichtig	für	den	Gesamtprozeß	der	Volkswirtschaft	im	Zeitalter	der	 intensivierten	 Industrialisierung	 war	 der	 Außenhandel.’ 92 	Therefore,	 it	 is	incomprehensible	why	the	Prussian	state	realised	the	need	for	a	military	base	on																																																									90	StE	IV	1431,	Vertrag	betreffend	Unterhaltung	der	Hafenanstalten	in	Emden	(vom	18./22.	Decbr.	1879	nebst	Anhang	v.	16./28.	Septbr.	1882)	91	Ibid.	92	Nipperdey,	Deutsche	Geschichte,	Band	I,	p.	279	
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the	North	Sea	Coast,	namely	Wilhelmshaven,	but	did	not	take	any	action	to	create	competition	 for	Hamburg	 and	 Bremen,	which	were	 still	 not	 part	 of	 the	 customs	union.	An	answer	to	this	might	again	be	given	by	Nipperdey,	who	argues	that,	even	during	 the	 protectionist	 turn	 ‘[war]	 das	 Prinzip	 liberaler	 Handlungsfreiheit	 und	der	Marktorientierung	 […]	 so	 stark	und	sicher	verankert,	daß	man	allenfalls	von	einer	 Doppelung	 individualistischer	 und	 tariff-	 und	 sozialpolitisch	interventionistischer	Prinzipen	der	Wirtschaftsverfassung	sprechen	kann.’	Hence,	unlike,	 for	 example,	 the	 Dutch	 state	 in	 Rotterdam	 or	 Amsterdam,	 the	 Prussian	government	did	not	pursue	an	active	policy	of	seeing	to	the	facilitation	of	trade	in	Emden	–	at	least	in	this	case.	At	the	same	time,	the	fact	that	the	Prussian	state	was	not	 interested	 in	creating	competing	against	Hamburg	and	Bremen	suggests	 that	the	 Hanseatic	 Zollanschluss	 did	 not	 have	 an	 economic	 motivation	 but	 rather	 a	symbolic	one.		
	
d.	The	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	–	Emden	finding	its	place?			Before	examining	the	way	Emden	was	finally	connected	to	the	industrial	region	of	Westphalia,	it	is	necessary	to	take	a	look	at	how	this	fitted	in	with	plans	that	were	made	for	an	extensive	canal	network	in	the	German	Empire.	As	early	as	the	1850s,	there	 was	 a	 committee	 in	 Dortmund	 that	 submitted	 a	 memorandum	 to	 the	Prussian	 Ministerium	 für	 Handel,	 Gewerbe	 und	 öffentliche	 Arbeiten.	 In	 this	memorandum,	the	need	for	a	Mittellandkanal	was	pointed	out.	The	idea	at	the	time	was	to	create	a	canal	system	crossing	the	whole	of	Germany	from	West	to	East	and	another	one	 from	 the	River	Main	 to	 the	Danube.	 Indeed,	water	 transport	was	of	growing	 importance	 to	Germany.	While	 inland	water	 transport	on	 the	Rhine	and	rail	transport	in	the	area	were	of	equal	importance	at	the	end	of	the	century,	only	ten	 years	 later,	 the	 share	 of	 water	 transport	 had	 doubled	 in	 comparison.93	The	Hohenzollern	 monarchy	 had	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 supporter	 of	 canalisation.	 In	 the	Prussian	 heartland,	 it	 had	 been	 the	 Great	 Elector	 which	 began	 to	 see	 to	 the	construction	of	artificial	waterways,	namely	the	canal	 from	the	River	Oder	to	the	Spree.	This	was	followed	other	canals,	such	as	the	Finow-Kanal,	the	Klodnitz-Kanal																																																									93	Karl	Löbe	has,	for	example,	pointed	to	the	increasing	significance	of	inland	water	transport	prior	to	the	First	World	War	in	Löbe,	‘Ein	Fluß	belebt	seine	Landschaft’,	p.	93.	See	also	Hannelore	Horn,	Der	Kampf	um	den	Bau	des	Mittellandkanals	(Köln,	1964)		
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in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 or	 the	Spandauer	Schiffahrtskanal	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	nineteenth	century.		Still,	the	project	of	a	Mittellandkanal	remained	innovative,	as	it	 envisaged	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 canal	 in	 the	West-East	 direction	 through	 the	whole	of	Germany.	 It	 is	not	 surprising	 that	many	different	 ideas	arose	 regarding	the	canal’s	actual	route	nor	that	it	was	extremely	difficult	to	press	ahead	with	this	matter;	 ‘die	 Idee	 des	 Binnenverkehrs	 auf	 dem	 Wasser	 fand	 anfangs	 in	 weiten	Teilen	des	Reiches,	und	in	besonders	wichtigen,	kaum	Widerhall.’94		 It	was	not	until	the	second	half	of	the	1870s	that	the	Prussian	government	turned	 to	 the	 plan	 of	 expanding	 inland	 waterways.	 In	 1877,	 the	 Prussian	government	issued	a	memorandum	regarding	the	improvement	and	expansion	of	the	inland	waterway	system.	In	this	memorandum,	the	Prussian	government	asked	for	 the	construction	of	a	canal	connecting	the	rivers	Rhine,	Weser	and	Elbe.	Two	years	 later,	 another	 report	 was	 submitted	 to	 the	 Prussian	 Diet	 by	 the	 Prussian	government	with	 the	 subject	 of	upgrading	 the	navigable	parts	of	 the	Vistula,	 the	Oder,	the	Elbe,	the	Weser	and	the	Rhine.	Rather	than	focusing	on	the	seaports	on	the	North	Sea	Coast,	emphasis	was	at	first	put	on	improving	and	expanding	inland	waterways.	 However,	 this	 inevitably	 also	 led	 to	 reflections	 about	 the	 need	 for	 a	North	 to	South	connection,	 from	the	hinterland	 to	 the	seaports	on	 the	North	Sea	Coast.	Discussions	about	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	have	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	this	 Mittellandkanal	 project,	 since	 it	 was	 planned	 as	 only	 one	 section	 of	 the	complete	 Mittellandkanal.	 It	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 favour	 for	 the	construction	 of	 a	 canal	 to	 the	 North	 Sea	 Coast	 first	 grew	 in	 the	 Rhineland	 and	Westphalia	and	not	in	Emden.			 In	1882,	the	Prussian	government	issued	yet	another	memorandum	entitled	
Denkschrift	 über	 die	 geschäftliche	 Lage	 der	 Preußischen	 Kanalprojekte. 95 	This	memorandum	 also	 dealt	 with	 the	 project	 of	 the	Mittellandkanal.	 In	 contrast	 to	former	plans,	there	were	now	considerations	about	a	Northern	route	that	the	canal	could	 possibly	 take.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 Northern	 route	 would	 be	 the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	The	route	from	Dortmund	to	the	Ems	was	estimated	to	cost	around	50	million	Marks,	thus	enabling	Emden	to	make	use	of	its	position	vis-à-vis	the	 Ruhr	 area.	 From	 this	 section,	 the	 canal	 was	 thought	 to	 make	 its	 way	 via																																																									94	Löbe,	‘Ein	Fluß	belebt	seine	Landschaft’,	p.	95	95	Geheimes	Staatsarchiv	Preußischer	Kulturbesitz	I.	HA	Rep.	93	B,	Nr.	5194,	Denkschrift	über	die	geschäftliche	Lage	der	Preußischen	Kanalprojekte	
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Oldenburg	 to	Vegesack,	 located	on	 the	Lower	Weser,	and	 then	 to	Stade,	which	 is	situated	on	the	Lower	Elbe.	At	this	point,	it	had	been	realised	that	it	was	necessary	to	 incorporate	 seaports	 into	 the	 project	 of	 a	 large	 canal	 system	 in	 the	 German	Empire.	Interestingly,	the	Southern	route	of	the	Mittellandkanal,	the	one	that	was	eventually	 built,	 was	 resolutely	 opposed	 in	 Hamburg.	 In	 Bremen,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 opinions	 on	 the	 preferred	 route	 were	 divided.96	Thus,	 competition	 from	Emden	did	not	seem	to	have	had	an	impact	in	neither	Hamburg	nor	Bremen.	In	the	end,	the	plan	for	a	Mittellandkanal	was	declined	by	a	commission	of	the	Prussian	House	of	Representatives.	As	highlighted	by	Löbe,	in	the	Prussian	Landtag	‘begnete	jeder	 Kanalbau	 der	 Ablehnung	 der	 Konservativen,	wo	 starke	 landwirtschaftliche	Interessen	 sich	 vor	 allem	 gegen	 Erleichterungen	 der	 Getreideeinfuhr	wehrten.’97	Due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	no	direct	connection	 to	 the	Rhine,	benefits	 for	 the	ports	 on	 the	 River	 Ems	 were	 regarded	 as	 doubtful. 98 	In	 fact,	 ‘allgemeines	Staatsinteresse	hielt	die	Kommission	nur	unter	den	Umständen	 für	gegeben,	daß	der	 im	 Rahmen	 eines	 größeren	 Binnenkanals	 gedachte	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	zugleich	mit	 diesem	 zur	 Ausfertigung	 gebracht	werde.’99	Hence,	 Emden	was	 still	not	regarded	as	a	viable	alternative	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen.			 In	 fact,	 there	 are	 no	 signs	 that	 indicate	 the	 active	 engagement	 of	incorporating	 Emden	 into	 the	 new	 canal	 system.	 In	 April	 1882,	 when	 the	memorandum	 was	 submitted	 to	 the	 Prussian	 House	 of	 Representatives,	 Emden	amongst	others	was	 requested	 to	 take	action	 in	 favour	of	 the	project	by	 the	 city	council	 of	 Lingen.	 Since	 Lingen	did	not	 consider	 itself	 influential	 enough,	 its	 city	council	contacted	Dortmund,	Münster,	Papenburg,	Leer	and	Emden	with	respect	to	seizing	the	initiative	against	the	Kanalrebellen,	the	opponents	of	the	canal.	Indeed,	while	 Emden	 was	 still	 inactive,	 other	 regions	 had	 already	 been	 promoting	 the	construction	 of	 a	Mittellandkanal.	 For	 example,	 in	 January	 1882,	 the	 Kölnische	
Volkszeitung	argued:			 Wenn	 das	 Reich	 in	 der	 Hamburger	 Frage	 so	 bedeutende	 Kosten	 auf	 seine	Schultern	 zu	 nehmen	 sich	 bereit	 findet,	 so	 sollten	 wir	 meinen,	 dürfte	Preußen	 für	 die	 Entwickelung	 seines	 Emdener	 Hafens,	 des	 von	 der	 Natur																																																									96	Löbe,	‘Ein	Fluß	belebt	seine	Landschaft’,	pp.	98-99	97	Ibid.,	p.	99	98	Horn,	Kampf,	pp.	34–35	99	Ibid.,	p.	35	
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angewiesenen	 Ausfuhrpunktes	 unseres	 westfälischen	 Kohlereichthumes,	auch	etwas	zu	thun	in	der	Lage	sein.100		Similarly,	 it	was	the	city	council	of	Leer	 that	decided	to	react	 to	Lingen’s	request	and	to	call	a	meeting	between	all	cities	with	an	interest	in	the	construction	of	the	planned	 Rhein-Weser-Ems-Kanal.101	The	 meeting	 between	 all	 representatives	 of	cities	affected	by	the	canal	project	took	place	on	May	3	1882	in	Leer.		Senator	 Brons	 agreed	 to	 represent	 Emden	 at	 the	 meeting	 and	 spoke	 in	favour	of	awaiting	the	decision	of	the	Prussian	House	of	Representatives	in	Berlin	rather	 than	 taking	 any	 immediate	 actions.	 Brons	 argued	 that	 the	 House	 of	Representatives	was	either	already	discussing	the	canal	project	or	would	so	in	the	coming	days.	Hence,	he	did	not	regard	it	as	necessary	to	take	any	action	before	the	House	 of	 Representatives	 had	 come	 to	 a	 decision.	 This	 was	 met	 with	incomprehension	by	the	other	attendees.	Leer’s	mayor	Pustan,	who	was	chairman	of	the	meeting,	pointed	out	that	 ‘durch	Schweigen	der	nächstbetheiligten	Bezirke	dieselben	 leicht	 einer	 nachtheilig	 wirkenden	 Gleichgültigkeit	 und	 Lässigkeit	geziehen	 werden	 könnten	 […].’102 	It	 was	 argued	 that	 in	 light	 of	 the	 sudden	agitation	against	 the	project,	 it	was	absolutely	necessary	 to	 take	a	 firm	stand	 for	the	 project.	 In	 the	 end,	 all	 attendees,	 including	 the	 representative	 of	 East	Friesland’s	 agricultural	 society,	 agreed	 to	 submit	 a	 resolution	 to	 the	 Prussian	House	of	Representatives.	In	this,	the	need	for	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	would	be	highlighted,	 which	 ‘entspricht	 allseitig	 und	 vollkommen	 den	 Interessen	 der	 von	ihnen	 vertretenen	Gemeinden	und	 Institute;	 insbesondere	 auch	 erscheint	 es	 den	berechtigten	 Anforderungen	 der	 Montan-Industrie	 und	 des	 Ackerbaus	 und	 der	Forstwirtschaft	 durchaus	 förderlich.’ 103 	Furthermore,	 upon	 Brons’	 proposal,	Dortmund	was	chosen	as	the	head	of	any	further	agitation	in	favour	of	the	canal.	When	it	came	to	bearing	the	costs	of	this	agitation	there	seems	to	have	been	less	agreement,	particularly	on	Brons’	side.	The	minutes	of	 the	meeting	state	that	 the	expenses	 for	 promoting	 the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	would	 be	 shared	 by	 the	 cities	involved	on	 the	basis	of	 the	number	of	 inhabitants.	Yet,	Brons	 left	 a	note	on	 the	side	that	clarifies:	‘Dies	ist	nicht	richtig.	Es	ist	meinerseits	ausdrücklich	contastirt,																																																									100	StE	IV	2021,	Kölnische	Volkszeitung,	Köln,	5.	Jan.	Donnerstag,	Zweites	Blatt,	1882.	101	StE	IV	2021,	Magistrat	der	Stadt	Leer,	Leer,	den	27.	April	1882.		102	StE	IV	2021,	Verhandelt	Leer	am	3.	Mai	1882.		103	Ibid.	
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daß	es	 sich	bei	diesem	Beschlusse	nur	um	die	 in	dieser	Verhandlung	gemachten	Kosten	 handele.’	 Emden	was	 hard-pressed	 for	money,	 due	 to	 issues	 involving	 a	new	 sewage	 system.	 Therefore,	 agitation	 for	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 was	obviously	not	the	city’s	priority,	which	is	to	some	extent	astonishing	regarding	the	impact	of	the	canal	on	Emden.	Subsequently,	 Dortmund	 did	 indeed	 become	 the	 head	 of	 any	 further	agitation	 which	 did	 not	 end	 even	 after	 the	 project	 had	made	 it	 to	 the	 Prussian	House	 of	 Representatives.	 In	 Emden,	 it	 was	 the	 Kaufmännische	 Deputation	 that	agreed	 to	 pay	 for	 further	 expenses	 –	 the	 first	 payment	 to	 the	 newly	 founded	committee	 amounted	 to	 300	 Marks. 104 	In	 1883,	 another	 bill	 regarding	 the	construction	of	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	was	again	submitted	to	the	Prussian	Diet.	Naturally,	the	committee	for	promoting	the	project	sent	a	petition	to	the	Prussian	House	 of	 Representatives,	 which	 was	 the	 first	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 matter.	 In	 this	petition,	 it	 was	 emphasised	 that	 the	 canal	would	 connect	 ‘zwei	 hochentwickelte	Wirtschaftsgebiete	 […],	 auf	 der	 einen	 Seite	 den	 niederrheinisch-westfälischen	Industriedistrict	mit	 seiner	 von	 Jahr	 zu	 Jahr	wachsenden	Massenproduction,	 auf	der	 anderen	 Seite	 das	 Handelsgebiet	 der	 deutschen	 Nordseeküste.’105	Certainly,	the	fact	that	the	Syndikus	of	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	had	also	signed	the	petition	reveals	that	the	project	of	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	was	always	viewed	as	one	 step	 towards	 the	 expansion	 of	 Germany’s	 entire	 inland	 waterway	 system.	However,	 this	also	shows	 the	widespread	 impact	 that	 the	project	had.	 Instead	of	Emden,	which	actually	regarded	itself	as	the	natural	seaport	of	Westphalia	and	the	Rhineland,	other	circles	assumed	responsibility.	Business	circles	in	Westphalia	and	the	 Rhineland,	 in	 particular,	made	 it	 their	 priority	 to	 realise	 the	Dortmund-Ems-
Kanal.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 Emden	 eventually	 intensified	 its	 efforts	 to	 promote	 the	motion.	 In	April	1883,	 it	was	decided	that	another	memorandum	to	highlight	the	need	 for	 the	planned	 canal	 should	be	presented	 to	 the	members	of	 the	Prussian	Diet.	 Representative	 bodies	 of	 the	 interested	 cities	 along	 the	 River	 Ems	 and	mercantile	 institutions	 joined	 many	 in	 handing	 in	 petitions	 to	 the	 Prussian	
Landtag.	Furthermore,	Leo	Fürbringer	resolved	to	travel	to	Berlin	himself	in	order																																																									104	StE	IV	2021,	Geschehen	Emden,	in	der	Magistratssitzung	am	20.	Novbr.	1882.	105	StE	IV	2021,	Münster	in	Westfalen,	den	25.	Januar	1883.	An	das	hohe	Haus	der	Abgeordneten	Berlin.	
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to	press	ahead	with	the	matter.	Indeed,	even	though	a	commission	of	the	House	of	Representatives	 again	 voted	with	 13	 to	 10	 votes	 against	 the	 construction	 of	 the	canal,	the	House	of	Representatives	voted	in	favour	of	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	on	June	 6	 1883.	 From	 Düsseldorf,	 Henry	 Alex	 Bueck,	 manager	 of	 the	 Vereins	 zur	
Wahrung	der	gemeinsamen	wirtschaftlichen	Interessen	in	Rheinland	und	Westfalen,	promptly	 sent	 a	 telegram	 of	 congratulations	 to	 Fürbringer,	 which	 indicates	 the	importance	 that	was	 ascribed	 to	 the	 project.106	In	 addition	 to	 Bueck,	 Fürbringer	was	 also	 in	 contact	 with	 William	 Thomas	 Mulvany,	 another	 influential	entrepreneur	in	Westphalia	and	the	Rhineland,	who	was	advocating	the	expansion	of	inland	waterways.107		In	 any	 case,	 the	 Prussian	House	 of	Deputies	 rejected	 the	 envisaged	 canal.	Remarkably,	 only	 135	 deputies	 took	 part	 in	 the	 vote,	 while	 36	 deputies	 were	absent	 with	 an	 excuse	 and	 another	 109	 without	 an	 excuse,	 one	 of	 whom	 was	Bismarck.	 Of	 the	 remaining	 135	 deputies,	 70	 voted	 against	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-
Kanal	and	65	in	favour.108	The	decision	against	the	canal	in	Berlin	again	resulted	in	post	 from	the	Rhineland.	 In	a	 letter	 from	 July	1,	Franz	Merkens,	president	of	 the	
Westdeutscher	 Fluss-	 und	 Kanalverein	 and	 participator	 in	 the	 banking	 house	
Seydlitz	&	Merkens	in	Cologne,	wrote	to	Fürbringer.	Merkens	raged:			So	 kann,	 so	 darf	 sich	 ein	 Volk	 in	 seinen	 materiellen	 Interessen	 nicht	schädigen	 lassen,	 wie	 es	 hier	 geschehen.	 Wenn	 die	 Aristokraten	 den	politischen	Fortschritt	zu	hemmen	bestrebt	sind,	um	verrottete	Priviligien	zu	schirmen	 und	 zu	 schützen,	 so	 mag	 man	 darin	 eine	 Art	 von	 Berechtigung	erkennen,	 denn	 die	 idealen	 Anschauungen	 des	 Communismus	 und	Socialismus	haben	unpraktische	Seiten;	wenn	sie	sich	aber	vermessen,	dem	materiellen	Fortschritt	erschwerend	entgegenzutreten,	dann	wagen	sie	den	Lebens	 und	 Existenznerv	 des	 Volkes	 zu	 unterbinden,	 eine	 Handlung	 die	ebenso	ungestraft	nicht	vollzogen	werden	kann,	als	wie	jene,	in	das	Rad	der	Zeit	eingreifen	zu	wollen.109		
																																																								106	StE	IV	2021,	Telegraphie	des	Deutschen	Reiches.	Telegraphenamt	Emden,	7.6.1883	107	See	StE	IV	2021,	Rede	von	Wm.	T.	Mulvany	in	der	am	13.	März	1883	abgehaltenen	General-Versammlung	108	Horn,	Kampf,	p.	35	109	StE	IV	2021,	Rhöndorf	1	July	1883,	Mein	lieber,	verehrter	Freund!	
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In	fact,	efforts	by	the	advocates	of	the	canal	did	not	stop	at	that	point.	In	November	1883,	 the	 Komité	 zur	 Förderung	 des	 Schiffahrtskanals	 von	 Dortmund	 nach	 den	
Emshäfen	in	Dortmund	informed	Emden’s	city	council	 that	 it	was	campaigning	to	submit	 the	 motion	 once	 again	 to	 the	 Prussian	 Landtag.	 However,	 since	 the	committee	 did	 not	 regard	 itself	 legitimised	 under	 the	 Prussian	 constitution	 to	submit	the	motion,	it	 	made	a	request	to	Bismarck,	who	was	at	that	time	also	the	Minister	 of	 Trade	 and	 Industry.110	The	 fact	 that	 the	 committee	was	 not	 going	 to	give	up	 is	also	proven	by	 the	discussion	about	 the	establishment	of	a	permanent	office.111	Emden	even	took	the	trouble	to	prepare	another	petition	to	the	Prussian	
Landtag	 at	 the	 end	 of	 1883.	 In	 this,	 the	 city	 expressed	 that	 its	 hopes	 were	tempered	 ‘nach	 Vollendung	 der	 in	 der	 Ausführung	 begriffenen	 staatsseitigen	Umwandlung	 ihres	 Hafens	 in	 einen	 für	 große	 Seeschiffe	 zugänglichen	Hochwasserhafen	 zum	 Hauptplatze	 für	 den	 Import	 und	 Export	 des	 westlichen	Deutschlands	zu	erblühen	[…].’112		 Still,	 there	 was	 little	 progress	 made	 until	 early	 1885	 when	 Albert	 von	Maybach,	Prussian	Minister	 for	Public	Works,	made	an	announcement	before	the	House	 of	 Representatives	 to	 submit	 another	 bill	 to	 the	 Prussian	 Landtag.113	By	August	1885,	Maybach	was	ordered	to	work	out	the	details	of	the	new	bill.	This	bill	was	 supposed	 to	 include	 the	whole	 section	 between	 the	 Rhine	 via	 Dortmund	 to	Emden.	 Of	 this	 section,	 only	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 was	requested.	However,	by	April	1886,	it	looked	like	the	bill	would	be	rejected	by	the	House	 of	 Representatives	 for	 the	 second	 time.	 Conservatives	 would	 most	 likely	vote	against	the	bill.	The	party,	which	had	already	voted	in	the	majority	against	the	canal	 in	 1883,	 argued	 that	 the	 state’s	 financial	 status	 did	 not	 allow	 for	 such	 a	project.	Similarly,	the	Freisinnige	Partei	was	also	expected	to	vote	against	the	bill.	As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 all	 involved	 parties	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 canal	were	 urged	 by	 the	
Westdeutscher	Fluss-	und	Kanalverein	to	again	send	petitions	to	the	Prussian	Diet	in																																																									110	Article	32	of	the	Prussian	Constitution	was	concerned	with	the	submission	of	petitions	to	the	Landtag.	In	this,	it		states	that	only	authorities	and	corporations	were	allowed	to	submit	petitions.	For	the	letter	to	Bismarck,	see	StE	IV	2021,	Dortmund	und	Münster	den	16.	November	1883	111	StE	IV	2021,	An	die	Herren	Mitglieder	des	Executivausschusses	des	Komité’s	zur	Förderung	des	Schifffahrtskanals	von	Dortmund	nach	der	unteren	Ems,	Dortmund,	den	26.	November	1883.	112	StE	IV	2021,	An	das	hohe	Herrenhaus	(Abgeordnetenhaus)	des	Preußischen	Landtages	zu	Berlin,	Emden	den	14.	Dezember	1883	113	Horn,	Kampf,	p.	35	
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April	1886.114	Consequently,	a	 flood	of	petitions	was	sent	to	the	Landtag	and	this	effort	 seems	 to	 have	 made	 an	 impact.	 On	 May	 25	 1886,	 the	 Prussian	 House	 of	Representatives	approved	the	bill	by	a	large	majority.	The	feeling	of	relief	that	this	decision	produced	is	best	illustrated	by	the	following	poem	that	was	sent	to	Emden	from	Cologne	by	telegram	the	following	day:				 Der	Kanal	er	ist	kein	Wahn,	denn	er	kommt	trotz	Eisenbahn.	Gratuliere	Stadt	und	Land,	Magistrat	und	Schifferland.	Und	als	Vater	Goethe	sprach:	Ein	Lanze	fuer	ihn	brach,		Mann	mit	zugeknöpften	Taschen	dir	thut	niemand	was	zu	lieb,	Hand	wird	nur	von	Hand	gewaschen,	wenn	du	nehmen	willst,	dann	gieb	--	stumm	--,	ist	keiner	da	gewesen,	Beifall	tönt	von	allen	Seiten,		in	den	Augen	konnt	man	lesen,	jetzt	beginnen	beßere	Zeiten,	drum	ein	hoch	dem	Kind	der	Qual,	dreifach	hoch	der	Emskanal.115		On	June	10	1886,	the	bill	was	also	approved	by	the	House	of	Deputies.	Again,	only	a	small	number	of	deputies	were	present	for	the	vote,	in	which	57	out	of	102	votes	were	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 bill.116	It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	Emder	Zeitung	 and	 the	
Ostfriesische	 Zeitung	 were	 unanimously	 enthusiastic	 about	 this	 decision.	 Both	newspapers	reported	the	spontaneous	festivities	that	took	place	after	the	outcome	of	 the	 vote	 had	 been	 announced.117	The	 Emder	 Zeitung	 wrote	 that	 ‘viele	 Bürger	[hängten]	 noch	 ihre	 Fahnen	 aus,	 […]	 vom	 Rathausthurme	 herab	 ließ	 unsere	städtische	 Capelle,	 um	 der	 Stimmung	 der	 Bürgerschaft	 Ausdruck	 zu	 geben,	 das	„Nun	danket	Alle	Gott“	erschallen	[…].’118		 For	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	a	budget	of	58.4	million	Marks	was	provided.	However,	 this	budget	had	to	be	raised	to	79.4	million	Marks	by	1897.	Due	to	the	continued	protest	from	opponents	of	the	canal,	such	as	Finance	Minister	Johannes	von	Miquel,	 the	beginning	of	 construction	works	was	delayed	until	 1892.	One	of	the	 consequences	 of	 these	 continued	 protests	 was	 that	 only	 vessels	 with	 a																																																									114	StE	IV	2022,	Westdeutscher	Fluss-	und	Kanal-Verein,	Berlin,	im	Arpil	1886	115	StE	IV	2022,	Telegraphie	des	Deutschen	Reiches.	Amt	Emden.	26/5	1883.	Emden	v	Coeln	116	Horn,	Kampf,	p.	35	117	See	StE	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	No.	135,	Emden,	Freitag,	den	11.	Juni	1886	and	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	135,	Freitag	den	11.	Juni	1886	118	StE	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	135,	Freitag	den	11.	Juni	1886	
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maximum	 tonnage	 capacity	 of	 750	 tons	 were	 allowed	 to	 use	 the	 canal.119	On	August	 11	 1899,	 Wilhelm	 II	 himself	 inaugurated	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	Naturally,	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘gewissermaßen	 dem	 Rhein	 eine	 deutsche	 Mündung	verschafft	 wird	 […]’	 generated	 high	 expectations. 120 	The	 Emder	 Zeitung,	 for	example,	 spoke	 of	 the	 ‘Beginn	 einer	 hoffentlich	 bis	 in	 die	 fernsten	 Zeiten	währenden	 Blütheperiode	 […].’121	Furthermore,	 unlike	 the	 inauguration	 of	 the	
Ems-Jade-Kanal	 in	 1888,	 which	 had	 hardly	 received	 any	 attention	 in	 the	 Emder	
Zeitung,	the	procedure	of	the	inauguration	of	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	made	it	to	the	 title	 page	 of	 the	 Emder	 Zeitung	 and	 the	 Ostfriesische	 Zeitung.122	The	 high	expectations	 in	 Emden	 were	 also	 nurtured	 by	 the	 Emperor	 himself,	 when	 he	explained:	‘Ich	bin	der	festen	Ueberzeugung,	daß	es	dieser	Stadt	gelingen	wird,	in	Verbindung	 mit	 Dortmund	 und	 weiter	 hinein	 in	 das	 Hinterland	 […]	 eine	 große	Zukunft	herbeizuführen.’123	As	 part	 of	 the	 canal	 construction,	 Emden’s	 port	was	 also	 expanded	 again.	For	 this,	 the	Prussian	 state	 first	budgeted	around	4.8	million	Marks	and	another	965,	000	Marks	for	the	shipping	channel.	The	fact	that	these	works	were	extremely	necessary	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 Carl	 Schweckendieck.	 In	 his	 festschrift	 for	 the	opening	 of	 Emden’s	 new	 seaport,	 Schweckendieck	 pointed	 out	 that	 until	 1896,	there	was	only	one	larger	vessel	arriving	in	Emden	with	a	draught	of	5.4	metres.124	Subsequently,	 Emden	 received	 new	 port	 facilities	 and	 the	 depth	 of	 water	 was	increased.	 Once	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 was	 inaugurated,	 the	 Hamburg-
Amerikanische	 Packetfahrt-Aktiengesellschaft	 (Hapag)	 of	 Hamburg	 and	 the	
Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 of	 Bremen	 showed	 interest	 in	 expanding	 their	 business	 to	Emden.	 The	 condition	 for	 this	 was	 another	 expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 so	 that	seagoing	 vessels	 would	 be	 able	 to	 call	 there.	 This	 further	 expansion	 was	 then	completed	in	1901.	On	July	30	1902,	Wilhelm	II	visited	Emden,	the	only	time	the	Emperor	had	made	 it	 to	East	Friesland,	 to	celebrate	 the	 inauguration	of	Emden’s	
																																																								119	Hummerich,	Kaufmannsgut,	p.	23	120	StE	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Nr.	189,	Emden,	Montag,	den	14.	August	1899.	121	StE	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	187,	Freitag,	den	11.	August	1899	122	See	StE	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Nr.	188,	Emden,	Montag,	den	12.	August	1899;	Ostfriesische	Zeitung,	Nr.	188	(Zweites	Blatt),	Emden,	Montag,	den	12.	August	1899	and	StE	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	188,	Sonnabend,	den	12.	August	1899	123	StE	Emder	Zeitung,	Nr.	188,	Sonnabend,	den	12.	August	1899	124	Carl	Schweckendieck,	Festschrift	zur	Eröffnung	des	neuen	Emder	Seehafens	(Berlin,	1901),	p.	39	
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seaport.	By	the	time	construction	works	were	completed	in	1901,	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	had	cost	more	than	22	million	Marks.	Another	75	million	Marks	had	been	invested	in	the	construction	of	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.125	These	works	did	not	even	mark	the	end	of	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	and	until	the	First	World	War,	there	were	continued	works	 in	 the	city,	such	as	the	Große	Seeschleuse	which	was	built	 between	 1907	 and	 1913.126 	At	 the	 time	 of	 its	 construction,	 the	 Große	
Seeschleuse	 was	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 of	 its	 kind	 in	 the	world.	 Its	 construction	 had	been	made	necessary	due	to	Emden’s	increased	shipping	traffic	in	previous	years.	Furthermore,	 Fürbringer	 had	 also	 agreed	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 dockyard	 in	Emden.	 For	 this	 purpose,	 the	Nesserlander	Schleuse	 simply	would	 not	 have	 been	sufficient.			 Thus,	 in	 1901,	with	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port,	 the	hopes	 that	 already	 arose	 after	 the	 Prussian	 annexation	 of	 1866	 had	 finally	materialised.	Emden	was	now	in	a	position	that	allowed	for	competition	with	the	other	major	port	cities	on	the	North	Sea	Coast.	As	we	have	seen,	the	journey	to	this	new	 position	 was	 highly	 difficult	 for	 Emden.	 While	 the	 Ems-Jade-Kanal	 was	primarily	 built	 for	 military-strategic	 reasons,	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 was	capable	 of	 opening	 up	 a	 large	 and	 prosperous	 hinterland	 to	 Emden.	 Certainly,	Emden	played	a	comparatively	minor	role	in	realising	the	project	of	a	canal	from	Dortmund	 to	 Emden.	 It	 was	 mainly	 the	 more	 influential	 industrial	 circles	 in	Westphalia	that	enabled	the	construction.	However,	despite	all	this,	Emden	was	in	an	 extremely	 favourable	position	by	 the	 turn	of	 the	 century.	As	 early	 as	 January	1886,	 the	 Rheinisch-Westfälische	 Zeitung	 argued	 that	 if	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 make	Emden	 a	 viable	 alternative	 again	 ‘dann	 wird	 die	 weitere	 Entwickelung	 keine	künstliche	 sein,	 weil	 in	 einer	 mehrgestalteten	 Verbindung	 mit	 einem	 großen	Hinterland	die	Vorbedingungen	 für	ein	 ferneres	Gedeihen	gegeben	sind.’127	From	the	 beginning,	 the	 hopes	 that	 were	 drawn	 from	 Emden’s	 port	 expansion	 were	great.	Therefore,	it	needs	to	be	examined	next	how	Emden’s	mercantile	community	took	advantage	of	the	city’s	new	seaport.																																																											125	Ibid.,	p.	59	126	For	more	information	on	the	Große	Seeschleuse	see	Clasmeier’s	detailed	study	on	this	topic:	Clasmeier,	100	Jahre	Große	Seeschleuse	127	StE	IV	2022,	Rh.-Westf.	Zeitung,	No.	8	vom	8./1.	86.	
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e.	Further	canal	projects	–	a	danger	to	Emden		The	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	was	first	regarded	as	just	one	section	of	a	larger	inland	waterway	system.	At	 the	beginning	of	 the	 twentieth	century,	 there	were	plans	to	expand	the	Hunte-Ems-Kanal,	or	Campe-Dörpen-Kanal	as	the	new	project	was	also	called,	 to	 connect	 the	 River	 Ems	 and	 Bremen	 via	 Oldenburg.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal,	 these	 plans	 were	 worked	 out	 by	 the	 Grand	 Duchy	 of	Oldenburg	and	Bremen.	The	reaction	to	these	plans	document	how	fragile	Emden’s	position	vis-à-vis	its	competitors	on	the	North	Sea	Coast	still	was	despite	the	fact	that	 the	 Prussian	 state	 had	 spent	 a	 fortune	 on	 expanding	 the	 city’s	 port.	 Even	though	 the	 Rheinisch-Westfälische	 Zeitung	 had	 opined	 that	 ‘eine	 Vermehrung	großer	 Handelsplätze	 nicht	 eine	 Schwächung	 der	 einzelnen,	 viel	 eher	 eine	Erstarkung	derselben	zur	Folge	hat	[…]’,	Emden	regarded	the	project	of	the	Campe-
Dörpen-Kanal	with	suspicion.128			 In	 April	 1906,	 after	 complaints	 from	 Emden’s	 city	 council,	 the	 Prussian	Minister	 for	 Public	 Works	 responded	 that	 there	 could	 be	 no	 objections	 against	preliminary	 works	 by	 Oldenburg’s	 government	 for	 the	 Campe-Dörpen-Kanal.	 As	early	 as	 possible,	 Emden	 attempted	 to	 thwart	 Oldenburg’s	 plans.	 Similarly,	 the	
Kaufmännische	Deputation	wrote	 to	 Paul	 von	Breitenbach,	 at	 that	 point	Minister	for	Public	Works,	in	order	to	interfere	in	the	plans	for	the	new	canal.	In	particular,	Bremen	was	criticised	for	advertising	the	canal:	‘In	besonderem	Maße	ist	es	dabei	auf	die	Schädigung	der	Stadt	Emden	abgesehen,	gegen	die	Bremen	oft	in	geradezu	kleinlicher	Weise	 vorgeht.’129	As	 an	 example	of	 this,	 the	deputation	points	 to	 the	fact	that	there	were	import	levies	on	goods	imported	from	Emden	to	Bremen	while	there	 were	 none	 for	 goods	 imported	 from	 Leer. 130 	In	 order	 to	 convince	Breitenbach	 of	 the	 need	 for	 intervention,	 the	Kaufmännische	Deputation	 also	 did	not	 fail	 to	 mention	 that	 approving	 the	 canal	 would	 ‘das	 Interesse	 des	 eigenen	Staates	auf	das	schwerste	schädigen,	zum	mindestens	würden	sie	die	bedeutenden	Aufwendungen	 nutzlos	 machen,	 die	 […]	 für	 die	 Erweiterung	 der	 hiesigen																																																									128	Ibid.		129	StE	IV	2086,	Kaufmännische	Deputation	betr.	den	Bau	des	Hunte-Emskanals,	Emden,	den	3.	Mai	1906	130	Leer	is	situated	close	to	Emden	further	upstream	on	the	River	Ems.	While	Leer	had	modernised	its	port	between	1901	and	1903,	it	remained	considerably	smaller.	Leer’s	industry	also	grew.	Leer,	for	example,	possessed	an	iron	foundry	and	a	paper	mill.	See	Krömer,	Kleine	Wirtschaftsgeschichte,p.	82	
	 167	
Hafenanlagen	aus	Staatsmitteln	bewilligt	worden	sind.’131	So,	even	after	the	turn	of	the	century,	Emden’s	Kaufmännische	Deputation	hoped	to	make	a	case	by	pointing	to	the	self-interest	of	the	Prussian	state.				 Breitenbach	 quickly	 dashed	 this	 hope	 by	 soberly	 responding	 to	 the	deputation	 that	 the	 Prussian	 government	 had	 only	 allowed	 preliminary	 works.	However,	when	it	came	to	deciding	on	the	project	in	general	it	had	to	evaluated	–	‘bei	allem	Wohlwollen	für	Emden	[…]’	–	‘ob	das	geplante	Unternehmen	für	weitere	nationale	 Kreise	 in	 wirthschaftlicher	 Beziehung	 von	 besonderem	 Vorteil	 sein	wird.’132	According	to	Breitenbach,	this	focus	on	national	interest	had	been	the	sole	reason	for	agreeing	to	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port.	When	Emden	made	further	efforts	to	frustrate	Oldenburg’s	plan	for	the	canal,	the	city’s	representatives	had	to	find	out	that	the	Emperor	himself,	Wilhelm	II,	was	in	favour	of	the	project,	as	was	the	Ministry	 for	 Public	Works.133	Bremen’s	 attitude	 towards	 the	 projected	 canal	was	also	concretised	now:	the	Norddeutsche	Lloyd	was	said	to	be	in	favour	of	the	
Campe-Dörpen-Kanal,	 while	 other	 circles	 wanted	 to	 concentrate	 on	 the	
Mittellandkanal.			 Subsequently,	Emden’s	efforts	did	not	abate.	The	Kaufmännische	Deputation	sent	 a	 petition	 to	 the	 Minister	 of	 Public	 Works.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	
Handelskammer	 für	Ostfriesland	und	Papenburg	 also	 got	 involved	 in	 the	 agitation	against	 the	 canal.	 In	 this,	 it	 was	 again	 highlighted	 that	 the	 project	 canal	 almost	exclusively	 drew	 Bremen’s	 interest,	 which	 would	 receive	 a	 connection	 to	 the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 via	 the	 Mittellandkanal.	 Fears	 of	 losing	 out	 to	 Bremen	through	 the	 new	 Campe-Dörpen-Kanal	 were	 justified	 by	 the	 Königliche	
Wasserbauinspektion	in	Emden.	In	a	survey,	that	body	argued	that	although	freight	costs	to	Bremen	would	still	exceed	those	to	Emden	by	about	18%,	Bremen	would	still	 constitute	 fierce	 competition.	 The	 problem	was	 that	 imports	 for	Westphalia	and	 the	Rhineland	were	processed	via	Emden	but	 the	majority	of	barges	 leaving	Emden	southwards	returned	without	any	goods.	Only	289	out	of	675	barges	could	be	 fully	 loaded	 in	 1905.	 In	 Bremen,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	alone	needed	more	German	coal	than	the	total	tonnage	delivered	to	Emden	on	the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	 Even	 worse,	 the	 Norddeutsche	 Lloyd	 had	 already	 bought																																																									131	Ibid.		132	StE	IV	2086,	Der	Minister	der	öffentlichen	Arbeiten,	III.A.3.984.,	Konstans,	den	3.	Juni	1906	133	StE	IV	2086,	Vertraulich!	Leer,	den	15.	Juni	1906	
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some	coal	pits	on	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	As	a	result,	the	import	of	ore	to	Emden,	which	was	currently	carried	out	by	the	Hapag,	was	also	in	danger	of	being	moved	to	Bremen.	 For	other	 goods,	 such	 as	 coal	 and	wood,	 the	prospect	 of	 keeping	 the	business	 in	 Emden	 was	 equally	 bleak.	 Therefore,	 the	 Campe-Dörpen-Kanal	 was	clearly	a	threat	to	Emden’s	position.	It	would	have	exclusively	benefitted	Bremen	and	Oldenburg.			 In	this	context,	it	certainly	is	unsurprising	that	Emden	did	not	stop	agitating	against	 the	 envisaged	 canal.	 Its	 construction	 would	 have	 been	 a	 huge	 blow	 to	Emden’s	favourable	development	as	a	port	city.	In	a	letter	to	the	Minister	for	Public	Works,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 made	 this	 clear:	 ‘Im	 allgemeinen	 wird	 nach	Ausführung	dieses	Kanals	der	Verkehr	im	hiesigen	Hafen	auf	den	Standpunkt	des	Jahres	 1898	 zurückgeschraubt	 werden	 […].’ 134 	Bremen	 was	 still	 pictured	 as	foreseeing	 Emden’s	 bright	 future	 and	 therefore	 wanting	 to	 eliminate	 the	competition	 before	 it	 was	 too	 late.	 Thus,	 in	 Emden,	 there	 was	 still	 a	 clear	separation	between	the	German	nation	and	the	Prussian	state.	This	is	absolutely	in	line	with	Emden’s	attitude	towards	the	German	nation	which	is	discussed	above.	In	Emden,	the	Prussian	state	still	had	priority	over	the	German	nation.	With	regard	to	what	had	been	achieved	in	Emden	since	the	Prussian	annexation,	this	is	certainly	understandable.	 Yet,	 while	 Emden	 had	 always	 regarded	 itself	 as	 a	 possible	competitor	to	Hamburg,	Bremen	and	the	Dutch	ports,	by	1906,	there	was	still	no	feeling	of	being	able	to	compete	face	to	face	with	these	ports.	Prussian	approval	of	the	Campe-Dörpen-Kanal	was	equated	with	Berlin	turning	its	back	on	Emden.	After	all,	 the	 city,	 ‘die	 mit	 äusserster	 Anstrengung	 aller	 Kräfte	 an	 der	 Aufgabe,	 aus	Emden	 ein	 preussisches	 Handelsemporium	 zu	 machen,	 wird	 […]	 Opfer	 einer	Politik	der	Regierung,	die	nicht	vorauszusehen	war	[…].’135			 This	viewpoint	was	also	set	out	in	a	petition	to	the	Emperor.	In	this,	it	was	argued	again	that	Bremen	simply	wanted	to	get	rid	of	its	new	competition	on	the	River	 Ems.	 As	 proof,	 the	 petition	mentions	 a	 member	 of	 the	Nordwestdeutscher	
Kanalverein	 who	 emphasised	 to	 the	 Weserzeitung	 in	 1905:	 ‘Bremen	 muß	Anstrengungen	 machen,	 denn	 es	 wird	 durch	 Emden	 geschädigt.	 Was	 Emden	 an	sich	 riß,	 das	 ging	 auf	 Kosten	 deutscher	 besonders	 der	 Weserhäfen.’ 136																																																									134	StE	IV	2086,	Magistrat	der	Stadt	Emden.	J.	No.	16854,	Emden,	den	5.	November	1906	135	Ibid.		136	StE	IV	2086,	Reinentwurf,	Sr.	Majestät	dem	Deutschen	Kaiser	und	König	von	Preußen	
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Furthermore,	 there	were	also	preparations	for	a	petition	to	the	Reich	Chancellor,	Bernhard	 von	 Bülow.	 However,	 aside	 from	 taking	 official	 action,	 there	 are	indications	that	Leo	Fürbringer	made	a	lot	of	progress	in	Berlin	behind	the	scenes.	For	example,	on	January	10	1907,	Fürbringer	sent	a	letter	to	Emden’s	city	council	from	Hamburg.	 In	 this	 letter,	Fürbringer	 informs	the	city	council	of	a	meeting	he	had	with	Albert	Ballin,	general	director	of	the	Hapag.	Fürbringer	reported:			 Die	 Rundschau	 hatte	 überdies	 im	 gestrigen	 Abendblatt	 die	 Nachricht	gebracht,	 dass	 in	 Kreisen	 der	 Oldenburgischen	 Landtagsabgeordneten	verlaute,	dass	der	Kaiser	dem	Großherzog	versprochen	hatte,	dass	der	Canal	Dörpen-Campe	 zugelassen	 werden	 solle.	 Das	 Blatt	 übergab	 ich	 Ballin,	 der	mir	 versprach	 es	 sofort	 dem	 Kaiser	 einzusenden	 u.	 S.	 M.	 um	 Auskunft	 zu	bitten,	ob	dies	bezweckt	sei.	Er	sprach	die	Überzeugung	aus,	dass	es	nicht	so	sei,	der	Kaiser	sei	überrascht	gewesen	u.	habe	ganz	entschieden	Abneigung	bekundet	auf	den	Canal	einzugehen	als	Ballin	S.	M.	neulich	gesprochen	und	die	Schädigung	des	Hafens	von	Emden	hervorgehoben	hatte.137		Supporting	Emden	had,	of	course,	two	advantages	for	Hamburg.	Firstly,	Hamburg	could	 exert	 influence	 on	 developments	 in	 Emden.	 Secondly,	Hamburg	 could	 also	ensure	 that	 its	 competitor	 on	 the	 Weser	 was	 kept	 in	 check	 by	 the	 growing	significance	 of	 Emden	 as	 a	 seaport.	 Subsequently,	 Emden	 and	 Fürbringer’s	lobbying	 activities	 continued.	 On	 February	 9	 1907,	 the	Budgetkommission	 of	 the	Prussian	 House	 of	 Representatives	 requested	 the	 Prussian	 government	 to	 not	decide	on	the	matter	of	the	canal	before	consulting	the	House	of	Representatives.	This	 request	 was	 then	 endorsed	 by	 the	 Prussian	 Minister	 for	 Public	 Works.	Subsequently,	Fürbringer	was	approached	by	a	Prussian	Under-Secretary	of	State	and	 asked	 to	 cease	 agitation	 against	 the	 canal	 project,	 since	 ‘Regierung	 sei	entschlossen	denselben	abzulehnen,	doch	werde	aus	Höflichkeit	gegen	Oldenburg	die	schriftliche	Eröffnung	noch	einige	Woche	aufgeschoben	werden.’138			 Of	course,	the	manner	of	undertaking	agitation	for	and	against	the	Campe-
Dörpen-Kanal	 reveals	 a	 lot	 about	 the	way	 politics	was	 conducted	 in	 the	 German																																																									137	StE	IV	2086,	Hotel	Union	–	Hamburg,	Hamburg,	den	10.	Januar	1907,	Wohllöblicher	Magistrat!	138	StE	 IV	 2086,	 Haus	 der	 Abgeordneten,	 Berlin,	 den	 18.	 Februar	 1907,	 Wohllöblicher	Magistrat!	
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Empire.	 It	 also	 shows	 how	much	 influence	 Fürbringer	 had	 been	 able	 to	 build	 in	Berlin	 and	 in	 Hamburg,	 where	 he	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 close	 to	 Albert	 Ballin.	 In	March,	at	a	soiree	in	Berlin,	Fürbringer	was	also	able	to	talk	to	Breitenbach	about	the	 matter.	 Fürbringer	 informed	 Breitenbach	 that	 he	 already	 knew	 of	 the	Emperor’s	decision	to	reject	the	plans	for	the	canal.	Even	Breitenbach,	the	Minister	for	 Public	 Works,	 had	 only	 been	 notified	 of	 this	 a	 few	 days	 before	 the	 soiree.	Breitenbach	 told	 Fürbringer	 that,	 when	 the	 canal	 question	 was	 discussed	 with	Wilhelm	 II,	 the	 Emperor	 expressed	 about	 Emden’s	 mayor:	 ‘Der	 Arme	 hat	 auch	einen	seiner	Söhne	in	Südwestafrika	verloren.’139	However,	there	were	supporters	of	 the	 canal	 present	 at	 the	 soiree,	 who	 shouted	 at	 Fürbringer:	 ‘gebaut	 wird	 er	doch’.140	The	decision	against	the	canal	was	definitely	not	regarded	as	permanent.	In	 order	 to	 remain	 on	 good	 terms	 with	 the	 government,	 Fürbringer	 invited	Breitenbach,	who	had	visited	Emden	before,	and	his	wife	 to	Emden.	After	all,	 the	Minister	 for	 Public	 Works	 had	 not	 doubted	 for	 one	 second	 that	 the	 canal	 ‘mit	Rücksicht	 auf	 Emden	 u.	 seine	 Bedrohung	 für	 den	 preußischen	 Staat	 und	 des	deutschen	Reich	 schlechterdings	 abzulehnen	 sei	 und	die	Auffassung	 vom	Anfang	an	 offen	 ausgesprochen	 hätte.’141	Hence,	 for	 the	 time	 being,	 Emden	 was	 able	 to	fend	 off	 plans	 for	 the	 Campe-Dörpen-Kanal,	 which	 certainly	 would	 have	deteriorated	its	situation	vis-à-vis	Bremen.			 However,	 as	 early	 as	 1909	 the	 subject	 aroused	 interest	 again.	 In	 the	meantime,	 the	 lobbying	 work	 for	 the	 canal	 had	 continued,	 as	 promised	 to	Fürbringer	during	the	soiree	in	1907.	Indeed,	there	is	some	indication	that	the	two	parties	 moved	 closer.	 For	 example,	 Fürbringer	 was	 negotiating	 with	representatives	from	Oldenburg	the	possibility	of	receiving	compensation	in	case	the	Campe-Dörpen-Kanal	was	built.	Unsurprisingly,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 rejected	this	idea	on	the	grounds	that	there	would	be	no	adequate	compensation.	Still,	due	to	 the	 fact	 that	 Breitenbach	 revealed	 to	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 that	 the	 Prussian	government	 believed	 ‘aus	 bundesfreundlichen	 Rücksichten	 und	 nach	 dem	Grundsatze	„noblesse	oblige”	nicht	länger	dem	verbündeten	Staate	Oldenburg	den	Anschluss	ihres	projektierten	Hunte-Ems-Kanals	versagen	zu	können.’	
																																																								139	StE	IV	2086,	Notiz	für	den	Magistrat	der	Stadt	Emden,	Berlin,	den	15.	März	140	StE	IV	2086,	Haus	der	Abgeordneten,	Berlin,	den	15.	März	1907	141	StE	IV	2086,	Notiz	für	den	Magistrat	der	Stadt	Emden,	Berlin,	den	15.	März	1907	
	 171	
Subsequently,	 it	 was	 decided	 in	 Emden	 to	 once	 again	 underline	 the	resentment	against	the	projected	canal	to	the	Emperor.	In	a	petition	to	Wilhelm	II	from	February	1910,	Emden	even	warned	of	serious	differences	with	the	Prussian	Diet,	 as	 the	 new	 canal	 would	 interfere	 with	 existing	 Prussian	 projects.	 Emden	warned	 that	 ‘Krisen	 hervorgerufen	 werden	 [könnten],	 die	 jeder	 preussische	Patriot	 zu	 vermeiden	 bemüht	 sein	 muss.’142	In	 fact,	 in	 1910,	 it	 was	 realised	 in	Emden	that	its	situation	had	not	significantly	improved	since	the	foundation	of	the	Empire.	Emden’s	trade	for	its	own	account	was	still	comparatively	low.	Therefore,	it	 was	 argued:	 ‘die	 Hansestadt	 Bremen,	 ein	 Riese	 dagegen,	 der	 den	 kleinen	Konkurrenzhafen	vollständig	lahm	legen	würde,	sobald	er	über	seine	Lebensader,	den	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 das	 Mitverfügungsrecht	 erlangt	 haben	 würde.’ 143	Emden	 suspected	 an	 intrigue	 behind	 the	 canal	 project.	 The	 Hapag,	 which	 in	contrast	 to	 the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd,	 had	actually	 established	business	 in	Emden,	was	 now	 assumed	 to	 withdraw	 from	 Emden	 again	 –	 on	 the	 initiative	 of	 the	
Norddeutscher	Lloyd.	It	was	pointed	out	that	this	suspected	intrigue	was	organised	in	 order	 to	 ‘in	 Emden	 keine	 Konkurrenz	 für	 die	 Hansestädte	 entstehen	 zu	lassen.’144	In	 the	 end,	 even	 though	 Breitenbach	 reported	 to	 Emden’s	 city	 council	that	 the	Prussian	government	would	not	refuse	negotiations	out	of	consideration	for	 Emden,	 the	 Campe-Dörpen-Kanal	 was	 not	 built	 before	 the	 First	 World	 War.	Construction	of	the	Küstenkanal,	as	it	is	called	today,	began	in	1922	and	ended	in	1935,	as	part	of	one	the	first	job	creation	schemes	of	the	Third	Reich.145			
f.	Emden’s	problem	of	getting	connected		At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 Emden	 became	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	
Brandenburgisch-Afrikanische	 Compagnie.	 At	 the	 time,	 Frederick	 William	 of	Brandenburg	chose	Emden	as	the	port	of	registry	for	his	new	overseas	endeavour.	However,	 the	 company’s	 success	 was	 limited	 and	 so	 it	 had	 to	 be	 dissolved	 by	Frederick	William’s	son.	By	the	time	of	the	Empire,	Emden,	due	to	its	small	size	and	standing,	 certainly	 could	 not	 have	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 influence	 on	 Germany’s																																																									142	StE	IV	2087,	Emden,	Februar	1910,	Allerdurchlauchtigster	grossmächtigster	Kaiser,	allergnädigster	Kaiser,	König	und	Herr!	143	Ibid.		144	Ibid.		145	Clasmeier,	100	Jahre	Große	Seeschleuse,	p.	36	
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colonial	venture	as	Hamburg	or	Bremen.	Additionally,	when	the	decision	in	favour	of	acquiring	colonies	was	made,	during	the	early	1880s,	Emden’s	port	had	not	yet	been	expanded	to	the	size	of	a	viable	seaport.	In	addition	to	this,	in	Emden	itself	it	was	realised	that	the	city’s	trade	volume	was	still	relatively	low	even	after	the	turn	of	 the	 century.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ask	 how	 Emden’s	 mercantile	community	was	capable	of	taking	advantage	of	Emden’s	new	port	facilities	and	to	what	 extent	 Emden’s	 merchants	 were	 actually	 able	 to	 compete	 with	 those	 in	Hamburg	 and	 Bremen.	 Certainly,	 Emden	 still	 had	 a	monopoly	 on	 trade	with	 the	Empire’s	 industrial	 areas	 in	Westphalia	 and	 the	Rhineland,	 yet	 this	 situation	did	not	seem	to	be	permanent.	Trade	with	Germany’s	colonial	possession	would	have	been	one	option	for	Emden	to	become	an	alternative	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen	on	the	North	Sea	Coast.			 Carl	 Lehnkering	 definitely	 had	 a	 similar	 idea	 in	 1905.	 In	 1872,	 Carl	Lehnkering	together	with	his	father	and	the	merchant	Carl	Scholl	had	founded	the	firm	Lehnkering	&	Cie.	Originally	headquartered	in	Duisburg,	the	firm	also	opened	a	 branch	 office	 in	 Emden,	 only	 two	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 opening	 of	 the	Dortmund-
Ems-Kanal.146	Henceforth,	 the	 firm	was	able	 to	establish	 itself	 as	one	of	 the	most	significant	 shipping	 companies	 in	 Emden.	 One	 of	 its	 branches	 of	 business	 was	agency	 business.	 Amongst	 other	 companies,	 Lehnkering	 &	 Cie.	 represented	 the	
Westfälische	Transport	Aktiengesellschaft	 in	Emden,	which	played	a	major	 role	 in	the	 freight	 traffic	 on	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	 When	 in	 1905,	 the	 Colonial	Department	 of	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 ordered	 the	 compilation	 of	 freight	 rates	 from	Germany	 to	 German	 East	 Africa,	 Carl	 Lehnkering	 urged	 Carl	 Schweckendieck	 in	Berlin	to	press	for	the	consideration	of	Emden	in	this	matter.		In	 addition	 to	 this,	 Lehnkering	 points	 to	 the	 projected	 construction	 of	 a	railway	 line	 in	 South	 West	 Africa	 between	 Lüderitzbucht	 and	 Kubub,	 which	 is	situated	to	the	east	of	Lüderitzbucht	and	south	of	Aus.	This	line	was	planned	as	the	first	section	of	a	southern	railway	line	between	Lüderitzbucht	and	Keetmanshoop.	For	 this	 railway	 line,	 Lehnkering	wanted	 to	 see	 the	material	 being	 shipped	 from	German	ports	only,	as	had	been	officially	decided	earlier	in	the	year.	Lehnkering’s	preference	in	this	respect	was,	of	course,	Emden,	from	where	his	firm	was	already	exporting	material	to	Swakopmund,	South	West	Africa.	Lehnkering	did	not	fail	 to																																																									146	Hummerich,	Kaufmannsgut,	pp.	53–56	
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emphasise	to	Schweckendieck	that	Emden’s	port	‘immer	noch	von	allen	Seiten	der	kräftigsten	Unterstützung	bedarf,	um	sich	weiter	zu	entwickeln.’147	The	matter	was	then	 brought	 before	 the	Ministry	 for	 Public	Works,	which	 in	 turn	 contacted	 the	Colonial	Department.	In	fact,	in	the	Department	it	was	then	determined	to	instruct	the	 Deutsche	 Stahlwerksverband	 AG	 to	 produce	 the	 materials	 close	 to	 the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal,	 so	 that	 Emden	 could	 be	 used	 as	 the	 port	 of	 export.	 With	regard	to	integrating	Emden	into	the	traffic	with	German	East	Africa,	there	were	no	objections	 from	 any	 side.	 However,	 the	 precondition	 for	 this	 was	 of	 course	 the	establishment	of	a	regular	shipping	service	to	the	colony.		Indeed,	 this	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	 biggest	 obstacle	 to	 the	 realisation	 of	Lehnkering’s	plan.	While	it	was	simple	to	find	a	shipping	company	that	was	able	to	handle	the	shipment	of	railway	materials	to	South	West	Africa,	namely	Hamburg’s	
Woermann-Linie,	 it	 was	 more	 difficult	 to	 find	 a	 company	 dealing	 with	 trade	 to	German	 East	 Africa.	 As	 a	 result,	 Fürbringer	 first	 wrongly	 contacted	 the	 Hapag,	which	did	not	maintain	a	service	to	East	Africa.	The	matter	was	forwarded	to	the	
Deutsche	 Ost-Afrika	 Linie	 of	 Hamburg.	 However,	 the	 company’s	 response	 to	Fürbringer	was	far	from	satisfactory	for	Emden.	Fürbringer	was	informed	that	‘der	Export	 nach	 Ostafrika	 noch	 ein	 sehr	 geringer	 [ist],	 sodas	 sich	 das	 Anlaufen	 von	Emden	 nicht	 lohnt.’148	Therefore,	 a	 direct	 and	 regular	 calling	 at	 Emden	was	 not	feasible	 for	 the	 company.	 Once	 trade	 with	 German	 East	 Africa	 could	 reach	appropriate	 dimensions	 and	 calling	 at	 Emden	 would	 make	 economic	 sense,	 the	company	promised	to	attend	to	the	matter	again.			 In	 1907,	 the	Ostfriesische	Nachrichten	 then	 announced	 that	 the	Hamburg-
Bremer	 Afrika-Linie	 was	 going	 to	 introduce	 a	 regular	 shipping	 service	 to	 the	Empire’s	African	colonies.	It	was	also	announced	that	one	of	the	company’s	vessels	was	going	to	call	at	Emden	in	order	to	deliver	goods	to	Togo.	However,	 this	plan	seems	 to	 have	 been	 extremely	 short-lived.	 Only	 a	 few	 weeks	 after	 the	announcement,	 the	 Hamburg-Bremer	 Afrika-Linie	 clarified	 that	 it	 had	 not	 been	possible	to	call	at	Emden	due	to	the	 lack	of	export	goods.	 In	the	 letter	 from	mid-April,	 the	 shipping	 company	 revealed	 its	 plans	 to	 organise	 a	 single	 shipment	 to	Africa	 from	Emden	 in	 June	of	 that	year.	For	 the	 time	being,	 a	monthly	 service	 to	Emden	 ‘wird	 uns	 jedoch	 vorderhand	 nicht	 möglich	 sein,	 da	 es	 an	 genügenden																																																									147	StE	IV	2083,	Carl	Lehnkering,	Kommerzienrat,	Duisburg,	den	13.	Dezember	1905	148	StE	IV	2083,	Deutsche	Ost-Afrika-Linie,	Hamburg,	den	21.	Februar	1906	
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ausgehenden	Gütern	mangelt,	um	ein	Analufen	Emdens	mit	den	Interessen	unserer	Rhederei	zu	vereinbaren.’149	The	Prussian	district	president	in	Aurich	then	took	up	the	issue	again	in	autumn	of	1907.	Subsequently,	Emden	contacted	the	Hamburg-
Bremer	 Afrika-Linie	 once	 more.	 However,	 Emden	 received	 another	 negative	response,	even	though	the	company	confirmed	that	it	was	still	eager	to	establish	a	regular	 service	 from	 Emden.	 The	 company	 also	 highlighted	 that	 it	 had	 even	reduced	freight	rates	from	Emden,	so	that	the	port	could	compete	with	Rotterdam	and	Antwerp.	Still,	the	company	had	to	admit	that	whenever	it	was	able	to	attract	business	from	Westphalia,	shipment	could	not	be	organised	from	Emden.	This	was	because	 consigners	 generally	 preferred	 Rotterdam	 and	 Antwerp.	 This	 example	shows	how	difficult	it	was	for	Emden	to	take	part	in	the	colonial	business,	in	which	Hamburg	and	Bremen	played	the	major	roles	within	Germany.	Since	there	was	no	native	 shipping	 company	 that	 could	 have	 assumed	 the	 task	 of	 organising	 trade	with	 the	 African	 colonies,	 Emden	 was	 entirely	 dependent	 on	 companies	 from	Hamburg	and	Bremen.		 In	order	to	change	this	situation,	there	were	plans	to	found	an	Afrikanische	
Compagnie	towards	the	end	of	1905.	Fürbringer	in	particular	seems	to	have	been	heavily	involved	in	planning	this	new	company,	which	would	be	headquartered	in	Emden.	 Together	 with	 Fürbinger,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	 promised	 to	 support	 the	envisaged	company	in	every	way.	Naturally,	the	initiators	of	the	project	referred	to	Emden’s	 proud	 history	 as	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 Brandenburgisch-Afrikanische	
Compagnie.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 past	 venture,	 the	 Afrikanische	 Compagnie	 was	planned	as	a	 joint	stock	company	with	a	 total	 seed	capital	of	1.25	million	Marks.	Functions	 of	 the	 new	 company	 were	 manifold	 and	 included	 purchasing	 new	territory,	 running	 plantations	 and	 commercial	 transactions	 of	 all	 kinds.	 A	 firm	from	 Hamburg,	 which	 already	 owned	 factories	 in	 Cameroon,	 was	 supposed	 to	merge	with	the	Afrikanische	Compagnie.	According	to	the	company’s	brochure,	this	did	indeed	look	like	an	extremely	profitable	deal.	After	all,	the	firm’s	profits	were	respectable:	with	a	capital	of	800,	000	Marks,	the	firm	made	profits	of	around	16%,	30%	and	35%	in	1903,	1904	and	1905	respectively.150	In	addition	to	the	German	colonies,	 the	 Afrikanische	 Compagnie	 also	 planned	 to	 develop	 business	 in	 other	
																																																								149	StE	IV	2083,	Hamburg-Bremer	Afrika-Linie	A.G.,	Hamburg,	den	15.	April	1907	150	StE	IV	2083,	Prospekt	betreffend	Grüdung	der	„Afrikanischen	Compagnie“	
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parts	 of	 Africa,	 such	 as	 Morocco,	 with	 the	 collaboration	 of	 the	
Mittelmeergesellschaft.				 However,	 Emden’s	 general	 interest	 in	 the	 company	 seems	 to	 have	 been	limited.	 In	 May	 1906,	 after	 the	 brochure	 had	 been	 made	 public,	 Eberhard	 von	Schkopp,	 one	 of	 the	 initiators	 of	 the	 project,	 complained	 to	 Fürbringer:	 ‘Meine	Vermutungen,	daß	seitens	der	Emdener	Bürgerschaft	fast	gar	kein	Interesse	für	die	Afrikanische	Compagnie	besteht,	geht	wohl	am	deutlichsten	daraus	hervor,	daß	ein	einziger	 Bürger	 Emden’s	 sich	 mit	 nur	 2000	 Mark	 […]	 zu	 beteiligen	 gedenkt.’151	Furthermore,	Schkopp	also	enquired	about	 the	provision	of	 land	 in	Emden	at	no	charge,	 which	 had	 been	 promised	 previously.	 To	 this,	 Emden’s	 city	 council	responded	 that	 it	 was	 still	 waiting	 for	 the	 actual	 foundation	 of	 the	 company.	Unluckily,	 this	 strategy	 turned	out	 to	 be	 fatal.	 In	 June	1906,	 Schkopp	once	 again	pushed	for	more	enthusiasm	for	the	project	in	Emden.	He	pointed	out	that	it	was	entirely	up	to	the	shareholders	to	determine	the	company’s	headquarters,	so	that	Emden’s	cooperation	in	the	matter	was	necessary.			 At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Afrikanische	 Compagnie,	 Emden’s	participation	was	still	limited.	In	August	1906,	a	newspaper	article	announced	that	[w]as	 die	 in	 Gründung	 begriffene	 Afrikanische	 Compagnie	 anbelangt,	 […]	 so	 ist	diesmal	der	Engel	scheints	an	uns	vorbeigegangen.’152	While	one	person	informed	the	newspaper	that	he	had	lost	interest	in	the	project,	others	even	claimed	to	have	been	 falsely	associated	with	 it.	One	of	 these	people	seems	to	have	been	a	certain	Hermann	 Paasche,	 who	 claimed	 that	 he	 ‘seinerzeit	 auf	 Wunsch	 des	 Herrn	Oberbürgermeister	 Fürbringer-Emden	 an	 einer	 konstituierenden	 Versammlung	teilgenommen	 [habe].’153	Still,	 according	 to	 Paasche,	 while	 he	 took	 part	 in	 the	discussion,	he	was	not	involved	in	any	of	the	company’s	business	thereafter.	In	any	case,	 the	company’s	headquarters	were	moved	to	Hamburg	and	Berlin	 instead	of	Emden.	 Therefore,	 the	 newspaper	 concluded	 that	 this	 project	 ‘bedarfs	 für	 uns	außer	 dieser	 doch	 wohl	 zweckdienlichen	 Orientierung	 dafür	 jedenfalls	 weiter	keines	 –	 namentlich	 finanziellen	 –	 Interesses,	 zumal	 es	 jetzt	 hierorts	 selbst	 an	Unternehmungslust	 nicht	 mangelt.’ 154 	The	 company	 seems	 to	 have	 been	
																																																								151	StE	IV	2083,	Sehr	geehrter	Herr	Oberbürgermeister,	Berlin,	d.	29.V.06	152	StE	IV	2083,	Afrikanische	Compagnie,	Emden,	18.	Aug.	153	StE	IV	2083,	Hannov.	Courier		vom	30/8.	1906,	Abend-Ausg.,	No.	26395	154	StE	IV	2083,	Afrikanische	Compagnie,	Emden,	18.	Aug.	
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successful:	 in	 its	 first	 year,	 the	 company	 planned	 to	 pay	 a	 dividend	 of	 10%	 to	shareholders.155			 In	 the	end,	Emden	was	not	able	 to	establish	any	kind	of	connection	to	 the	German	 colonies.	 Whether	 or	 not	 moving	 the	 headquarters	 of	 the	 Afrikanische	
Compagnie	 to	Emden	was	 in	 fact	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	enthusiasm	for	 the	project	 in	Emden	is	difficult	to	evaluate.	Fürbringer	and	Emden’s	city	council	were	certainly	willing	 to	support	 the	venture.	Still,	 there	seems	to	have	been	a	general	problem	with	 integrating	 Emden	 into	 the	 international	 shipping	 network	 and	 with	mobilising	 Emden’s	mercantile	 community.	 This	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 attempts	 in	Emden	 to	establish	a	 regular	 shipping	 service	 to	Great	Britain.	As	early	 as	1883,	there	were	plans	for	the	establishment	of	a	shipping	service	between	Emden	and	Boston,	 Great	 Britain.	 These	 plans	 were	 put	 forward	 by	 Julius	 Rothenstein,	 a	merchant	based	in	Berlin	at	Leichtentritt	&	Rothenstein.	Even	though	Emden’s	city	council	 supported	 this	 venture	by	way	of	 a	petition	 to	 the	Prussian	government,	Rothenstein	was	not	 able	 to	put	his	 initial	plan	 into	action.	The	 reason	 seems	 to	have	 been	 financial	 problems	 on	 Rothenstein’s	 side.	 From	 the	 beginning,	 the	project	had	been	viewed	critically:			 An	 Schwierigkeiten	 wird	 es	 dem	 Unternehmen	 anfangs	 namentlich	 nicht	fehlen;	Bremen	und	Hamburg	auf	der	 einen	Seite	und	Holland	und	Belgien	auf	der	anderen	werden	schon	Alles	aufbieten,	dasselbe	zu	drücken,	so	daß	ohne	 kräftigste	 Unterstützung	 der	 Regierung	 und	 der	 betr.	 Behörden	namentlich	 im	Anfange	das	Unternehmen	kaum	wird	bestehen	können,	wie	denn	 auch	wohl	 die	Annahme	eines	 regelmäßigen	 täglichen	Versands	über	hier	von	21	Wagenladungen	für	den	Anfang	wohl	etwas	zu	sanguinisch	sein	möchte.156		Still,	Rothenstein	was	not	the	only	party	interested	in	a	shipping	service	between	Emden	 and	 Great	 Britain.	 For	 example,	 in	 April	 1887,	 a	 certain	 H.	 Diekenga	 let	Emden’s	city	council	know	about	 the	 interest	of	an	English	 firm	 in	establishing	a	
																																																								155	StE	IV	2083,	Bericht	über	das	1.	Geschäftsjahr	der	Afrikanischen	Kompanie	A.-G.	zu	Berlin	pro	Jahr	1907	156	StE	IV	2043,	Königl.	Eisenbahn-Direktion	(Rechtsrheinisch)	Köln,	Emden,	23.	Februar	1884,	G.	Voss	
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regular	 service	 between	 Emden	 and	 Great	 Britain.	 Ultimately,	 this	 venture	 also	came	to	nothing.			 Thereafter,	 the	 idea	of	a	regular	service	between	Emden	and	Great	Britain	arose	again	and	again.	In	1900,	Fürbringer	brought	the	idea	of	a	regular	passenger	service	before	Albert	Ballin.	 In	 the	Hapag’s	 response,	 it	was	emphasised	 that	 the	company,	 after	 due	 consideration	 ‘des	 Projectes	 einer	Passagierdampferverbindung	 Emden-Harwich	 zu	 der	 Überzeugung	 gelangt	 [ist],	dass	 eine	 erfolgreiche	 Concurrenz	 der	 neu	 zu	 gründenden	 Linie	 mit	 den	holländischen	 Linien	 […]	 nicht	 möglich	 sein	 wird.’157	The	 reason	 given	 by	 the	
Hapag	 was	 that	 the	 journey	 between	 the	 Dutch	 ports	 and	 Great	 Britain	 was	shorter.	A	service	from	Emden	would	not	have	been	able	to	compete.	Even	when	travelling	 from	 Great	 Britain	 to	 the	 German	 Empire	 or	 vice	 versa,	 the	 route	 via	Emden	was	said	to	be	one	to	two	hours	longer	than	via	Dutch	ports.		In	1912,	 Fürbringer	was	 contacted	by	 a	 certain	Friedrich	Kothe,	who	was	working	 for	 the	 Argo	 Reederei	 in	 Bremen.	 Kothe	 proposed	 to	 Fürbringer	 the	establishment	of	a	 fast	 liner	service	between	Emden	and	London.	While	working	for	 a	 company	 in	 Bremen,	 Kothe	 realised	 that	 ‘fast	 die	 Hälfte	 des	 gesammten	deutsch/	englischen	Verkehrs	über	die	fremden	Häfen	zur	Beförderung	kommt.’158	According	 to	 Kothe,	 this	 was	mostly	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	were	geographically	disadvantaged	in	comparison	to	the	Dutch	and	Belgian	ports.	Hence,	the	two	Hanseatic	Cities	were	not	able	to	attract	trade	from	Westphalia,	the	Rhineland,	 Thuringia	 and	 Southern	 Germany.	 Although	 Kothe	 had	 already	attempted	 to	 awaken	 interest	 in	 his	 project	 in	 Bremen,	 these	 efforts	 remained	unsuccessful.	He	claimed	that	in	Bremen	‘will	man	aus	verschiedenen	bestimmten	Gründen,	welche	Ihnen	auch	wohl	erklärlich	sein	werden,	nichts	von	einer	neuen	Linie	 wissen,	 welche	 evtl.	 den	 Interessen	 Bremens	 zuwider	 laufen	 könnte.’159	Kothe	estimated	the	costs	for	this	new	shipping	service	at	no	more	than	12	million	Marks.	 Still,	 Kothe	 also	 realised	 that	 it	 would	 be	 absolutely	 essential	 to	 receive	support	 from	 the	 government	 in	 this	 matter.	 Indeed,	 Reinhold	 Krätke,	 State	Secretary	in	the	Reichspostamt,	endorsed	the	project	by	showing	interest	in	using	
																																																								157	StE	IV	2043,	Hamburg-Amerika-Linie,	Hamburg,	den	9.	November	1900	158	StE	IV	2101,	Friedrich	Kothe	to	Leo	Fürbringer,	Bremen,	15.	Juni	1912	159	Ibid.		
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the	 new	 service	 provided	 that	 the	 conditions	 were	 favourable.160	One	 of	 these	conditions	was	a	direct	railway	connection	to	and	from	Emden.		On	the	other	hand,	Breitenbach,	still	Minister	for	Public	Works,	rejected	the	idea	 of	 introducing	 special	 railway	 tariffs	 in	 support	 of	 the	 shipping	 service.	 A	special	 tariff	 like	 this	 was,	 for	 example,	 granted	 for	 trade	 with	 the	 Levant.	Breitenbach	 highlighted	 that	 while	 trade	 with	 the	 Levant	 would	 not	 be	 feasible	without	 the	 special	 tariff,	 German	 trade	 with	 Great	 Britain	 was	 also	 possible	without	 governmental	 assistance. 161 	At	 the	 end	 of	 1912,	 the	 regional	administrative	authority	in	Aurich	informed	Fürbringer	that	representatives	of	the	
Königliche	Eisenbahndirektion	were	overall	in	favour	of	the	project,	yet	the	details	of	 the	project	were	not	sufficiently	worked	out.162	During	1913,	 the	realisation	of	the	project	was	further	delayed;	in	particular,	the	profitability	of	passenger	traffic	from	 Emden	 to	 Great	 Britain	 was	 questioned.	 Contacting	 a	 larger	 shipping	company	 was	 considered	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 use	 redundant	 vessels	 for	 the	service	but	the	Hapag	refused	to	take	part	in	the	project.163	Subsequently,	in	early	1914,	Emden’s	city	council	had	to	report	to	the	administrative	authority	in	Aurich:	‘Die	 Finanzierung	 der	 geplanten	 Dampfer-Linie	 Emden-London	 ist	 noch	 nicht	gelungen.’164	Until	the	beginning	of	the	First	World	War,	there	was	no	progress	on	the	matter.		Hence,	 all	 these	 examples	 demonstrate	 how	 difficult	 it	 was	 for	 Emden	 to	establish	itself	as	a	viable	alternative	to	the	major	German,	Dutch	and	Belgian	ports	on	the	North	Sea	Coast.	Emden’s	port	underwent	major	expansion	works	up	until	the	First	World	War	but	this	did	not	mean	that	the	city	was	suddenly	able	to	attract	new	business.	While	the	condition	of	Emden’s	port	facilities	improved	throughout	the	period	of	the	German	Empire,	its	mercantile	community	was	not	able	to	make	full	use	of	these	new	conditions.	With	regard	to	colonial	trade,	it	was	not	possible	for	the	city	to	compete	with	Hamburg	and	Bremen.	When	it	came	to	establishing	a	regular	 service	 to	 Great	 Britain,	 Dutch	 competitors	 had	 the	 edge	 over	 Emden.	Certainly,	 these	 are	 only	 two	 examples,	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 Emden	 attempted	 to	establish	a	shipping	service	to	Great	Britain	for	about	30	years	reveals	a	lot	about																																																									160	StE	IV	2101,	Der	Staats-Sekretär	des	Reichs-Postamts,	Berlin,	den	18.	Oktober	1912	161	StE	IV	2101,	Der	Minister	der	öffentlich	Arbeiten,	Berlin,	den	25.	Oktober	1912	162	StE	IV	2101,	Der	Regierungs-Präsident,	Aurich,	den	13.	Dezember	1912	163	StE	IV	2101,	Adolf	Koch,	Berlin,	den	3.	September	1913	164	StE	IV	2101,	Der	Regierungs-Präsident,	Aurich,	den	29.	Dezember	1913	
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its	 status	 on	 the	North	 Sea	 Coast.	 It	was	 relatively	 easy	 to	 update	 Emden’s	 port	facilities	 but	 creating	 the	 infrastructure	 to	 connect	 Emden	 to	world	 trade	was	 a	different	matter.			
g.	Emden	and	the	emigration	business		While	Emden	certainly	encountered	problems	when	competing	with	Hamburg	and	Bremen,	there	were	also	some	more	positive	developments.	Hamburg	and	Bremen	had	both	received	free	port	areas	in	the	1880s	due	to	the	cancellation	of	their	free	port	 status.	 Still,	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 were	 not	 the	 only	 ports	 with	 free	 port	areas.	For	example,	Stettin,	Danzig	and	Altona	also	possessed	free	port	areas.	With	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	seaport,	 the	question	of	whether	or	not	Emden	should	receive	 a	 free	 port	 area	 also	 arose.	 After	 all,	 Friedrich	 II	 had	 granted	 free	 port	status	to	the	city	in	1751.	This	significant	right,	however,	was	lost	with	the	decline	of	Emden’s	trade,	as	pointed	out	by	Carl	Schweckendieck.165			 One	of	the	supporters	of	a	free	port	area	was	the	Hapag.	In	a	report	on	the	matter,	the	company	argued	that	it	had	from	the	beginning	pointed	to	the	fact	that	‘als	eine	der	wesentlichsten	Vorbedingungen,	von	denen	die	Erreichung	des	Zieles,	Emden	 einen	beträchtlichen	überseeischen	 Seeverkehr	 zuzuführen,	 abhängig	 sei,	die	 Einrichtung	 eines	 Freibezirks	 angesehen	werden	müsse.’166	Furthermore,	 the	report	 emphasised	 that	 if	Emden	had	not	 received	a	 free	port	 area,	 it	would	not	have	been	able	to	compete	with	other	port	cities	that	possessed	such	an	area.	This	argument	was	generally	accepted	and,	thus,	the	government	decided	to	grant	this	privilege	 to	 Emden.	 Since	 it	 had	 been	 standard	 practice	 to	 make	 the	 cities	contribute	to	the	costs	of	establishing	a	free	port	area,	Emden	also	had	to	pay	its	part.	 Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Fürbringer	 had	 asked	 ‘mit	 Bezug	 auf	 die	 ungünstige	Finanzlage	 der	 Stadt	 um	 Beschränkung	 dieser	 Forderung	 auf	 einen	 minimalen	Betrage’,	Emden	was	requested	to	contribute	30,	000	Marks	to	the	project,	which	amounted	to	a	fifth	of	the	total	costs.167	Still,	even	this	amount	exceeded	the	city’s	means,	 so	 Emden	 promised	 to	 pay	 only	 20,	 000	Marks.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	 Federal	Assembly	resolved	Emden’s	free	port	area	of	81.2	hectares	in	February	1901.																																																											165	Schweckendieck,	Festschrift,	p.	69	166	StE	IV	2061,	Hamburg-Amerika-Linie,	Hamburg,	den	29.	Juni	1900	167	StE	IV	2061,	Der	Minister	der	öffentlichen	Arbeiten,	Berlin,	den	20.	Oktober	1900	
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	 Overall,	 the	 new	 free	 port	 area	 in	 Emden	 seems	 to	 have	 had	 an	 overall	positive	impact	on	trade	and	shipping.	In	1904,	Emden’s	free	port	area	was	turned	into	 a	 Zollausschlußgebiet.	 This	 aimed	 to	 further	 facilitate	 Emden’s	 trade.	 In	 a	report	on	this	subject,	it	was	emphasised	that	promoting	competition	by	creating	a	free	port	area	 ‘ist	bis	zu	einem	gewissen	Grade	gelungen,	und	damit	hat	sich	das	Abhängigkeitsverhältnis,	 in	 dem	 sich	 bisher	 das	 rheinisch-westfälische	Industriegebiet	 anderen	 Seehäfen	 gegenüber	 befand,	 wenigstens	 in	 etwas	gelockert.’ 168 	Indeed,	 overall	 traffic	 in	 Emden’s	 port	 increased	 significantly,	although	 it	 remains	questionable	 to	what	extent	 the	 free	port	should	be	credited	for	 this.	 Between	 1898,	 when	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 was	 inaugurated,	 and	1902,	 trade	had	 risen	 from	158,	818	 to	1,	044,	788	 tons.	 Similarly,	 traffic	on	 the	
Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 had	 also	 increased	 from	 119,	 000	 in	 1898	 to	 890,	 000	register	 tons	 in	1902.	Due	 to	 this	upsurge	 in	 traffic,	 ‘machen	ausländische	Häfen	die	größtmöglichen	Anstrengungen,	um	diese	erfreuliche	Entwicklung	zu	hemmen	und	 womöglich	 auch	 den	 jetzigen	 Verkehr	 […]	 wieder	 in	 die	 alten	 Geleise	 zu	ziehen.’169	Upgrading	Emden	to	a	customs	enclave	was	viewed	as	the	only	way	to	prevent	 this	 from	 happening.	 However,	 during	 the	 same	 period,	 the	 further	expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 was	 also	 concluded.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	attribute	the	rise	in	port	traffic	to	either	the	establishment	of	the	free	port	area	or	its	expansion.		 Still,	even	though	being	granted	a	customs	enclave	in	Emden	was	certainly	a	success	 for	 the	 city,	 competing	 with	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 in	 crucial	 business	sectors	remained	next	 to	 impossible.	One	of	 these	business	sectors	was	certainly	the	 emigration	 business.	 In	 Germany,	 the	 monopoly	 in	 this	 business	 was	traditionally	 held	 by	 Bremen	 and	 Hamburg.	 While	 from	 Bremen,	 4,	 859,	 676	emigrants	had	been	embarked	between	1832	and	1910,	3,	743,	924	emigrants	had	left	 from	Hamburg	between	1846	and	1910.170	Bremen	was	definitively	ahead	of	its	 competitor	 on	 the	Elbe	with	 regard	 to	 the	 emigration	business.	 It	 also	 shows	that	the	emigration	business	played	an	important	role	in	both	Hanseatic	cities.	For	a	city	like	Emden,	which	had	no	experience	in	organising	the	emigration	business,	
																																																								168	StE	IV	2061,	Bundesrat,	Session	1904,	Ausschüsse	für	Zoll-	und	Steuerwesen	und	für	Handel	und	Verkehr,	Berlin,	den	9.	Januar	1904		169	Ibid.		170	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte,	pp.	148–149	and	pp.	164–165	
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it	 was	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 get	 a	 foot	 in	 the	 door.	 Yet,	 this	 was	 a	 risk	 that	Fürbringer	and	some	companies	were	willing	to	take.				 The	first	project	to	establish	an	emigration	business	in	Emden	took	place	in	1909.	 The	 company	 Heinecke	 &	 Co.	 in	 Harburg	 applied	 for	 an	 emigration	concession	from	Emden	to	the	United	States	and	Canada,	which	was	denied	by	the	
Regierungspräsident	 in	 Aurich.	 Thereafter,	 Fürbringer	 reported	 to	 the	 district	president	on	the	events	surrounding	the	concession	application	from	his	point	of	view.	This	report	sheds	light	on	the	difficulties	that	came	with	establishing	a	new	shipping	service.	Fürbringer	describes	that	the	matter	became:				 Gegenstand	 einer	 eifrigen	 Zeitungsfehde	 […],	 wobei	 das	 Hamburger	Fremdenblatt	und	anonyme	Inserate	in	den	hiesigen	Lokalblättern	eine	nicht	schöne	Rolle	gespielt	haben.	Diese	waren	von	einem	Bremer	Annoncenbüro	eingesandt	 und	dienten	 offenbar	 den	Gegnern	 als	 Versuchs-Ballon	 und	 zur	Irreführung	 der	 öffentlichen	 Meinung,	 um	 sie	 alsdann	 als	 wirkliche	Tatsachen	 im	 Hamburger	 Fremdenblatt	 zur	 Verdächtigung	 und	Heruntersetzung	des	Unternehmes	zu	verwerten.171		Furthermore,	 Fürbringer	 reported	 of	 a	 visit	 from	 two	Hapag	 representatives,	 in	which	 it	was	made	 clear	 that	 the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	 and	 the	Hapag	would	 not	tolerate	competitition	in	the	emigration	business	from	Emden.	It	was	pointed	out	that	Hamburg	and	Bremen	would	do	anything	to	get	in	the	way	of	the	application	for	 a	 concession	 in	 the	 Federal	 Assembly.	 Even	 if	 this	 were	 not	 possible,	 both	companies	would	compete	against	the	venture.	This	would	‘nur	kurze	Zeit	dauern,	denn	 den	 beiden	 Gesellschaften	 sei	 kein	 noch	 so	 gut	 fundiertes	 Unternehmen	gewachsen,	es	müsste	nach	kurzer	Zeit	unterliegen.’172	While	Fürbringer	urged	the	Prussian	government	to	support	the	venture,	the	Hapag	established	a	new	monthly	service	 between	Hamburg	 and	Galveston,	which	was	 supposed	 to	 be	 the	 port	 of	call	for	the	service	from	Emden.173		
																																																								171	StE	IV	2106,	Fürbringer,	Betreff:	Leitung	eines	Teils	des	Auswandererverkehrs	nach	den	Südstaaten	von	Nordamerika	und	später	auch	nach	Canada	über	den	Hafen	von	Emden,	Emden,	den	3.	Januar	1910	172	Ibid.		173	StE	IV	2106,	Heinecke	&	Co.,	Herrn	Oberbürgermeister	Geheimrat	Fürbringer,	Hamburg,	den	14.	März	1910	
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	 In	1912,	with	 the	so-called	Fürstenkonzern,	 a	group	of	Silesian	 industrials,	another	 company	 showed	 interest	 in	 the	 project	 of	 establishing	 an	 emigration	business	in	Emden.	The	plan	was	to	introduce	a	regular	shipping	service	between	Emden	and	New	York.	To	this	end,	 the	Fürstenkonzern	had	 founded	the	Deutsche	
Rhederei,	which	was	supposed	to	in	charge	of	the	emigration	business	from	Emden.	Initially,	the	company	possessed	an	original	capital	of	5	million	Marks.	This	would	be	 augmented	 to	20	million	Marks	once	 the	 company	 received	 its	 concession.	 In	total,	the	company	planned	to	use	seven	new	vessels	for	its	service,	which	was	due	to	 start	 on	 October	 1	 1913,	 the	 date	 when	 Emden’s	 expanded	 port	 would	 be	inaugurated.	 Unsurprisingly,	 Fürbringer	 and	 the	 city	 of	 Emden	 immediately	supported	 this	 venture.	 To	 this	 end,	 in	 May	 1912,	 a	 petition	 was	 sent	 to	 the	Wilhelm	 II.	 In	 this,	 it	 was	 emphasised	 that	 Emden	 ‘kann	 nur	 durch	 eine	gleichberechtigte,	 ausschließlich	 für	 seinen	 Verkehr	 besorgte	 kapitalkräftige	Rhederei	zu	seiner	von	Euer	Kaiserlichen	und	Königlichen	Majestät	vorgesehenen	Bedeutung	 und	 Entwicklung	 für	 den	 Weltverkehr	 […]	 gelangen.’ 174 	The	
Norddeutscher	Lloyd	 and	 the	Hapag	 also	got	 in	 contact	with	 the	government	and	proposed	a	monthly	service	from	Emden	with	their	own	emigrant	vessels.	Once	 again,	 the	 project	 also	 sparked	 off	 a	 broad	 discussion	 about	 the	usefulness	of	such	a	shipping	service.	For	example,	as	late	as	1912,	the	Preußische	
Zeitung	still	criticised	Hamburg	and	Bremen	as	follows:	‘Ohnehin	schwärmt	man	in	Hamburg	 und	 in	 Bremen	 für	 Manchesterum	 und	 Konkurrenzfreiheit.’175	In	 this	case,	 the	 newspaper	 argued,	 competition	 was	 desirable	 on	 a	 socio-political	 and	economic	 level,	 since	 it	 would	 improve	 Emden’s	 position	 and	 lead	 to	 a	 viable	alternative	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen.	Thus,	 in	 this	scenario,	Emden	was	regarded	as	a	seaport	of	international	importance	next	to	Hamburg	and	Bremen.	In	a	similar	vein,	 the	 Deutsche	 Wirtschafts-Zeitung	 pointed	 to	 the	 following	 fact:	 ‘Die	Weiterentwicklung	unserer	transatlantischen	Schiffahrt,	ob	sie	von	Hamburg	oder	Bremen	oder	vom	preußischen	Staatshafen	Emden	ihren	Ausgang	nimmt,	ist	eine	welthistorische	 Notwendigkeit	 geworden.’ 176 	In	 this	 case,	 it	 was	 argued	 that																																																									174	StE	IV	2106,	Allerdurchlauchtigster,	Großmächtigster	Kaiser,	Allergnädigster	Kaiser,	König	und	Herr!	Emden,	den	15.	Mai	1912	175	StE	IV	2105,	Preußische	Zeitung	(Kreuz-Zeitung),	Abend-Ausgabe,	Nr.	217,	Berlin,	Donnerstag,	9.	Mai	1912	176	StE	IV	2106,	Deutsche	Wirtschafts-Zeitung.	Nummer	12.	Berlin,	den	15.	Juni	1912.	VIII.	Jahrgang	
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Emden	was	one	step	on	 the	way	 to	obtaining	a	 larger	 share	of	 the	world’s	 trade	and	 shipping.	 In	 particular,	 competition	 to	 Great	 Britain	 was	 emphasised.	However,	there	were	also	opposing	views,	such	as	the	one	brought	forward	by	the	
Berliner	Actionair.	While	 the	newspaper	acknowledged	 that	 the	company,	Emden	and	Prussia,	all	of	which	injected	millions	into	the	seaport,	were	certainly	right	to	be	in	favour	of	the	venture,	it	also	asked:			Von	 allen	 Seiten	 her	 ist	 die	 ausländische	 Konkurrenz	 den	 deutschen	Schiffahrtsgesellschaften	 gegenüber	 im	 Wachsen	 begriffen.	 Enorme	 Werte	sind	in	ihnen	angelegt:	will	man	sie	leichtfertig	durch	Schaffung	einer	neuen	Konkurrenz,	gewissermaßen	im	eigenen	Lager	aufs	Spiel	setzen?177		The	Berliner	Actionair	reminded	its	readers	of	the	capital	that	had	been	invested	in	emigrant	vessels	by	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	and	the	Hapag.	Getting	in	the	way	of	these	 two	 companies	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 interest	 on	 this	 capital,	 which	 was	spread	 all	 over	 the	 German	 Empire,	 would	 be	 diminished.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	newspaper	 spoke	 of	 a	 national	 interest	 in	 keeping	 off	 competition	 for	 the	 two	companies.	Thus,	 it	was	not	 in	 the	national	 interest	 to	 jeopardise	 the	business	of	the	 two	 most	 important	 German	 shipping	 companies.	 Instead,	 the	 newspaper	argued	for	encouraging	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	and	the	Hapag	to	call	at	Emden.			 Unsurprisingly,	public	opinion	in	Hamburg	was	very	similar.	In	the	picture	below,	 which	 was	 published	 in	 the	 Hamburger	Woche,	 we	 can	 see	 two	 elderly	women	 sitting	 at	 a	 dining	 table.	 The	 turkey	 in	 the	 background,	 entitled	“Auswanderer”,	 seems	 to	have	been	 finished	by	Bremen	and	Hamburg.	Now,	 the	little	boy,	“Emden”,	also	wants	to	join	the	two	ladies	and	he	has	even	brought	along	another	turkey.	The	boy	states	that	he	wants	to	join	the	two	ladies,	to	which	they	reply	 in	 Low	German:	 ‘Of	 course,	my	 dear,	 if	 you	 can	 handle	 all	 of	 this?!’	 In	 the	background,	 we	 can	 also	 see	 a	 picture	 of	 Albert	 Ballin	 hanging	 on	 the	 wall,	emphasising	 the	 fact	 that	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 were	 home	 to	 the	 emigration	business.	 After	 all,	 emigration	 was	 a	 well-established	 business	 in	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen.	Emden	would	only	overextend	itself	with	the	emigration	business.		
																																																								177	StE	IV	2106,	2.	Beilage	zu	No.	1279	des	Berliner	Actionair.	Berlin.	Mittwoch	den	24.	April	1912	
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Source:	StE	IV	2106,	Die	Hamburger	Woche,	Nr.	17	 		In	any	case,	on	June	15	1912,	the	Reich	Chancellor,	Theobald	von	Bethmann	Hollweg,	informed	Emden	that	he	would	not	grant	an	emigration	concession	to	the	
Deutsche	 Rhederei.	 Instead,	 he	 held	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 allowing	 the	
Norddeutscher	Lloyd	and	the	Hapag	to	use	Emden	as	their	port	of	embarkation	for	the	emigration	business.178	Hereafter,	a	discussion	about	the	Emperor’s	role	in	this	decision	 arose.	 The	 periodical	 Die	 Zeitschrift	 published	 an	 article	 on	 July	 6	revealing	 that	 the	 Wilhelm	 II	 himself	 possessed	 company	 shares	 of	 the	
Norddeutscher	Lloyd	and	the	Hapag.	 It	was	estimated	that	the	value	of	the	shares	amounted	 to	 between	10	 and	 12	million	Marks.	 Additionally,	 the	Grand	Duke	 of	Oldenburg	was	also	said	to	possess	company	shares	of	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd.	In	response	to	this,	the	Norddeutsche	Allgemeine	Zeitung	pointed	out	that	the	‘aus	der																																																									178	StE	IV	2106,	Der	Reichskanzler	(Reichsamt	des	Innern),	Berlin,	den	15.	Juni	1912,	III	A	4565	
	Figure	3.2:	Emden	against	Hamburg	and	Bremen	
	 185	
Ueberschrift	des	Artikels	zu	entnehmende	bösartige	Insinuation,	als	ob	der	Kaiser	Hamburger	 Interessen	 gegen	 preußische	 begünstige,	 weisen	 wir	 aufs	 schärfste	zurück.’179	The	 Hapag	 declared	 that	 ‘die	 Mitteilungen	 der	 Zeitschrift	 unrichtig	seien	 und	 daß	man	 zurzeit	 nähere	 Angaben	 nicht	machen	 könne.’180	While	 both	sides	 were	 in	 close	 contact	 with	 the	 Emperor,	 the	Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 and	 the	
Hapag	seem	to	have	been	more	capable	of	exploiting	this	advantage.	Certainly,	not	without	 reason	 did	 the	 Rheinisch-Westfälische	 Zeitung	 render	 the	 following	judgement	 on	 the	 two	 companies:	 ‘Sie	 wissen:	 im	 deutschen	Großschiffahrtsgewerbe	fällt,	soweit	obrigheitliche	Gewalt	dreinzureden	hat,	keine	Entscheidung,	ohne	daß	der	Kaiser	gefragt	wurde.’181		 Subsequently,	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	and	the	Hapag	entered	negotiations	about	the	establishment	of	a	regular	shipping	service	from	Emden.	These	came	to	an	 end	 in	 December	 1912.	 Both	 companies	 promised	 to	 alternately	 carry	emigrants	 on	 a	 fortnightly	 basis	 from	Emden	 to	New	York.182	The	 service	would	begin	no	 later	 than	April	1	1914.	 In	May	1913,	 the	Hapag	and	the	Norddeutscher	
Lloyd	 also	 bought	 land	 in	 order	 to	 erect	 necessary	 buildings	 for	 the	 emigration	business.183	Both	companies	planned	to	make	stopovers	at	Emden	as	well	as	using	Emden	as	a	port	of	departure	and	destination.		The	 following	 year,	 on	 April	 16	 1914,	 Emden	 officially	 became	 an	emigration	 port.	 The	 steamer	 Brandenburg	 arrived	 at	 Emden	 and	 took	 on	 89	passengers.	 In	 October	 1913,	 the	 two	 companies	 had	 already	 started	 their	stipulated	 services	 to	Australia,	East	Asia	 and	South	America.	On	 the	occasion	of	Emden’s	 first	 emigrant	 vessel,	 the	 city	 council	 planned	 to	 organise	 festivities.	However,	both	companies	asked	Emden’s	city	council	to	refrain	from	this	idea.	This	led	 a	 newspaper	 from	 Bremen	 to	 report:	 ‘Peinlich	 bemerkt	 wurde,	 daß	 eine	offizielle	 Begrüßung	 des	 ersten	 Amerikadampfers	 nicht	 stattfand.’184 	Although	some	 important	 figures	 made	 their	 way	 to	 the	 new	 landing	 stage	 for	 emigrant	
																																																								179	StE	IV	2105,	Hannov.	Courier.	No.	29999	vom	14.	Juli	1912	and	StE	IV	2105,	Die	Hapag	gegen	Emden:	Der	Kaiser	als	Schiffahrtsaktienbesitzer	180	StE	IV	2105,	Die	Hapag	gegen	Emden:	Der	Kaiser	als	Schiffahrtsaktienbesitzer	181	StE	IV	2106,	Rheinisch-Westfälische	Zeitung,	Abend	(III.)	Ausgabe.	Donnerstag,	27.	Juni	1912.	Nr.	765.	Jahrgang	171	182	StE	IV	2106,	Abschrift,	Bremen/	Hamburg,	den	11.	Dezember	1912	183	StE	IV	2106,	Kaufvertrag,	Emden,	den	6.	Mai	1913	184	StE	IV	2106,	Die	Eröffnung	des	Auswandererverkehrs	in	Emden,	Emden,	16.	April.	The	article	was	presumably	taken	from	the	Weser-Zeitung.		
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vessels,	there	was	no	organised	reception	for	the	vessel.	In	a	letter	to	Fürbringer’s	successor,	Wilhelm	Mützelburg,	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	criticised	this	report	and	advised	 the	 mayor	 to	 find	 out	 the	 correspondent’s	 identity. 185 	Interestingly,	Mützelburg	 is	 also	notified	 that	 the	 shipping	 company	had	not	been	 informed	of	the	 article	 prior	 to	 its	 printing.	 Otherwise,	 the	 Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 could	 have	prohibited	this	from	happening.		This	 again	 emphasises	 the	 influence	 the	 Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 had	 in	Bremen.	Furthermore,	together	with	the	Hapag,	the	Norddeutscher	Lloyd	had	been	able	 to	prevent	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 rival	 shipping	 company	 in	 the	 emigration	business.	For	this,	influential	contacts	in	politics	were	used.	At	the	same	time,	the	company	could	also	exert	influence	on	the	media	and,	therefore,	public	opinion.	To	Bremen	 as	 a	 port	 city,	 the	 Norddeutscher	 Lloyd	 certainly	 was	 extremely	advantageous,	 since	 it	was	one	of	 the	 largest	 shipping	 companies	 in	 the	German	Empire.	In	Emden,	on	the	other	hand,	the	disadvantages	of	such	a	concentration	of	power	in	one	commercial	sector	were	laid	open.	Competition	from	Emden	was	not	tolerated	 in	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen.	 This	 meant	 that	 Emden	 was	 in	 a	 difficult	position	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 First	World	War,	which	 broke	 out	 only	 a	 few	months	after	the	first	emigrant	vessel	had	called	at	Emden.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									185	StE	IV	2106,	Norrdeutscher	Lloyd,	Bremen,	20.	April	1914.		
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h.	The	development	of	Emden’s	trade		Having	looked	at	developments	in	Emden	in	detail,	it	is	also	necessary	to	examine	their	impact	on	Emden’s	trade	statistics.	As	can	be	gathered	from	the	graph	below,	Emden	 saw	 an	 impressive	 rise	 in	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 seagoing	 vessels	 from	1899	to	 the	outbreak	of	 the	First	World	War.	The	reason	 for	 this	 is	certainly	 the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	and	the	new	connection	to	the	industrialised	hinterland	of	Westphalia	and	the	Rhineland,	which	was	completed	in	1899.		
	
Figure	3.3:	Emden’s	Maritime	Traffic	
Source:	 The	 numbers	 for	 this	 graph	 are	 taken	 from	 Kunz,	 Scholl,	 Die	 deutsche	
Seeschifffahrt,	pp.	156-157	and	162-163		The	 graph	 clearly	 demonstrates	 that	 Emden	 did	 not	 initially	 benefit	 from	 the	foundation	of	the	German	Empire.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	Emden’s	port	was	in	an	 extremely	 poor	 condition.	 Despite	 agitation	 for	 an	 improvement	 of	 this	situation	on	Emden’s	 side,	 it	 took	up	until	 the	1890s	 for	Emden’s	 trade	 to	 show	noticeable	signs	of	recovery.	In	the	period	between	1899	and	1913,	the	amount	of	incoming	 tonnage	 to	Emden	 increased	no	 less	 than	 twelve-fold,	 from	108,400	 to	1,305,300	 net	 register	 tons.	 Outgoing	 tonnage	 rose	 in	 similar	 dimensions,	 from	108,700	to	1,359,400	net	register	 tons.	Certainly,	 in	comparison	to	Bremen,	with	an	average	 tonnage	of	5,228,394	 register	 tons	 in	1913,	 these	numbers	were	 still	relatively	 small.	 Still,	 it	 is	 the	 speed	 of	 Emden’s	 increase	 in	 trade	 that	 is	 most	
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impressive.	Emden	was	able	to	become	one	of	the	big	players	on	Germany’s	North	Sea	Coast	within	15	years	or	so.		At	the	same	time,	the	graph	also	demonstrates	Emden’s	dependence	on	the	German	 and	 European	 markets.	 The	 effect	 of	 establishing	 a	 free	 port	 area	 in	Emden,	therefore,	seems	to	have	been	minor.	In	1913,	more	than	46%	of	Emden’s	total	incoming	tonnage	arrived	from	other	German	ports.	The	rest	of	Europe	made	up	 another	 47%,	 so	 that	 only	 a	mere	 4,5%	of	 seagoing	 vessels	 calling	 at	 Emden	came	 from	 overseas	 ports.	 Similarly,	 of	 the	 seagoing	 vessels	 departing	 from	Emden,	more	 than	32%	were	directed	 to	German	ports	 and	about	53%	 to	other	European	destinations	while	10%	of	the	outgoing	tonnage	went	to	overseas	ports.	While	 Emden’s	 overall	 development	 is	 oimpressive,	 there	 was	 still	 a	 large	dependence	on	its	geographical	position	vis-à-vis	the	Ruhr	area.	This	is	proven	by	Emden’s	total	traffic	statistics:	out	of	Emden’s	total	traffic	in	1909,	only	44%	was	sea	 traffic,	 while	 52%	 was	 made	 up	 of	 canal	 traffic,	 and	 another	 4%	 of	 river	traffic.186	Furthermore,	vessels	under	the	German	flag	carried	out	56%	of	Emden’s	total	sea	traffic	in	1909.	British	(15%	of	the	total),	Swedish	(13%)	and	Norwegian	(8%)	vessels	also	played	an	important	role	in	Emden’s	sea	traffic.	Unsurprisingly,	coal	 (40%	of	 the	 total	 in	1909)	 and	ores	 (30%)	were	by	 far	 the	most	 important	commodities	trade	in	Emden.		To	 conclude,	 Emden	 unquestionably	 made	 some	 big	 steps	 towards	becoming	 one	 of	 the	most	 significant	 port	 cities	 on	 Germany’s	 North	 Sea	 Coast.	However,	while	Emden’s	overall	growth	was	 impressive,	 it	was	 to	a	 large	degree	dependent	on	 its	canal	connection	with	Westphalia	and	the	Rhineland.	Naturally,	this	 situation	 also	 carried	with	 it	 some	 dangers.	 For	 example,	 Emden	 had	 to	 try	hard	to	prevent	the	establishment	of	a	canal	connection	from	Dortmund	to	Bremen	in	 connection	with	 the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	was	 extremely	complicated	for	Emden	to	extend	its	sphere	of	 influence,	as	can	be	seen	from	the	difficulties	of	establishing	an	emigration	business	in	Emden.	Even	though	Emden’s	geographical	proximity	to	the	Empire’s	industrial	area	was	made	use	of,	the	city’s	mercantile	community	overall	failed	to	widen	its	field	of	activity	beyond	exploiting	the	Dortmund-Ems-Kanal.	 In	 this	 respect,	Hamburg	 and	Bremen’s	 advantage	of	 a	long-standing,	 uninterrupted	 history	 as	 port	 cities	 had	 made	 it	 impossible	 for																																																									186	These	numbers	for	1909	were	taken	from	Oppel,	Die	deutschen	Seestädte,	p.	178	
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Emden	 to	 catch	 up	 to	 any	 significant	 degree.	 In	 1886,	 the	Rheinisch-Westfälische	
Zeitung	 claimed	 that	 ‘wenn	 es	 gelingt,	 Emden	 erst	 wieder	 in	 die	 Zahl	 der	 in	betracht	 kommenden	Ein-	 und	Ausfuhrhäfen	 einzureihen,	 dann	wird	die	weitere	Entwickelung	keine	künstliche	sein	[…].’187	Yet,	 this	hope	had	not	materialised	by	1914.	Emden’s	development	in	trade	and	shipping	was	still	largely	controlled	and	driven	from	outside	the	city.			 An	essential	driving	force	in	the	process	of	putting	Emden	back	on	the	map	was	without	 doubt	 Leo	 Fürbringer.	 Unlike	 in	Hamburg	 and	Bremen,	where	 long	established	mercantile	communities	exerted	a	dominating	influence	on	the	city,	in	Emden,	 Fürbringer	 mostly	 coordinated	 shipping	 and	 trade.	 When	 Fürbringer	announced	 his	 retirement	 in	 1913,	 the	 Deutsche	 Rhederei	 expressed	 its	understanding	 ‘wenn	 Sie	 sich	 jetzt	 von	 Ihren	 Hauptgeschäften	 zurückziehen	wollen,	 denn	 dieselben	 haben	 doch	 in	 den	 letzten	 Jahren	 in	 ganz	aussergewöhnlicher	 Weise	 auf	 Ihnen	 gelastet.’188	Fürbringer’s	 era	 in	 office	 was	overall	beneficial	for	the	city.	The	mayor	continuously	pressed	for	the	expansion	of	Emden’s	port	and	the	establishment	of	new	shipping	companies.	Still,	he	was	not	able	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 lack	of	 a	mercantile	 community	 capable	of	 exploiting	the	 expansion	 of	 Emden’s	 port	 to	 the	 full	 extent.	 Therefore,	 the	 majority	 of	Emden’s	trade	remained	focused	on	other	German	and	European	ports	and	on	coal	and	ore.																																																																						187	StE	IV	2022,	Rheinisch-Westfälische	Zeitung,	No.	8	v.	8/1.	86	188	StE	IV	2101,	Deutsche	Rhederei,	Hamburg,	den	10.	Oktober	1912	
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IV.	Hamburg			When	examining	the	development	of	port	cities	on	the	North	Sea	coast,	there	is	of	course	no	way	of	disregarding	Hamburg.	At	the	beginning	of	the	German	Empire,	Hamburg	 was	 Germany’s	 most	 significant	 port	 city	 and	 it	 has	 maintained	 this	status	up	to	the	present	day.	Indeed,	as	one	of	the	busiest	port	cities	in	the	whole	of	Europe,	 the	 city	 has	 attracted	more	 academic	 attention	 than	 Bremen	 or	 Emden.	For	 this	 reason,	 this	chapter	will	not	be	as	broad	as	 the	previous	 two.	 Instead,	 it	will	be	able	to	focus	on	key	events,	illustrating	Hamburg’s	evolving	position	within	the	German	Empire.	As	in	the	case	of	Bremen,	these	events	include	the	reaction	to	the	Reichsgründung	together	with	the	public	representation	of	the	Franco-Prussian	War,	 the	 Zollanschluss	 and	 Hamburg’s	 involvement	 in	 the	 Empire’s	 colonial	venture.	 Examining	 these	 aspects	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 were	 similarities	between	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen.	 As	 the	 section	 on	 Emden’s	 emigration	 business	demonstrated,	it	was	not	at	all	unusual	for	Hamburg	and	Bremen	(or	rather	their	respective	 shipping	 companies)	 to	 work	 together	 in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 their	status	within	the	German	Empire	and	see	off	potential	rivals.	However,	the	chapter	will	also	demonstrate	that	there	were	nonetheless	significant	differences	between	the	two	leading	Hanseatic	cities.			
a.	Hamburg	and	the	German	nation		In	1868,	Wilhelm	I	of	Prussia	decided	to	inspect	his	new	subjects	in	the	Duchies	of	Schleswig	 and	 Holstein.	 Both	 duchies	 had	 been	 annexed	 by	 Prussia	 after	 the	Austro-Prussian	 War	 of	 1866	 (alongside	 the	 former	 Kingdom	 of	 Hanover).	Hamburg,	which	had	owed	its	historic	independence	in	part	to	the	rivalries	among	its	various	neighbours,	now	found	itself	entirely	surrounded	by	Prussian	territory.	That	became	an	issue	during	Wilhelm’s	royal	tour	of	1868,	when	the	Hohenzollern	monarch	was	 due	 to	 call	 at	 the	 town	 of	 Altona,	 located	 on	 the	 very	 doorstep	 of	Hamburg.	 This	 opened	 up	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 Hamburg	 should	officially	invite	the	Prussian	King	and	head	of	the	North	German	Confederation	to	the	 city.	 To	 Carl	 Herman	Merck,	 Syndikus	 of	 Hamburg’s	 senate,	 this	matter	 was	
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clear.	Merck	saw	 little	reason	 in	officially	 inviting	 the	King	 to	Hamburg.	After	all,	‘[wird]	man	 uns	 aber	 deshalb	 einen	 einzigen	Thaler	 am	Aversum	 erlassen?	Man	wird	 höchstens	 sagen:	 das	 Hamburg,	 Donnerwetter,	 ist	 eine	 reiche	 Stadt,	 da	schwimmt	man	 im	Champagner,	die	können	schon	mehr	bezahlen.’1	On	the	other	hand,	Gustav	Kirchenpauer,	Burgomaster	of	Hamburg	and	member	of	the	Federal	Assembly	 in	 Berlin,	 was	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 imperial	 visit.	 Kirchenpauer’s	 opinion	prevailed:	the	visit	took	place	in	September	1868.	While	it	did	not	proceed	without	a	minor	incident	–	the	King’s	ship	run	aground	on	a	sandbank	in	the	River	Elbe	–	both	 sides,	 the	people	 of	Hamburg	 and	 the	King,	 both	 seem	 to	have	 enjoyed	 the	royal	visit.2			 However,	 there	 are	 two	 sides	 to	 this	 medal.	 It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	Prussian	King	was	welcomed	jubilantly.	After	all,	he	was	a	celebrity	at	the	time.	It	would	be	more	problematic,	however,	to	regard	Hamburg’s	welcome	for	its	royal	visitor	as	straightforward	proof	of	a	new	pan-German	spirit	in	Hamburg.	Overall,	it	is	likely	that	there	was	a	growing	sense	of	pan-German	patriotism	in	Hamburg,	just	like	in	other	parts	of	Germany.	On	the	other	hand,	Merck’s	argument	in	this	context	is	 interesting.	 While	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 people	 of	 Hamburg	 overall	 enjoyed	 the	presence	 of	 the	 King,	 there	were	 also	 voices	 pointing	 to	 reasonable	 commercial	assessment	 and	 the	 cost-benefit-analysis	 of	 a	 possible	 visit.	 Admiration	 for	 the	King	was	not	altogether	boundless.	After	all,	there	was	little	that	the	city	received	in	return	for	welcoming	Wilhelm	to	the	city.			 Hence,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	the	way	the	foundation	of	the	new	German	nation-state	 itself	was	 celebrated	 and	 commemorated	 in	Hamburg.	 For	 this,	 it	 is	helpful	 to	 look	at	Hamburg’s	version	of	a	Kriegerdenkmal.	Here	 it	 is	 important	to	note	 that	 the	 case	 of	 Hamburg’s	Kriegerdenkmal	 is	 not	 comparable	 to	 Bremen’s	monument.	While	 in	 Bremen	 there	was	 a	 debate	 about	 the	 actual	 nature	 of	 the	monument,	 in	 Hamburg	 it	was	 decided	 straightaway	 that	 the	monument	 should	commemorate	the	fallen	of	the	State	of	Hamburg.	The	initiative	for	this	emanated	from	 Hamburg’s	 Bürgerschaft,	 the	 lower	 house	 of	 Hamburg’s	 parliament.3	Even	though	the	purpose	of	the	monument	was	debated	later	on,	the	focus	remained	on	the	 sacrifice	 of	Hamburg	 citizens	 (and	not	 of	 potential	 imperial	 subjects).	 In	 line																																																									1	Hauschild-Thiessen,	Bürgerstolz	&	Kaisertreue,	pp.	7–8	2	Ibid.,	p.	8	3	See	StaH	111-1	Cl	VII	Lit.	Fc	No.	21	Vol.	6	Fasc.	1,	Mittheilung	der	Bürgerschaft	an	den	Senat.	16te	Sitzung,	den	26sten	April	1871.		
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with	 this,	 the	 appointed	 joint	 commission	 between	 members	 of	 the	 Senate	 and	
Bürgerschaft	decided	to	opt	for	a	proposal	by	Johannes	Schilling	of	Dresden.4	In	the	
Hamburgischer	Correspondent,	 Schilling’s	proposal	was	criticised	 for	not	 fulfilling	the	obligation	of	living	up	to	its	historic	cause.	At	the	same	time,	it	was	regarded	as	a	brilliant	proposal	on	an	artistic	 level.	The	problem	was	 that,	 as	 the	newspaper	suggests,	 the	monument	could	 just	as	easily	have	been	erected	by	the	French	 for	
their	fallen	soldiers.		 Schilling’s	Entwurf	hält	die	Erinnerung	an	im	Kriege	gefallene	Mitbürger	mit	zarter	 Empfindung	 in	 vollendet	 schöner	 Form	 wach,	 -	 erinnert	 aber	 auch	nicht	 im	Entferntesten	daran,	daß	diese	Mitbürger	 im	gemeinsamen	Kampf	mit	ihren	deutschen	Brüdern	durch	ihr	Blut	die	Einheit	unseres	Volkes,	das	neue	deutsche	Reich	erstreiten	halfen.5			There	 had	 in	 fact	 been	 other	 more	 nationalistic,	 submissions.	 For	 example,	 a	proposal	 by	 Siemering	 depicted	 Germania	 as	 she	 was	 approaching	 a	 wounded	soldier	 in	order	 to	 crown	him.	Similarly,	 the	 third	of	 the	newspaper’s	 favourites,	Pfeifer’s	proposal,	also	portrayed	Germania.	At	the	same	time,	Pfeifer’s	monument	also	 showed	 Hammonia,	 Hamburg’s	 counterpart	 to	 Germania,	 combining	 local	Hamburg	patriotism	with	pan-German	sentiment.			 However,	 in	 May	 1873,	 the	 joint	 commission	 recommended	 adopting	Schilling’s	 proposal. 6 	In	 other	 words,	 the	 commission	 rejected	 the	 proposed	representations	of	Hamburg’s	role	as	part	of	the	larger	German	unification	process	in	favour	of	concentrating	firmly	on	Hamburg’s	citizens.	While	the	Senate	agreed	to	the	 commission’s	 recommendation,	 the	Bürgerschaft	was	not	 able	 to	 come	 to	 an	agreement	straightaway.	The	reasons	for	this	were	threefold:	the	planned	location	of	the	monument,	doubts	about	the	make-up	of	the	joint	commission,	and	thirdly,																																																									4	So,	the	commission	chose	an	artist	from	the	traditionally	pro-Austrian	and	anti-Prussian	Kingdom	of	Saxony.	Just	like	Hamburg,	Saxony	had	sympathised	with	the	Habsburg	Empire	during	the	Austro-Prussian	War	of	1866.	In	Hamburg,	this	sympathy	with	the	Habsburg	Empire	had	stemmed	from	the	provision	of	a	loan	during	the	economic	crisis	of	1857.	See	Richard	J.	Evans,	Death	in	Hamburg:	Society	and	Politics	in	the	Cholera	Years	(London,	2005),	p.	5	5	StaH	111-1	Cl	VII	Lit.	Fc	No.	21	Vol.	6	Fasc.	2	b,	Hamburgischer	Correspondent	No.	238,	8.	October	1872	6	StaH	111-1	Cl	VII	Lit.	Fc	No.	21	Vol.	6	Fasc.	1,	Mittheilung	des	Senats	an	die	Bürgerschaft.	No.	69.	Hamburg,	den	5.	Mai	1873	
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the	 absence	 of	 a	 recognisable	 national	 dimension	 to	 the	 monument.	 This	 was	emphasised	by	one	Member	of	Parliament:	 ‘Der	Entwurf	passe	 für	 einen	Aufsatz	oder	 für	 den	 Kirchhof,	 nicht	 für	 ein	 Denkmal;	 derselbe	 entbehre	 des	 nationalen	Charakters.’ 7 	Furthermore,	 Schilling	 was	 accused	 of	 having	 submitted	 an	 old	proposal	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 did	 not	 expect	 to	 stand	 a	 chance	 against	competitors	 from	Hamburg.8	Yet,	despite	all	 this	agitation	against	the	monument,	the	majority	of	the	Bürgerschaft	still	voted	in	favour	of	Schilling’s	proposal.	So,	as	in	the	case	of	Bremen,	it	was	eventually	decided	to	concentrate	on	celebrating	the	local	contribution	to	the	Franco-Prussian	War.	Hamburg’s	historic	identity	clearly	still	trumped	the	nationbuilding	project	of	the	new	German	Empire.			
b.	Hamburg	and	the	Zollverein		After	Hamburg	had	become	part	of	the	Prussian-led	North	German	Confederation,	its	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	 German	 Customs	 Union	 became	 a	 subject	 of	 heated	discussion.	The	debate	divided	into	two	camps.	On	the	one	hand,	there	were	those	arguing	 for	 accession	 to	 the	 customs	 union	 (and	 the	 creation	 of	 entrepôts	 –	 a	
Zollvereinsniederlage	 –	 to	 facilitate	 intermediate	 trade);	 on	 the	 other,	 were	 the	champions	of	Hamburg’s	existing	free	port	status.	The	two	camps	both	based	their	respective	reasoning	on	economic	factors.9	Ship	owners	such	as	Sloman,	Godeffroy,	Hertz,	Schön	and	Laeisz	worried	about	delays	with	regard	to	clearing	formalities.	Those	 merchants	 that	 carried	 out	 the	 significant	 European	 intermediate	 trade	were	of	course	in	line	with	the	ship	owners,	as	were	large	parts	of	exporters	and	importers	of	declarable	goods.	Then	again,	owners	of	smaller	shipping	companies,	like	 Woermann,	 O’Swald	 but	 also	 a	 partner	 of	 A.	 J.	 Schön,	 were	 in	 favour	 of	Hamburg’s	 accession.	 Naturally,	 there	 were	 also	 parts	 of	 Hamburg’s	 mercantile	community	that	would	have	remained	unaffected	by	an	accession.	One	example	of	this	was	the	areas	that	imported	goods	that	were	exempt	from	duties	or	merchants																																																									7	StaH	111-1	Cl	VII	Lit.	Fc	No.	21	Vol.	6	Fasc.	1,	Auszug	aus	den	Hamburger	Nachrichten,	den	12.	Septbr.	1873.	30.	Sitzung	der	Bürgerschaft,	d.	10/9.	73.	8	StaH	111-1	Cl	VII	Lit.	Fc	No.	21	Vol.	6	Fasc.	1,	Auszug	aus	den	Hamburger	Nachrichten,	den	28.	Novbr.	1873	9	An	excellent	overview	of	attitudes	for	and	against	Hamburg’s	accession	is	provided	by	Hans-Konrad	Stein,	‘Interessenkonflikte	zwischen	Grosskaufleuten,	Handelskammer	und	Senat	in	der	Frage	des	Zollanschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Reich	1866-1881,	in:	Zeitschrift	
des	Vereins	für	Hamburgische	Geschichte	(ZHG)	64	(1978),	pp.	55–89	
	 195	
that	 imported	 into	 Hamburg	 and	 then	 sold	 on	 the	 goods	 to	 customers	 in	 the	customs	union	without	processing	them.	Likewise,	 the	merchant	bankers	did	not	have	a	unanimous	view	on	the	topic,	which	was	characteristic	of	those	who	lived	in	Hamburg.	 Their	 view	was	 largely	 dependent	 on	 the	 kind	 of	 business	 they	were	involved	in	and	their	respective	clientele.10		 The	 only	 group	 of	 merchants	 to	 favour	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 were	 those	that	traded	with	produce	from	within	the	German	customs	union.	In	order	to	avoid	duties	on	re-imports,	these	merchants	had	to	move	business	outside	Hamburg	or	store	 their	 goods	 in	 entrepôts.	 Therefore,	 only	 a	minority	 of	merchants	were	 in	favour	of	Hamburg’s	 accession.	Those	advocating	 the	 retention	of	 the	 status	quo	were	 definitely	 in	 the	 majority	 following	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 North	 German	Confederation.	 It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 look	 at	 the	 reasons	 behind	 this	prevalent	standpoint	of	Hamburg’s	merchants	in	more	detail.	In	1867,	the	Freunde	
der	 Freihafenstellung	 published	 20	 surveys	 on	 the	 need	 to	 maintain	 Hamburg’s	status	 as	 a	 free	 port.11	This	 publication	 in	 defence	 of	Hamburg’s	 free	 port	 status	was	 a	 response	 to	 a	 collection	 of	 nine	 surveys	 arguing	 in	 favour	 of	 joining	 the	customs	 union.	 In	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	 publication,	 it	 is	 pointed	 out	 that	 ‘die	weit	 überwiegend	 grosse	 Mehrzahl	 des	 Hamburgischen	 Handelsstandes	 dem	Anschluss	 unseres	 Platzes	 an	 den	 Zollverein	 entschieden	widerstrebt	 […].’12	The	importance	attached	by	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community	to	their	free	port	status	is	of	 course	also	proven	by	 the	 fact	 that	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	 role	outside	 the	customs	 union	 was	 later	 specifically	 guaranteed	 in	 Article	 34	 of	 the	 Imperial	Constitution.	Therefore,	rather	 than	 looking	at	 the	general	 line	of	argument	 from	advocates	 and	 opponents	 of	 the	 free	 port	 status,	we	will	 look	 at	 two	 surveys	 in	detail.	 These	 surveys	 look	 at	 the	 expected	 consequences	 of	 joining	 the	 customs	union	for	the	import	and	export	trade	and	on	the	shipping	traffic	and	export	trade.			 The	 first	 survey	by	Carl	L.	D.	Meister	&	Co.	first	of	 all	 points	 to	Hamburg’s	historic	 role	 as	 a	 free	 port.	 It	 was	 argued	 that	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 would	 be	contradictory	 to	 the	 ‘ganzen	 Vergangenheit	 unseres	 Freistaates	 und	 mit	 allen	unseren	bisherigen	auf	höchstmögliche	Handelsfreiheit	gerichteten	Bestrebungen	
																																																								10	Ibid.,	pp.	61–64	11	Gustav	Eduard	Nolte	(ed.),	Zwanzig	Gutachten	in	Bezug	auf	Hamburgs	künftiges	
Verhältniss	zum	Zollverein	(Hamburg,	1867)	12	Ibid.,	p.	III	
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[…].’13 	Like	 ‘ein	 rother	 Faden	 zieht	 sich	 durch	 die	 Geschichte	 Hamburgs	 das	unablässige	 Bestreben	 seiner	 Bürger,	 den	 Handelsverkehr	 von	 allen	 Fesseln	 zu	befreien,	 die	 seiner	 Entwickelung	 hinderlich	 erschienen.’ 14 	In	 other	 words,	Hamburg’s	status	as	a	free	port	city	was	stylised	as	part	of	its	identity.	Defending	free	trade	was	supposedly	in	the	Hamburg	blood.	It	is	suggestive,	however,	that	it	was	 judged	necessary	 to	 add	 a	wider	perspective:	Hamburg’s	 role	 as	 a	 free	port	was	portrayed	 as	 serving	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 entire	German	nation.	Hamburg,	 it	was	argued,	was	only	able	to	compete	with	other	leading	Continental	ports,	such	as	Antwerp	 and	 Le	 Havre,	 due	 to	 its	 freedom	 of	 trade.	While	 in	 these	 other	 ports	goods	had	to	be	stored	in	entrepôts,	in	Hamburg	goods	could	be	stored,	examined	and	 sorted	 without	 any	 external	 controls.	 Once	 this	 advantage	 was	 abolished,	Hamburg	would	not	be	able	to	compensate	for	its	geographical	disadvantage	vis-à-vis	 those	 ports	 that	 were	 located	 closer	 to	 the	 Atlantic	 Ocean.	 In	 particular,	Hamburg’s	trade	in	spirits	was	seen	to	be	in	danger	of	losing	out	to	competing	port	cities.	 Spirits,	 especially	 Dutch	 gin,	 were	 exported	 to	 the	 La	 Plata	 countries,	 to	Brazil,	the	West	India,	Brazil	and	other	overseas	markets.	Under	the	customs	laws	of	the	new	German	Empire,	the	export	of	spirits	might	become	unfeasible.		Complications	 were	 also	 expected	 for	 other	 exported	 goods	 should	Hamburg	lose	its	free	port	status.	Hamburg	was	forecast	to	eventually	lose	its	role	as	a	major	hub	in	European	trade.	Therefore,	the	report	highlighted	the	necessity	‘ganz	 besonders	 die	 Königl.	 Preussische	 Regierung,	 sowie	 die	 preussischen	 und	deutschen	 Abgeordneten	 und	 die	 öffentliche	 Meinung	 Deutschlands	 zu	überzeugen,	 dass	 der	 Freihandel	 Hamburgs	 ein	 Bedürfniss	 für	 Deutschland	 ist	[…].’15	Hamburg’s	accession	to	the	German	Customs	Union	would	be	of	incalculable	disadvantage	 to	 Germany’s	 trade	 and	 industry,	 whereas	 the	 German	 Customs	Union	would	not	be	materially	weakened	should	Hamburg	remain	outside	it.	What	is	more,	 joining	 the	customs	union	was	portrayed	as	a	 retrograde	step	 in	an	age	when	the	whole	of	Europe	seemed	well	on	the	way	towards	establishing	free	trade	–	 Britain,	 for	 example,	 had	 repealed	 the	 Navigation	 Act	 in	 the	 mid-nineteenth	century.	 The	 German	 Customs	 Union,	 in	 that	 perspective,	 was	 fast	 becoming	 an	
																																																								13	Ibid.,	p.	4	14	Ibid.,	p.	4	15	Ibid.,	p.	8	
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anachronism	 and	 would	 eventually	 be	 forced	 to	 abolish	 its	 own	 trade	 barriers.	Why	join	something	with	no	future?		The	 local	 voices	 in	 favour	 of	 accession,	 meanwhile,	 were	 dismissed	 as	‘Particularinteressen’.16	These	voices,	it	was	argued,	put	their	own	interests	before	the	common	good	of	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community.	They	were	reminded	–	in	stern	tones	–	that	‘der	Einzelne	in	einem	Gemeinwesen	sich	nicht	einreden	möge,	prosperiren	 zu	 können,	 während	 der	 eigentliche	 Lebensnerv	 der	 Gesammtheit	leidet.’17		In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 the	 survey	 by	 August	 Bolten	 with	 respect	 to	 shipping	traffic	 and	 export	 trade	 emphasised	 the	 difficulties	 connected	 with	 Hamburg’s	accession.18	These	difficulties	were	mainly	of	a	practical	nature.	It	was	highlighted	that	 of	 the	 total	 of	 6,000	 arriving	 vessels	 per	 year,	 4,500	 would	 be	 subject	 to	customs	controls.	These	controls	were	seen	to	pose	a	threat	to	Hamburg’s	trading	business,	since	they	slowed	down	the	handling	of	cargo.	 In	addition,	accession	to	the	customs	union	would	be	regarded	as	the	‘Anerkennung	der	Unrichtigkeit	aller	bisher	 befolgten	 Principien.’19	These	 were	 principles	 that	 had	 led	 to	 Hamburg’s	rise	 to	one	of	 the	most	 frequented	European	ports.	 In	 contrast	 to	port	 cities	 like	Liverpool,	 London	 and	New	York,	where	 free	 trade	 had	 never	 existed,	 Hamburg	was	 able	 to	 flourish	 for	 other	 reasons.	 These	 reasons	 included	 the	 circumstance	that	Hamburg	was	not	as	closely	connected	to	Germany	as	Liverpool	and	London	were	 to	 their	 respective	hinterlands	 –	 ‘auf	 sich	 selbst	 angewiesen,	 erstrebte	und	erkämpfte	Hamburg	 sein	 eigenes	 selbstständiges	Handelsterrain	 […].’20	As	 in	 the	previous	report,	Hamburg’s	role	as	a	 free	port	city	was	defended	on	the	grounds	that	 it	was	 the	main	 reason	 for	 the	 city’s	 economic	 success.	 It	was	 again	 argued	that	free	trade	was	Hamburg’s	recipe	for	success.	Therefore,	Hamburg’s	merchants	saw	 no	 reason	 to	 change	 this.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this,	 those	 people	 promoting	Hamburg’s	 accession	 to	 the	 customs	 union	were	 viewed	 as	 representing	 vested																																																									16	Ibid.,	p.	10	17	Ibid.,	p.	11	18	August	Bolten	was	the	owner	of	a	shipping	company	and	co-founder	of	the	Hapag	and	the	Hamburg-Südamerikanische	Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft.	See	Aug.	Bolten	Wm.	Miller’s	Nachfolger	(GmbH	&	Co.)	KG.	Geschichte.	‘Mehr	als	200	Jahre	hamburgische	Seeschifffahrt.’:	http://www.aug-bolten.de/unternehmen/geschichte/	Accessed:	16/08/2016	19	Gustav	Eduard	Nolte	(ed.),	Zwanzig	Gutachten	in	Bezug	auf	Hamburgs	künftiges	
Verhältniss	zum	Zollverein	(Hamburg,	1867),	p.	135	20	Ibid.,	p.	139	
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interests.	 Indeed,	 the	advocates	of	accession	were	outnumbered	 in	1866/67.21	In	any	 case,	 since	 free	 trade	 was	 thought	 to	 be	 on	 the	 rise	 in	 Europe,	 Hamburg’s	merchants	were	inclined	to	believe	that	the	issue	would	eventually	go	away.	How	wrong	they	were!	In	late	1878,	Bismarck	brought	forward	a	motion	to	the	 Federal	 Assembly	 regarding	 the	 revision	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 tariff	 system.	Bismarck	had	 turned	 to	protectionism.	Subsequently,	 the	Reich	Chancellor	got	 in	contact	with	Hamburg.	Burgomaster	Gustav	Kirchenpauer,	head	of	the	Deputation	
für	 Handel	 und	 Schiffahrt,	 was	 asked	 about	 any	 specific	 changes	 that	 Hamburg	would	like	to	see	implemented	in	the	tariff’s	revision.	Additionally,	enquiries	were	made	about	whether	Hamburg	could	participate	in	the	commission	tasked	with	the	elaboration	of	Bismarck’s	plan.	Naturally,	this	plan	of	introducing	protective	tariffs	provoked	 resentment	 in	 Hamburg.	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Kirchenpauer’s	deputation,	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	declared:			 Sie	 ist	auch	 jetzt	noch	der	Überzeugung,	daß	ein	System	der	Beschränkung	des	 Zolles	 auf	 eine	 kleine	 Anzahl	 einträglicher	 Artikel	 […]	 für	 die	wirthschaftliche	 Wohlfahrt	 nicht	 allein	 Hamburgs	 und	 der	 Seestädte,	sondern	des	gesammten	Deutschland	das	Förderlichste	sein	werde.	22		It	 is	 therefore	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 Chamber	 was	 entirely	 against	 the	 tariff	revision.	It	asked	Hamburg’s	member	of	the	commission	to	oppose	any	proposals	that	envisaged	the	 introduction	of	 tariffs	 ‘mit	vollen	Kräften’.23	The	Chamber	also	got	 in	 contact	with	 the	Geheimen	Kommerzienrat	Delbrück	 (presumably	Adelbert	Delbrück).	 Here,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 sought	 support	 in	 its	 opposition	against	Bismarck’s	project.	It	was	pointed	out	that	various	Chambers	of	Commerce	such	 as	 Berlin,	 Frankfurt,	 Leipzig,	 Bremen,	 which	 represented	 diverse	 interests,	would	act	 irresponsibly	 ‘wenn	sie	sich	in	einen	kürzlich	übertriebenen	Gegensatz	zwischen	 seestädtischen	 und	 binnenländischen	 Handelsinteressen	 hineinreden	ließen	[…].’24	Rather,	the	Chambers	were	urged	to	carry	out	their	duty	of	caring	for	‘die	gemeinsamen	Lebensinteressen	alles	Großhandels,	welche	heute	ernstlich	nur																																																									21	See	also	Stein,	‘Interessenkonflikte’,	pp.	60–64	22	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	Die	Handelskammer,	Hamburg,	den	31.	Dezember	1878.	An	die	Deputation	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt,	hier	23	Ibid.	24	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	Herrn	Geheimen	Commerzienrath	Delbrück,	Berlin,	Hamburg,	d.	14.	Januar	1879	
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zu	 ernstlich	 bedroht	 scheinen	 […].’25	These	 quotes	 provide	 two	 crucial	 points.	Firstly,	 as	 in	 the	 case	with	Bremen,	Hamburg’s	 role	 in	advocating	 free	 trade	was	also	met	with	disapproval	from	the	rest	of	the	German	Empire.	Secondly,	there	can	be	 no	 doubt	 that	 Hamburg’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 considered	 the	 effect	 of	protective	tariffs	on	trade	to	be	severe.	Like	Bremen,	it	was	prepared	to	stand	up	for	this	position	and	to	take	action	against	Bismarck’s	protectionism.				 In	April	1879,	the	finished	plan	for	the	new	tariff	system	was	submitted	to	the	Reichstag	 in	Berlin.	 In	a	 letter	 to	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	 the	 company	A.	
Spiermann	&	Wessely,	which	was	producing	ovenware	and	pottery,	gave	an	account	of	the	effect	the	tariff	system	would	have.	The	company	reported	that	by	using	the	tariff	system	the	company	would	 ‘so	außerordentlich	hart	getroffen	werden,	dass	wir	 uns	 erlauben	 Ihnen	 hiervon	 Mittheilung	 zu	 machen	 […].’26	In	 detail,	 if	 the	company	 were	 not	 passing	 the	 tariff	 on	 to	 the	 customer,	 it	 would	 have	 had	 to	expect	a	loss	of	10–16%	on	different	models.	This	share	would	in	most	cases	have	exceeded	the	profit	made	on	ovens.	This	led	the	author	to	complain:	‘Nach	10	Jahre	langem	Fleiß	größter	Mühe	&	bedeutenden	Kosten	ist	es	uns	gelungen	die	[Fabrik]	wieder	in	Ehren	u.	an	den	Markt	zu	bringen	[…].’27	The	new	tariff	would	effectively	result	in	the	inability	to	sell	the	products	abroad,	which	made	up	a	quarter	of	sales.			 In	 an	 evaluation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 tariffs	 on	 specific	 goods,	 further	inadequacies	of	the	proposed	law	were	demonstrated.28	For	example,	the	tariff	law	envisaged	the	introduction	of	a	tariff	on	English	curtains.	This	tariff	would	have	led	to	 additional	 costs	 of	 30%.	 However,	 these	 curtains	 were	 not	 fabricated	 in	Germany	 and	 the	 German	 Empire	was	 fully	 dependent	 on	 imports	 from	 abroad.	According	 to	 the	 evaluation,	 this	 product	was	 largely	bought	by	 the	 less	well-off	part	 of	 the	 population.	 Similarly,	 unbleached	 curtain	 stuff	 was	 in	 the	 main	imported	by	Saxon	manufacturers	which	processed	the	material.	As	a	result	of	the	new	 tariff	 system,	 importing	 the	material	would	become	 impossible.	Overall,	 the	effectiveness	of	protective	 tariffs	was	doubted.	For	example,	 there	was	already	a	high	tariff	on	cotton	filling	and	still	it	had	not	led	to	moves	to	produce	it	locally	in	Germany.	 Since	 the	 product	was	 of	 low	value,	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 tariff	 on	 it	was	seen	as	giving	cause	 for	concern.	On	 the	other	hand,	a	 rise	of	 the	 tariff	on	silken																																																									25	Ibid.		26	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	A.	Spiermann	&	Wessely.	Hamburg,	d.	22.	April	1879.		27	Ibid.		28	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	Referat	des	Herrn	Rothenbüchen	Hamburg,	17.	April	1879	
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lace	was	considered	as	entirely	feasible	but	not	to	the	extent	envisaged	by	the	new	law.	Thus,	there	can	be	no	doubt	that	Hamburg’s	merchants	had	a	clear,	nuanced	and	 informed	opinion	of	 the	new	tariff	 law.	The	preference	of	a	 liberal	economic	policy	represented	by	the	majority	of	merchants	ran	contrary	to	Bismarck’s	project	of	protective	tariffs.	At	the	same	time,	protectionism	was	not	solely	condemned	on	an	 ideological	 basis.	 Hamburg’s	merchants	 also	 saw	 practical	 deficiencies	 in	 the	introduction	of	protective	tariffs.		 Hamburg’s	mercantile	 community	was	prepared	 to	defend	 this	 standpoint	publicly.	The	Chamber	of	Commerce	submitted	a	petition	to	the	Reichstag	in	April	1879.29	Especially	 the	 fifth	paragraph	of	 the	new	law	was	met	with	opposition	 in	Hamburg.	 In	 this	 paragraph,	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	would	 be	 authorised	 to	 alter	tariff	 rates	 for	specific	countries	which	did	not	possess	a	commercial	 treaty	with	the	 Empire.	 In	 Hamburg,	 this	 clause	 was	 understood	 as	 a	 means	 ‘die	 anderen	Staaten	 zum	 Abschluss	 von	 Handelsverträgen	 auf	 Grundlage	 des	 projektirten	Tarifs	zu	zwingen.’30	The	Chamber	expected	that	such	measures	would	ultimately	lead	 to	 a	 tariff	 war	 instead	 of	 compliance.	 Altogether,	 ‘[dem]	 Handel	 aber	 und	speziell	dem	Seehandel	würde	damit	die	Axt	an	die	Wurzel	gelegt	werden.’31	Like	Bremen,	Hamburg’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	regarded	it	as	necessary	to	point	to	the	reasons	behind	Hamburg’s	exclusion	from	the	customs	union:			 Die	 Freiheit	 der	 Bewegung	 ist	 es,	 in	 welcher	 die	 Hansestädte	 die	 Kraft	gefunden	haben,	ihre	Welthandelsstellung	gegenüber	der	Konkurrenz	der	in	weit	 günstigerer	 Lage	 gelegenen	 und	 von	 staatswegen	 auf	 alle	 Weise	unterstützen	 kontinentalen	 Häfen	 aufrecht	 zu	 erhalten.	 Nicht	Partikularismus,	 sondern	 die	 innerste,	 aus	 genauer	 Kenntnis	 der	Verhältnisse	 geschöpfte	 Ueberzeugung,	 dass	 auch	 die	 bei	 dem	 jetzigen	System	mögliche	 schonende	 und	 kulante	 Zollbehandlung	 diese	 ihre	 jetzige	Stellung	 erschüttern	 müsse,	 hat	 Bremen	 und	 Hamburg	 veranlasst,	 ihre	Freihafenstellung	 aufrecht	 zu	 halten	 und	 die	 schweren	 mit	 derselben	verbundenen	Opfer	auf	sich	zu	nehmen.32																																																										29	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	Petition	der	Handelskammer	zu	Hamburg,	bezüglich	des	Entwurfs	eines	Gesetzes	betreffend	den	Zolltarif	des	deutschen	Zollgebiet.	Hamburg,	April	1879.	30	Ibid.	31	Ibid.		32	Ibid.	
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Hamburg’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 urged	 the	Reichstag	 to	 continue	 the	 Empire’s	liberal	economic	policy.	At	the	same	time,	it	painted	an	extremely	gloomy	picture	of	 the	 consequences	 the	 new	 system	would	 have,	 particularly	 on	 trade.	 Another	petition	to	the	Reichstag	submitted	by	a	group	of	merchants	from	Hamburg	came	to	a	similar	conclusion.	In	this,	it	was	argued	that	should	protectionist	measures	be	introduced	 in	 order	 to	 support	 individual	 branches	 of	 the	 economy,	 then	 that	would	mean	 that	 ‘Deutschland	wird	seinem	Berufe	als	Culturstaat	abwendig	und	Hamburg	 büsst	 seine	 Mission	 als	 Stätte	 des	 Welthandels	 ein	 […].’33	Just	 like	Hamburg’s	Chamber	of	Commerce,	this	group	of	merchants	regarded	the	new	tariff	system	 as	 a	 serious	 threat	 to	 Hamburg’s	 status	 as	 a	 seaport	 of	 international	importance.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 neither	 these	 merchants	 nor	 the	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	opposed	the	introduction	of	financial	duties	on	specific	goods	in	order	to	support	the	state	finances.		The	 position	 of	 Hamburg’s	mercantile	 community	 regarding	 the	 Empire’s	tariff	 law	approved	by	 the	Reichstag	 in	 June	1879	 is	absolutely	 clear.	Hamburg’s	merchants	 unquestionably	 opposed	 Bismarck’s	 turn	 to	 protectionism.	Protectionism	was	regarded	as	likely	to	lead	to	Hamburg’s	downfall.	In	light	of	all	that,	it	may	seem	astonishing	that	Hamburg	should	have	agreed	to	become	part	of	the	Empire’s	customs	union	only	about	two	years	later.			 	
c.	Hamburg’s	accession		In	May	1879,	Hamburg’s	senate	received	a	letter	from	the	Prussian	envoy	Otto	von	Wentzel.	 Like	 Bremen,	 Hamburg	was	 asked	whether	 the	 city	wanted	 to	 join	 the	customs	union	 in	 the	 foreseeable	 future.	 It	 is	clear	 that	 the	 initiator	of	 this	move	was	 Bismarck	 himself.	 In	May	 1878,	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 had	 already	muttered	that	‘es	mit	der	Freihafenstellung	auch	nicht	so	weiter	gehe.’34	Soon	after	receiving	the	letter,	Kirchenpauer,	Hamburg’s	envoy	to	the	Federal	Assembly,	wrote	back	to	Hamburg.	 He	 reported	 that	 there	 was	 general	 bemusement	 about	 the	 letter’s	origin	 in	 Berlin.	 Kirchenpauer	 highlighted	 that	 even	Minister	 Karl	 von	 Hofmann	knew	of	nothing	–	he	was	quoted	saying:	 ‘Das	wird	er	 so	über	meinen	Kopf	weg																																																									33	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	Petition	der	unterzeichneten	Hamburgischen	Kaufleute	34	StaH	314-6	ZI,	Abschrift	eines	Briefes	des	Reichstagsabgeordneten	Dr.	Wolffson,	aus	Berlin,	vom	1.	Mai	1878,	an	Herrn	Senator	Dr.	Versmann,	Hamburg	
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gemacht	 haben.’35	According	 to	Maxmilian	 von	 Philipsborn,	 the	Auswärtiges	Amt	was	not	involved	in	the	matter	either.36	This	strongly	suggests	that	it	was	Bismarck	alone	who	was	pressing	for	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	accession.	In	any	case,	for	both	Hanseatic	 cities	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 explain	 the	 reason	 behind	 the	 letter.	Kirchenpauer	 reported	 that	 H.	 H.	 Meier	 (in	 Bremen)	might	 have	 contributed	 to	Bismarck’s	initiative	due	to	a	previous	discussion	between	the	two	on	the	topic	of	differential	duties	for	the	benefit	of	the	shipping	sector.	Bismarck	was	said	to	have	pointed	out	that	‘er	es	nur	als	eine	vorübergehende	Ausnahmestellung	angesehen	[habe],	die	nach	etwa	10	oder	15	Jahren	von	selbst	aufhören	werde;	jetzt	sei	es	an	der	Zeit	[…].’37	Subsequently,	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 exchanged	 opinions	 on	 how	 to	respond	 to	 the	 letter.	 From	 this,	 the	 overall	 attitude	 of	 Hamburg’s	 ruling	 elite	towards	 the	 enquiry	 can	 be	 gathered.	 Gustav	 Kirchenpauer	 pointed	 out	 that	Hamburg	was	also	‘beglückt	worden’	with	the	Prussian	enquiry	but	the	one	or	the	other	 took	 comfort	 in	 the	 assumption	 that	 it	 had	 primarily	 been	 directed	 to	Bremen.38	Still,	 Kirchenpauer	 already	 anticipated	 that	 the	matter	 ‘wird	 […]	wohl	bitterer	 Frust	 für	 beide	 Städte.’39 	Besides,	 Kirchenpauer	 conveyed	 that	 Ernst	Gossler,	 a	banker	 from	Hamburg	and	head	of	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	 openly	sided	with	Alexander	Mosle	in	Bremen,	who	was	a	supporter	of	Bismarck’s	turn	to	protectionism.	According	to	Kirchenpauer,	it	was	an	unfortunate	coincidence	that	Gossler,	 as	 the	 longest	 serving	 member,	 was	 head	 of	 the	 Chamber.	 This	circumstance	naturally	added	extra	weight	to	Gossler’s	stance	on	the	issue.			At	 the	same	time,	 the	reaction	by	 the	remaining	members	of	 the	Chamber	shows	 the	 prevalent	 attitude	 in	 Hamburg	 towards	 Bismarck’s	 protectionism	 in	1879.	 In	 reaction	 to	 Gossler’s	 positioning,	 the	 ‘sofortige	 Widerspruch	 seiner	sämtlichen	 Collegen	 nöthigte	 ihn	 […]	 sein	 Amt	 niederzulegen	 […].’40	However,	 it																																																									35	StaH	314-6	ZI,	Deutsches	Reich.	Bericht	des	Hamburgischen	Bevollmächtigten	zum	Bundesrathe.	No.	52.	Berlin,	d.	28.	Mai	1879	36	In	the	end,	on	the	assumption	that	Bismarck	had	not	himself	instructed	Wentzel,	Kirchenpauer	concluded	that	there	was	only	one	last	person	to	blame	for	having	forwarded	Bismarck’s	will	to	Wentzel	–	‘unser[…]	alte[r]	Freund	v.	B.	[…].’	It	is	likely	that	these	initials	stood	for	Bernhard	Ernst	von	Bülow,	father	of	Bernhard	von	Bülow,	who	was	a	close	ally	of	Bismarck.		37	Ibid.	38	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Bd.	1,	Hamburg,	d.	24.	Mai	79,	Verehrter	Herr	College	39	Ibid.		40	Ibid.		
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was	still	feared	that	Bismarck	would	construe	Gossler’s	open	approval	of	Mosle	in	the	 way	 that	 it	 demonstrated	 that	 there	 were	 voices	 in	 favour	 of	 Hamburg’s	accession.	Subsequently,	a	senatorial	commission	was	appointed	in	order	to	decide	upon	 a	 response	 to	 the	 Prussian	 envoy.	 In	 June,	 Kirchenpauer	 gave	 notice	 to	Bremen	 that	 ‘nach	Allem	was	 ich	höre	bezweifle	 ich	aber	nicht,	daß	die	Antwort	ablehnend	ausfallen	wird.’41	Ultimately,	with	reference	to	Article	34	of	the	Imperial	Constitution,	 Hamburg	 did	 indeed	 give	 a	 negative	 response	 to	 Wentzel.	 It	 was	argued	 that	 ‘die	Beibehaltung	 der	 jetzigen,	 seit	mehr	 als	 zehn	 Jahren	 bewährten	EInrichtungen	 auch	 dem	 Reichsinteresse	 förderlicher	 sei,	 als	 die	 Aufhebung	derselben.’42	It	 follows	 from	 this	 that,	 in	 1879,	 both,	 Hamburg’s	 governing	 body	and	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 were	 still	 by	 a	 clear	 majority	 in	 favour	 of	maintaining	Hamburg’s	status.		In	 April	 1880,	Hamburg	was	 given	 another	 shock.	 In	 a	 bill	 to	 the	 Federal	Assembly,	 the	 unelected	 upper	 chamber	 of	 the	 Imperial	 Parliament	 in	 Berlin,	Prussia	requested	the	inclusion	of	Altona	and	parts	of	the	Vorstadt	St	Pauli,	which	was	 administered	 by	 Hamburg.	 By	 way	 of	 an	 overall	 majority	 and	 without	consulting	 the	 Reichstag,	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	was	 to	 resolve	 this	matter.	 This	was	 seen	 as	 a	 direct	 challenge	 to	 Hamburg’s	 insistence	 on	 its	 free	 port	 status.	Bismarck	 was	 planning	 to	 move	 the	 customs	 border	 straight	 to	 Hamburg’s	 city	gates.	The	bill	rightly	highlighted	that	Altona’s	 inclusion	 in	the	customs	union,	as	part	 of	 the	 Prussian	 province	 of	 Schleswig-Holstein,	 could	 be	 decided	 without	Hamburg’s	agreement.	St	Pauli,	on	the	other	hand,	was	an	entirely	different	matter.	It	was	part	of	Hamburg’s	area	of	administration.	Despite	 this,	 the	bill	 stated	 that	the	 question	 of	 ‘wer	 darüber	 zu	 entscheiden	 hat,	 in	 welchem	 Umfange	 eine	Ausschließung	des	 städtischen	Gebiets	 erforderlich	 ist	 […]’	was	 not	 answered	 in	Article	34.43		As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 bill,	 Hamburg’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 convened	 the	
Versammlung	Eines	Ehrbaren	Kaufmannes.	 In	 this,	 Arthur	 Lutteroth,	 president	 of	the	Chamber,	claimed	that	the	Prussian	bill	was	‘als	nichts	anderes,	denn	als	eine	
																																																								41	StaB	2-Ss.4.e.1.,	Bd.	1,	Hamburg,	d.	12.	Juni	79,	Verehrter	Herr	College	42	StaH	314-6	ZI,	Hamburg,	den	25.	Juni	1879,	An	von	Wentzel	43	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Hamb.	Correspondent	vom	25.	April	1880,	‘Antrag	Preußens	betreffend	Einverleibung	der	Stadt	Altona	und	eines	Theiles	der	Vorstadt	St.	Pauli	in	das	Zoll-Gebiet.’	
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Vergewaltigung	 Hamburgs	 zu	 betrachten	 […].’44	This	 statement	 was	 met	 with	approval.	Furthermore,	since	Prussia	had	not	conferred	with	Hamburg	on	the	topic	prior	to	submitting	the	bill	‘so	stelle	sie	sich	geradezu	als	ein	förmlicher	Ueberfall	dar.’45	Naturally,	 all	 the	 speakers	 of	 the	 meeting,	 including	 for	 example	 Adolph	Woermann,	 agreed	 on	 the	 audacity	 of	 the	 Prussian	 bill.	 The	 mood	 towards	Bismarck	at	this	time	is	best	demonstrated	by	a	speaker	by	the	name	of	Zacharias,	who	pointedly	observed:			 Man	 sage,	 Bismarck	 sei	 von	 einem	 Ringe	 politischer	 Streber	 und	Interessenten	umgeben,	der	den	Kanzler	verhindere,	die	richtigen	Stimmen	in	der	wirthschaftlichen	Frage	zu	hören,	und	es	sei	zu	verwundern,	daß	ein	mann,	 der	 auf	 politischem	 Gebiete	 realien	 Zielen	 nachstrebe,	 in	wirtschafthlicher	 Hinsicht	 Idealpolitik	 treibe.	 Wir	 seien	 stets	 berei,	 dem	großen	 Kanzler	 auf	 politischem	 Gebiete	 die	 Ehre	 zu	 geben,	 welche	 ihm	gebühre,	 und	 hätten	 ihm	 zugejubelt,	 als	 die	 deutsche	 Einheit	 durch	 ihn	herbeigeführt	ware,	 auf	wirthschaftlichem	Gebiete	 sei	 der	 Fürst	 aber	 nicht	derjenige	 große	 Mann,	 für	 den	 seine	 Freunde	 ihn	 so	 gerne	 ausgeben	möchten.46		In	 this	 meeting,	 it	 was	 also	 decided	 that	 a	 petition	 would	 be	 submitted	 to	Hamburg’s	senate,	highlighting	the	Chamber’s	opposition	to	the	Prussian	bill.	The	Senate	was	urged	to	proceed	against	Bismarck’s	plan.		 	Hamburg’s	 newspapers	 were	 also	 taken	 by	 surprise	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 bill.	 The	
Hamburgische	Börsen-Halle,	for	example,	pointed	out	that	it	was	as	much	surprised	by	 the	 content	 of	 the	 bill	 as	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Imperial	 Government	 had	 not	previously	 advised	Hamburg’s	 government	of	 the	bill.	 This	new	approach	by	 the	Imperial	 Government	was	 in	 conflict	with	 the	 ‘freunschaftlichen	 Verhältniß,	 daß	zwischen	 Bundesstaaten	 und	 Reichsgenossen	 bestehen	 soll.’ 47 	Similarly,	 the	
Hamburger	Nachrichten	expressed	 that	 the	 bill	 was	 entirely	 devoid	 of	 any	 legal																																																									44	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Hamb.	Börsenhalle	vom	28.	April	1880,	‘Versammlung	Eines	Ehrbaren	Kaufmanns.’	45	Ibid.		46	Ibid.	47	SuB	Hamburg,	Hamburgische	Börsen-Halle,	Abendzeitung	für	Handel,	Schiffahrt	und	Politik,	21,098,	Sonnabend,	den	24.	April	1880,	Nachmittags.	Ausgabe	4	Uhr	
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foundation.48	Therefore,	 the	 newspaper	 sided	 with	 the	 decision	 taken	 by	 the	
Versammlung	Eines	Ehrbaren	Kaufmannes.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	Hamburgischer	
Correspondent	 primarily	 concerned	 itself	 with	 the	 possible	 consequences	 of	 the	Prussian	 bill.	 It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	 St	 Pauli	 in	 particular	was	criticised.	According	to	the	Correspondent,	the	bill	would	lead	to	the	economic	ruin	of	St	Pauli.	Thus,	the	bill	 ‘streitet	nicht	nur	gegen	die	Gerechtigkeit,	sondern	auch	gegen	den	wirthschaftlichen	Vortheil.’49	However,	it	was	not	only	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community	and	Hamburg’s	newspapers	 that	 were	 surprised	 by	 the	 Prussian	 bill.	 The	 Kieler	 Zeitung,	 for	example,	 also	 advanced	 an	 opinion	 on	 this	matter.	 In	 an	 article,	 the	 newspaper	warned	of	the	adverse	effect	that	the	Prussian	exploitation	of	its	power	would	have	and	‘bei	den	verbündeten	Regierungen	den	Glauben	erweckte,	als	ob	es	bereit	sei,	sich	 zu	 ihrem	 Nachtheil	 über	 die	 Grundlage	 unseres	 staatlichen	 Lebens,	 die	Reichsverfassung,	hinwegzusetzen.’50	It	was	thus	perhaps	not	so	much	the	fact	that	Hamburg	 would	 be	 affected	 by	 this	 but	 Bismarck’s	 blatant	 disregard	 of	 the	Empire’s	constitution	that	 incensed	Hamburg	most.	Hamburg	duly	 filed	a	motion	to	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	 requesting	 that	 the	 Prussian	 bill	 be	 regarded	 as	 illegal	without	approval	by	Hamburg’s	senate.			 Bismarck’s	 course	 of	 action	 also	 caused	 a	 stir	 in	 the	 Reichstag.	 The	representatives	Isaac	Wolffson,	Rudolf	Heinrich	Möring	(both	from	Hamburg)	and	Heinrich	 Rickert	 –	 who	 was	 one	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 left	 wing	 of	 the	 National	Liberal	 Party	 –	 initiated	 an	 interpellation	 to	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 regarding	 the	planned	 accession.51	In	 this,	 Bismarck	was	 asked	whether	 it	was	 correct	 that	 he	had	requested	the	Federal	Assembly	alone	to	resolve	upon	the	projected	accession.	He	also	asked	whether	there	had	been	any	previous	negotiations	with	Hamburg’s	government	and	whether	 the	accession	would	be	carried	out	without	Hamburg’s	agreement.	The	interpellation	was	debated	in	the	Reichstag	on	May	1	1880.	In	this	
																																																								48	SuB	Hamburg,	Hamburger	Nachrichten,	No.	101,	Hamburg,	Mittwoch,	den	28.	April	1880,	Morgen-Ausgabe	49	SuB	Hamburg,	Hamburgischer	Correspondent,	No.	98,	Sonnabend,	den	24.	April	1880	50	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Hamb.	Börsenhalle	vom	28.	April	1880,	‘Stimmen	der	Presse	über	den	Antrag	auf	Zoll-Anschluß	Altona’s	und	St.	Pauli’s.’	51	1880,	4,	Nr.	148.	Interpellation,	Verhandlungen	des	Deutschen	Reichstags,	Reichstagsprotokolle:	http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt3_k4_bsb00018412_00330.html.	Accessed	18/06/2016	
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debate,	Wolffson	gave	the	reasons	for	initiating	the	interpellation.	While	Wolffson	argued	 that	 the	 Prussian	 motion	 was	 not	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 Altona,	 the	interpellation	was	 first	of	all	directed	to	 the	case	of	St	Pauli.	Wolffson	pointed	to	the	 fact	 that	Hamburg	had	 just	been	able	 to	come	 to	 terms	with	 the	government	regarding	 the	 increase	 of	 the	 Aversum	 from	 3	 to	 5	 Marks	 per	 capita.	 To	 this,	Wolffson	 noted	 that	 ‘man	 glaubte	 bei	 uns	 in	 Hamburg	 mit	 diesem	 Opfer	 –	 als	solches	 ist	 es	betrachtet	worden	–	 endlich	 einmal	 sich	Ruhe	erkauft	 zu	haben.’52	However,	 suddenly	 ‘wie	 ein	 Blitz	 aus	 heiterem	 Himmel,	 ohne	 daß	 ein	 Mensch	etwas	davon	geahnt	hätte’,	the	government	proposed	the	accession	to	the	customs	union	of	parts	of	Hamburg’s	municipal	area.53	Overall,	the	main	reason	for	concern	in	 the	 Reichstag	 was	 the	 question	 of	 the	 motion’s	 constitutionality	 rather	 than	concern	for	Hamburg’s	status	as	a	free	port.	In	response	to	this,	Adolf	von	Scholz	pointed	out,	on	behalf	of	Bismarck,	that	the	Reich	Chancellor	would	not	discuss	a	matter	that	had	been	submitted	to	the	Federal	Assembly	in	the	Reichstag.		There	is	no	need	to	go	into	further	detail	about	the	subsequent	discussions	in	the	Reichstag.	Ultimately,	the	interpellation	led	to	nothing	more	than	the	debate	in	the	Reichstag.	In	a	second	session,	on	May	7	1880,	it	was	decided	not	to	take	the	matter	 further.	However,	 it	 is	still	 significant	 to	 learn	 from	this	 that	 the	Prussian	motion	to	the	Federal	Assembly	caused	a	stir	throughout	the	Empire.	It	was	seen	as	a	process	affecting	not	only	Hamburg	and	Bremen.	As	such,	it	went	beyond	the	dispute	 between	 advocates	 and	 opponents	 of	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen’s	 special	statuses	 as	 free	 ports.	 For	 example,	 Eugen	 Richter,	 who	 also	 spoke	 in	 the	discussion	 about	 the	 interpellation,	 argued:	 ‘Meine	 Herren,	 wir	 haben	 dieses	Reservatrecht	 den	 Hansestädten	 gegeben,	 nicht	 im	 politisch-partikularistischen	Interesse	 sondern	 mit	 dem	 vollen	 Bewusstsein,	 daß	 diese	 Freihafenstellung	 ein	deutsches	Interesse	ist.’54	Then,	Richter	concluded	by	highlighting:			
																																																								52	1880,	2,	43.	Sitzung	am	1.	Mai	1880,	Verhandlungen	des	Deutsches	Reichstags,	Reichstagsprotokolle:	http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt3_k4_bsb00018409_00393.html.	Accessed	18/06/2016	53	Ibid.	54	1880,	2,	43.	Sitzung	am	1.	Mai	1880,	Verhandlungen	des	Deutsches	Reichstags,	Reichstagsprotokolle:	http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt3_k4_bsb00018409_00401.html.	Accessed:	18/06/2016	
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Meine	Herren,	wenn	man	heut	zu	Tage	sagt,	daß	in	Deutschland	die	Autorität	vor	Recht	und	Gesetz	in	weiten	Kreisen	des	Volkes	erschüttert	ist	–	hüten	Sie	sich	 im	 Bundesrath,	 dieser	 Stimmung	 neue	Nahrung	 zu	 gebe,	 schützen	 Sie	die	 Autorität	 von	 Recht	 und	 Verfassung,	 damit	 man	 nicht	 sagen	 kann:	 In	Deutschland	geht	Macht	vor	Recht.		(Lebhaftes	Bravo.)55		Hence,	there	were	clearly	voices	in	the	Empire	that	completely	disagreed	with	the	Prussian	motion.	Indeed,	the	motion	was	part	of	much	larger	historic	issues	in	the	German	 Empire.	 These	 were	 Bismarck’s	 way	 of	 governing	 and	 the	 latent	constitutional	 crisis	 of	 the	 Empire.	 Not	 without	 reason	 has	 the	 Imperial	Constitution	 been	 described	 as	 ‘merkwürdiger	 Zwitter,	 eine	 Mischung	 aus	konservativen	und	progressive	Elementen.’56	In	the	end,	this	hybrid	cemented	the	Prussian	 hegemony	 over	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 Empire.	 Protest	 against	 Bismarck’s	approach	was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 political	 arena	 of	 the	 Reichstag.	 As	 Oncken	 has	demonstrated:	‘Einstimmig	fast	ward	von	der	Presse	das	Mittel	verdammt	und	der	Zweck	 ungefähr	 ebenso	 ungewürdigt	 gelassen,	 wie	 einst	 im	 Jahr	 1865	 die	Februarbedingungen	 in	 der	 Schleswig-Holsteinschen	 Frage.’ 57 	Thus,	 just	 like	Prussia	 had	 deceived	 the	 Habsburg	 Empire	 in	 1865/66,	 it	 now	 dealt	 with	 the	remaining	states	of	the	German	Empire	in	a	similar	manner.	Breaches	of	 law	and	agreements	remained	an	effective	remedy	for	Bismarck.		In	 any	 case,	 it	 remains	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 Bismarck	 intended	 to	accomplish	 anything	 other	 than	 to	 pressurise	Hamburg	 into	 joining	 the	 customs	union.	As	we	have	seen,	the	constitutionality	of	Bismarck’s	motion	to	the	Federal	Assembly	was	at	least	dubious.	Such	a	view	is	also	advanced	by	Julia	Cholet,	who	highlights	 that	 Prussia	 had	 intended	 to	 provoke	Hamburg’s	 countermeasure	 ‘um	die	Verhandlungen	um	einen	Zollanschluss	der	gesamten	Stadt	voran	zu	treiben.’58	Bismarck,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 stated	 that,	 as	 the	 Prussian	 representative,	 it	 was	merely	 his	 duty	 to	 stand	 in	 for	 those	 Prussian	 interests	 ‘welche	 durch	 die																																																									55	1880,	2,	43.	Sitzung	am	1.	Mai	1880,	Verhandlungen	des	Deutsches	Reichstags,	Reichstagsprotokolle:	http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt3_k4_bsb00018409_00402.html.	Accessed:	18/06/2016	56	Volker	Ullrich,	Die	nervöse	Großmacht:	Aufstieg	und	Untergang	des	deutschen	
Kaiserreichs,	1871-1918	(Frankfurt,	1997),	p.	31	57	Wilhelm	Oncken,	Das	Zeitalter	des	Kaisers	Wilhelm,	Zweiter	Band	(Berlin,	1892),	p.	703		58	Julia	Cholet,	Der	Etat	des	Deutschen	Reiches	in	der	Bismarckzeit	(Berlin,	2012),	p.	348	
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gegenwärtige	Gestaltung	des	hamburgischen	Freihafenbezirks	geschädigt	und	 im	Genuß	der	ihnen	auf	Grund	der	nationalen	Einigung	Deutschlands	und	des	Artikels	33	 der	 Verfassung	 zustehenden	 Rechte	 beeinträchtigt	 werden.’ 59 	In	 the	 end,	Bismarck’s	 initial	 plan	 to	 include	 Altona	 and	 St	 Pauli	 in	 the	 customs	 union	was	altered,	so	that	only	Altona	was	included.	This	was	duly	approved	by	the	Federal	Assembly.	However,	 the	 issue	 regarding	Hamburg’s	 accession	was	not	 resolved	with	the	decision	made	in	the	Federal	Assembly.	The	Member	of	Parliament,	Rudolf	von	Delbrück,	Bismarck’s	former	right	hand,	had	submitted	a	motion	to	the	Reichstag	regarding	the	revised	Elbschiffahrtsakte.60	In	this	treaty	between	states	situated	on	the	River	Elbe	it	had	been	determined	that	the	Federal	Assembly	would	be	able	to	shift	the	customs	border.	Delbrück	urged	the	Reichstag	to		agree	to	this	only	on	the	condition	that	the	Reichstag	was	to	first	agree	to	any	such	shifts.	In	a	speech	before	the	Reichstag	opposing	Delbrück’s	proposal	on	May	8	1880,	Bismarck	pointed	 to	the	 fact	 that,	 in	his	opinion,	 there	was	a	 sensible	decline	 in	patriotism.	Bismarck	argued:			 Wenn	ich	sehe,	[…]	daß	mein	thätigster	und	bedeutendster	Mitarbeiter,	den	ich	bei	der	Herstellung	der	Reichsverfassung	gehabt	habe,	heutzutage	Arm	in	Arm	 mit	 dem	 Centrum	 und	 mit	 den	 Parteinen,	 die	 damals	 gegen	 die	Reichsverfassung	waren,	mir	gegenüber	tritt,	so	habe	ich	das	Gefühl,	daß	die	rückläufige	 Bewegung,	 die	 Minderung	 der	 Begeisterung	 für	 die	 nationale	Entwicklung,	 die	 damals	 uns	 alle,	 beherrschte,	 alle	 einen	 ganz	außerordentlich	weiten	Weg	schon	zurückgelegt	hat.	[…]	Ist	es	nützlich,	den	Partikularismus	 zu	 unterstützen?	 Er	 ist	 stark	 genug	 ohne	 Sie,	 meine	Herren.61		
																																																								59	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Hamb.	Nachrichten	vom	8.	Mai	1880	60	Rudolf	von	Delbrück	was	a	Member	of	Parliament	for	the	constituency	Neustadt	a.d.	Orla,	which	was	located	in	the	Grand	Duchy	of	Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach.	Delbrück	represented	this	constituency	in	the	Reichstag	between	1878	and	1881.	See	Parlamentarierportal	(BIOPARL).	Abgeordnete	in	den	norddeutschen	und	deutschen	Reichstagen	1867-1918	(BIORAB-Kaiserreich).	Rudolf	von	Delbrück:	http://zhsf.gesis.org/ParlamentarierPortal/biorabkr_db/biorabkr_db.php	Accessed:	17/08/2016	61	Oncken,	Zeitalter	des	Kaisers,	pp.	703-704	
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Thus,	by	emphasising	Hamburg’s	particularistic	role	as	a	free	port,	Bismarck	was	able	to	depict	Hamburg	as	a	Reichsfeind,	an	enemy	of	 the	Reich.	Bismarck	simply	equated	Hamburg’s	special	status	with	a	non-patriotic	attitude	of	the	city.	This	 is	the	opinion	that	Bismarck	wanted	to	take	when	he	argued	that	economic	disunity	stood	in	the	way	of	a	unified	nation.	Here,	Bismarck	precisely	refers	to	the	problem	of	economic	and	cultural	unification.	He	argued	that	without	economic	unification,	the	 idea	of	 a	unified	German	nation	would	be	 impossible	 to	 achieve.	This	 line	of	argument	seems	to	have	gained	recognition.	The	Reichstag	voted	with	a	majority	of	138	to	110	against	Delbrück’s	modification.		Only	 a	 couple	 of	 weeks	 after	 this	 incident,	 Bismarck	 announced	 an	upcoming	Prussian	motion	regarding	the	incorporation	of	the	River	Elbe	into	the	Empire’s	 customs	union.	 In	 response	 to	 this,	Hamburg	 submitted	a	 report	 to	 the	Federal	 Assembly	 regarding	 the	 feasibility	 of	 this	 plan.	 In	 this,	 Hamburg	 argued	that	 any	 ‘über	 das	 Aufziehen	 einer	 besonderen	 Zollflagge	 bei	 Tage,	beziehungsweise	 das	 Zeigen	 einer	 Zolllaterne	 bei	 Nacht	 hinausgehende	Kontrolmaßregel’	would	have	a	devastating	effect	on	Hamburg’s	maritime	traffic.62	In	 fact,	 it	 was	 emphasised,	 that	 Antwerp	 had	 just	 been	 able	 to	 implement	 the	abolishment	 of	 any	 customs	 control	 on	 the	 way	 to	 its	 port.	 Still,	 the	 Reich	Chancellor	declared	 that	he	had	 to	 insist	 ‘darauf,	daß	die	preußischen	Provinzen	Hannover	 und	 Schleswig-Holstein	 nicht	 länger	 Hamburg	 zu	 Liebe	 durch	Zollschranken	gegen	die	Elbe	hin	getrennt	bleiben	könnten	[…].’63	Ultimately,	 the	Federal	 Assembly	 approved	 of	 including	 the	 Lower	 Elbe,	 from	 Hamburg	 to	Cuxhaven,	 in	 the	 customs	 union.	 Bismarck	 was	 tightening	 the	 noose	 around	Hamburg.	 In	 Hamburg,	 Bismarck’s	 actions	 prompted	 Gustav	 Kirchenpauer	 to	resign	 as	 Hamburg’s	 envoy	 to	 the	 Federal	 Assembly.	 Kirchenpauer	 had	 been	 a	prominent	 champion	 of	 Hamburg’s	 historic	 role	 as	 a	 free	 port.	 Henceforth,	Johannes	Versmann	took	over	the	role	in	Berlin.	In	the	end,	Versmann	turned	out	to	 be	 well	 suited	 for	 this	 job:	 ‘Daß	 Bismarck	 Hamburg	 erheblichen	
																																																								62	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Besonderer	Abdruck	der	Drucksache	des	Bundesrath	No.	108.	Vorläufige	Bemerkungen	zu	der	in	der	Sitzung	des	Bundesraths	vom	1.	Juni	1880	eingebrachten	Vorlage	No.	106,	betreffend	die	Einverleibung	der	unteren	Elbe	in	das	Zollgebiet	63	Gottlob	Engelhaaf,	Geschichte	der	Neuesten	Zeit:	Vom	Frankfurter	Frieden	bis	zur	
Gegenwart	(Stuttgart,	1915),	p.	189	
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Verhandlungsspielraum	 einräumte,	 ist	 dem	 unermüdlichen,	 stets	 fachkundigen	und	pragmatischen	Versmann	zu	verdanken.’64		 Indeed,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 pressure	 Bismarck	 exerted	 on	Hamburg	 had	 an	effect	on	how	a	possible	accession	was	dealt	with	in	Hamburg.	At	the	end	of	June	1880,	a	small	group	of	members	of	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce	prepared	a	report	on	its	general	standpoint	on	the	matter	as	well	as	a	list	of	conditions	under	which	an	accession	would	be	acceptable	–	the	so-called	“Robinow	programme”.	While	it	was	 considered	 to	 officially	 submit	 this	 report	 to	 the	 Senate,	 this	 plan	 was	 not	realised.	Looking	at	the	report	gives	a	perfect	insight	into	the	position	this	part	of	Hamburg’s	 mercantile	 community	 took	 vis-à-vis	 Hamburg’s	 accession.	 In	 the	report,	it	was	pointed	out	that	if	the	group	of	merchants	had	been	able	to	render	a	judgement	 solely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Hamburg’s	 interests	 and	 needs,	 it	 would	 have	decided	in	favour	of	Hamburg’s	free	port	status.65	At	the	same	time,	the	delegates	also	admitted	that	 it	was	concerned	 ‘daß	bei	einem	starren	Festhalten	an	diesem	Standpunkt	 […]	 dem	 Blühen	 unseres	 Handels,	 die	 ernstesten	 Gefahren	 drohen	[…].’66	For	 this	 reason,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 regarded	 itself	 constrained	 to	specify	a	course	of	action	in	to	order	to	avert	these	dangers.			 Above	all	stood	the	realisation	that	there	was	little	that	Hamburg	was	able	to	 do	 once	 Bismarck	 had	 set	 his	 mind	 on	 bringing	 about	 Hamburg’s	 accession.	There	 can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 this	 was	 candidly	 realised	 by	 the	 delegates	 of	 the	Chamber.	Additionally,	 it	was	also	accepted	 that	Hamburg	had	 few	supporters	 in	the	 rest	 of	 the	 Empire.	 Although	Hamburg	 had	 received	 support	 in	 the	 Prussian	motion	on	Altona	and	St	Pauli’s	accession,	the	city	possessed	a	level	of	prosperity,	‘welches	 sich	 zu	 vortheilhaft	 abhebt	 von	 dem	unserm	Hinterlande	 beschiedenen	Loose,	 als	daß	es	nicht	vielfach	Mißgunst	 gegen	uns	erregen	 sollte.’67	Apart	 from	changing	party	interests	against	Bismarck,	a	victory	like	the	one	in	the	matter	on	St	Pauli	was	entirely	unrealistic.	In	fact,	even	this	victory	was	assumed	to	turn	out	to	be	 a	 Pyrrhic	 victory.	 Consequently,	 in	 view	 of	 this	 situation,	 the	 Chamber’s	delegation	advised	the	Senate	to	enter	negotiations	with	the	imperial	government																																																									64	Frank	M.	Hinz,	Planung	und	Finanzierung	der	Speicherstadt	in	Hamburg:	
Gemischtwirtschaftliche	Unternehmensgründungen	im	19.	Jahrhundert	unter	besonderer	
Berücksichtigung	der	Hamburger	Freihafen-Lagerhaus-Gesellschaft	(Hamburg,	2000),	p.	95	65	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Handelskammer,	Hamburg,	d.	28.	Juni	1880	66	Ibid.	67	Ibid.	This	part	seems	to	have	been	cut	out	in	a	later	version.	
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regarding	 the	 terms	of	an	accession.	Like	 this,	Hamburg	would	 ‘nicht	 ferner	dem	Vorwurf	 des	Particularismus	 ausgesetzt	 sein,	 und	dem	Odium,	welches	bisher	 in	Folge	 unserer	 Seperat-Stellung,	 wenn	 auch	 mit	 Unrecht,	 auf	 uns	 lastete,	 in	wirksamer	 Weise	 begegnen.’ 68 	In	 any	 case,	 negotiations	 with	 the	 imperial	government	were	not	binding.	 In	 case	 they	actually	produced	acceptable	 results,	for	 example	 concessions	 to	 Hamburg’s	 industry,	 ‘dann	 könnte	 jeder	 Hamburger,	auch	der	 eifrigste	Anhänger	unserer	Freihafenstellung,	 solche	Lösung	 getrost	 als	die	glücklichste	bezeichnen,	welche	zu	finden	überhaupt	möglich	war.’69		 This	 statement	 contains	 two	 vital	 points.	 Firstly,	 Hamburg’s	 mercantile	community	was	 totally	aware	of	 its	weak	position	vis-à-vis	 the	Reich	Chancellor.	There	were	few	illusions	about	the	German	Empire’s	ability	to	force	the	accession	upon	 Hamburg.	 It	 was	 without	 a	 doubt	 realised	 in	 Hamburg	 that	 Bismarck’s	measures,	the	motion	regarding	Altona	and	St	Pauli	and	the	customs	border	on	the	Elbe,	were	aimed	at	making	the	city	change	 its	mind.	Under	these	circumstances,	opposition	 to	 the	 Empire’s	 economic	 political	 turn	 to	 protectionism	 took	 a	 back	seat.	Secondly,	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community	was	well	aware	of	 the	 fact	 that	the	right	granted	in	Article	34	led	to	a	dismissive	attitude	–	the	‘Odium’	–	towards	Hamburg	in	the	rest	of	the	Empire.	Since	negotiations	were	seen	as	a	way	to	end	accusations,	the	contempt	of	Hamburg	in	the	rest	of	the	Empire	must	at	least	have	had	 some	 effect	 in	 Hamburg.	 It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 this	 contempt	 in	 the	 rest	 of	Germany	actually	had	a	negative	economic	effect	on	the	city.	After	all,	the	delegates	of	 the	Chamber	admitted	that	 it	would	not	have	opted	 for	an	accession	 in	case	 it	had	been	able	to	make	a	truly	independent	decision.	Yet,	ridding	themselves	from	the	taint	of	being	“un-German”	was	a	welcome	side-effect	of	an	accession.		 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 July	 1880,	 a	 small	 delegation	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	Commerce	 then	enquired	of	Hamburg’s	senate	about	 the	state	of	negotiations.	 In	the	 end,	 two	 senators,	 Versmann	 and	O’Swald,	were	 assigned	 to	 hold	 a	meeting	with	 representatives	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	which	 took	 place	 on	 July	 13	1880.	 In	 this,	 Versmann	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 members	 had	 been	 right	 not	 to		submit	 the	 report	 to	 the	 Senate.	 The	 reasons	 for	 this	 were	 straightforward:	Versmann	pointed	out	the	need	to	delay	the	matter	in	order	to	improve	Hamburg’s	basis	 for	negotiations	with	 the	Empire.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	did	not	mean	 that																																																									68	Ibid.		69	Ibid.		
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Hamburg	 should	 wait	 for	 a	 change	 in	 the	 government	 staff	 –	 this	 had	 been	discussed	 amongst	 the	 delegates.	 After	 all,	 Bismarck’s	 dismissal	 was	 neither	probable	 nor	 desirable,	 as	 Versmann	 emphasised.	 Versmann	 argued:	 ‘Der	Umschwung	 in	 der	 Stimmung	 hier	 sei	 ihm	 in	 höchstem	 Grade	 überraschend	gewesen;	 auch	 in	 Berlin	 sei	man	 ganz	 der	 Ansicht,	 daß	 die	 Stimmung	 hier	 noch	dieselbe	sei,	wie	vor	weniger	Wochen.’70	By	this,	Versmann	most	likely	meant	the	increasing	 favour	 for	Hamburg’s	accession.	For	example,	at	 the	end	of	May	1880,	the	 Hamburger	 Zollanschlußpartei	 had	 been	 founded.	 However,	 it	 remains	questionable	whether	 there	had	been	a	general	 turnabout	 in	 the	general	opinion	on	Hamburg’s	accession.	After	all,	when	Versmann	began	to	look	for	a	settlement	with	 the	 Imperial	 government	 in	 early	 July	 1880,	 he	 did	 so	 without	 letting	Hamburg’s	 senate	 know. 71 	Even	 if	 Hamburg	 was	 now	 prepared	 to	 start	negotiations,	 Bismarck	 was	 said	 not	 to	 want	 to	 negotiate.	 Therefore,	 Versmann	was	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	what	 ‘jetzt	 erreicht	werden	 könne,	 das	werde	 immer	 zu	erreichen	sein.’72	Before	Hamburg	was	able	to	enter	negotiations	with	the	German	Empire,	it	would	need	to	elaborate	a	comprehensive	plan.	Overall,	Versmann	took	a	 pessimistic	 view	 of	 what	 actually	 could	 be	 achieved	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	Reich	Chancellor.			 The	delegation	of	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce	also	 learnt	 that	preparations	for	 the	 coming	 negotiations	with	 the	 imperial	 government	were	 being	made.	 To	assist	 with	 this,	 a	 questionnaire	 had	 been	 drawn	 up.	 Additionally,	 visits	 to	influential	members	of	every	branch	of	the	economy	had	taken	place	and	were	to	be	 continued.	 These	 negotiations	 between	 Hamburg’s	 senate	 and	 the	 imperial	government	then	began	in	secret	in	November	1880.	Prior	to	this,	in	late	October,	a	group	of	32	merchants	 from	Hamburg	had	submitted	a	note	to	Bismarck.	 In	this,	the	group	asked	the	Reich	Chancellor	to	see	to	Hamburg’s	accession.	Opponents	of	the	 accession	 were	 labelled	 as	 “un-German”.	 In	 response	 to	 this,	 over	 1,700	merchants	and	firms	signed	a	protestation	against	 the	demand	note	to	Bismarck.	This	group	of		objectors	claimed	‘daß	die	Aufrechterhaltung	der	Freihafenstellung	
																																																								70	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Dienstag	d.	13.	Juli	1880.	Nachmittags	2	½	Uhr	im	Verwaltungsgebäude	71	Becker,	‘Eingliederung	der	Hansestädte’,	pp.	236-237	72	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Dienstag	d.	13.	Juli	1880.	Nachmittags	2	½	Uhr	im	Verwaltungsgebäude	
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Hamburgs	sowohl	im	nationalen	Interesse	des	gesamten	Vaterlandes	wie	auch	im	Hamburgischen	Interesse	unbedingt	geboten	ist.’73	At	 roughly	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 late	 1880,	 there	 were	 also	 talks	 between	Hamburg’s	 senate	 and	 delegates	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 regarding	 the	conditions	upon	which	an	accession	would	be	manageable.	The	options	discussed	in	 one	 meeting	 in	 December	 1880	 were	 later	 written	 up	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce.	In	this,	the	need	for	a	free	port	area	rather	than	a	customs	free	entrepôt	is	emphasised.	Under	any	other	solution	than	a	free	port	area,	it	was	questionable	 whether	 Hamburg’s	 ‘Handel	 in	 bisheriger	Weise	 sich	 erhalten	 und	fortentwickeln	 könne	 […].’74	Interestingly,	 Hamburg’s	 basis	 for	 negotiations	 is	again	regarded	as	being	poor.	The	report	argues	for	adhering	to	the	idea	of	a	free	port	area	even	 if	 the	prospect	of	being	granted	an	entire	area	was	unlikely.	With	regard	 to	 the	 location	and	 requirements	 this	 area	had	 to	 fulfil,	 the	 consensus,	 at	this	early	stage,	still	seems	to	have	been	that	it	should	be	established	in	a	sparsely	populated	 area	 of	 Hamburg.	 It	 was	 highlighted:	 ‘Ist	 aber	 das	 Verbleiben	 von	Bewohnern	 im	Freihafengebiet	ausgeschlossen,	werden	damit	auch	alle	Projekte,	welche	einen	größeren	Theil	der	 jetzt	bewohnten	Stadt	 in	dasselbe	einschließen,	hinfällig.’75	The	relocation	of	people	and	the	costs	 for	expropriations	would	 ‘ganz	abgesehen	 von	 allen	 anderen.	 mit	 einer	 so	 umfassenden	 Veränderung	verbundenen	Unzuträglichkeiten,	 unerschwingliche	und	mit	 den	 zu	 errichtenden	Vortheilen	außer	allem	Verhätnis	stehnde	Kosten	beanspruchen.’76	The	problem	of	determining	the	right	 location	 for	 the	 free	port	area	will	be	discussed	 later	on	 in	this	chapter.	For	now,	it	 is	suffice	to	say	that,	 from	the	beginning,	expectations	in	Hamburg	of	the	outcome	of	negotiations	with	the	imperial	government	were	low.	Being	granted	a	 free	port	area	was	viewed	as	a	best-case	scenario.	The	decision-making	 elites	 of	 Hamburg	were	 still	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	were	 reliant	 on	Bismarck’s	good	will.			 Later	on,	when	the	decision	about	Hamburg’s	future	as	a	free	port	drew	to	a	close	 –	 negotiations	 were	 concluded	 in	 late	 May	 1881	 –	 Hamburg’s	 position	towards	 the	 Reich	 Chancellor	 seems	 to	 have	 improved.	 In	 late	 March	 1881,	Versmann	 disclosed	 to	 some	 members	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 that	 the																																																									73	Stein,	‘Interessenkonflikte’,	p.	57	74	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Hamburg,	Jannuar	1881	75	Ibid.		76	Ibid.		
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implementation	of	the	decision	concerning	the	accession	of	Altona	and	the	Lower	Elbe	was	raising	major	difficulties	in	Berlin.77	For	this	reason,	Versmann	wanted	to	see	about	the	following	five	concessions:	a	reserved	free	port	area,	the	facilitation	of	 customs	 regulations,	 concessions	 for	 the	 export	 industry,	 Hamburg’s	 own	customs	authority,	and	a	contribution	by	the	Empire	towards	the	costs	of	the	new	free	 port	 area.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Versmann	 gave	 up	 hope	 of	 being	 granted	 an	imperial	guarantee	for	the	new	conditions.			 On	 April	 12	 1881,	 another	 session	 of	 the	 Versammlung	 Eines	 Ehrbaren	
Kaufmanns	took	place.78	This	was	just	around	a	year	after	Lutteroth	had	spoken	of	the	 violation	 of	 Hamburg	 with	 respect	 to	 Bismarck’s	 motion	 to	 the	 Federal	Assembly.	However,	this	time,	the	meeting	took	a	completely	different	course.	The	meeting	 began	 with	 the	 deputy	 Heinrich	 Amsinck	 calling	 upon	 the	 assembly	 to	show:			 …	daß	bei	allen	Meinungsverschiedenheiten	die	Hamburger-Kaufmannschaft	mit	unverbrüchlicher	Treue	an	Kaiser	und	Reich	festhalte,	auf	ein	dreifaches	Hoch	 auf	 den	 Kaiser	 auszubringen,	 in	 solches	 die	 Versammlung	enthschieden	einstimmt.79		After	this	open	display	of	loyalty	to	the	Emperor	and	the	Reich,	Amsinck	went	on	to	propose	a	resolution.	This	change	of	tone	in	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	had,	of	course,	become	necessary	due	to	the	imminent	conclusion	of	negotiations	between	the	 Empire	 and	 Hamburg.	 It	 was	 now	 in	 the	 merchants’	 interest	 to	 portray	themselves	as	loyal	subjects	to	the	Emperor.	In	the	proposed	resolution,	which	was	based	upon	the	Chamber’s	annual	report	for	1880,	it	would	be	emphasised	that	the	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 still	 accepted	Hamburg’s	 status	 as	 a	 free	 port	 city	 as	 the	most	desirable	solution.	In	the	case	that	it	was	impossible	to	maintain	the	current																																																									77	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Sonnabend,	den	26.	März	1881.	Nachmittags	2	½	Uhr	im	Versammlungszimmer	der	Handelskammer.	Only	a	small	group	of	members	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	had	been	privy	to	the	negotiations	between	Hamburg’s	senate	and	the	imperial	government.	On	April	9	1881,	this	group	discussed	a	petition,	which	had	been	signed	by	50	members	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	asking	for	a	meeting	of	Eines	Ehrbaren	Kaufmanns	in	order	to	get	an	update	on	the	state	of	affairs.	See	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Sonnabend,	den	9.	April	1881.	Abend	7	¼	Uhr	im	Versammlungszimmer	der	Handelskammer.	78	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Versammlung	Eines	Ehrbaren	Kaufmanns.	Dienstag,	den	12.	April	1881.	Nachmittags	2	¼	Uhr	im	Börsensaale.	79	Ibid.	
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circumstances,	it	was	argued	that	a	free	port	area	was	inevitable.	In	a	vote	on	the	matter,	the	majority	of	the	attendant	members	approved	of	Amsinck’s	resolution.			 In	 the	 end,	 official	 negotiations	 between	 Hamburg,	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	and	 the	 imperial	 government	 were	 concluded	 on	 May	 25	 1881.	 The	 terms	 of	Hamburg’s	 accession	 to	 the	 Empire	 had	 been	 determined.	Hamburg’s	 delegation	was	 able	 to	 announce	 that	 it	 had	 carried	 its	 point.	 The	 Reich	 Chancellor	 had	accepted	 all	 the	 relevant	 points.	 After	 some	 efforts	 at	 persuasion,	 Hamburg’s	
Bürgerschaft	 also	 approved	 of	 the	 treaty	 on	 June	 15	 1881.80	Upon	 the	 treaty’s	promulgation,	 Hamburg’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 discussed	 the	 phrasing	 of	 a	statement	on	the	issue.	In	this	discussion	it	became	apparent	that	general	opinion	in	 Hamburg	 was	 not	 necessarily	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 accession.	 The	 need	 for	 a	statement	from	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	was	argued	to	be	necessary	in	order	to	‘der	 äußerst	 lebhaften	 Agitation,	 welche	 die	 Bevölkerung	 und	 die	Bürgerschaftsmitglieder	 zu	 schroff	 ablehnender	 Haltung	 bestimmen	 wolle,	entgegenzutreten	 […].’81	In	 a	 public	 statement,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 then	declared	 that	 the	 treaty	 between	 Hamburg	 and	 the	 Reich	 did	 not	 endanger	Hamburg’s	position	 in	overseas	 trade.	 Indeed,	 the	Chamber	regarded	 ‘die	 festere	und	 wohlwollende	 Verbindung	 mit	 dem	 übrigen	 Deutschland	 für	 so	 werthvolle	Güter,	daß	sie	nur	dringend	wünschen	kann	[…]’	to	support	the	treaty.82		 Hence,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 Hamburg’s	 newspapers	 were	 not	 exactly	enthusiastic	 about	 the	 decision	 to	 join	 the	 customs	 union.	 For	 example,	 the	
Hamburgische	Börsen-Halle	complained	that	the	agreement	between	Hamburg	and	the	German	Empire	was	not	satisfying	for	any	of	the	parties	involved.	According	to	the	newspaper,	the	costs	for	Hamburg’s	accession	were	too	high	to	be	justifiable	in	the	face	of	the	little	benefits.83	While	the	Hamburgischer	Correspondent	also	saw	no	reason	for	changing	Hamburg’s	status	quo,	it	argued	that	if	Hamburg	was	ever	to	join	the	customs	union	it	had	to	be	done	under	the	favourable	conditions	offered	by	 the	 agreement	 with	 the	 German	 Empire.	 Accepting	 these	 conditions	 was	
																																																								80	Frank	M.	Hinz,	Planung	und	Finanzierung,	pp.	96–97	81	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Dienstag	d.	31.	Mai	1881.	Nachmittags	2	¼	Uhr	im	Versammlungszimmer	der	Handelskammer.		82	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Erklärung	der	Handelskammer	betreffend	den	Zollanschluss,	Hamburg,	d.	7.	Juni	1881	83	SuB	Hamburg,	Hamburgische	Börsen-Halle,	Abendzeitung	für	Handel,	Schiffahrt	und	Politik,	No.	129,	Mittwoch,	den	1.	Juni	1881,	Nachmittags-Ausgabe,	77.	Jahrgang	
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regarded	 as	 the	 only	 way	 to	 restore	 peace	 with	 the	 German	 Empire.84 	The	
Hamburger	Nachrichten,	on	 the	other	hand,	criticised	 the	agreement	sharply.	For	the	liberal	newspaper	the	agreement	was	a	looming	disaster,	which	‘die	schwerste	Gefährdung	unserer	wirthschaftlichen	Interessen	über	uns	verhängt	[…].’85		 In	a	private	letter	to	Arthur	Lutteroth,	head	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	it	becomes	 obvious	 that	 among	 the	 members	 of	 Hamburg’s	Handelskammer	 there	were	 similar	 views	 to	 those	 expressed	 by,	 for	 example,	 the	 Hamburgischer	
Correspondent.	 Due	 to	 the	 absence	 from	 Hamburg,	 the	 author,	 who	 was	 also	 a	member	of	the	Chamber,	made	sure	to	give	his	general	view	on	whether	or	not	to	join	the	customs	union.	He	highlighted:			 Ich	bin	 für	 einen	Anschluss	nur	unter	den	bekannten	Bedingungen	&	zwar	nicht	aus	wirthschaftlichen	sonders	aus	politischen	Gründen;	denn	wenn	der	bisherige	Zustand	bestehen	bleiben	könnte	ware	es	besser	&	 ich	würde	für	Erhaltung	desselben	sein.	Die	Art	und	Weise	der	Behandlung	der	Sache,	wie	sie	 neuerdings	 von	 Berlin	 aus	 beliebt	 ist,	 könnte	 mich,	 wenn	 ich	 meine	Meinung	zu	sagen	hätte,	veranlassen,	mich	für	Abbruch	aller	Verhandlungen	auszusprechen.86			By	 late	 1880	 and	 early	 1881,	 this	 view	 seems	 to	 have	 reflected	 the	 attitudes	 of	wider	 circles	 in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce.	 We	 have	 seen	 that	 there	 were	vociferous	 protests	 against	 Bismarck’s	 turn	 to	 protectionism	 and	 the	 projected	incorporation	of	Altona	and	St	Pauli.	However,	together	with	these	protests	came	the	 realisation	 that,	 from	 a	 political	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 was	 sensible	 to	 give	 in	 to	Bismarck.	Compared	to	1866/67,	when	the	majority	of	members	were	in	favour	of	maintaining	Hamburg’	status,	the	support	for	this	status	had	begun	to	crumble	by	the	 late	 1870s.	 In	 view	 of	 Bismarck’s	 increasing	 pressure,	 the	 “Robinow	programme”	then	turned	into	a	feasible	alternative.	 It	suddenly	became	the	most	diplomatic	 and	 politically	 reasonable	 solution.	 In	 view	 of	 these	 facts,	 Bismarck’s	
																																																								84	SuB	Hamburg,	Hamburgischer	Correspondent,	No.	155,	Sonntag,	den	5.	Juni	1881,	Morgen-Ausgabe,	151.	Jahrgang	85	See	SuB	Hamburg,	Hamburger	Nachrichten,	No.	125,	Hamburg,	Freitag,	den	27.	Mai	1881,	Abend-Ausgabe	and	Hamburger	Nachrichten,	No.	127,	Hamburg,	Sonntag,	den	29.	Mai	1881,	Morgen-Ausgabe	86	AdHH,	20.S.2a.3,	Geehrter	Herr	Lutteroth,	Hamburg,	21.	Mai	1881.	
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pressure	on	Hamburg	has	to	be	regarded	as	the	main	driving	force	in	the	process	towards	Hamburg’s	accession.		In	addition	to	this,	as	Stein	has	pointed	out,	there	was	certainly	also	a	shift	in	attitudes	among	Hamburg’s	mercantile	community.87	It	was	not	so	much	a	case	of	 growing	 support	 for	 Hamburg’s	 accession,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 merely	 32	advocates	 favouring	 an	 accession	 in	 October	 1880.	 Rather,	 those	 merchants	resolutely	arguing	in	favour	of	maintaining	Hamburg’s	free	port	status	decreased	in	 number,	 as	 did	 their	 overall	 influence	 in	 the	 community.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	‘indifferent’	 faction	 grew.	 What	 is	 striking	 about	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 is	 that,	unlike	 in	 Bremen,	 ideological	 considerations	 became	 subordinate	 relatively	quickly	 in	 Hamburg.	 Even	 though	 there	 were	 voices,	 such	 as	 Kirchenpauer’s,	invoking	Hamburg’s	 historic	 role	 as	 a	 liberal	 free	 port,	 these	were	progressively	drowned	out.	Political	 and	diplomatic	 considerations	gained	 the	upper	hand	and	their	advocates	became	more	vocal.		
d.	The	Speicherstadt		In	 the	 agreement	 between	Hamburg	 and	 the	 Imperial	 government	 from	May	 25	1881,	 Hamburg	 was	 granted	 the	 right	 to	 build	 a	 free	 port	 area,	 which	 is	 now	known	as	the	Speicherstadt.	The	construction	of	this	area	was	connected	to	a	large	relocation	programme.	After	having	decided	in	favour	of	an	accession,	Hamburg’s	political	 and	 economic	 elites	 were	 then	 urged	 to	 make	 a	 decision	 that	 directly	impacted	 upon	 large	 groups	 of	 people.	 So,	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 to	 the	 German	customs	union	was	no	longer	simply	a	matter	that	affected	Bismarck	on	one	side	and	Hamburg’s	governing	body	and	mercantile	community	on	the	other.	 Instead,	Hamburg’s	 economic	 integration	 into	 the	 Empire	 suddenly	 turned	 into	 a	 subject	that	 directly	 concerned	 thousands	 of	 people	 in	 Hamburg.	 Therefore,	 it	 will	 be	necessary	to	investigate	how	this	decision	was	pushed	through.	After	all,	it	is	one	thing	to	cheer	for	the	King	on	his	visit	to	Hamburg	but	it	is	a	whole	different	matter	when	the	idea	of	a	German	nation	forces	those	people,	who	supposedly	cheered	for	the	 King	 15	 years	 or	 so	 earlier,	 to	 leave	 their	 homes	 behind.	 In	 this	 respect,	
																																																								87	Stein,	‘Interessenkonflikte’,	pp.	75–78	
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Hamburg	constitutes	a	special	case,	since	the	process	of	economic	integration	was	inseparably	connected	to	a	social	problem.		Recently,	 Hamburg’s	 Speicherstadt	 has	 been	 made	 a	 UNESCO	 World	Heritage	 Site.	 The	 huge	 complex	 of	 warehouses	 in	 the	 former	 free	 port	 area	reflects	Hamburg’s	significance	as	Germany’s	main	seaport.	However,	prior	to	the	construction	 of	 warehouses,	 the	 Wandrahm-Kehrwieder	 district	 was	 home	 to	thousands	of	people.	The	Wandrahm	Island	had	received	its	name	from	a	historical	site	 for	 the	 production	 of	 cloth	 between	 the	 fourteenth	 and	 the	 seventeenth	centuries.	 As	 part	 of	 the	 production	 process,	 the	 cloth	 was	 hung	 up	 to	 dry	 on	wooden	frames.	When	these	workers	moved	away,	the	area	became	home	to	other	craftsmen,	as	well	as	wealthy	merchants,	such	as	emigrant	Dutch	merchants;	this	became	 the	Holländischer	Brook.	While	 the	area	remained	home	 to	 the	well-off	–	the	Godeffroy	 family,	 for	 example,	 owned	 a	 house	 on	 the	Alten	Wandrahm	 –	 the	island	 was	 also	 a	 quarter	 for	 labourers	 and	 the	 poor.	 The	 situation	 of	 these	inhabitants	has	been	described	as	follows:			 Ihre	 Wohnung	 gehören	 zu	 den	 ungesündesten	 Wohnstätten	 in	 der	 Freien	und	Hansestadt	Hamburg.	Die	meisten	Straßen	liegen	so	tief,	daß	die	Häuser	regelmäßig	bei	Hochwasser	überflutet	werden.	Manchmal	steht	das	Wasser	so	 hoch,	 daß	 in	 den	 Erdgeschoßwohnungen	 Tische	 und	 Stühle	 bis	 an	 die	Decke	schwimmen.	Der	Schmutz,	den	das	ablaufende	Hochwasser	hinterläßt,	wird	 kaum	 noch	 entfernt,	 er	 kommt	 mit	 der	 nächsten	 Flut	 ja	 wieder.	 Die	meisten	Wohnungen	zur	ebenen	Erde	sind	ständig	feucht.88			The	distance	from	homestead	to	workplace	for	those	male	labourers	employed	in	Hamburg’s	port	was	short;	the	women	could	work	on	the	nearby	Hopfenmarkt	or	for	the	wealthier	population	of	the	island.			 However,	 Hamburg’s	 agreement	 with	 the	 Imperial	 government	 did	 not	include	details	about	the	precise	location	of	the	area.	Instead,	finding	an	acceptable	location	 for	 the	 area	was	 largely	 left	 to	 Hamburg.	 Therefore,	 a	 commission	was	appointed	 in	 Hamburg	 in	 order	 to	 make	 preparations	 for	 the	 accession	 to	 the	customs	union.	With	respect	to	locating	the	free	port	area,	the	commission	initially	put	 forward	 three	 different	 projects,	 differing	 principally	 in	 the	 extent	 to	which																																																									88	Fischer,	Griem,	Kaufmannsträume,	pp.	7–8	
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they	covered	 the	Kehrwieder	and	Wandrahm	 islands.	While	projects	VII	and	VIII	did	not	include	all	of	Wandrahm,	Project	VI	planned	to	turn	the	whole	of	the	area	into	 a	 free	port	 area.	The	 three	projects	were	 later	modified,	 so	 that	Project	VIa	effectively	 envisaged	 the	 relocation	 of	 around	18,	 500	 inhabitants.	 The	 available	storage	 space	was	 estimated	 at	 64,	 000	 square	metres	 at	 a	 land	price	 of	 around	54.5	million	Marks.	Project	VIIa	and	Project	VIIIa	would	have	led	to	the	relocation	of	 16,500	 and	 13,000	 inhabitants	 respectively.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 the	 attainable	storage	 space	 was	 notably	 smaller	 at	 40,000	 and	 27,500	 square	 metres.	 The	estimated	costs	of	expropriations	for	these	two	projects	were	disproportionate	to	its	attainable	storage	space.	Project	VIIa	was	calculated	to	cost	around	45.5	million	Marks	 and	 Project	 VIIIa	 around	 37	 million	 Marks.	 According	 to	 a	 report	 by	Hamburg’s	Chamber	of	Commerce,	the	city	needed	a	free	port	area	of	around	59,	000	 square	 metres	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 further	 pursue	 its	 business.89 	In	comparison,	the	total	area	covered	by	storehouses	at	the	time	in	Hamburg	and	its	suburb	was	estimated	to	be	around	87,	877	square	metres.		Naturally,	 the	 plan	 to	 erect	 Hamburg’s	 new	 free	 port	 area	 led	 to	 wider	discussions.	 Even	 in	 the	 Senats-Commission	 für	 die	 Vorbereitung	 des	
Zollanschlusses,	the	need	for	a	free	port	area	in	Hamburg’s	centre	was	questioned.	According	to	the	commission’s	report,	there	was	one	anonymous	member	pointing	to	the	expendability	of	the	area	on	the	northern	bank	of	the	Elbe.	In	the	member’s	view	 the	 traditional	 need	 for	 proximity	 of	 offices	 and	 storehouses	 had	 already	ended.	 Instead,	 Hamburg’s	 merchants	 were	 now	 cutting	 deals	 by	 presenting	samples.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	member	proposed	a	 considerably	 smaller	 free	port	area	on	 the	northern	bank	of	 the	Elbe	without	demolishing	 an	 entire	 residential	area.	 In	opposition	 to	 this	view,	 it	was	pointed	out	 that	 ‘es	 für	die	Erhaltung	der	Handelsstellung	 Hamburgs	 von	 großer	 Bedeutung	 sei,	 die	 Lagerung	 der	 auf	 das	Freihafengebiet	 angewiesenen	 Waaren	 in	 unmittelbarer	 Nähe	 der	 Zollstadt	 zu	ermöglichen.’90	Changing	 the	principle	 of	 storing	 trading	 goods	 in	 the	 immediate	vicinity	of	 the	merchants’	offices	would	 lead	to	similarly	unfavourable	conditions	as	those	obtained	in	London,	where	the	location	of	the	docks	had	led	to	trade	being	conducted	on	the	basis	of	samples.	Hamburg’s	other	principal	former	competitors,																																																									89	AdHH	20.S.2a.9,	Hamburgs	Anschluß	an	das	deutsche	Zollgebiet.	Verhandlungen	zwischen	Senat	und	Bürgerschaft.	No.	2.	Antrag	des	Senats	an	die	Bürgerschaft	vom	3.	Juli	1882,	pp.	21–22	90	Ibid.,	pp.	15–16	
	220	
namely	 Rotterdam	 and	 Liverpool,	 had	 managed	 to	 avoid	 London’s	 constraints.	Although	 storehouses	 on	 the	 respective	 opposite	 banks	 of	 the	 rivers	 had	 been	necessary	 in	 both	 cases,	 they	 were	 easily	 accessible	 by	 bridge	 (in	 the	 case	 of	Rotterdam)	or	by	ferry	(in	Liverpool).	Even	so,	merchants	of	these	two	cities	still	attempted	 to	 find	 storage	 space	 in	 the	 old	 parts	 of	 town,	 close	 to	 their	 offices.	Consequently,	 in	the	 light	of	processes	 in	Hamburg’s	rivalling	cities,	 the	free	port	area	in	Hamburg’s	centre	was	regarded	as	vital.	This	view	was	also	shared	by	the	
Deputation	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt	and	the	Chamber	of	Commerce.		Hence,	 locating	 the	 free	 port	 area	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 Hamburg	 was,	 by	 the	majority,	viewed	as	the	most	advantageous	solution	for	the	port	city.	Certainly,	the	commission	itself	realised	that	‘für	die	Durchführung	des	Projektes	aber	auch	ganz	außerordentliche	Opfer	zu	bringen	sein	würden.’91	This	sacrifice,	of	course,	meant	the	relocation	of	at	least	18,	500	people.	While	the	commission’s	concerns	actually	led	to	the	elaboration	of	 the	two	alternative	projects	(VIIa	and	VIIIa),	Project	VIa	was	 regarded	 as	 the	 most	 beneficial	 for	 Hamburg.	 Similarly,	 Hamburg’s	
Baudeputation	 voted	 with	 six	 to	 five	 votes	 in	 favour	 of	 Project	 VIa.	 Meanwhile,	there	was	disagreement	amongst	the	members	of	the	Finanzdeputation.	Half	of	its	representatives	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 Project	 VIa,	 while	 the	 rest	 expressed	 unease	about	the	dimensions	of	the	planned	project.	In	their	view,	the	necessity	of	a	free	port	 area	 could	 ‘in	 anderer,	 minder	 bedenklicher	 und	 kostspieliger	 Weise,	 als	durch	 die	 Niederlegung	 eines	 bewohnten	 Stadttheils	 genügt	werden	 […]’.92	With	respect	to	the	question	of	postponing	a	decision	about	including	parts	of	the	area	until	1886,	the	financial	deputation	argued	in	favour	of	reaching	a	decision	as	early	as	possible	‘mit	Rücksicht	auf	die	betreffenden	Grundeigenthümer	und	Bewohner	[…]’.93	In	 other	 words,	 there	 were	 doubts	 at	 least	 amongst	 parts	 of	 Hamburg’s	ruling	elite	about	the	wisdom	of	sacrificing	an	entire	residential	district	to	the	new	port	area.		In	 line	 with	 this,	 Johann	 Friedrich	 Stahmer’s	 statement	 regarding	 the	project	is	highly	interesting.94	This	statement	was	given	during	a	plenary	meeting	of	the	Baudeputation.	Stahmer	was	a	merchant	in	Hamburg	and	Senator	from	1875	until	his	death	in	1896.	Having	been	a	member	of	different	deputations,	head	of	the																																																									91	Ibid.,	p.	28	92	Ibid.,	p.	5	93	Ibid.,	p.	6	94	Ibid.,	pp.	66–69	
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Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 in	 1872	 and	 also	 head	 of	 the	 second	 section	 of	 the	
Baudeputation,	Stahmer	was	a	fully-fledged	member	of	Hamburg’s	ruling	elite.95	In	March	 1882,	 Stahmer	 took	 a	 firm	 stand	 in	 the	 discussion	 about	 the	 project	 of	establishing	 the	 free	 port	 area	 on	 the	 Kehrwieder-Wandrahm	 Island.	 Stahmer	openly	 argued	 that	 he	 was	 ‘von	 Anfang	 an	 gegen	 das	 Wandrahmsinsel-Project	gewesen	 und	 zwar	 wegen	 der	 damit	 verbundenen	 enormen	 Kosten	 und	 der	Nothwendigkeit,	 eine	 große	 Anzahl	 Menschen	 zu	 dislociren.’ 96 	Stahmer	 also	pointed	to	the	fact	that	the	project	was	making	accessible	an	area	for	storage	that	was	just	as	large	as	Hamburg’s	current	total	area	(including	St	Pauli	and	St	Georg).	Instead,	Stahmer	proposed	the	erection	of	the	free	port	area	on	the	southern	bank	of	 the	 Elbe.	 In	 his	 eyes,	 the	 actual	 area	 needed	 for	 storage	 was	 considerably	smaller	 than	 that	 envisaged	 by	 the	 project.	 In	 any	 case,	 in	 the	 joint	 commission	appointed	 by	 both,	 the	 Senate	 and	 the	 Bürgerschaft	 –	 the	 Senats-	 und	
Bürgerschafts-Commission	über	den	Generalplan	und	Generalkostenanschlag	für	die	
Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	and	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet	 –	 there	was	no	more	room	for	Stahmer.	As	also	pointed	out	by	Hinz,	opponents	of	the	Kehrwieder-Wandrahm	 project,	 such	 as	 the	 Senators	 Mönckeberg,	 Kirchenpauer	 [i.e.	Bismarck’s	old	antagonist	over	 the	 issue	of	Hamburg’s	accession],	Schroeder	and	Stahmer,	were	henceforth	simply	ignored.97	Ultimately,	 the	 joint	 commission	between	members	 of	 the	 Senate	 and	 the	
Bürgerschaft	 came	 to	 the	 same	 conclusion	 as	 the	 senatorial	 commission.	 It	 was	emphasised	 that	 locating	 the	 free	 port	 area	 on	 the	 southern	 bank	 of	 Elbe	 was	incompatible	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 Hamburg’s	 trade.	 The	 Kehrwieder-Wandrahm	Island	was	the	only	acceptable	solution.	However,	the	commission	also	entertained	doubts	about	the	necessity	of	turning	the	entire	island	into	a	free	port	area.	With	ten	to	three	votes,	the	commission	then	resolved	upon	not	recommending	Project	VIa	to	Hamburg’s	government.98	The	three	members	in	favour	argued	that	it	would	
																																																								95	Since	Stahmer	was	a	member	of	the	Senats-Commission	für	die	Vorbereitung	des	
Zollanschlusses,	it	is	in	fact	likely	that	the	aforementioned	anonymous	opponent	of	the	project	in	the	commission	was	Stahmer.	96	Ibid.,	p.	66	97	Hinz,	Planung	und	Finanzierung,	p.	112	98	AdHH	20.S.2a.9,	Mittheilung	des	Senats	an	die	Bürgerschaft.	Hamburg,	den	8.	November	1882.	Bericht	der	Senats-	und	Bürgerschaftscommission	über	den	Generalplan	und	Generalkostenanschlag	für	die	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet	
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be	difficult	to	extend	the	border	of	the	free	port	area	once	it	had	been	determined.	For	this	reason,	the	area	should	be	set	out	larger	than	was	actually	needed.	In	the	end,	 the	 commission	decided	 to	 introduce	 another	 alternative	 (Project	X),	which	was	passed	with	eleven	to	two	votes.		Governmental	commissions	were	not	the	only	ones	engaged	with	finding	a	solution	 for	 locating	 the	 free	 port	 area.	 Robert	Miles	 Sloman	 Jr.,	manager	 of	 the	family-owned	shipping	company,	came	up	with	yet	another	solution,	which	would	have	 saved	 the	Kehrwieder-Wandrahm	 Island.	 Sloman	was	not	 a	member	 of	 the	commission	and	had	decided	 to	publicise	his	plan.	However,	 the	commission	did	not	 accept	 this	 plan	 as	 a	 feasible	 alternative	 to	 the	 projects	 incorporating	 the	Kehrwieder-Wandrahm	 Island.	 Even	 though	 the	 plan	was	 not	 viewed	 as	 a	 valid	option,	 Sloman’s	 plan	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 discussions	 regarding	 the	 free	 port	area	 also	 had	wide	 repercussions	 outside	 the	 appointed	 commissions.	 Certainly,	people	 like	 Sloman,	 who	 were	 attempting	 to	 find	 different	 solutions,	 did	 not	necessarily	 consider	 the	 poor	 population	 of	 the	 Kehrwieder-Wandrahm	 quarter.	The	significance	of	preserving	the	historic	warehouses	of	the	Wandrahm	certainly	also	played	a	role.	Nonetheless,	there	was	vocal	opposition	to	this	project.		In	 the	 end,	 the	 joint	 commission	 of	 members	 of	 the	 Senate	 and	 of	 the	
Bürgerschaft	 dropped	 its	 former	 plan.	 There	 were	 now	 voices	 which	 protested	against	 the	 demolition	 of	 the	 ‘Wandrahm,	 des	 alten	 Sitzes	 der	 Hamburgischen	Kaufmannschaft	mit	zum	Theil	werthvollen	Wohngebäuden	und	Speichern	[…].’99	After	 all,	 according	 to	 the	 report,	 it	 was	 desirable,	 ‘wenn	 man	 bei	 der	verhaltnismäßig	 besten	 Lösung	 der	 Aufgabe	 für	 das	 Gemeinwohl	 die	entgegenstehenden	Einzel-Interessen	verhältnismäßig	im	Großen	und	Ganzen	am	wenigstens	verletzt.’100	As	a	result,	another	alternative	was	brought	forward.	This	again	highlights	the	chaos	that	prevailed	at	the	time.	In	any	case,	the	Bürgerschaft	eventually	rejected	the	commission’s	counterproposal,	even	though	it	would	have	led	 to	 a	 lower	 number	 of	 relocations	 compared	 to	 the	 majority	 of	 other	alternatives.			 This	 inevitably	 leads	 to	 the	question	of	how	the	Bürgerschaft	 came	to	 this	decision.	 Let	 us	 look	 at	 the	 minutes	 of	 the	 sessions	 of	 the	 Bürgerschaft.																																																									99	AdHH	20.S.2a.9,	Mittheilung	des	Senats	an	die	Bürgerschaft.	Hamburg,	den	29.	Januar	1883.	Fernerer	Antrag,	betreffend	den	Generalplan	und	Generalkostenanschlag	für	die	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet,	p.	30	100	Ibid.,	p.	30	
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Surprisingly,	 the	 plan	 to	 realise	 Project	 VIa	 (incorporating	 the	Wandrahm)	 was	once	 more	 put	 forward	 by	 a	 group	 of	 52	 Members	 of	 Parliament.	 This	 group	included	 Arthur	 Lutteroth,	 who	 had	 first	 been	 an	 opponent	 of	 Hamburg’s	accession,	and	Adolph	Woermann.	The	main	motivation	of	this	group	was	that,	as	pointed	out	by	Lutteroth,	the	profitability	of	Project	VIa	was	expected	to	be	higher	than	 of	 any	 other	 alternative:	 ‘das	 große	 Projekt	muß	 sich	 besser	 rentiren,	weil	das,	was	wir	schaffen,	dem	Handelsstande	verhältnißmäßig	billiger	kommt,	als	das	kleinere.’101	While	 it	 was	 with	 regret	 that	 Lutteroth	 asserted	 that	 3,000	 more	people	would	have	to	be	dislocated,	this	was	definitely	not	a	reason	to	forego	the	project.	 Instead,	 it	 was	 pointed	 out	 that	 ‘das	Wohl	 der	 Vaterstadt	 […]	 auch	 dies	nothwendige	Uebel	[erfordert].’102	Indeed,	this	seems	to	have	been	the	prevailing	opinion	 on	 the	 matter	 in	 the	 Bürgerschaft.	 In	 the	 following	 debate	 in	 the	
Bürgerschaft	 the	 issue	of	dislocating	an	expected	 total	of	18,	000	people	was	not	discussed	in	detail	again.	Another	member,	Tilemann,	only	noted:			 Viel	 ist	 von	 der	 Austreibung	 der	 Massen	 geklagt	 worden;	 es	 ist	 allerdings	sehr	 beklagenswerth	 ,	 daß	 so	 viele	 Familien	 ihre	 Wohnungen	 verlassen	müssen,	aber	es	ist	auch	bei	Vielen	nur	die	Macht	der	Gewohnheit,	welche	sie	in	 den	 alten	 Räumen	 halt.	 Verhältnismäßig	 wenige	 sind	 an	 die	 jetzigen	Lokale	gebunden,	ihre	Geschäfte	lassen	sich	auch	in	anderen	Stadtgegenden	betreiben.103				 Prior	to	the	debates	in	the	Bürgerschaft,	the	projected	extent	of	relocations	was	met	with	incomprehension	and	criticism.	The	newspaper	Reform,	for	example,	highlighted	 that	 even	 though	 it	 was	 futile	 to	 try	 and	 change	 the	 minds	 of	Hamburg’s	 ruling	 elites;	 it	 was	 their	 duty	 to	 warn	 of	 the	 planned	 mass	demolitions.104	It	 was	 argued	 that	 the	 projected	 free	 port	 area	 would,	 amongst	other	 things,	 lead	 to	 the	 ‘kostspieligen	 Abbruch	 zahlreicher	 Straßen,	 […]	 die	 für	manche	 Familien	 geradezu	 ruinöse	 Austreibung	 von	 15	 000	 Bewohnern	 […].’105	The	necessity	to	build	the	Speicherstadt	was	doubted	by	the	newspaper.	Instead,	it																																																									101	StaH	314-6	A11,	Reform	No.	33	v.	8/2.	83.	5	Sitzung	der	Bürgerschaft.	Mittwoch,	den	7.	Februar,	Abends	7	¼	Uhr.	102	Ibid.	103	Ibid.		104	StaH	314-6	A11,	Reform	No.	31	v.	6/2.	83.	Lokal-Bericht.	105	Ibid.		
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pointed	 to	 statements	 from	 ‘Vertreter	 des	 Welthandels,	 die	  »königlichen	Kaufleute«’,	such	as	Heinrich	Amsinck,	who	had	first	defended	Hamburg’s	status	as	a	 free	 port	 city.	 Once	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 had	 been	 decided,	 these	 merchants	argued	against	the	establishment	of	a	free	port	area.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	these	merchants,	 like	Amsinck,	 Sloman,	 Laeisz,	 John	Henry	 Schröder	 and	 others,	believed	that	there	was	no	need	for	such	a	large	project.	To	the	critics	of	the	free	port	 area,	 it	 all	 seemed	 an	 orgy	 of	 profiteering:	 ‘Bauspekulanten,	 Hauswirthe,	Bauhandwerker	träumten	von	goldenen	Bergen.	Vom	»Bedürfnis	des	Handels«	ist	schon	 seit	 langer	 Zeit	 gar	 nicht	mehr	 die	 Rede,	 die	 Frage	war	 immer	 nur:	»Wie	brechen	wir	recht	viel	ab?«’106		Nonetheless,	the	Bürgerschaft	voted	in	favour	of	accepting	Project	VIa	with	a	majority	of	76	against	53.	The	reaction	to	 this	decision	was	 largely	critical.	For	example,	 the	Fremdenblatt	wrote:	 ‘Wir	bedauern	deshalb,	daß	VIa.	gestern	 in	der	Versammlung	Annahme	fand	und	hoffen,	daß	bis	zur	dritten	Lesung	am	nächsten	Mittwoch	 eine	 bessere	 Einsicht	 in	 die	 Gemüther	 einkehrt.’ 107 	Similarly,	 the	
Correspondent	 pointed	 to	 the	negative	 consequences	 of	 the	decision,	 such	 as	 the	financial	 burden	 for	 Hamburg.108	More	 severe	 criticism	was	 brought	 forward	 by	the	Reform.	The	newspaper	 informed	 its	 readers	 that	 the	 ‘Land-Haifische	 […]	 für	VIa	mit	einer	kolossalen	Unverfrorenheit	 [plaidiren].’109	Furthermore,	 it	was	said	that	members	 of	 the	 joint	 commission	 had	 already	 been	 involved	 in	 speculative	purchases	of	 territory	 in	 those	parts	 that	were	to	be	demolished.	Later	on,	 Julius	Keller,	 who	 had	 been	 quoted	 in	 the	 newspaper,	 repudiated	 such	 a	 statement.	Besides,	 Gerhard	 Busch,	 editor	 of	 the	 Reform,	 was	 also	 persecuted	 for	 having	insulted	Members	of	Parliament.110	On	the	other	hand,	the	Hamburger	Nachrichten	pronounced	that	the	project	would	turn	into	a	blessing	for	Hamburg.111	In	the	end,	Hamburg’s	senate	rejected	the	realisation	of	Project	VIa.	So,	both	the	Bürgerschaft	and	 the	 Senat	 had	 to	 settle	 for	 a	 compromise.	 Although	 it	 had	 previously	 been	
																																																								106	Ibid.		107	StaH	314-6	A11,	Fremdenblatt	34	v.	10/2.	83.	Tagesbericht.	108	StaH	314-6	A11,	Correspondent	No.	40	v.	10/2.	83	M.	Die	vorläufige	Entscheidung	in	der	Zollanschluß-Frage.	Hamburg,	den	9.	Februar.	109	StaH	314-6	A11,	Reform	No.	35	v.	10/2.	83	110	In	the	end,	the	author	of	the	article,	Georg	Wilhelm	Waltemath,	was	convicted	to	three	months	in	jail	for	having	insulted	the	joint	commission	of	Bürgerschaft	and	Senat	111	StaH	314-6	A11,	Hamb.	Nachrichten	No.	36	v.	11/2.	83	M.	Vaterstädtische	Blätter.	Die	Anschluß-Frage	
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accepted	 in	 the	 commission	 with	 a	 majority	 of	 eight	 to	 four,	 Hamburg’s	
Bürgerschaft	altogether	rejected	the	idea	of	saving	the	storehouses	in	the	western	part	of	the	island.112	In	view	of	the	large	majority	that	had	voted	for	this	plan	and	in	order	to	make	progress	in	the	matter,	the	Senate	reluctantly	agreed	to	this.113	In	the	end,	the	compromise	was	still	10	million	Marks	more	expensive	than	the	initial	Project	XIIc.		What	 is	 remarkable	 about	Hamburg’s	 path	 to	 its	 new	Speicherstadt	 is	 not	only	 the	 length	of	 the	deliberations	but	also	 the	sheer	disunity	prevailing	during	this	 period.	 None	 of	 the	 involved	 parties	 were	 certain	 about	 the	 actual	 space	needed	 for	 the	 free	 port	 area.	 Together	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 suspicion	towards	the	Empire	regarding	allowing	a	 later	expansion	of	 the	area,	 this	caused	chaos	in	Hamburg.	In	this	whole	process,	the	Bürgerschaft	certainly	did	not	prove	to	be	a	representative	body	of	the	whole	of	Hamburg’s	population.	On	the	contrary,	it	seems	that	it	was	primarily	private	interests	that	proved	decisive	in	determining	the	attitude	of	those	involved	in	the	decision-making	process.	As	demonstrated	by	the	 accusation	 of	 speculations,	 this	 caused	 a	 deep	 rift	 amongst	 the	 people	 of	Hamburg.	For	those	involved	in	the	decision-making	process	it	was	easy	to	justify	personally	 motivated	 projects	 with	 the	 Hamburg’s	 fate	 as	 a	 seaport.	 As	 Sloman	pointed	 out	 at	 the	 time,	 ‘Wie	 die	 Angelegenheit	 aber	 jetzt	 liegt,	 so	 muß	 es	 ein	wahrhaft	 patriotisches	 Herz	 doch	 mit	 dem	 tieffsten	 Schmerz	 erfüllen,	 daß	Ansichten	in	der	Bürgerschaft	Platz	greifen,	die	einen	Privatmann	sicher	zu	Grunde	richten	würde.’114	The	 impact	 that	public	opinion	 could	have	 in	 this	process	was	certainly	limited,	although	this	was	attempted	by	the	Reform	newspaper.	All	in	all,	the	fate	of	people	affected	by	the	relocations	was	subordinated	to	the	greater	good	of	Hamburg.	 The	majority	 of	Hamburg’s	 ruling	 elites	 definitely	 did	 not	 pursue	 a	reformist	social	agenda.	Instead,	personal	and	commercial	interests	prevailed.				
																																																								112	AdHH	20.S.2a.9,	Mittheilung	des	Senats	an	die	Bürgerschaft.	Hamburg,	den	21.	Februar	1883.	Mittheilungen	der	Bürgerschaft	an	den	Senat	betreffend	den	Generalplan	und	den	Generalkosten-Anschlag	für	die	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet.	113	AdHH	20.S.2a.9,	Mittheilung	des	Senats	an	die	Bürgerschaft.	Hamburg,	den	26.	Februar	1883.	Erwiderung,	betreffend	den	Generalplan	und	den	Generalkostenanschlag	für	die	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet.	114	StaH	314-6	A11,	Correspondent	No.	47	v.	17/2.	83	M.	Sprechsaal.	Zur	Zollanschlußfrage.	
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	 After	 the	precise	dimensions	of	Hamburg’s	 free	port	area	had	 finally	been	determined,	 a	 commission	 was	 appointed	 in	 1883	 in	 order	 to	 overlook	 the	execution	 of	 the	 project.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 actions	 of	 the	 so-called	 Senats-	 und	
Bürgerschafts-Commission	 zur	 Ausführung	 des	 Anschlusses	 Hamburgs	 an	 das	
Deutsche	Zollgebiet	was	 to	 resolve	upon	a	work	 schedule	 for	 the	project	 in	April	1883.	This	schedule	envisaged	the	approbation	of	a	total	of	around	440	properties	together	with	16,000	 inhabitants.	Hamburg’s	 financial	deputation	was	 instructed	with	 the	 task	of	 carrying	out	 the	necessary	property	acquisition.	On	 this	 subject,	the	 commission	 reported	 in	 its	 annual	 report	 that	 the	 deputation’s	 request	 ‘ist	Seitens	 der	 betheiligten	 Grundeigenthümer	 überall	 bereitwillig	 entsprochen	worden,	so	daß	Entschädigungsansprüche	oder	auch	nur	Differenzen	wegen	nicht	rechtzeitig	 auf	 den	 1.	 November	 1883	 erfolgter	 Kündigung	 nicht	 vorgekommen	sind.’115	During	 subsequent	 planning	 stages,	 it	was	 then	 determined	 that	 further	properties	had	to	be	expropriated.			 To	the	end	of	acquiring	all	the	necessary	properties,	a	law	was	publicised	in	May	1883.	This	law	arranged	for	the	appointment	of	a	commission	made	up	of	four	jurists	and	24	non-jurists.	Together,	 the	members	of	 this	 commission	planned	 to	assume	the	role	of	estimating	the	value	of	properties,	in	case	no	other	agreement	could	be	reached.	Of	the	total	of	440	properties	and	around	16,000	inhabitants,	it	was	decided	that	200	properties	together	with	around	8,000	inhabitants	had	to	be	appropriated	 by	 the	 state	 immediately.	 In	 early	 1884,	 it	 was	 determined	 that	another	 78	 private	 properties	 had	 to	 be	 expropriated	 from	 their	 owners.	 Thus,	Hamburg’s	 government	 planned	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 appropriation	 of	 around	 500	properties	between	1883	and	1887,	when	the	last	properties	would	be	acquired.		Even	Hamburg’s	senate	realised	the	challenge	that	this	project	brought	with	it.	In	March	1883,	the	Senate	emphasised	that	it	might	be	possible	to	come	to	terms	with	some	of	the	property	owners	and	to	agree	on	adequate	prices,	‘doch	mit	der	Wahrscheinlichkeit	 gerechnet	 werden	 müsse,	 daß	 bei	 der	 überwiegenden	Mehrzahl	das	Expropriationsverfahren	zur	Anwendung	kommen	werde.’116	In	any	case,	 the	 commission	 regarded	 the	 first	 round	 of	 property	 acquisitions	 as	successful	overall.	Of	 those	properties	 that	were	needed	by	November	1	1883,	 a																																																									115	AdHH	20.S.2a.12,	Erster	Bericht	der	Senats-	und	Bürgerschafts-Commission	zur	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet	umfassend	das	Geschäftsjahr	1883/84,	p.	4	116	Ibid.,	p.	7	
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total	 of	 126	 were	 bought	 by	 usual	 contract.	 The	 commission	 for	 estimating	 the	value	of	properties	had	to	get	involved	in	106	cases.	In	88	cases,	this	commission	was	 able	 to	 come	 to	 terms	with	 the	 owners,	 in	 ten	 cases	 it	 had	 to	make	 a	 final	judgement,	and	the	remaining	eight	cases	were	still	unsolved.	Six	property	owners	also	appealed	against	the	expropriation.		In	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	 commission	 also	 discussed	 accommodating	 the	former	 occupants.	 Since	 Hamburg’s	 revenue	 authorities	 had	 informed	 the	commission	 that	 there	 was	 a	 surplus	 supply	 of	 newly	 built	 accommodation	 in	Hamburg,	 the	matter	was	not	 further	deliberated.	 Instead,	 the	matter	was	 left	 to	the	private	initiative	of	the	displaced	people.	Neither	did	the	commission	compile	information	on	where	these	people	moved.	All	that	could	be	assumed	on	the	basis	of	population	censuses	was	that	the	greater	part	of	the	8,000	people	remained	in	the	 city	 centre.	 Others	 moved	 to	 outlying	 districts,	 such	 as	 Hammerbrook,	Billwerder	or	St	Pauli,	or	even	to	suburbs,	such	as	Eilbeck,	Borgfelde	or	Eimsbüttel.	Hamburg’s	senate	and	parliament	deployed	a	commission	in	November	1883	that	was	 entrusted	 with	 examining	 petitions	 for	 financial	 support	 sent	 in	 by	 former	occupants.	For	 this,	 the	commission	was	granted	100,000	Marks	which	would	be	used	 according	 to	 the	 commission’s	 best	 judgement.	 In	 comparison,	 for	 the	demolition	 of	 all	 houses	 vacated	 by	November	 1,	 a	 total	 of	 156,	 000	Marks	was	allowed	for	by	Hamburg’s	government.117		The	process	of	acquiring	properties	continued	throughout	the	financial	year	of	1884/85.	The	commission	was	again	able	 to	conclude	that	 ‘[derselbe]	hat	sich	im	Ganzen	 in	den	schon	 im	ersten	 Jahre	gebahnten	Wegen	bewegt	und	giebt	aus	diesem	Grunde	zu	besonderen	Bemerkungen	erfreulicher	Weise	keinen	Anlaß.’118	Indeed,	the	estimation	commission	dealt	with	a	total	of	131	cases.	Only	in	two	of	these	did	the	property	owner	appeal	against	the	decision	made	by	the	commission.	Overall,	 around	 5,600	 people	 were	 again	 forced	 to	 leave	 the	 area.	 Within	 two	years,	 from	 December	 1882	 to	 December	 1884,	 the	 population	 of	 the	 area	 that	would	 become	 the	 Speicherstadt	 had	 decreased	 from	 around	 16,500	 people	 to	3,000.	Again,	the	report	mentioned	that	most	of	the	displaced	people	remained	in																																																									117	In	the	end,	these	costs	could	be	decreased	by	selling	the	debris	and	other	measures.	The	remaining	amount	was	estimated	at	6,000	Marks.	118	AdHH	20.S.2a.12,	Zweiter	Bericht	der	Senats-	und	Bürgerschafts-Commission	zur	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet	umfassend	das	Geschäftsjahr	1884/85,	p.	4	
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the	city	centre,	 ‘indem	er	die	dort	 leer	stehenden	Wohnungen	bezog	oder	andere	Bewohner	von	dort	verdrängte.’119	However,	this	only	seems	to	have	been	the	case	for	 those	that	could	afford	to	 live	 in	 this	area.	Those	that	needed	to	 find	cheaper	accommodation	moved	 to	 outlying	 districts.	 Still,	 the	 problems	 arising	with	 this	huge	relocation	project	were	larger	than	Hamburg’s	government	first	expected.	By	September	1884,	the	commission	in	charge	of	supporting	those	in	need,	which	had	been	appointed	 in	November	1883,	had	already	run	out	of	money.	As	a	 result,	 it	received	another	50,	000	Marks.		As	 in	 previous	 years,	 the	 remaining	 territory	 acquisitions	 and	 relocations	continued	without	any	critical	 incidents.	Between	December	1884	and	December	1886,	 the	 population	 of	 the	 area	 further	 decreased	 from	 3,029	 to	 1,009	inhabitants.	By	the	time	of	Hamburg’s	accession	to	the	customs	union	 in	October	1888,	 the	majority	of	construction	works	had	been	completed.	Overall,	according	to	the	commission’s	report,	the	area	needed	for	Hamburg’s	new	free	port	area	had	been	home	to	over	21,000	people.	Of	these,	only	1,112	still	lived	there	in	December	1888.	 In	 total,	 the	 project	 had	 cost	 a	 minimum	 of	 112,711,000	 Marks.	 It	 was	expected	 that	 further	additional	costs	would	mean	that	 the	estimated	costs	were	exceeded.	 More	 than	 40%	 of	 these	 estimated	 costs	 were	 made	 up	 of	 costs	 for	property	purchases.	For	523	properties	 in	 the	 free	port	area,	 the	city	had	 to	pay	47.7	 million	 Marks	 plus	 some	 minor	 additional	 costs.	 To	 this,	 the	 commission	added	another	3.3	million	Marks	 for	other	properties	 in	 the	southern	part	of	 the	free	port	area.120			 It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 commission	 assessed	 the	 execution	 of	 the	project	in	a	bureaucratically	sober	manner.	Still,	 it	is	also	necessary	to	grasp	how	the	 rest	 of	 the	 population	 looked	 at	 the	 massive	 changes	 that	 took	 place	 in	Hamburg’s	 cityscape.	 When	 it	 came	 to	 the	 first	 expropriations	 and	 compulsory	changes	 of	 residence	 in	 late	 1883,	 the	 Fremdenblatt	 wrote:	 ‘Greise	 Männer	 und	Frauen	 packten	 ihre	 Habe	 nicht	 ohne	 Wehmuth	 auf	 Karren	 und	 Wagen	 und	vergossen	 Thränen	 beim	 Scheiden	 aus	 ihrem	 ihnen	 seit	 Jahren	 liebgewordenen	
																																																								119	Ibid.,	p.	5	120	AdHH	20.S.2a.12,	Fünfter	Bericht	der	Senats-	und	Bürgerschafts-Commission	zur	Ausführung	des	Anschlusses	Hamburgs	an	das	Deutsche	Zollgebiet	umfassend	das	Geschäftsjahr	1887/88	sowie	den	Zeitraum	vom	1.	April	bis	Ende	December	1888,	pp.	34–36	
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Heim;	Kinder	schrien	umher,	als	sie	die	Eltern	weinen	sahen	[…].’121	While	it	seems	that	 it	 was	 not	 a	major	 problem	 for	 these	 people	 to	 find	 new	 residences,	many	people	 seemed	 to	 struggle	 to	 meet	 the	 higher	 rents.	 Therefore,	 by	 the	 end	 of	October,	prior	to	the	due	date	for	the	change	of	residence,	the	police	had	already	received	 over	 100	 requests.122	Overall,	 the	 newspapers	 described	 a	 melancholic	atmosphere	 in	 Hamburg.	 There	 were,	 for	 example,	 calls	 for	 collections	 of	photographs	in	order	to	keep	this	historic	part	of	Hamburg	in	memory.	At	the	same	time,	the	newspapers	gave	comfort	with	the	words	of	Schiller:	 ‘Das	Alte	stürzt,	es	ändert	sich	die	Zeit,	Und	neues	Leben	blüht	aus	den	Ruinen.’123		 By	 1887,	 according	 to	 non-local	 newspapers,	 the	 mood	 in	 Hamburg	 had	shifted	 towards	 an	 acceptance	 of	 Hamburg’s	 accession.	 The	 Kölnische	 Zeitung	reported	 that	 ‘[a]llgemein	 versicherte	 man	 mir,	 daß	 irgendwelche	 Gegnerschaft	gegen	 die	 Umwandlung	 wenigstens	 in	 der	 Oeffentlichkeit	 kaum	 mehr	hervortrete.’124	Furthermore,	 it	 was	 noted	 that	 hardly	 anyone	 would	 regret	 the	remodelling	of	 the	district,	 ‘da	 sie	mit	 ihren	engen	Gassen	und	Höfen	zu	den	am	wenigsten	 anheimelnden	 Teilen	 des	 alten	 […]	 Hamburg	 gehörten.’125	The	 arch-conservative	 pro-Prussian	Kreuz-Zeitung	 announced	 in	 a	 similar	 vein	 that	 public	opinion	had	lately	come	to	agree	with	the	project,	‘die	trüben	Prophezeihungen	der	Fortschrittspartei	 sind	 verstummt.’126	However,	 the	 Reform	 argued	 against	 such	generalisations.	 Prior	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 statements,	 the	Reform	 had	 already	emphasised:			 Hier	in	Hamburg	hat	man	sich	in	das	Schicksal	des	Zollanschlusses	mit	jener	Resignation	 gefunden,	 die	 starken	 Naturen	 eigen	 ist,	 wenn	 sie	 das	Unvermeidliche	nicht	mehr	abwenden	können,	nirgends	aber,	 […]	wird	der	Zollanschluß	als	ein	Segen	gefunden.127		Later	on,	 the	Reform	again	gave	 its	opinion	on	views	from	non-local	newspapers.	For	example,	a	paper	from	Lübeck	had	reported	from	Hamburg:	 ‘Es	ist	ein	Segen,																																																									121	StaH	314-6	A11,	Fremdenblatt	No.	254	v.	31/10.	83	122	StaH	314-6	A11,	Reform	257	v.	30/10.	83	123	StaH	314-6	A11,	Hamb.	Nachr.	No.	305	v.	25/12.	83	M.	124	StaH	314-6	A12,	Kölnische	Zeitung	No.	154	v.	5.	Juni	87.	II.	Blatt	125	Ibid.	126	StaH	314-6	A12,	Kreuz-Zeitung	No.	130	A	v.	8.	Juni	87.	II.	Ausgabe	127	StaH	314-6	A12,	Reform	No.	90	v.	15.	Arpril	1887	
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daß	wir	 das	 alte	 Gerümpel	 los	 geworden	 sind.’128	To	 this,	 the	Reform	 responded	that	 as	 part	 of	 the	 remodelling	 many	 still	 usable	 houses	 had	 to	 be	 demolished,	which	 created	 a	 financial	 burden	 for	 the	 people	 of	 Hamburg.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	could	not	understand	why	the	demolitions	should	have	been	a	blessing	for	the	city.	In	addition,	the	handling	of	the	request	for	support	was	criticised	as	hundreds	of	requests	 were	 apparently	 turned	 down	 by	 the	 commission	 responsible.	 Thus,	 it	was	 argued,	 the	 damage	 to	 the	 population	 was	 in	 fact	 larger	 than	 Hamburg’s	government	and	other	newspapers	liked	to	admit.		In	addition	to	this,	the	Börsenhalle	pointed	out	that	the	city	had	not	given	up	its	status	as	a	free	port	city	in	order	to	develop	its	industrial	production	but	rather	‘weil	 man	 die	 Freihafenstellung	 der	 gesammten	 Stadt	 Hamburg	 aufgeben	mußte.’ 129 	Thus,	 there	 can	 be	 doubt	 that	 even	 in	 1887,	 just	 a	 year	 before	Hamburg’s	 planned	 accession,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Speicherstadt	 was	 still	 a	controversial	 topic	 in	 Hamburg.	 Still,	 it	 is	 true	 that	most	 of	 the	 criticism	 at	 this	point	revolved	around	the	sheer	size	of	the	re-development.	Certainly,	the	Reform	remained	 an	 outpost	 of	 liberalism,	 criticising	 the	 accession	 from	 an	 ideological	standpoint.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 remaining	 newspapers,	 however,	 seem	 to	 have	come	to	terms	with	the	demolition	of	the	historic	quarter,	although	some	were	still	concerned	 about	 the	 project’s	 general	 success.	 For	 example,	 the	 Hamburger	
Nachrichten	was	 hoping	 that,	 while	 ‘man	 auch	 den	 Abbruch	 so	 vieler	 schöner	Häuser,	 welche	 gleichsam	 die	 Handelsgröße	 des	 alten	 Hamburg	 repräsentiren,	bedauern	muß	[…]’,	the	city	would	bloom	even	fuller.130		Eventually,	Hamburg’s	new	Speicherstadt	proved	to	be	a	success.	While	the	years	of	transition	had	been	difficult	for	the	city,	the	accession	led	to	an	economic	upturn.	 In	 November	 1886,	 the	 Correspondent	 had	 reported	 that	 although	 the	Senate	had	estimated	a	steady	increase	of	shipping	traffic	of	around	300,	000	tons,	Hamburg’s	traffic	had	decreased	by	around	5–7%	since	1884.	The	reason	for	this	was	perceived	to	be	rooted	in	the	lack	of	wharves	and	warehouses.	The	building	of	the	Speicherstadt	was	 thus	seen	as	a	beneficial	 side-effect	of	accession,	while	 the	general	 consequences	 of	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 still	 seemed	 doubtful:	 ‘Lassen	 Sie	uns	 daher	 hoffen,	 daß	 der	 gegenwärtig	 als	 unumstößlich	 Thatsache	 zu																																																									128	StaH	314-6	A12,	Hbg.	Reform	No.	134	v.	7.	Juni	87	129	StaH	314-6	A12,	Hbg.	Börsenhalle	No	158	v.	7.	Juli	87	130	StaH	314-6	A12,	Hbg.	Nachrichten	No	267	v.	13	November	87	(Sonntags-Beilage)		
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betrachtende	Anschluß	unserer	Vaterstadt	and	das	deutsche	Zollgebiet	derselben	in	aller	Zukunft	zum	Vorhteil	und	Segen	gereichen	wird!’131	At	the	beginning	of	the	year	1891,	the	same	newspaper	was	then	able	to	conclude	that	the	accession	had	been	 an	 absolute	 success	 and	 pointed	 to	 the	 ‘täglich	 steigende[n]	 Verkehr	 des	Hamburger	 Hafens	 […].’132	It	 also	 added	 that	 Hamburg	 mirrored	 ‘alles	 das	 in	gedrängterem	Raume	wieder,	was	für	die	wirthschaftliche	Entwicklung	des	großen	deutschen	Vaterlandes	von	tiefgreifendem	Interesse	und	maßgebender	Bedeutung	ist.’133	In	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	 newspaper	 rendered	 homage	 to	 the	 ‘gewaltigen	Schaffenskraft,	die	der	erste	Kanzler	des	neuen	Deutschen	Reiches	im	Dienste	des	Vaterlandes	bethätigt	hat	[…]’	and	a	song	of	praise	for	the	German	Empire:			 So	 schreitet	 Hamburg,	 dessen	 Volkszahl	 in	 steigender	 Proportion	anzuwachsen	 begonnen	 hat,	 auf	 allen	 Gebieten	 des	 staatlichen	 und	communalen	Lebens	in	der	erfreulichsten	Weise	vorwärts	und	macht	seiner	Stellung	als	 zweiter	Stadt	des	deutschen	Reiches	alle	Ehre.	Das	aber	 ist	 für	jeden	 echten	 Hamburger	 ein	 ebenso	 beglückendes	 Gefphl,	 als	 er	 sich	 von	gerechtem	 Stolze	 gehoben	 fühlt,	 ein	 Bürger	 des	 mächtigen	 Deutschen	Reiches	 zu	 sein,	 über	 dessen	 Wohlfahrt	 die	 Hand	 Gottes	 im	 vergangenen	Jahre	so	gnädig	gewaltet	hat.134		On	 the	 whole,	 these	 statements	 leave	 absolutely	 no	 doubt	 about	 the	 profound	impact	of	Hamburg’s	accession.	After	all,	the	economic	success	of	the	accession	left	no	room	for	any	criticism	of	the	measures	taken	by	Bismarck.	Instead,	the	former	Reich	Chancellor	proved	to	have	been	right.	In	addition	to	this,	as	can	be	gathered	from	the	quote	above,	economic	unification	–	and	primarily	its	success	–	also	led	to	an	 increased	 sense	 of	 togetherness	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 German	 Empire	 and	 an	upsurge	of	pan-German	patriotism.																																																														131	StaH	314-6	A12,	Hamb.	Correspondent	No.	329	v.	27.	Novemb.	86.	Mg.		132	StaH	314-6	A13,	Hamb.	Correspondent	vom	1.	Januar	1891	133	Ibid.		134	Ibid.		
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e.	Hamburg	and	the	Colonies		The	 beginning	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 colonial	 venture	 and	 Hamburg’s	 accession	 took	place	 at	 roughly	 the	 same	 time.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 examine	 whether	Hamburg’s	 accession	 influenced	 the	 mercantile	 community’s	 stance	 on	colonialism.	Up	to	the	point	of	agreeing	to	the	accession,	Hamburg	unquestionably	regarded	 itself	 as	 an	 advocate	 of	 free	 trade.	 Besides,	 it	 was	 also	 viewed	 from	outside	as	 a	 stronghold	of	 liberal	 economic	policies	 in	Germany.	For	 example,	 in	October	 1847,	 Richard	 Cobden,	 one	 of	 the	 central	 promoters	 of	 Manchester	Liberalism,	 visited	Hamburg	as	part	of	 a	 tour	 through	Europe.135	Cobden’s	 views	on	 free	 trade	 and	 liberalism	 were	 acknowledged	 by	 Hamburg’s	 ruling	 elites	 –	seven	hundred	people	were	present	 for	 the	banquet.	By	 the	 time	of	 the	German	Empire,	this	predisposition	towards	and	belief	in	free	trade	and	liberalism	had	not	vanished,	 as	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 protests	 against	 protectionism.	 However,	liberalism	 in	 general,	 and	 Cobden’s	 interpretation	 in	 particular,	 were	 in	 conflict	with	the	idea	of	colonial	ventures.136	What	needs	to	be	examined	therefore	are	the	responses	 to	 the	 Samoa-Vorlage	 and,	 secondly,	 to	 Bismarck’s	 enquiry	 about	colonial	demands	in	1883.			 The	Samoa-Vorlage,	 it	 is	worth	recalling,	envisaged	bailing	out	a	Hamburg	trading	house	involved	in	the	South	Seas	trade.	Its	owners,	the	Godeffroys,	had	run	into	 financial	 difficulties.	 In	 the	 end,	 shares	 of	 the	 Deutsche	 Handels-	 und	
Plantagengesellschaft	der	 Südsee-Inseln	 zu	Hamburg	had	 to	 be	 hypothecated	 to	 a	London	bank	company.	In	order	to	keep	the	company	in	German	hands,	the	banker	Adolph	 von	 Hansemann	 and	 others	 formed	 a	 consortium.	 This	 was	 intended	 to	continue	 the	 trading	 house	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 the	 imperial	 government	offered	a	payment	guarantee.	This	payment	guarantee	was	put	before	the	imperial	legislators	in	the	form	of	a	bill.	While	the	Federal	Assembly	agreed	to	the	bill,	the	Reichstag	rejected	it.			 In	Hamburg,	 the	bill	was	not	received	favourably	–	 irrespective	of	 the	 fact	that	a	Hamburg	trading	house	was	at	stake.	In	the	city’s	press,	the	bill	was	largely																																																									135	John	Breuilly,	‘’Ein	Stück	Englands?	A	contrast	between	the	free-trade	movements	in	Hamburg	and	Manchester’,	in:	Andrew	Marrison	(ed.),	Free	Trade	and	its	Reception	1815–
1960:	Freedom	and	Trade,	Volume	I	(London,	1998),	pp.	105–126	136	See	for	example,	Hendrik	L.	Wesseling,	The	European	Colonial	Empires,	1815–1919	(Abingdon,	2013),	p.	76	
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condemned.	 The	 two	 most	 significant	 arguments	 were,	 firstly,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	government	 should	 not	 get	 involved	 with	 the	 bankruptcy	 of	 a	 private	 firm.	Secondly,	there	were	concerns	about	further	consequences	this	could	have	for	the	introduction	 of	 a	 colonial	 programme. 137 	Hamburg’s	 government	 also	 had	reservations	 about	 the	 feasibility	 of	 the	 bill.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	Deputation	 für	
Handel	und	Schiffahrt,	headed	by	Kirchenpauer,	it	was	argued	that,	on	the	basis	of	Hamburg’s	 established	 principle	 of	 open	 competition,	 any	 state	 support	 would	have	 to	 be	 rejected.138	Similarly	 to	 Bremen,	 Hamburg’s	 senate	 was	 against	 the	project	 but	 informed	Minister	 Resident	 Krüger	 that	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 bill	 could	have	far-reaching	repercussions	on	the	city’s	relationship	to	Bismarck.	Therefore,	Krüger	was	 first	 instructed	 to	abstain	 from	voting.	Eventually,	Hamburg’s	 senate	decided	not	to	stand	in	the	way	of	Bismarck’s	will.	Krüger,	in	particular,	seems	to	have	played	a	major	role	in	persuading	Hamburg’s	Senate	not	to	vote	against	the	bill	–	the	same	process	as	in	Bremen.	The	Senate	argued	that	it	‘mit	Rücksicht	auf	die	Stellung,	welche	die	Reichsregierung	der	Samoa-Angelegenheit	gegenüber	nun	einmal	 eingenommen	 habe,	 sich	 entschlossen,	 die	 in	 Hamburg	 vielfach	bestehenden	 auch	 dem	 Bevollmächtigten	 bekannten	 Bedenken	 fallen	 zu	 lassen	[…].’ 139 	Therefore,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Hamburg’s	 forced	 accession,	 the	 city’s	supposedly	 liberal	 convictions	 had	 to	 make	 room	 for	 straightforward	 political	realism.	The	early	1880s	were	thus	absolutely	vital	for	Hamburg’s	integration	into	the	German	Empire.	There	was	now	a	realisation	in	Hamburg	that	the	city’s	actual	ability	to	influence	the	German	Empire’s	politics	was	extremely	limited.		 	However,	it	was	not	only	Hamburg’s	senate	that	was	not	convinced	of	state-run	colonial	ventures.	With	regard	to	the	Chamber	of	Commerce,	Washausen	has	pointed	to	the	 fact	 that	 ‘[von]	einer	Begeisterung	für	Kolonien	kann	aber	auch	 in	den	Jahren	nach	1874	keineswegs	die	Rede	sein.’140	In	Hamburg,	the	agitation	for	colonialism	was	 viewed	with	 scepticism	 and	 evaluated	 from	 a	 practical	 point	 of	view.	 It	 was	 not	 until	 1881,	 prior	 to	 the	 Reichstag	 election,	 that	 the	 colonial	question	became	increasingly	pressing.	For	this	reason,	the	matter	was	discussed	in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 in	 October	 1881	 –	 at	 this	 point	 Hamburg’s	 fate	regarding	 an	 accession	 had	 been	 sealed.	 Now,	 Adolph	 Woermann,	 who	 later																																																									137	Washausen,	Kolonialpolitik,	p.	29	138	Ibid.,	p.	32	139	Ibid.,	p.	33	140	Ibid.,	p.	139	
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became	a	central	figure	in	colonialism,	came	to	the	fore.	Having	been	a	member	of	the	Chamber	for	merely	two	years,	Woermann	openly	advocated	the	establishment	of	 colonies	 as	 long	 as	 these	 were	 not	 projected	 to	 function	 as	 colonies	 for	emigrants.	 In	 this	 regard,	 another	 member	 of	 the	 Chamber,	 Hermann	 Robinow,	supported	Woermann.		Still,	 it	 was	 felt	 that	 answering	 the	 colonial	 question	 was	 not	 part	 of	 the	Chamber’s	responsibilities.	Instead,	it	would	have	to	concentrate	on	the	economic	utilisation	of	 future	colonies.	Additionally,	 it	was	emphasised	 in	 the	meeting	 that	the	 Chamber	 had	never	 assumed	 the	 role	 of	 promoting	 colonialism.	At	 the	 time,	there	were	still	resolute	opponents	of	colonial	ventures.	For	example,	Lippert,	who	was	doing	business	in	Southern	Africa,	argued	that	the	only	way	to	make	profit	out	of	colonies	was	to	introduce	protective	duties	in	order	to	deter	other	nations	from	trading	with	those	colonies.	As	rightly	pointed	out	by	Washausen,	this	‘	–	so	ware	der	 Gedankengang	 Lipperts	 fortzuführen	 –	 würde	 eine	 Einschränkung	 der	Handelsfreiheit,	 eine	 Rückkehr	 zu	 merkantilistischen	 Wirtschaftsmethoden	bedeuten,	 die	 den	 hanseatischen	 Handel	 an	 zahlreichen	 Punkten	 der	 Welt	empfindlich	stören	würden.’141	Subsequently,	there	was	a	debate	about	whether	or	not	 to	 speak	 out	 against	 colonialism	 in	 general.	While	 the	 Chamber’s	 president,	Lutteroth,	 favoured	 the	 rejection	 of	 colonialism,	 there	was	 also	 a	 large	 group	 of	members	 that	 argued	 for	 a	 more	 reserved	 approach.	 Colonialism	 would	 not	 be	excluded	altogether.	So,	at	this	point,	opinions	over	the	issue	of	colonialism	were	certainly	 already	 divided	 amongst	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce.	There	was	definitely	no	longer	a	unanimous	rejection	of	colonialism,	as	one	might	expect	with	regard	to	Hamburg’s	position	as	a	stronghold	of	economic	liberalism.	Nonetheless,	 in	 1881,	Hamburg’s	 senate,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 the	Samoa-Vorlage,	together	with	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	were	still	in	disagreement	about	the	idea	of	state-led	colonialism.		 In	 April	 1883,	 Hamburg’s	 Burgomaster,	 Carl	 Friedrich	 Petersen,	 received	the	same	enquiry	from	Otto	von	Wentzel	as	Bremen.	Hamburg	was	also	asked	to	inform	the	Prussian	envoy	about	interests	Hamburg’s	merchants	had	on	the	West	African	 coast.	 To	 this	 end,	 Adolph	 Woermann,	 who	 had	 taken	 over	 his	 father’s	shipping	company	C.	Woermann,	produced	a	memorandum.	 Interestingly,	Adolph																																																									141	Ibid.,	p.	140	
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Woermann	had	previously	been	an	outspoken	opponent	of	Hamburg’s	accession	to	the	 customs	 union	 and	 of	 Bismarck’s	 measures	 to	 achieve	 this.	 For	 example,	 in	June	1880,	Woermann	had	exclaimed	in	a	confidential	meeting	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	 that	 the	 pressure	 put	 on	 Hamburg	 would	 not	 make	 him	 change	 his	mind	in	the	matter.	Furthermore,	Woermann	pointed	out	that	negotiations	would	lead	 to	 nothing,	 as	 the	 negotiating	 partner	 could	 not	 be	 trusted	 to	 keep	 his	promise:	 ‘Die	 Frage	 ist	 eine	 Personenfrage,	 mit	 einer	 Personaländerung	 würde	auch	 eine	 Systemänderung	 verbunden	 sein.	 Dann	 würden	 die	Freihandelsprinzipien	wieder	obenauf	kommen,	und	dann	werde	auch	diese	Frage	einschlafen.’142 	While	 Woermann	 did	 not	 want	 to	 put	 any	 trust	 in	 Bismarck	regarding	Hamburg’s	accession,	he	was	suddenly	able	to	put	trust	in	him	when	it	came	to	the	foundation	of	German	colonies.			 Hamburg’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 adopted	 Woermann’s	 memorandum	after	 a	 few	changes	had	been	made.	 It	was	 then	 submitted	 to	 the	Deputation	für	
Handel	und	Schiffahrt	as	a	response	to	the	Prussian	enquiry	from	April	16	1883.143	With	 regard	 to	 the	 Chamber’s	 dedication	 to	 economic	 liberalism	 prior	 to	Hamburg’s	accession,	in	particular,	it	is	worth	looking	at	the	position	taken	by	the	Chamber.	Naturally,	the	report	points	to	the	diverse	interests	that	Germany	had	in	the	 trade	with	West	Africa.	For	 this	purpose,	 the	report	compared	 the	volume	of	trade	between	Hamburg	and	West	Africa	and	England	and	West	Africa.	This	was	done	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 register	 tons	 of	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 vessels.144	While	Hamburg’s	trade	with	West	Africa	was	certainly	not	as	high	as	Britain’s,	it	was	still	growing	constantly.	Between	1873	and	1881,	the	volume	of	incoming	vessels	from	West	 Africa	 had	 increased	 from	 5,888	 to	 24,470	 register	 tons.	 Similarly,	 for	outgoing	vessels	the	numbers	had	risen	from	8,668	to	36,028	register	tons	during	the	same	time	frame.	This	compared	to	the	following	numbers	for	England’s	trade	with	 West	 Africa	 in	 1881	 –	 arriving	 vessels:	 92,116	 register	 tons;	 departing	vessels:	 210,389	 register	 tons.	 Thus,	 there	 was	 definitely	 still	 a	 gap	 between	Hamburg’s	 trade	 with	 West	 Africa	 and	 England’s	 trade	 with	 West	 Africa.	 Still,	Hamburg’s	 mercantile	 community	 had	 managed	 to	 significantly	 increase	 trade																																																									142	Stein,	‘Interessenkonflikte’,	p.	71	143	AdHH	84.A.1.3,	An	die	Deputation	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt,	Hamburg,	den	6.	Juli	1883.	Die	Handelskammer	144	See	Anlage	I.	of	AdHH	84.A.1.3,	An	die	Deputation	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt,	Hamburg,	den	6.	Juli	1883.	Die	Handelskammer	
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with	West	Africa	within	not	even	a	decade.	Similarly,	the	value	of	imports	was	also	becoming	more	significant.	While	in	1871	the	total	value	of	imports	amounted	to	4,	620,	300	Marks	(a	total	of	84,	338	quintals),	by	1882	this	number	had	risen	to	8,	588,	 000	Marks	 (and	 a	 total	 of	 223,	 659	 quintals).	 This	 underlines	 the	 growing	importance	of	trade	with	West	Africa	for	Hamburg.	 It	goes	without	saying	that	C.	
Woermann	of	course	also	possessed	factories	on	the	African	West	Coast.				 Overall,	the	report	looked	favourably	upon	German	treatment	in	French	and	English	colonies.	Yet,	while	the	 involved	trading	firms	had	generally	always	been	content	with	French	and	English	colonial	administration,	there	were	some	recent	incidents	that	were	said	to	trouble	the	involved	parties.	One	of	these	incidents	was	the	fact	that	the	French	commandant	of	Gabon	imposed	the	prohibition	of	the	arms	trade,	 which	 badly	 affected	 colonial	 trade	 overall.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 following	conclusion:	 ‘Es	 dürfte	 aber	 nicht	 mehr	 der	 Stellung	 des	 deutschen	 Reiches	entsprechen,	 dass	 seine	 Angehörigen	 im	Auslande	 auf	 den	 guten	Willen	 und	 die	Geneigtheit	 fremder	Mächte	angewiesen	sind	[…].’145	Consequently,	 it	was	argued	that	it	was	necessary	for	the	German	Empire	to	provide	protection	for	the	German	interests	in	the	area.		For	 this	 reason,	 one	of	 the	overall	 eight	demands	 expressed	 in	 the	 report	was	the	acquisition	of	Fernando	Po,	an	island	off	the	West	African	coast,	from	the	Spanish.	Here,	a	naval	base	would	be	built.	Furthermore,	Hamburg’s	trading	firms	recommended	 the	 acquisition	 of	 a	 coastal	 strip	 opposite	 Fernanda	 Po	 from	 the	Cameroons	to	Corisco	Bay,	which	is	part	of	present-day	Gabon.	The	purpose	of	this	acquisition	was	the	establishment	of	a	trading	colony,	rather	than	using	this	land	for	cultivation	or	as	a	settlement	for	German	emigrants.	This	was	a	point	that	was	made	 particularly	 clear	 in	 the	 Chamber’s	 report	 to	 the	 deputation.	 The	 involved	trading	 firms	 also	 urged	 that	 ‘wenn	Deutschland	 nicht	 für	 immer	 auf	 den	Besitz	daselbst	 verzichten	 wolle,	 jetzt	 gewissenmassen	 der	 letzte	 Augenblick	 sei,	 um	solche	zu	erwerben.’146	The	Chamber	of	Commerce	affiliated	itself	to	this	view.	In	addition	to	this,	the	Chamber	also	emphasised	that	it	attached	great	importance	to	the	 recommendations	 of	 involved	 trading	 firms	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘Manche	derselben	 bis	 vor	 Kurzem	 die	 Erwerbung	 deutschen	 Kolonialbesitzes	 für	überflüssig	 und	 bedenklich	 gehalten	 haben,	 und	 erst	 durch	 die	 erwähnten																																																									145	Ibid.,	p.	5	146	Ibid.,	p.	8	
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neuerlichen	Vorgänge	und	Rückwirkungen	[…]	zu	anderer	Ansicht	gelangt	sind.’147	These	recent	processes	referred,	for	example,	to	the	expansion	of	France’s	sphere	of	 influence	 and	 the	 new	Portuguese	 differential	 duty.148	It	was	 also	 emphasised	that	there	were	no	private	interests	connected	to	the	foundation	of	colonies,	since	the	 proposed	 areas	 would	 not	 lead	 to	 direct	 advantages	 for	 Hamburg’s	 trading	firms.	Instead,	German	interests	in	general	were	said	to	be	at	stake	in	this	matter.		In	 view	of	 the	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	promotion	of	German	 colonialism,	one	 has	 to	 wonder	 how	 this	 fitted	 in	 with	 its	 previous	 dedication	 to	 economic	liberalism.	 During	 Bismarck’s	 turn	 to	 protectionism	 in	 the	 late	 1870s,	 Hamburg	had	sent	warnings	that	‘Deutschland	wird	seinem	Berufe	als	Culturstaat	abwendig	und	Hamburg	büsst	seine	Mission	als	Stätte	des	Welthandels	ein	[…].’149	Now,	the	new	German	colony	would	be	 financed	by	 introducing	 import	 tariffs.	 In	Lagos,	 it	was	pointed	out,	these	tariffs	yielded	significant	surpluses	for	the	British	colonial	administration.	Certainly,	 it	must	be	emphasised	that	Hamburg’s	merchants	were	not	 against	 financial	 duties,	 not	 even	 in	 the	 1870s.	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Chamber	 of	 Commerce	was	 now	actively	 promoting	 the	 introduction	 of	 customs	duties	 indicates	 a	 remarkable	 change	 in	 fundamental	 values	 amongst	Hamburg’s	merchants.		This	point	was	proven	during	the	meeting	that	took	place	in	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	 in	 order	 to	 discuss	 Woermann’s	 initial	 memorandum.150	During	 the	debate	on	adopting	Woermann’s	call	for	a	colonial	venture	of	the	German	Empire,	two	 of	 the	 attendees,	 Witt	 and	 Gütschow,	 rejected	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 Chamber’s	affiliation	 to	 Woermann.	 One	 of	 them,	 Witt,	 later	 gave	 in	 to	 Woermann,	 Hertz,	Mestern,	Ahlers	and	Robinow,	who	‘entschieden	für	die	Festsetzung	Deutschlands	
																																																								147	Ibid.,	p.	9	148	Indeed,	in	the	early	1880s,	French	expansionism	in	West	Africa,	for	example,	under	Pierre	de	Brazza,	was	not	only	feared	by	Woermann	but	also	by	British	colonialists.	The	main	reason	for	this	was	that	the	French,	just	like	the	Portuguese,	introduced	discriminatory	tariffs	in	their	colonial	territories.	Woermann	argued	that	the	French	acted	eagerly	and	ruthlessly	in	the	interest	of	their	own	trade	in	West	Africa.	With	respect	to	the	Portuguese,	Woermann’s	memorandum	also	pointed	to	the	fact	that	‘unter	portugiesischer	Verwaltung	jeder	Handel,	der	fremde	wie	der	eigene,	verkümmert.’	AdHH	84.A.1.3,	An	die	Deputation	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt,	Hamburg,	den	6.	Juli	1883.	Die	Handelskammer,	p.	7;	see	also	Wehler,	Bismarck,	pp.	300–302	149	AdHH,	20.B.1.3.1,	Petition	der	unterzeichneten	Hamburgischen	Kaufleute	150	AdHH	84.A.1.3,	Montag,	den	18.	Juni	1883,	Nachmittags	2	½	Uhr.	Anwesend	die	Herren	Refardt,	Woermann,	Hertz,	Robinow,	Witt,	Ahlers,	Mestern,	Dr.	Jürgens,	Dr.	Gütschow	
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auf	 dem	 Lande	 eintraten.’151	This	 group	 brought	 forward	 the	 argument	 that	 the	matter	had	to	be	viewed	from	a	practical	and	not	a	theoretical	perspective.	Due	to	the	fact	that	all	 interested	parties	were	in	favour	of	German	involvement	in	West	Africa,	 the	 practical	 solution	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 Woermann’s	 project.	 In	 this	context,	 the	 importance	 of	 pointing	 to	 the	 need	 of	 establishing	 a	 trading	 colony	was	indicated.	The	Chamber’s	attitude	towards	Woermann’s	project	was	 justified	with	 the	 circumstance	 that	 ‘zu	 diesen	 [Handelskolonien]	 habe	 die	 Kammer	überhaupt	 noch	 keine	 Stellung	 eingenommen	 […].’ 152 	Indeed,	 in	 the	 matter	regarding	 Samoa,	 of	 which	 the	 Chamber	 had	 disapproved,	 ‘ganz	 besondere	Verhältnisse’	were	purported	to	have	been	prevailing.		Noticeably,	 those	 attendees	 disagreeing	with	Woermann’s	 project	 did	 not	put	 forward	 ideological	concerns.	 Instead,	 three	main	reasons	were	cited.	Firstly,	the	fact	that	the	climatic	conditions	in	the	relevant	districts	was	unhealthy.	While	those	 people	 currently	 living	 in	 the	 area	 did	 so	 of	 their	 own	 free	 will,	 it	 was	 a	different	matter	when	people,	such	as	government	officials,	would	have	to	be	sent	to	the	area.	Secondly,	opponents	of	the	project	pointed	to	the	high	costs	associated	with	acquiring	overseas	territory.	In	addition	to	administration	costs,	there	would	also	be	costs	for	the	enhancement	of	Germany’s	naval	forces	in	order	to	be	able	to	defend	 the	 new	 territories.	 Thirdly,	 the	 disapproving	 members	 of	 the	 meeting	warned	 about	 the	 long-term	 effect	 that	 this	 colonial	 venture	 could	 have	 for	 the	German	Empire.	It	was	highlighted	that	up	to	that	point	it	had	been	Germany’s	role	to	 defend	 and	 strengthen	 its	 position	 on	 the	 European	 continent.	 If	 the	 Empire	now	 wanted	 to	 acquire	 overseas	 territories,	 its	 naval	 forces	 would	 need	 a	completely	 different	 type	 of	 training	 and	 so	 on.	 Last	 but	 not	 least:	 ‘Für	 die	Verwickelungen,	 zu	 denen	 eine	 solche	 Politik	 führen	 könne,	 böte	 gerade	 die	neueste	 Zeit	 (Afghanistan,	 Zulu,	 Boers,	 Tums,	 Tonking)	 zahlreiche	 Beispiele.’153	Still,	 the	majority	of	attendees	overruled	 these	objections.	One	counterargument,	for	example,	underlined	the	fact	that	it	was	preferable	to	send	German	government	officials	 overseas.	 Like	 this,	 ‘ein	 neuer	 Geist	 [würde]	 in	 die	 jetzige	 Verwaltung	gebracht	 werden.’	 The	 government	 would	 be	 induced	 to	 look	 at	 the	 trading	
																																																								151	Ibid.		152	Ibid.		153	Ibid.	
	 239	
business	 in	 a	 different	 light,	 ‘als	 es	 jetzt	 leider	 der	 Fall	 sei	 […].’154	There	 was	obviously	a	feeling	amongst	some	attendees	that	Hamburg’s	trade	with	Africa	did	not	receive	enough	support	from	Berlin.		The	report	was	sent	to	the	senatorial	deputation	in	July	1883.	In	November	1883,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 then	 got	 in	 contact	 with	 the	 Deputation	 für	
Handel	und	Schiffahrt	 once	 again.155	In	 this	 appeal,	 the	 Chamber	 argued	 that	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 whole	 project	 would	 unquestionably	 take	 some	 time.	However,	 it	urged	the	Senate	to	push	for	sending	a	German	consul	to	the	African	West	Coast.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	the	Chamber	was	increasingly	scared	of	the	expansion	of	the	French	sphere	of	influence	in	the	area.	Thus,	here	an	internal	German	 dynamic	 was	 partly	 driven	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 French,	 a	 recurring	feature	 of	 nineteenth-century	 German	 history,	 but	 one	 easily	 overlooked	 by	 a	narrow	focus	on	Prussian	expansionism.	Prior	to	this,	and	much	to	the	regret	of	the	Chamber,	 the	 deputation	 had	 raised	 concerns	 over	 the	 Chamber’s	 project	 for	 a	colonial	 venture.	 Still,	 the	 imperial	 government	 eventually	 agreed	 to	 the	 idea	 of	establishing	a	consulate	in	West	Africa,	which	would	be	instructed	with	concluding	contracts	 ‘mit	anderen	unabhängigen	Negerstaaten	[…].’156	In	addition	to	this,	the	stationing	of	naval	vessels	 in	 the	area	was	also	envisaged.	As	 it	 turned	out	 later,	these	 were	 the	 first	 steps	 towards	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 German	 colonial	empire.		In	conclusion,	what	is	absolutely	striking	about	the	late	1870s	and	the	early	1880s	 in	Hamburg	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 there	was	 a	 noticeable	 change	 from	 agitation	against	protectionism	and	talk	of	Bismarck’s	violation	of	Hamburg	to	compliance	with	 Bismarck.	 This	 change	 took	 place	 in	 a	 matter	 of	 merely	 five	 years	 or	 so.	Breuilly,	 for	 example,	 has	 pointed	 to	 the	 limits	 of	 Hamburg’s	 liberalism	 with	respect	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 freedom.	 He	 has	 emphasised	 that	 the	 term	 “economic	liberalism”	was	used	more	frequently	following	the	1860s.	The	reasons	for	this	are	‘on	the	one	hand,	a	conflating	of	free-trade	positions	with	more	general	policies	of	economic	 liberalisation;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 distinction	 between	 economic	 and	
																																																								154	Ibid.		155	AdHH	84.A.1.3,	An	die	Deputation	für	Handel	und	Schiffahrt.	Die	Handelskammer,	Hamburg	den	5.	November	1883	156	AdHH	84.A.1.3,	Königlich	Preußische	Gesandtschaft	in	Mecklenburg	und	den	Hansestädten.	Hamburg,	den	26.	Decbr.	1883	
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political	 liberalism.’157	Furthermore,	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 Hamburg’s	 merchants,	 free	trade	was	an	 ‘obvious	necessity	 to	preserve	 the	autonomy	and	civilised	 forms	of	life	 they	 had	 managed	 to	 construct	 and	 defend	 in	 their	 city-state.’158	Hence,	 in	Hamburg,	only	one	particularly	ingredient	of	liberalism	was	prevalent,	namely	the	one	which	best	suited	the	economic	interests	of	the	city.	While	Breuilly	argues	that	the	end	of	this	economic	liberalism	in	Germany	faltered	with	the	beginning	of	the	
Gründerkrise,	 this	 is	 not	 true	 for	Hamburg.	 Instead,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 city-state	was	able	 to	 maintain	 some	 of	 its	 autonomy	 as	 a	 free	 port	 city,	 economic	 liberalism	remained	 crucial	 to	 the	 city.	 Once	 Bismarck	 set	 out	 determinedly	 to	 abolish	Hamburg’s	 special	 status	 in	 1880,	 the	 adherence	 to	 economic	 liberalism	 also	became	 void.	 Outside	 the	 restrictions	 of	 an	 economic	 liberal	 mindset,	 colonial	ventures	 then	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 profitable	 alternatives.	 Therefore,	 in	 Hamburg,	there	was	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 coming	 to	 terms	with	Bismarck’s	 protectionism	and	the	promotion	of	colonialism.			Hence,	 it	was	the	establishment	of	colonial	empires	in	Africa	in	the	1880s,	not	least	by	the	French,	that	signalled	to	the	merchants	of	Hamburg	that	free	trade	would	not	prevail.	A	whole	continent	was	effectively	lost	to	the	ideal	of	free	trade.	Under	these	circumstances,	Hamburg	did	not	regard	 itself	capable	of	securing	 its	trading	links	with	Africa.	At	this	point,	Hamburg	needed	support	from	the	German	nation-states.	 There	 is	 some	 irony	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 French,	which	 had	 ended	Hamburg’s	 independence	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 now	drove	Hamburg	into	the	arms	of	Bismarck.			
																																																								157	Breuilly,	‘Ein	Stück	Englands?’,	p.	122	158	Ibid.,	p.	122	
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V.	Conclusion			This	 study	 has	 investigated	 the	 economic	 and	 cultural	 integration	 of	 Emden,	Bremen	and	Hamburg	into	the	German	Empire.	All	 these	three	seaports	shared	a	history	 of	 trade	 and	 shipping	 dating	 back	 several	 centuries.	 While	 Bremen	 and	Hamburg	 had	maintained	 their	 position	 as	major	 seaports	 for	 centuries,	 Emden	had	seen	a	period	of	stagnation	after	 its	golden	age	during	the	sixteenth	century.	Furthermore,	the	Hanseatic	Cities	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen	were	at	first	not	even	part	of	 the	Empire’s	customs	union.	At	 the	same	time,	 this	 thesis	has	shown	that	there	were	also	significant	differences	in	the	integration	of	Hamburg	and	Bremen	into	the	German	Empire.	Although	both	were	traditional	overseas	ports	and,	hence,	exposed	 to	 similar	degrees	of	 cosmopolitan	 thought,	 their	 cultural	 and	economic	integration	proceeded	in	different	ways.			 According	to	Article	34	of	the	Imperial	Constitution,	 it	was	in	the	hands	of	Bremen	 and	 Hamburg	 to	 decide	 when	 to	 join	 the	 Empire’s	 customs	 union.	However,	 it	 was	 the	 Imperial	 government	 that	 actually	 made	 a	 move	 towards	integration	by	approaching	the	two	cities	in	1879.	Both	Hanseatic	cities	were	thus	confronted	with	this	issue	at	the	same	time.	Bismarck’s	approach	was	explained	by	wanting	 to	 make	 the	 two	 cities	 act	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 national	 economy.	However,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 study,	 particularistic	 tendencies	 were	 still	prevalent	 in	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 during	 the	 1880s.	 The	 Reich	 Chancellor	certainly	realised	 that	patriotic	allegiance	 to	Germany	co-existed,	at	 times	a	 little	uneasily,	 with	 a	 strong	 local	 patriotism	 in	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen.1	Identification	with	their	respective	cities	and	the	tradition	of	being	independent	city-states	was	still	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 both	 Hanseatic	 cities,	 as	 can	 be	 gathered	 from	 the	discussions	 around	 erecting	 monuments	 commemorating	 the	 Franco-Prussian	War.	It	is	unsurprising	therefore	that	reactions	to	this	enquiry	were	similar	in	the	two	cities.	Bremen	and	Hamburg	were	 in	agreement	about	 the	need	 to	maintain	their	free	port	status,	which	left	the	cities	outside	the	Empire’s	protectionist	tariffs.	However,	 in	Hamburg,	disagreement	with	the	Zollanschluss	on	the	grounds	of	the																																																									1	Pflanze,	Bismarck:	Der	Reichskanzler,	p.	254	
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liberal	 ideology	 of	 its	 ruling	 elite	 was	 overcome	 earlier	 than	 in	 Bremen.	 In	 this	regard,	 the	 substitution	 of	 Gustav	 Kirchenpauer	 with	 Johannes	 Versmann	 was	definitely	 crucial.	 Versmann	was	willing	 to	 give	 in	 to	 Bismarck’s	will,	 which	 the	Reich	Chancellor	was	prepared	to	enforce	by	almost	any	means.			 Hamburg’s	 decision	 to	 give	 in	 to	 the	 Prussian	 supremacy	 in	 the	 German	Empire	was	not	simply	a	renunciation	of	its	free	port	status	according	to	Article	34.	The	 decision	 also	 had	 wider	 implications.	 Once	 the	 hurdle	 of	 joining	 the	protectionist	customs	union	was	cleared,	liberal	mindsets	became	subordinated	to	private	interests,	such	as	on	the	Western	coast	of	Africa.	It	seems	that	the	decision	to	 become	 part	 of	 the	 customs	 union	 eroded	 traditional	 liberal	 opposition	 to	colonialism.	While	Hamburg	was	still	a	notable	outpost	of	resistance	at	the	time	of	the	Samoa-Vorlage	(much	as	Bremen	was),	aversion	to	state-led	colonial	ventures	began	 to	 decrease	 with	 the	 agreement	 to	 join	 the	 customs	 union.	 Hence,	 in	Hamburg,	the	Reich	Chancellor	was	indeed	able	to	integrate	the	city	economically	and	 also	 culturally	 in	 the	 early	 1880s.	 As	 soon	 as	 the	 accession	 was	 certain,	Hamburg’s	 traditional	 belief	 in	 economic	 liberalism	 effectively	 became	compromised	by	private	interests.			 Bremen,	on	the	other	hand,	took	a	different	path	to	 its	eventual	accession,	which	is	why	it	has	been	important	to	look	at	the	two	Hanseatic	cities	separately	in	this	 thesis.	 While	 political	 realism	 quickly	 took	 the	 upper	 hand	 in	 Hamburg,	Bremen’s	 liberal	 mercantile	 community	 struggled	 to	 go	 along	 with	 the	 Reich	Chancellor.	 Even	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Gründerkrise	 in	 Bremen	 was	 not	 enough	 to	destroy	 completely	 the	 city’s	 traditional	 liberal	 mindset.	 In	 particular,	 Theodor	Barth,	 who	 openly	 defended	 the	 free	 trade	 principle,	 played	 a	 central	 role	 in	agitating	 against	 Bismarck.	 By	 the	 time	 Bremen	 was	 finally	 prepared	 to	 open	negotiations	 with	 the	 Empire,	 it	 had	 manoeuvred	 itself	 into	 a	 distinct	 political	corner.	 Hamburg	 had	 made	 the	 first	 step	 towards	 Bismarck,	 which	 made	 it	necessary	for	Bremen	also	to	try	and	come	to	terms	with	the	Reich	Chancellor	so	that	 Hamburg	 would	 not	 gain	 a	 permanent	 advantage	 over	 Bremen.	 Upon	concluding	 negotiations	 with	 Hamburg,	 Bismarck	 tellingly	 lost	 interested	 in	dealing	 with	 Bremen’s	 accession	 –	 Bismarck	 was	 no	 doubt	 conscious	 of	 having	already	gained	the	upper	hand.	Eventually,	Bismarck’s	dislike	of	Barth’s	opposition	even	made	Barth	 lose	 his	 job	 in	 Bremen’s	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce.	 In	 spite	 of	 all	this,	 the	 belief	 in	 liberalism	 still	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 ingrained	 in	 the	 minds	 of	
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Bremen’s	 ruling	 elite.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting,	 for	 instance,	 that	 Bremen’s	 mercantile	community	 refrained	 from	 demanding	 the	 acquisition	 of	 colonies,	 unlike	Hamburg’s	Chamber	of	Commerce.	 In	Bremen’s	Chamber	of	Commerce	there	had	thus	not	occurred	a	complete	Hamburg-style	 ideological	volte-face.	Yet	 it	became	obvious	very	quickly	during	 the	 course	of	negotiations	with	 the	German	Empire,	that	 Bremen	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 resist	 assimilation	 into	 the	 newly	 founded	nation-state,	 as	 the	 case	 of	 Barth’s	 curtailed	 career	 demonstrates.	 The	 accession	ultimately	 proved	 to	 be	 more	 important	 than	 holding	 on	 to	 liberal	 convictions.	Significantly,	 a	 mere	 decade	 after	 Bremen’s	 economic	 integration	 was	 put	 into	effect,	 it	 was	 decided	 in	 Bremen	 to	 erect	 a	 monument	 to	 (the	 recently	 retired)	Bismarck.	In	retrospect,	it	seems,	earlier	unease	about	the	former	Reich	Chancellor	was	 eclipsed	 by	 Bismarck’s	 great	 feat	 of	 uniting	 the	 fatherland.	 Economically,	Bremen’s	 accession	 remained	 something	 of	 a	 side	 issue,	 since	 Bremen’s	 trade	statistics	 hardly	 changed	 after	 the	 accession.	 But	 by	 making	 Bremen	 join	 the	customs	union,	Bismarck	was	able	to	end	–	or	at	least	neutralise	–	the	city’s	liberal	opposition	to	his	economic	policies.		 Overall,	examining	Hamburg	and	Bremen’s	accession	has	demonstrated	that	the	 integration	 of	 the	 Hanseatic	 cities	was	 regarded	 as	 highly	 significant	 by	 the	Reich	Chancellor.	 Especially	 after	 the	 turn	 to	 protectionism,	 the	 accession	 of	 the	two	old	 strongholds	of	 liberal	 thought,	was	 vital	 for	 the	nation-building	process.	Due	 to	 their	opposition	 to	 the	Reich	Chancellor’s	protectionist	 economic	policies	and	 their	 special	 status	 outside	 the	 Empire’s	 customs	 union,	 the	 two	 Hanseatic	cities	had	stood	 in	 the	way	of	 completing	 the	establishment	of	a	German	nation-state.	 In	 this	 respect,	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 played	 a	 role	 not	 dissimilar	 to,	 for	example,	the	Guelphs	in	(annexed)	Hanover	or	the	Catholic	Reichsfeinde	–	the	so-called	 “enemies	 of	 the	 Reich”.	 That	 angle	 of	 the	 integration	 of	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen	 has	 often	 been	 overlooked,	 even	 though	 it	 was	 obviously	 crucial	 for	Bismarck	at	the	time.			 The	 economic	 and	 cultural	 integration	 of	 Emden	 into	 the	German	Empire	was	an	entirely	different	matter.	After	the	Austro-Prussian	War,	Emden	reverted	to	Prussia,	a	fact	which	was	not	merely	welcomed	by	the	majority	in	Emden	but	met	with	 enthusiasm.	 In	 Emden,	 Prussian	 rule	 was	 equated	 with	 the	 prospect	 of	economic	success.	At	the	same	time,	there	was	no	cosmopolitan	mindset	in	place	in	Emden	to	counterbalance	this,	due	to	the	town’s	lack	of	overseas	trade.	This	meant	
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that,	 rather	 than	 supporting	 free	 trade,	 Emden	 was	 reliant	 upon,	 and	 eagerly	sought,	 state	 support.	 This	 is	 why	 Emden	 continued	 to	 fixate	 on	 the	 familiar	Kingdom	 of	 Prussia	 and	 not	 the	 new-fangled	 German	 Empire	 throughout	 the	period.	 One	 reason	 for	 this	 was	 certainly	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 Emden	 lacked	 an	extensive	hinterland	that	went	beyond	the	Ruhr	area.			Emden’s	 hopes	 for	 an	 economic	 upturn	 under	 Prussian	 rule	 were	 soon	dashed,	 however.	 The	 example	 of	 the	 Dortmund-Ems-Kanal	 demonstrates	 that	there	 was	 in	 fact	 no	 strategy	 by	 the	 Prussian	 Kingdom	 to	 support	 Emden’s	economy.	 The	 economic	 upsurge	 that	 had	 been	 expected	 after	 the	 Prussian	annexation	of	 the	Hanoverian	Kingdom	proved	elusive.	Any	progress	made,	 such	as	 connecting	Emden	 to	 the	 industrial	Ruhr	area,	was	 largely	 thanks	 to	pressure	groups	 and	 lobbying.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 Bismarck’s	 problems	 with	 Hamburg	 and	Bremen	in	the	early	1880s,	in	particular,	the	fact	that	there	was	no	plan	to	develop	Emden	as	an	overseas	port	is	surprising.	After	all,	Prussia	had	already	managed	to	build	a	naval	base	in	Wilhelmshaven	from	scratch.	In	any	case,	once	Emden’s	port	had	been	extended	around	the	turn	of	the	century,	Emden’s	mercantile	community	failed	 to	 make	 use	 of	 the	 new	 opportunities.	 While	 Emden	 became	 a	 German	alternative	 for	 overseas	 exports	 from	 the	 Ruhr	 area,	 centuries	 of	 economic	stagnation	 had	 left	 a	mark	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 connect	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 It	remained	difficult	 for	 the	city	 to	establish	new	 international	 shipping	services	 to	and	 from	 Emden.	 Competition	 from	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen	 also	 played	 an	important	 role	 in	 this.	 The	 Hanseatic	 cities	 were	 able	 to	 thwart	 to	 a	 significant	degree	 Emden’s	 commercial	 ambitions,	 particularly	 in	 the	 case	 of	 routing	emigration	 through	 Emden.	 	 Overall,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Emden’s	 port	 traffic	increased	steeply	from	the	late	1890s	until	the	First	World	War,	the	city	struggled	to	become	a	 real	 competitor	 to	Hamburg	 and	Bremen.	The	 concentration	on	 the	Prussian	 Kingdom	might	 have	 had	 a	 part	 in	 this.	 Unlike	 Hamburg	 and	 Bremen,	Emden	never	 entirely	 embraced	 the	German	nation-state.	Economic	 and	 cultural	integration	were	two	highly	significant,	interdependent	factors	for	the	investigated	port	cities	during	the	period	of	the	German	Empire.	Even	at	 the	 time	of	 the	 foundation	of	 the	Kaiserreich,	German	history	was	still	the	history	of	different	cities	and	regions.	Although	the	result	may	have	been	the	 same	 everywhere,	 the	 road	 to	 becoming	 a	 German	 nation	 was	 strikingly	different.	In	the	end,	there	were	two	main	factors	that	prevented	the	rise	of	lasting	
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resentment	against	the	Reich	Chancellor	in	the	Hanseatic	Cities.	On	the	one	hand,	Bismarck’s	 iron	will	 to	 integrate	Hamburg	 and	Bremen	 and	 the	preparedness	 to	grant	concessions	for	those	who	cooperated.	On	the	other	hand,	the	erosion	of	free	trade	 principles	 by	 the	 old	 European	 colonial	 powers,	 which	 ruthlessly	 pressed	ahead	with	the	acquisition	of	colonial	territories.	Under	these	circumstances,	even	Germany’s	strongholds	of	free	trade	longed	for	the	protection	of	the	new	Imperial	flag.		 																											
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